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The Age of Economic Warfare

CFR | 2026-06-08 | economy

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English Summary

The CFR article argues that we are entering an ‘age of economic warfare,’ characterized by a dramatic increase in sanctions and economic restrictions globally, driven by a mismatch between the current global economy and the geopolitical realities of heightened competition. Evidence points to a tripling of trade restrictions between 2019 and 2024, reflecting a scramble for economic security among major powers. This fragmentation is fueled by vulnerabilities in global supply chains and financial systems built during the 1990s. Policy implications suggest a need to consider one of three potential futures: preserving some level of global integration through agreed-upon rules, forming competing economic blocs, or pursuing a transactional approach – each with significant risks and opportunities for the United States and its allies.

中文摘要

《戰略與國際關係》(CFR) 雜誌的文章認為,我們正步入‘經濟戰爭’時代,其特徵是對全球制裁和經濟限制的顯著增加,這源於當前全球經濟與地緣政治現實——加劇競爭之間的脫節。證據表明,從 2019 年到 2024 年,貿易限制已 tripled,反映了主要大國在經濟安全方面的競爭。這種碎片化受到 20 世紀 90 年代建立的全球供應鏈和金融體系中的脆弱性所推動。政策建議表明,需要考慮三個潛在的未來之一:通過就範例達成共識來保持一定程度的全球整合,形成競爭經濟勢力範圍,或採用交易型方法——每個方法對美國及其盟友都存在顯著的風險和機遇。

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