ThinkTankWeekly

China

547 reviewed reports in the portal

This topic hub groups ThinkTankWeekly entries tagged China and links readers back to the original publishers.

Think tanks: CFR, Foreign Affairs, Chatham House, CSIS, Brookings, USNI, RAND, CATO, IISS, Mitchell, Heritage, INSS

  1. 1.

    The article outlines how a successful modern foreign policy career requires blending traditional diplomatic expertise with private sector acumen. Juster's career trajectory—from international law to high-stakes diplomacy (e.g., the Gulf War) and subsequently to the technology sector—demonstrates this synthesis. Key evidence includes his work managing complex negotiations under duress and his involvement in co-founding the U.S.-India High Technology Group. The implication for policy is that effective geopolitical strategy must actively integrate private sector knowledge and technological considerations to manage modern economic and security challenges.

    Read at CFR

  2. 2.
    2026-05-18 | china_indopacific | 2026-W20 | Topics: AI, China, Climate, Europe, Indo-Pacific, Middle East, Nuclear, Russia, Taiwan, Trade, Ukraine, United States

    The analysis concludes that China will hold the upper hand at the upcoming Trump-Xi summit, leveraging its dominance over critical minerals, rare earths, and magnet supply chains. This geopolitical leverage, combined with global instability (such as the Iran conflict), allows Beijing to dictate terms and buy time to consolidate its technological and industrial self-sufficiency. Strategically, the U.S. must avoid granting China a managed equilibrium by maintaining 'maximum pressure' on key sectors like AI and tech, rather than seeking broad agreements that could undermine American leadership.

    Read at CFR

  3. 3.
    2026-05-18 | china_indopacific | 2026-W20 | Topics: China, Indo-Pacific, Middle East, NATO, Nuclear, Russia, Taiwan, Trade, Ukraine

    The analysis cautions that the upcoming Trump-Xi summit must not result in short-term strategic concessions for the US, which risks undermining long-term stability. China is rapidly consolidating global power, leveraging US policy shifts and increasing its assertiveness across the Indo-Pacific and in technology. Strategically, the US must prioritize addressing the immediate crisis in Iran, where China holds significant leverage, and must also focus on joint cooperation on AI. Ultimately, the US must resist political impulses and pursue a robust strategy to counter China's growing challenge to global dominance.

    Read at Chatham House

  4. 4.
    2026-05-18 | economy | 2026-W20 | Topics: China, Indo-Pacific, Trade, Economy

    While China maintains critical dominance over the global rare earth processing supply chain, the US possesses a substantial, untapped domestic resource: electronic waste (e-waste). Estimates suggest that annual US e-waste contains enough rare earth magnets to meet a significant portion of projected domestic demand, far exceeding current domestic mining capacity. However, this potential is hampered by a lack of uniform federal recycling laws and specialized collection infrastructure, leading to valuable materials leaking out of the economy. To achieve mineral security, the US must shift its strategy from solely developing new mines to establishing a robust circular economy model. This requires federal policy intervention, investment in advanced separation technologies, and incentivizing product design for easy disassembly.

    Read at Chatham House

  5. 5.
    2026-05-18 | china_indopacific | 2026-W20 | Topics: China, Trade, Indo-Pacific

    The CFR analysis posits that the Trump-Xi summit is a critical juncture with the potential to fundamentally reshape global trade and technology competition. Key discussions center on nuanced economic strategies, such as China's financial maneuvering (e.g., dollar hoarding) and the necessity for allied manufacturing to counter China's technological dominance in areas like AI and robotics. Policymakers must therefore prepare for significant shifts in the bilateral relationship, emphasizing the need to strengthen allied supply chains and technological resilience to mitigate geopolitical risks.

    Read at CFR

  6. 6.

    The U.S.-China trade relationship remains defined by intense competition, characterized by persistent tariffs and tech export controls, despite temporary truces. While the conflict is driven by concerns over trade imbalances and China's adherence to global rules, the two economies remain deeply interdependent, making complete decoupling highly unlikely. Policy efforts are shifting away from achieving a definitive 'win' and toward managing this complex interdependence. Strategically, the U.S. must navigate the tension between protecting critical domestic industries and maintaining necessary global supply chains, suggesting a need for formalized mechanisms to manage future trade agreements.

    Read at CFR

  7. 7.

    China is consolidating its domestic energy control by restricting fuel exports to prioritize national needs, while simultaneously capitalizing on global energy instability to solidify its position as a dominant clean energy supplier. Key evidence includes record-high solar exports, driven by global supply chain shifts, and the implementation of detailed, binding national climate governance measures. These actions signal a dual strategy: enhancing energy self-sufficiency and using its manufacturing dominance to influence global energy transitions. Policymakers must anticipate that China will continue to tightly manage its energy market and leverage its climate leadership to deepen geopolitical influence.

    Read at CFR

  8. 8.

    The US faces an inherent policy tension regarding Chinese clean energy investment: balancing the necessity of Chinese technology to accelerate domestic energy deployment against critical national security risks, such as supply chain over-dependence and data vulnerability. While China provides essential low-cost inputs for reindustrialization, current policies are often a chaotic patchwork of tariffs and screening rules that lack technological specificity. Policymakers must clarify their long-term national objectives—whether pursuing full domestic self-sufficiency or managed partnership—and adopt nuanced, technology-specific strategies rather than a one-size-fits-all approach to mitigate risks effectively.

    Read at Brookings

  9. 9.
    2026-05-18 | china_indopacific | 2026-W20 | Topics: China, Indo-Pacific, Middle East, Nuclear, Taiwan, United States

    The article argues that China views the Iran conflict as a critical case study demonstrating that military victory is unnecessary for strategic success. Iran's ability to impose costs by choking the Strait of Hormuz and spiking energy markets proved that economic disruption can be a more potent form of warfare than conventional combat. Beijing plans to apply this 'coercion over conquest' model to the Indo-Pacific, suggesting that layered campaigns of maritime quarantine, cyber disruption, and financial pressure are optimal. This strategy aims not for immediate conquest, but for cumulative pressure designed to constrain U.S. decision-making and exhaust its resources across multiple theaters.

    Read at CFR

  10. 10.
    2026-05-18 | china_indopacific | 2026-W20 | Topics: China, Middle East, Taiwan, Trade, United States, Indo-Pacific

    The article argues that the upcoming Beijing summit will be characterized by an asymmetry: President Trump's short-term political need for visible deals versus Xi Jinping's long-term strategic goal of maintaining stability and resisting compromise. Consequently, the summit is unlikely to resolve deep structural issues like China's overcapacity or the trade imbalance, instead producing only carefully choreographed, limited agreements and a temporary stabilization of the atmosphere. Policymakers should view the apparent symmetry of the meeting as a warning, indicating that underlying geopolitical and macroeconomic tensions remain unresolved, despite the superficial appearance of progress.

    Read at CFR

  11. 11.
    2026-05-18 | china_indopacific | 2026-W20 | Topics: AI, China, Middle East, Nuclear, Taiwan, Trade, United States, Indo-Pacific

    The Trump-Xi summit achieved a delicate détente, establishing a baseline of 'decent peace' that prioritizes stability and commercial cooperation over major geopolitical breakthroughs. Key evidence includes agreements on energy, trade (e.g., Boeing aircraft, Nvidia chips), and regional issues like the Strait of Hormuz, while China repeatedly emphasized Taiwan as the most critical issue for future stability. Strategically, the relationship is now defined by managed competition, with the pending $14 billion arms package to Taiwan serving as the most consequential test of this new, fragile truce. The outcome of this arms deal, and whether it is used as a bargaining chip, will determine the limits of the current détente.

    Read at CFR

  12. 12.
    2026-05-18 | energy | 2026-W20 | Topics: China, Climate, Indo-Pacific, Middle East, Trade, United States, Energy

    Despite convening amid a severe energy crisis triggered by the Iran war, ASEAN failed once again to produce any binding, coordinated regional energy strategy. The failure is attributed to the bloc's inherent consensus-based structure, which allows individual member states to veto collective action due to competing national interests (e.g., prioritizing national reserves or aligning with bilateral powers). This paralysis not only stalled critical energy planning but also prevented progress on other major issues, such as the South China Sea Code of Conduct and the Myanmar crisis. The inability to act decisively undermines ASEAN's credibility and suggests that the organization remains structurally incapable of managing genuine, large-scale regional emergencies.

    Read at CFR

  13. 13.
    2026-05-18 | china_indopacific | 2026-W20 | Topics: AI, China, Cybersecurity, Nuclear, Russia, Trade, United States, Indo-Pacific

    The CFR argues that any US-China dialogue on AI safety must be narrowly scoped and coupled with a 'maximum pressure' campaign. Because China views AI cooperation primarily as a means to close its technological gap, the US cannot rely on Beijing's good faith and must maintain a significant technological lead. The recommended strategy is to tighten export controls to widen the US-China AI capability gap, thereby eliminating China's leverage and forcing Beijing to prioritize global AI safety. This approach preserves US leadership while creating the necessary structural conditions for long-term, enforceable safety agreements.

    Read at CFR

  14. 14.
    2026-05-18 | health | 2026-W20 | Topics: China, Climate, Europe, Middle East, United States, Health

    The rescission of the 2009 endangerment finding removes the legal basis for federal climate regulation, despite the established scientific consensus that greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions pose a severe threat to public health. The article argues that this policy decision risks increasing emissions, compounding long-term public health crises from extreme heat, air pollution, and disease. Strategically, this signals an abdication of global responsibility, potentially eroding international climate consensus and allowing competitors, particularly China, to widen their lead in green technology and geopolitical influence.

    Read at CSIS

  15. 15.
    2026-05-18 | diplomacy | 2026-W20 | Topics: China, Indo-Pacific, Nuclear, Russia, Diplomacy

    Despite rising global tensions and skepticism regarding formal arms control, the paper argues that avoiding a new nuclear arms race remains achievable. It analyzes the stability of four key nuclear relationships—including the US-Russia, US-China, and the N5 group—to assess the current risk landscape. The research provides concrete recommendations for states to manage these complex dynamics and prevent costly escalation. Ultimately, the findings emphasize that proactive diplomatic engagement is crucial to maintaining strategic stability, especially in the context of the NPT Review Conference.

    Read at Chatham House

  16. 16.

    India's foreign policy is defined by 'multialignment,' a self-interested strategy of maintaining strong, non-ideological ties with multiple global powers rather than adhering to any single bloc. This strategy is evidenced by India's simultaneous deepening of partnerships with the US (e.g., defense cooperation) while maintaining independent, critical relationships with Russia and France. Consequently, India is a major proponent of a multipolar global order, advocating for greater representation in international institutions. For external powers, the implication is that attempts to force alignment will fail; instead, a nuanced approach that works with India to maximize mutual gains is necessary for effective policy engagement.

    Read at CFR

  17. 17.
    2026-05-18 | china_indopacific | 2026-W20 | Topics: AI, China, Trade, United States, Indo-Pacific

    The Brookings analysis argues that the US and China can cooperate on mitigating shared AI risks—specifically those posed by nonstate actors—without compromising their intense technological competition. This cooperation should focus on practical measures, including establishing nonbinding safety guidelines, sharing limited threat intelligence, and creating an emergency communication hotline. Strategically, the US must leverage this dialogue to assert its leadership in global AI governance, preventing China from defining the standards. Failure to coordinate risks could lead to an AI arms race, while the US must also guard against China attempting to establish a 'floor' on American technology controls.

    Read at Brookings

  18. 18.
    2026-05-18 | china_indopacific | 2026-W20 | Topics: China, Europe, Indo-Pacific, Middle East, NATO, Nuclear, Russia, Trade, Ukraine, United States

    India is strategically deepening its security cooperation with the United States and Indo-Pacific partners while rigorously maintaining its principle of strategic autonomy. Rather than joining formal, treaty-based alliances, India utilizes flexible, transactional partnerships to build material capacity and legitimacy, even while signaling concern about regional challenges like China's growing influence. This selective engagement allows New Delhi to maximize its geopolitical flexibility and avoid explicit confrontation, but it simultaneously strains relationships with partners who press for clearer alignment. Policymakers must recognize that India's foreign policy is defined by this careful balancing act, requiring sustained, nuanced diplomacy to manage its diversified ties (e.g., between the West and Russia).

    Read at CFR

  19. 19.
    2026-05-18 | economy | 2026-W20 | Topics: China, United States, Economy

    The panel argues that the U.S. dollar's global monetary dominance is facing significant challenges from rising geopolitical competition and the rapid proliferation of digital currencies. Key evidence centers on the increasing adoption of alternative payment systems and the development of central bank digital currencies (CBDCs) by rival nations. These shifts suggest a fragmentation of the global monetary order, necessitating that major economies reassess their financial infrastructure and international trade mechanisms to mitigate potential de-dollarization risks.

    Read at CFR

  20. 20.
    2026-05-18 | china_indopacific | 2026-W20 | Topics: China, Indo-Pacific, Middle East, Trade

    The energy crisis stemming from the Middle East is creating a strategic opening for ASEAN nations, particularly the Philippines, to re-engage with China on joint oil and gas exploration in the South China Sea. This economic necessity provides a critical incentive for Beijing to cooperate on regional stability, allowing the Philippines to leverage its ASEAN chairmanship and growing US alliance to push for a binding South China Sea Code of Conduct (CoC). Policymakers should view this window of dialogue as a unique opportunity to advance international law (UNCLOS) and transform temporary energy cooperation into permanent maritime security agreements, thereby mitigating great power competition risks.

    Read at Chatham House

  21. 21.
    2026-05-18 | china_indopacific | 2026-W20 | Topics: AI, China, Indo-Pacific, Middle East, Taiwan, Trade, United States

    The recent summit between Trump and Xi Jinping established a period of 'uneasy stability' rather than yielding specific, detailed commitments. Key discussions covered stabilizing trade (agriculture, aerospace), establishing protocols for AI governance, and managing tensions surrounding Taiwan. This tacit truce allows China to consolidate its technological autonomy and strengthen its economic security controls. For the United States and its allies, the implication is a narrow window to build industrial resilience and mitigate geopolitical risks in the face of continued strategic competition.

    Read at CFR

  22. 22.

    India is uniquely positioned to anchor a democratic alternative to China’s authoritarian tech model, leveraging its democratic institutions and massive market to shape global technology norms. The analysis highlights that India’s tech governance remains rooted in the rule of law and pluralistic deliberation, contrasting sharply with state-led authoritarian models. However, the article stresses that India cannot lead alone; effective progress requires coordinated efforts from like-minded democratic powers, particularly the United States, to fill the growing normative vacuum. Strategically, democratic nations must urgently coordinate to establish shared frameworks for AI and data governance, or risk ceding future economic and regulatory influence to China.

    Read at CFR

  23. 23.
    2026-05-18 | china_indopacific | 2026-W20 | Topics: China, Indo-Pacific, Middle East, NATO, Trade, United States

    The article argues that the Trump administration's strained relationship with US allies has significantly diminished American negotiating leverage against China. This weakening is evidenced by allied nations (including Canada, the UK, and South Korea) forging independent, lucrative economic and strategic partnerships with Beijing. Consequently, China is capitalizing on the fractured US alliance structure, gaining greater economic connectivity and fewer multilateral constraints. To counter this, the US and its partners must urgently rebuild allied cohesion and develop a unified, collective bargaining strategy on critical issues like semiconductors and minerals, independent of Washington's unilateral actions.

    Read at Chatham House

  24. 24.
    2026-05-18 | china_indopacific | 2026-W20 | Topics: AI, China, Europe, Middle East, Nuclear, Russia, Taiwan, Trade, Ukraine, United States, Indo-Pacific

    The CFR briefing concludes that the Trump-Xi summit established a fragile, symbolic détente rather than achieving substantive structural reform. This temporary stability is largely predicated on the mutual acknowledgment of critical vulnerabilities, particularly China's control over rare earth minerals and global supply chains, which previously forced a trade truce. While the talks reduced immediate escalation risk, the underlying structural threats—including technology dependence, market access issues, and geopolitical flashpoints like Taiwan—remain unaddressed. Policymakers must therefore focus on mitigating these persistent vulnerabilities rather than relying on the diplomatic breakthroughs suggested by the summit.

    Read at CFR

  25. 25.
    2026-05-18 | china_indopacific | 2026-W20 | Topics: China, Climate, Cybersecurity, Indo-Pacific, Nuclear, Trade, Ukraine, United States

    Ambassador Verma argues that the U.S. foreign policy landscape is defined by intense great-power competition, regional conflicts (like the war in Ukraine), and persistent threats of terrorism. He posits that navigating these complex challenges requires a holistic, multi-sectoral approach that bridges traditional government expertise with private-sector economic insight. His own career, spanning military service, diplomacy, and the private sector, serves as evidence for the necessity of this breadth of experience. The key policy implication is the need for adaptive, resilient strategies that maintain global engagement while effectively managing geopolitical risks and economic security.

    Read at CFR

  26. 26.
    2026-05-18 | defense | 2026-W20 | Topics: AI, China, Middle East, Nuclear, Taiwan, Defense

    The upcoming summit between Xi and Trump is unlikely to result in direct discussions or agreements regarding China's growing nuclear arsenal or US missile defense projects. Instead, the analysis suggests that strategic stability can be advanced by focusing on shared threat assessments in emerging domains, such as artificial intelligence and outer space. Progress can be made by establishing dialogue on AI risks in escalation and reaffirming commitments to keep AI out of nuclear launch decisions. This shift allows the superpowers to build confidence and manage strategic tensions without confronting immediate nuclear limits, thereby providing a pathway for dialogue.

    Read at Chatham House

  27. 27.
    2026-05-18 | americas | 2026-W20 | Topics: China, Trade, United States, Americas

    The U.S.-Mexico relationship is facing significant strain due to growing skepticism in Mexico regarding U.S. reliability and political predictability. This distrust is fueled by volatile U.S. policy swings, aggressive trade tactics, and persistent concerns over potential unilateral military actions. While deep economic and security cooperation remains essential (e.g., USMCA review, drug trafficking), Mexico's increasing doubt suggests that future bilateral efforts will require Washington to demonstrate greater stability and transparency. Failure to stabilize the political climate risks undermining established cooperation and complicates regional governance.

    Read at CSIS

  28. 28.
    2026-05-18 | china_indopacific | 2026-W20 | Topics: China, Indo-Pacific, Middle East, Nuclear, Russia, Taiwan, Trade, Ukraine, United States

    The state visit signaled a desire for 'strategic stability' and economic cooperation, evidenced by China's agreement to purchase major U.S. goods. However, the summit highlighted deep geopolitical divergences, particularly regarding Taiwan and the Middle East (Iran). Beijing appears to be using economic engagement to buy time and forestall tariffs, while the U.S. is leveraging the relationship to manage the Iran conflict. Policymakers must anticipate continued strategic competition, as both nations will use upcoming multilateral forums, such as the G20, to manage their conflicting priorities and maintain influence.

    Read at CSIS

  29. 29.
    2026-05-18 | tech | 2026-W20 | Topics: AI, China, Europe, Trade, United States, Technology

    The concept of mandatory AI licensing and pre-release testing is resurfacing as a critical policy concern, driven by the emergence of highly capable, vulnerable models and renewed political interest in regulation. While the U.S. government is considering an executive order modeled after drug approval processes, the author argues that simply adapting existing regulations is insufficient. For effective policy, the U.S. must craft a framework tailored to AI's unique, continuously evolving nature, focusing heavily on rigorous pre-release evaluation methods. Crucially, any licensing regime must be paired with robust post-market oversight and enforcement mechanisms to manage the risks posed by advanced, rapidly advancing AI systems.

    Read at CSIS

  30. 30.
    2026-05-18 | china_indopacific | 2026-W20 | Topics: China, Indo-Pacific, Middle East, Nuclear, Russia, Taiwan, Trade, United States

    The Chatham House analysis argues that the upcoming Trump-Xi summit will focus on managing the US-China rivalry through transactional, short-term agreements rather than resolving deep structural competition. Both leaders are primarily constrained by domestic political pressures—Trump's election cycle and Xi's economic stability—leading them to prioritize immediate economic levers like trade purchases and technology access. While the US agenda is narrow and improvisational, China is leveraging its economic statecraft, particularly rare earth controls, to maintain an asymmetric stalemate. For policy makers, the report advises looking past immediate headlines, emphasizing that sustained data and execution on commitments, such as trade fulfillment, are more critical than the summit's stated outcomes.

    Read at Chatham House

  31. 31.

    The article argues that Taiwan faces a critical and complex energy security challenge, intensified by global conflicts and its deep reliance on imported fossil fuels. This vulnerability is compounded by the exponential energy demands of its semiconductor industry, which underpins its strategic global value, and the geopolitical threat of resource cutoff from China. To mitigate risks, Taiwan is rapidly diversifying energy sources away from the Middle East and increasing storage capacity. Policy must therefore urgently balance massive industrial energy growth, climate transition goals, and geopolitical instability to ensure sustained national resilience.

    Read at CSIS

  32. 32.
    2026-05-18 | defense | 2026-W20 | Topics: China, Nuclear, Russia, United States, Defense

    The article argues that the proposed 'Golden Dome' homeland missile defense project is fiscally unsound and strategically infeasible, citing a projected cost of $1.2 trillion that consumes a massive portion of the defense budget for limited defensive capability. It contends that such systems are unlikely to protect against advanced threats and could dangerously increase the risk of preemptive conflict. Instead of funding this costly infrastructure, policymakers should focus on pragmatic, proven methods to de-escalate tensions and deter the use of nuclear weapons, rather than attempting to 'win' a nuclear war.

    Read at CATO

  33. 33.

    The paper argues that Nordic-Baltic states are increasing engagement with the Indo-Pacific, driven by shared security concerns heightened by the war in Ukraine. The most significant area of convergence is the shared threat of subsea cable disruptions, which both regions view as a critical hybrid security challenge. While the Nordic-Baltic states are inclined toward a NATO-like defense architecture, the paper notes a structural disconnect with the diverse, often national-level, responses in the Indo-Pacific. Consequently, future collaboration is projected to be domain-specific—focusing on technical issues like critical infrastructure protection—rather than encompassing broad regional military or diplomatic alignment.

    Read at IISS

  34. 34.
    2026-05-18 | middle_east | 2026-W20 | Topics: China, Europe, Indo-Pacific, Middle East, Trade, United States

    The conflict involving Iran poses a critical energy security threat due to its potential disruption of the Strait of Hormuz, a vital global choke point for oil and LNG. The primary finding is that even temporary closures or blockades cause massive price volatility, with recovery being a slow, multi-year process due to complex logistics and damaged infrastructure. Economically, this translates to immediate and sustained cost-of-living increases for consumers, impacting household budgets and the price of goods like food. Policymakers must prioritize energy diversification and build resilience against geopolitical shocks to mitigate the severe economic fallout.

    Read at Brookings

  35. 35.
    2026-05-18 | china_indopacific | 2026-W20 | Topics: AI, China, Nuclear, Taiwan, Trade, United States, Indo-Pacific

    The Brookings article argues that Donald Trump's ambiguous comments regarding Taiwan—specifically suggesting that U.S. security support is negotiable leverage with China—dangerously undermine decades of established U.S. deterrence policy. By implying that Taiwan must 'cool down' and questioning the necessity of military intervention, Trump signals to Beijing that America's commitment is conditional. This shift from resolute deterrence to dealmaking will not reduce, but rather intensify, Chinese pressure on Taiwan. Therefore, the U.S. must maintain a consistent, unwavering focus on upholding stability in the Taiwan Strait and resist using Taiwan's security status as a bargaining chip with Beijing.

    Read at Brookings

  36. 36.
    2026-05-18 | defense | 2026-W20 | Topics: China, Europe, Indo-Pacific, Nuclear, Defense

    Malcolm Turnbull argues that the AUKUS security pact constitutes a 'huge wealth transfer' and a poor strategic decision for Australia. He criticizes the deal by citing logistical flaws, specifically noting that US naval yards cannot produce the required submarines at sufficient scale or speed. Furthermore, he points to the UK's shipbuilding industry being in 'complete disarray.' Strategically, Turnbull suggests that Australia would have been better positioned by maintaining its relationship with France to develop common defense platforms for Europe, rather than committing to the current trilateral arrangement.

    Read at Chatham House

  37. 37.

    The article argues that Russia's recent public displays, such as the diminished Victory Day parade, reveal deep structural cracks in its power and stability. Key evidence includes the military hardware's absence, slowing economic growth, and internal security tensions exacerbated by infighting and digital crackdowns. For policy, the analysis suggests that while Russia remains a threat, its declining geopolitical influence, coupled with the strengthening and consolidating hard-power capabilities of Europe and NATO, indicates a long-term erosion of Moscow's global standing.

    Read at CFR

  38. 38.
    2026-05-18 | economy | 2026-W20 | Topics: China, Middle East, Trade, United States, Economy

    The article argues that recent geopolitical tensions, such as the Iran conflict, are revealing significant vulnerabilities in the dollar's global dominance and the efficacy of U.S. sanctions. Evidence shows that trade payments spiked through China's CIPS using RMB, bypassing the dollar-based SWIFT system, particularly following heightened U.S. sanctions threats. While the market demonstrated a temporary return to dollar reliance, the increasing reliability and cost-effectiveness of RMB alternatives suggest that dollar sanctions are encouraging the development of resistant financial mechanisms. Policymakers must recognize that the appeal of these alternatives stems from offering dollar system benefits with reduced exposure to U.S. sanctions, necessitating a strategic reassessment of global financial dependence.

    Read at CFR

  39. 39.
    2026-05-18 | china_indopacific | 2026-W20 | Topics: China, Indo-Pacific, Nuclear, Russia, United States

    The article argues that the U.S.-India partnership should shift its focus from judging each country's domestic democratic performance to jointly championing democratic norms within the global international order. While strategic convergence (especially concerning China) remains the primary driver, the U.S. must recognize that India's engagement is rooted in self-interest and multialignment, not ideology. Policy should therefore guide the U.S. to work with India's efforts to democratize global governance structures, particularly in technology and security architecture. This approach allows the U.S. to leverage India's unique position to build a democratic alternative to authoritarian models without creating bilateral friction.

    Read at CFR

  40. 40.
    2026-05-18 | china_indopacific | 2026-W20 | Topics: China, Cybersecurity, Nuclear, Trade, United States, Indo-Pacific

    The article argues that China has matured into a full peer competitor to the United States in cyberspace, demonstrating capabilities across sophistication, scale, stealth, and strategy. Evidence points to China's deep penetration of U.S. critical infrastructure and its ability to mobilize a whole-of-society approach, including controlling the private sector's vulnerability supply chain. For policy, the US must abandon the concept of 'cyber deterrence' and instead adopt a reinvigorated, multi-domain strategy that strengthens its own cyber defenses, revitalizes its institutions, and develops clear, cross-domain responses to Chinese malicious activity.

    Read at CSIS

  41. 41.
    2026-05-18 | middle_east | 2026-W20 | Topics: China, Middle East, United States

    The analysis argues that while direct diplomatic talks offer a genuine path toward peace between Lebanon and Israel, achieving lasting security requires the re-emergence of a strong, sovereign Lebanese state. Key challenges include Israel's tendency to undermine state institutions through unilateral military actions, and the continued opposition from non-state actors like Hezbollah and Iran. Strategically, the US must pivot its focus from purely military confrontation to comprehensive support for Lebanese security sector reform and state capacity building, as this is identified as the only durable solution to the border conflict.

    Read at CSIS

  42. 42.

    The summit did not result in major breakthroughs but rather a return to managed stability in U.S.-China relations. Key outcomes include the establishment of a 'Board of Trade' and a 'Board of Investment,' which experts view as structural continuations of previous dialogues rather than radical new commitments. The discussions focused on managing existing trade flows and extending ceasefires, allowing China to maintain its economic status quo without making significant concessions. Strategically, this suggests that the U.S. must adjust its policy away from demanding fundamental systemic changes and instead focus on managing these stable, yet limited, bilateral agreements.

    Read at CSIS

  43. 43.
    2026-05-18 | china_indopacific | 2026-W20 | Topics: AI, China, Climate, Europe, Indo-Pacific, Middle East, Russia, Trade, Ukraine, United States

    U.S. allies are increasing diplomatic and economic ties with China, driven by growing frustration and concerns over the perceived unreliability of the United States as a security and trade partner. Key evidence includes high-level visits from European and Indo-Pacific leaders, resulting in agreements focused on diversifying trade, green energy cooperation, and AI technology. Experts caution that while these moves signal a desire to 'de-risk' and reduce reliance on the U.S., the strategy is largely symbolic and lacks coordinated substance. The primary implication is that allies are adopting an 'a la carte' hedging approach, which grants China increased time and space to build geopolitical leverage with the West.

    Read at CFR

  44. 44.

    The U.S.-China rivalry is defined by a state of 'mutually assured disruption,' where technological competition (semiconductor controls vs. rare earth embargoes) creates an unstable equilibrium. While the U.S. maintains a lead in AI frontier model development, China holds an advantage in deployment speed and cost, suggesting rough parity. Policy efforts should focus on immediate, proactive dialogue regarding AI safety and non-proliferation, drawing parallels to Cold War treaties. Crucially, any safety negotiations must be conducted while simultaneously tightening technological loopholes to maintain strategic leverage and prevent being outmaneuvered.

    Read at CFR

  45. 45.
    2026-05-16 | china_indopacific | 2026-W20 | Topics: Indo-Pacific, Middle East, China

    The current naval operational environment highlights significant resource strains and complex geopolitical challenges. While major assets like the USS Gerald R. Ford continue to deploy, the service faces personnel constraints, evidenced by potential hiring freezes due to Middle East conflict costs. Furthermore, regional flashpoints, such as Iran's attempts to control the Strait of Hormuz, underscore persistent maritime security risks. Policy must therefore balance sustained forward presence in the Western Pacific with careful resource management to maintain readiness and mitigate the impact of global conflict costs.

    Read at USNI

  46. 46.
    2026-05-16 | china_indopacific | 2026-W20 | Topics: China, United States, Indo-Pacific

    This analysis summarizes Orville Schell's observations of the Trump-Xi summit, arguing that the interactions between the two leaders are critical indicators of the future stability of U.S.-China relations. Schell's key reasoning focuses not only on what was discussed but also on the sensitive issues that were deliberately avoided or downplayed during the meeting. The overall finding suggests that the summit may represent a potential inflection point, signaling a possible shift in the strategic relationship between the two global powers. Policymakers must monitor these subtle dynamics to anticipate whether the relationship is moving toward de-escalation or renewed strategic tension.

    Read at Foreign Affairs

  47. 47.
    2026-05-16 | china_indopacific | 2026-W20 | Topics: AI, China, Europe, Indo-Pacific, Middle East, Nuclear, Russia, Taiwan, Trade, Ukraine, United States

    The article argues that the concept of great power spheres of influence has evolved beyond traditional military boundaries, now manifesting in functional domains like critical technology and digital infrastructure. This shift allows powerful states, such as China, to consolidate an 'open sphere' by leveraging economic and technological influence, particularly if the United States makes unilateral concessions or is strategically distracted. The author warns that the U.S.'s willingness to make policy concessions regarding Taiwan and its diminishing reliability as a security guarantor could hasten China's consolidation of influence in the Indo-Pacific. Strategically, this necessitates that Washington update its understanding of modern spheres to prevent a major geopolitical division that could escalate into conflict.

    Read at Foreign Affairs

  48. 48.

    Following a period of appeasement to the US under a volatile administration, European nations have undergone a strategic pivot toward self-reliance and collective action. This shift was catalyzed by perceived US overreach, prompting Europe to coordinate joint military exercises, activate anti-coercion tools, and establish a collective defense financing program. Economically, the EU is rapidly constructing a parallel trading system through major bilateral deals (e.g., India, Australia), reducing dependence on traditional transatlantic markets. These developments signal that Europe is building a more resilient, sovereign security and economic core, materially altering its geopolitical trajectory toward strategic autonomy.

    Read at Foreign Affairs

  49. 49.
    2026-05-15 | china_indopacific | 2026-W20 | Topics: China, Climate, Europe, Indo-Pacific, Middle East, Russia, Taiwan, Trade, United States

    Despite the public appearance of stabilization, the summit failed to resolve fundamental structural disputes between the U.S. and China, suggesting the competition remains deeply entrenched. Key issues, particularly Taiwan, trade imbalances, and geopolitical rivalry, were merely 'kicked down the road' through diplomatic rhetoric of 'strategic stability.' The analysis suggests that China is unlikely to make major concessions, viewing them as signs of weakness, meaning the relationship will continue to be managed through guarded competition rather than genuine cooperation. Policymakers must therefore anticipate persistent friction points and maintain vigilance regarding unresolved flashpoints to navigate the ongoing great power rivalry.

    Read at Foreign Affairs

  50. 50.
    2026-05-15 | china_indopacific | 2026-W20 | Topics: China, Indo-Pacific, Russia, Trade, United States

    The Western Pacific and Indo-Pacific remain highly active theaters, characterized by sustained multinational military deployments and high-tempo exercises. Key evidence includes major naval assets—such as the USS George Washington and JMSDF ships—conducting training, alongside the participation of allied forces (UK, Netherlands, ROK) in regional security patrols. The simultaneous monitoring of geopolitical flashpoints, including Russian convoys and North Korean sanctions violations, underscores persistent regional tensions. Strategically, this sustained high tempo implies that major powers and allies are maintaining a robust commitment to freedom of navigation and collective security cooperation in the face of escalating great power competition.

    Read at USNI

  51. 51.
    2026-05-14 | middle_east | 2026-W20 | Topics: China, Climate, Indo-Pacific, Middle East, Nuclear, Trade, United States

    Maritime experts warn that Iran's push to charge fees or impose controls on Strait of Hormuz transits sets a dangerous global precedent for maritime choke points. This 'tollbooth model' threatens the fundamental principle of freedom of navigation, raising concerns that other nations could replicate similar restrictions in key global waterways. The resulting instability poses a systemic risk to global trade and energy supplies, forcing international actors to prepare for potential long-term disruptions and the need to secure alternative supply routes.

    Read at USNI

  52. 52.
    2026-05-14 | economy | 2026-W20 | Topics: China, Europe, Indo-Pacific, Trade, United States, Economy

    The article argues that the current U.S. trade policy, characterized by tariffs and demands for concessions, is not genuine reciprocity but rather coercive unilateralism. This approach pressures allies to make unbalanced economic concessions, aiming to rebalance trade and realign global commerce with U.S. geopolitical goals. However, this strategy is unsustainable, as it erodes the trust and institutional framework of the international trading system. Consequently, trading partners are responding by deepening regional and multilateral economic ties, signaling a long-term shift toward alternative trade blocs independent of U.S. leadership.

    Read at Foreign Affairs

  53. 53.

    Beijing argues that the unraveling of the U.S.-led global order is ushering in an 'age of anarchy,' forcing China to abandon its anti-imperialist doctrine of non-interference. To safeguard its vast global commercial empire and critical supply chains, China is rapidly militarizing its foreign policy by building a comprehensive, forward-deployed security architecture. This strategy involves expanding intelligence collection, deepening security cooperation with foreign states, and deploying private security assets to protect infrastructure and trade routes far beyond its immediate periphery. This shift signals a move from diplomatic influence to overt, state-backed security enforcement to ensure the continuity of Chinese power.

    Read at Foreign Affairs

  54. 54.

    This RAND report develops a scenario-planning framework to analyze the complex future mental health landscape of the UK Armed Forces community through 2045. The analysis identifies key stressors, including the evolving character of conflict, geopolitical uncertainty, and broader societal trends like increased mental health awareness and technological disruption. The core finding is that the sector must move beyond reactive care, requiring proactive, collaborative strategic planning across military, NHS, and third-sector organizations. Ultimately, the report stresses the need for adaptable and resilient support systems to meet the unique and growing mental health needs of personnel and veterans.

    Read at RAND

  55. 55.
    2026-05-14 | china_indopacific | 2026-W20 | Topics: Indo-Pacific, NATO, Trade, United States, China

    Norway unilaterally canceled a significant contract with Malaysia for Naval Strike Missiles (NSMs) and launchers, citing new national arms export restrictions. The cancellation, which was protested by Malaysian officials, is reportedly linked to US restrictions on key components, such as gyroscopes, preventing the missile's export to non-NATO nations. Malaysia views this action as a breach of solemn agreements, warning that such unilateral decisions undermine the reliability of European defense partnerships. This incident raises concerns about the stability of defense supply chains and the increasing geopolitical friction among major powers in the Indo-Pacific region.

    Read at USNI

  56. 56.
    2026-05-13 | africa | 2026-W20 | Topics: China, Climate, Europe, Middle East, United States, Africa

    The persistence of violence in Nigeria stems primarily from systemic governance failures across federal, state, and local levels, rather than solely from external threats. Key evidence points to underfunded security services, a culture of judicial impunity, and the neglect of borders and rural areas, which create havens for armed groups. Compounding this are severe socio-economic pressures, including widespread poverty, high youth unemployment, and deadly resource disputes (e.g., farmer-herder conflicts). For stability, the report argues that Nigeria requires substantial and sustained investments in institutional capacity and governance reform to reverse the descent into instability.

    Read at Foreign Affairs

  57. 57.
    2026-05-13 | china_indopacific | 2026-W20 | Topics: China, Climate, Cybersecurity, Indo-Pacific, Nuclear, Russia, Taiwan, Trade, Ukraine, United States

    The article argues that China has significantly increased its leverage over the United States, constraining Washington's ability to set its own national security agenda. This shift is evidenced by the U.S. ceding authority over its own national security measures, such as export controls, in exchange for easing trade tensions following the 2025 trade war. Furthermore, China is successfully linking areas of cooperation and difference, forcing the U.S. to prioritize diplomatic optics over substantive policy goals. The implication is that Washington's decision-making is now constrained by Beijing, potentially emboldening China to test American resolve on vital interests like Taiwan and advanced technology.

    Read at Foreign Affairs

  58. 58.
    2026-05-13 | china_indopacific | 2026-W20 | Topics: AI, China, Indo-Pacific, Middle East, Nuclear, Russia, Taiwan, Trade, United States

    The article argues that the U.S.-China relationship is defined by a long-term, multifaceted strategic competition, which China views through a historical lens of achieving self-sufficiency and resisting foreign leverage. Beijing's approach is characterized by deep strategic planning, leading it to resist fundamental structural economic changes despite seeking temporary, mutually advantageous agreements. For policy, the analysis warns that the greatest risk lies not in disagreement, but in the misunderstanding or ambiguous interpretation of agreements following high-level summits. Therefore, managing the relationship requires both powers to clearly articulate their core, long-term objectives to prevent temporary stabilization from obscuring deep strategic divergence.

    Read at Foreign Affairs

  59. 59.
    2026-05-12 | americas | 2026-W20 | Topics: China, Indo-Pacific, Middle East, Nuclear, Trade, United States, Americas

    The article argues that traditional, brute-force anti-cartel strategies are ineffective and often backfire, empowering criminal groups rather than eliminating them. Instead, the U.S. should adopt a policy of "conditional repression," which involves setting clear red lines and applying severe pressure only when cartels cross them (e.g., through fentanyl trafficking or violence). This targeted approach aims to coerce cartels into reducing their most pernicious harms—such as extortion and environmental damage—while minimizing collateral damage. The U.S. should lead this shift, encouraging Latin American partners to adopt similar conditional strategies to stabilize the region.

    Read at Foreign Affairs

  60. 60.

    While US instability creates a theoretical geostrategic vacuum for China, the article argues that Beijing's ability to capitalize on this opportunity is limited. Global powers are increasingly adopting a 'hedging' strategy, seeking to reduce vulnerability to both US and Chinese influence, suggesting the competition is not zero-sum. China faces specific hurdles, including deep skepticism in Europe (due to Russia ties and trade issues) and poor returns on its soft power investments. Consequently, the global balance of power is shifting, but the primary implication is that both the US and China risk losing global influence as nations prioritize strategic balancing over alignment.

    Read at Foreign Affairs

  61. 61.
    2026-05-11 | china_indopacific | 2026-W20 | Topics: Europe, Indo-Pacific, China

    The article argues that the potential intersection of a Trump administration's unpredictable, transactional foreign policy and Xi Jinping's centralized power structure represents a critical geopolitical inflection point. Key reasoning suggests that this dynamic moves the US-China rivalry beyond traditional economic competition into a volatile, high-stakes confrontation across multiple domains. Policymakers must therefore adopt highly flexible strategies, preparing for rapid shifts in alliances and trade that necessitate hedging against both aggressive decoupling and sudden periods of cooperation.

    Read at Foreign Affairs

  62. 62.
    2026-05-11 | china_indopacific | 2026-W20 | Topics: China, Middle East, Taiwan, Trade, Ukraine, United States, Indo-Pacific

    The analysis addresses the high stakes of US-China competition, particularly in the context of potential high-level meetings between leaders like Trump and Xi Jinping. It argues that the current political uncertainty within the US complicates traditional bipartisan foreign policy approaches, requiring policymakers to navigate a complex landscape. Key flashpoints discussed include trade, technology, Taiwan, and Ukraine, underscoring the breadth of the strategic rivalry. Consequently, the brief implies that US strategy must adapt to manage this intense competition while mitigating the risks posed by domestic political volatility.

    Read at Foreign Affairs

  63. 63.

    The ongoing Iran war shock has highlighted the vulnerability of global energy markets and underscored the urgent need for accelerated energy innovation. CFR’s new Global Energy Innovation Index reveals that innovation efforts have stagnated, particularly in areas like renewable energy adoption and patenting, leading to limited options for responding to crises. The article emphasizes that necessity drives invention, exemplified by fuel-switching measures and stockpile releases, but stresses the importance of sustained government investment in research and development alongside private sector innovation. Ultimately, a renewed focus on energy innovation, particularly in areas like geothermal and advanced energy storage, is crucial to mitigating future disruptions and ensuring long-term energy security.

    Read at CFR

  64. 64.
    2026-05-08 | defense | 2026-W19 | Topics: China, Middle East, NATO, Nuclear, Russia, United States, Defense

    A recent CSIS analysis of the U.S.-Iran conflict highlights how Iran effectively countered U.S. battlefield successes through a sophisticated information war campaign utilizing deepfakes, false claims, and narratives exploiting American skepticism towards foreign intervention. The report emphasizes that simply achieving military victory is insufficient; maintaining public trust and shaping the narrative are crucial. To counter this, the U.S. needs to proactively rebuild public diplomacy, establish rapid response information warfare task forces, and prioritize speed and transparency in communication to establish a dominant narrative and expose disinformation networks.

    Read at CSIS

  65. 65.
    2026-05-08 | china_indopacific | 2026-W19 | Topics: AI, China, Cybersecurity, Indo-Pacific, Middle East, Nuclear, Russia, Taiwan, Trade, Ukraine, United States

    Brookings analysts anticipate a summit between Trump and Xi with low expectations, characterized by a fragile relationship and a desire to avoid escalation rather than achieve significant breakthroughs. While both leaders seek to maintain a trade truce and avoid conflict, risks remain, particularly concerning tariff restorations and potential shifts in U.S. policy on Taiwan. The meeting's significance lies in its role as a crucial communication channel to prevent miscalculation, and there's a potential for discussions on AI safety and cooperation, though deeper issues like talent competition and fentanyl remain unresolved.

    Read at Brookings

  66. 66.
    2026-05-08 | middle_east | 2026-W19 | Topics: China, Climate, Indo-Pacific, Middle East, Russia, Trade, Ukraine, United States

    Foreign Affairs’ analysis, dated May 8, 2026, posits that Iran has weaponized the Strait of Hormuz, creating a sustained economic threat comparable to the 1973 Arab oil embargo. Evidence suggests Iran’s sustained attacks utilizing mines, missiles, and drones have effectively blocked the waterway despite U.S. and Israeli military efforts. This situation is characterized by a durable leverage point for Tehran, stemming from its investment in asymmetric warfare capabilities and a global economy increasingly reliant on Gulf oil. Policy implications necessitate a shift from relying solely on military force and diplomatic pressure to building energy resilience, diversifying supply chains, and bolstering shipping routes to mitigate future disruptions and diminish Iran’s strategic advantage.

    Read at Foreign Affairs

  67. 67.
    2026-05-08 | china_indopacific | 2026-W19 | Topics: China, Indo-Pacific, United States

    This Heritage Foundation analysis argues that Donald Trump’s intervention was crucial in preventing the UK’s planned handover of the Chagos Islands to Mauritius, a move perceived as a strategic concession to Communist China. The article contends that Prime Minister Starmer’s pursuit of the deal, fueled by a ‘Deep State’ and lacking a clear strategic rationale, posed a significant threat to U.S. and British security. Trump’s opposition, bolstered by support from figures like John Kennedy and Claire Bullivant, successfully halted the legislation, preventing China from gaining undue influence in the Indo-Pacific. The piece highlights Trump’s decisive action as a vital defense against a potentially disastrous foreign policy misstep.

    Read at Heritage

  68. 68.
    2026-05-08 | europe | 2026-W19 | Topics: China, Europe, Middle East, NATO, Nuclear, Russia, Ukraine, United States

    This CFR analysis details a shift in U.S. military deployment in Europe, driven by tensions surrounding the Iran conflict and President Trump’s disagreements with European allies. The U.S. is reducing its troop presence, aiming for pre-Ukraine war levels, with a planned withdrawal of approximately 5,000 troops from Germany. Despite this drawdown, the U.S. maintains a significant military footprint across Europe, primarily through the Enhanced Forward Presence (EFP) in Eastern European NATO countries and ongoing training exercises. These deployments focus on forward defense, logistics, and training allied forces, particularly in support of Ukraine’s defense. The analysis highlights the continued importance of U.S. forces in bolstering NATO’s security posture and managing nuclear assets within the alliance.

    Read at CFR

  69. 69.
    2026-05-08 | china_indopacific | 2026-W19 | Topics: China, Indo-Pacific, Trade, Ukraine, United States

    CSIS analysis indicates that Japan’s Prime Minister Takaichi has enacted a landmark shift in defense export policy, effectively removing restrictions on arms sales to a defined list of partner nations. This change, driven by participation in key programs like the Global Combat Aircraft Program and support for the Royal Australian Navy, aims to foster a more ‘normal’ defense industrial profile for Japan. While industry’s success hinges on continued government support and expanded collaboration, the policy represents a significant step towards greater engagement in the global defense market. The initial export focus will be on 17 countries, primarily within Europe, Southeast Asia, and the Middle East, excluding Ukraine at this time.

    Read at CSIS

  70. 70.

    The conflict in Iran presents a mixed strategic picture for Beijing, offering diplomatic opportunities by allowing China to position itself as a neutral mediator and distracting the U.S. from the Indo-Pacific. However, these gains are offset by significant economic instability, energy market volatility, and the exposure of China's limited operational reach in the region. Strategically, Beijing's primary concern remains maintaining stability with the U.S. to ensure its continued rise, leading it to prioritize de-escalation over deep regional involvement. Ultimately, China must navigate the tension between asserting regional influence and mitigating the severe economic risks posed by disrupted global supply chains.

    Read at Brookings

  71. 71.
    2026-05-08 | china_indopacific | 2026-W19 | Topics: AI, China, Indo-Pacific, Middle East, Nuclear, Russia, Taiwan, Trade, United States

    The anticipated Trump-Xi summit is expected to center on extending the existing trade truce, with the U.S. seeking large-scale Chinese purchases of goods and China aiming to preserve access to U.S. technology. Beyond trade, Beijing will subtly press for rhetorical concessions on Taiwan and the adoption of a 'mutual respect' framework, signaling an implicit acceptance of China's core interests. The outcome is highly significant, as it will define the U.S.-China relationship trajectory, determining whether the relationship settles into stable, managed cooperation or escalates into deeper strategic tension across global issues like AI and the Middle East.

    Read at Brookings

  72. 72.
    2026-05-08 | china_indopacific | 2026-W19 | Topics: China, Europe, Indo-Pacific, Middle East, Nuclear, Russia, Taiwan, Trade, United States

    According to a CSIS press briefing, the upcoming Trump-Xi summit, delayed by six weeks, aims to address five U.S. priorities ("the five Bs") and three Chinese priorities ("the three Ts") including Taiwan, tariffs, and technology. China enters the meeting in a stronger position due to recent U.S. actions and a perceived improvement in its relative power, and is likely to pressure the U.S. regarding Taiwan, potentially seeking changes to U.S. policy on arms sales and transit for Taiwanese leaders. The briefing suggests China is well-prepared and confident, while the U.S. lacks a unified approach and is not adequately investing in its long-term economic foundations.

    Read at CSIS

  73. 73.

    The global economy faces unprecedented fragility, driven by the intersection of opaque private credit growth and severe geopolitical shocks. The primary stressor is the ongoing Iran conflict, which threatens critical shipping lanes, causing commodity shortages and forcing nations into inflationary, protectionist policies. This confluence of high global debt, supply shocks, and central bank dilemmas suggests a period of unpredictable market behavior and potential financial market dysfunction. Policymakers must monitor deteriorating financial market functioning and the risk of systemic stress across major economies.

    Read at CFR

  74. 74.
    2026-05-08 | middle_east | 2026-W19 | Topics: AI, China, Europe, Indo-Pacific, Middle East, Nuclear, Russia, Trade, Ukraine, United States

    This CFR analysis argues that the recent conflict with Iran offers three key lessons for nuclear security negotiations. First, military strikes alone are insufficient to dismantle a sophisticated nuclear program, as demonstrated by the limited impact of air attacks and the ongoing challenges faced by the IAEA. Second, reliance on force can incentivize concealment of nuclear activities, hindering transparency and inspection efforts. Finally, the conflict highlighted the inherent disparities within the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), particularly regarding access to nuclear technology for nations that did not initially test weapons. Consequently, negotiators should aim for ‘better-than-nothing’ deals, focusing on reaffirming the NPT’s core bargain and establishing a framework for continued dialogue and inspection, even if complete disarmament remains elusive.

    Read at CFR

  75. 75.
    2026-05-08 | middle_east | 2026-W19 | Topics: AI, China, Cybersecurity, Europe, Indo-Pacific, Middle East, Trade, United States

    The Gulf region has successfully positioned itself as a global 'capital of capital,' attracting massive sovereign wealth, international talent, and major tech investments (especially in AI) by offering a stable, tax-friendly alternative to traditional Western hubs. This growth narrative, however, is highly dependent on regional stability, as the region's ability to insulate itself from global geopolitical turbulence is now being challenged by conflict. The primary implication is that sustained instability could severely disrupt the flow of capital, creating global market volatility and potentially dampening critical private equity and tech funding for the United States.

    Read at CFR

  76. 76.
    2026-05-08 | diplomacy | 2026-W19 | Topics: AI, China, Indo-Pacific, Middle East, Russia, Trade, Ukraine, United States, Diplomacy

    The global press freedom index has reached its worst level in 25 years, driven by a sharp increase in the criminalization of journalism across most nations. Key threats include state authorities leveraging national security and defense secrets, alongside powerful corporate and political entities utilizing abusive lawsuits to suppress coverage. On the ground, authoritarian regimes are employing sophisticated tactics, such as internet blackouts and exploiting global chaos, to dismantle independent reporting. Policymakers must recognize that the erosion of free press is a systemic risk, requiring targeted diplomatic and technical support for journalists and civil society to maintain democratic accountability.

    Read at CFR

  77. 77.
    2026-05-08 | china_indopacific | 2026-W19 | Topics: China, Europe, Indo-Pacific, Nuclear, Russia, Taiwan, Trade, Ukraine, United States

    This Foreign Affairs article argues that the recent flurry of diplomatic visits by Western leaders to China is largely driven by a strategic hedging response to former President Trump’s increasingly adversarial relationship with the United States and its allies. Faced with what they perceive as a predatory U.S. foreign policy, countries like Canada, France, and others are seeking to maintain channels of communication with China to avoid being fully aligned with Washington. However, this approach risks legitimizing China’s authoritarianism and reinforcing Beijing’s narrative of a rising global power. The article calls for greater coordination among Western allies, setting clear redlines, and a more assertive approach from the U.S. to deter coercive behavior and safeguard shared interests, particularly regarding technological advantage and supply chain diversification.

    Read at Foreign Affairs

  78. 78.
    2026-05-08 | defense | 2026-W19 | Topics: China, Taiwan, United States, Defense

    This Brookings report, based on a discussion with Senators Shaheen and Tillis, argues that the United States needs to proactively strengthen its domestic capabilities and refine its statecraft to maintain a strategic advantage over China. The core reasoning centers on the perceived risk of the U.S. falling behind China in critical areas like technology and military power, necessitating a renewed focus on bolstering U.S. foundations and strategic tools. Policy recommendations will likely prioritize investments in domestic innovation and a more assertive approach to international relations. Consequently, the U.S. should pursue a multi-faceted strategy encompassing both strengthening its internal power and actively shaping the geopolitical landscape.

    Read at Brookings

  79. 79.
    2026-05-08 | economy | 2026-W19 | Topics: China, Indo-Pacific, Middle East, Russia, Trade, United States, Economy

    Following the disruptions caused by Iran’s control of the Strait of Hormuz, Southeast Asian nations are increasingly recognizing the strategic and economic value of the Strait of Malacca, a critical global maritime chokepoint. The crisis demonstrated how a single point of control can exert significant leverage over the world economy, particularly impacting energy supplies. Evidence of this shift includes Indonesian Finance Minister’s proposal to implement tolls on ships transiting the Strait, alongside discussions among Indonesian and Malaysian political elites. Furthermore, Thailand is actively pursuing a ‘land bridge’ project to circumvent the strait. This highlights a growing concern about supply chain vulnerabilities and the potential for regional states to assert greater control over this vital waterway. The potential monetization of the Strait of Malacca represents a significant shift in regional strategic thinking.

    Read at CFR

  80. 80.
    2026-05-08 | tech | 2026-W19 | Topics: China, United States, Technology

    This CSIS report argues that spectrum policy is increasingly intertwined with AI advancement, particularly as 6G technology emerges. The report highlights that the deployment of AI-powered systems, especially those requiring low latency like autonomous vehicles and robotics, will heavily rely on access to sufficient mid-band spectrum. Drawing lessons from the 5G rollout and China's rapid advancements, the authors warn that inadequate U.S. spectrum policy risks hindering domestic AI competitiveness and national security. Expanding the spectrum pipeline and streamlining allocation processes are crucial for U.S. leadership in AI and 6G.

    Read at CSIS

  81. 81.

    The development of superintelligence, exemplified by DeepMind's work, represents a transformative, dual-use technology comparable to nuclear power, promising massive gains in fields like medicine (e.g., AlphaFold). The analysis highlights that while pioneers like Demis Hassabis approach AI from a fundamental scientific motivation, the race dynamic makes global safety governance challenging. Strategically, the findings suggest that emerging markets view AI as a primary engine for development, contrasting with the caution seen in advanced economies due to job displacement fears. Policymakers must therefore focus on guiding AI development toward applications with clear human benefits to ensure global acceptance and manage the inherent risks of this powerful new technology.

    Read at CFR

  82. 82.
    2026-05-08 | middle_east | 2026-W19 | Topics: China, Middle East, Nuclear, Trade, United States

    This CFR analysis argues that Trump’s ‘Project Freedom’ – primarily a naval escort operation and blockade – will fail to open the Strait of Hormuz and resolve the ongoing conflict with Iran. The strategy relies on overly optimistic assumptions about Iran’s economic vulnerability and the immediate impact of a blockade, while failing to account for Iran’s resilience and ability to adapt through alternative trade routes. Evidence suggests Iran’s continued capacity to attack commercial vessels and retaliate underscores the futility of force-based approaches. Ultimately, a diplomatic solution remains the only viable path forward, despite the current impasse.

    Read at CFR

  83. 83.
    2026-05-08 | china_indopacific | 2026-W19 | Topics: China, Indo-Pacific, Nuclear, Russia, United States

    The CSIS report argues that the U.S. and South Korea must significantly strengthen their cyber cooperation to effectively deter and respond to escalating threats from North Korea, China, and Russia. It proposes a new, integrated framework emphasizing shared situational awareness, improved attribution, and proactive cyber defense, including a Cyberattack Severity Classification Framework (CSCF) to standardize decision-making. The report stresses aligning cyber policy with broader diplomatic, financial, and law enforcement tools to enhance overall resilience. This necessitates a shift beyond reactive measures towards a more comprehensive and coordinated approach.

    Read at CSIS

  84. 84.
    2026-05-08 | china_indopacific | 2026-W19 | Topics: Indo-Pacific, Middle East, Nuclear, United States, China

    A CSIS report argues that despite increased speculation and geopolitical pressures, Japan and South Korea are unlikely to develop nuclear weapons in the foreseeable future. The analysis highlights deeply ingrained domestic political and bureaucratic constraints, as well as a continued reliance on the U.S. security umbrella, as primary deterrents. While concerns about U.S. commitment and regional instability may fuel debate, the costs and risks associated with nuclear proliferation remain significant obstacles. This suggests policymakers should focus on strengthening alliance commitments and addressing regional security concerns through non-nuclear means.

    Read at Foreign Affairs

  85. 85.
    2026-05-08 | middle_east | 2026-W19 | Topics: China, Indo-Pacific, Middle East, Nuclear, Ukraine

    The war in Iran is unlikely to establish China as a direct replacement for the US as the Gulf's security provider, but it is accelerating the region's strategic shift away from absolute reliance on American guarantees. This dynamic allows China to gain influence by positioning itself as a diplomatic and technological partner, rather than a military guarantor. Gulf states are diversifying their defense procurement and seeking alternative regional stability models. Consequently, China is well-positioned to promote its own normative framework for regional cooperation, making its principles appealing to nations seeking stability without US-centric security commitments.

    Read at Chatham House

  86. 86.
    2026-05-08 | energy | 2026-W19 | Topics: AI, China, Climate, Nuclear, Trade, United States, Energy

    The article argues that states are failing to capitalize on the energy transition by adopting a false dichotomy between 'clean' or 'cheap' energy. The core finding is that energy must be viewed not merely as a commodity cost, but as a strategic lever for industrial and economic transformation. This shift is underpinned by technological evidence, including the exponential cost declines of renewables and the rise of distributed energy resources (DERs). Policy implications suggest that the most critical resource is demand-side flexibility and efficiency, which offers a cheaper and faster path to capacity than building new centralized infrastructure. Therefore, states must adopt a new operating model that co-evolves economic development with the energy system by rewarding efficiency as a core industrial resource.

    Read at Brookings

  87. 87.
    2026-05-08 | economy | 2026-W19 | Topics: China, Trade, United States, Economy

    The US economic debate between global integration and national self-reliance is an enduring historical thread that continues to define American policy. Current tensions, driven by strategic competition with China and the revival of industrial policy, reflect a growing skepticism toward globalization and established trade institutions. Policymakers must therefore interpret Washington's evolving economic posture—whether it signals renewed global leadership or strategic retrenchment—to anticipate shifts in international trade rules and global economic stability.

    Read at Chatham House

  88. 88.
    2026-05-08 | middle_east | 2026-W19 | Topics: China, Europe, Indo-Pacific, Middle East, NATO, Nuclear, Russia, Ukraine, United States

    A CFR analysis published in 2026 assesses the military campaign in the Iran War as largely ineffective in achieving strategic objectives. Despite significant damage inflicted on Iranian conventional weapons and naval capabilities, Iran continues to control vital waterways like the Strait of Hormuz and launch attacks, demonstrating a resilience that undermines the campaign’s success. The analysis highlights a crucial distinction between the ‘war of destruction’ – where the US Air Force achieved relative success – and a ‘war of disruption’ focused on countering Iranian drone and missile attacks, which the US has struggled with, leading to continued disruption of maritime traffic. Ultimately, the report concludes that Iran has effectively won the air war that matters most, highlighting the limitations of airpower in complex asymmetric conflicts.

    Read at CFR

  89. 89.

    President Trump has paused the U.S. military’s Hormuz shipping mission, citing progress in negotiations with Iran and a desire to facilitate a final agreement. This decision follows escalating tensions in the Strait of Hormuz, including attacks on U.S.-flagged vessels and heightened concerns over Iranian nuclear activity. The move reflects a strategic shift towards prioritizing a diplomatic resolution, although the U.S. maintains a naval blockade. Rising energy prices, exacerbated by the situation in the Persian Gulf, are a significant consequence of this policy change, highlighting the vulnerability of global energy markets to geopolitical instability. This action underscores a renewed focus on diplomacy within the Middle East, particularly concerning Iran.

    Read at CFR

  90. 90.
    2026-05-07 | china_indopacific | 2026-W19 | Topics: China, Indo-Pacific, Middle East, Nuclear, Russia, United States

    A recent U.S. Army test successfully launched a Tomahawk cruise missile 390 miles to a target in the Philippines, demonstrating the capability to strike key locations within the first island chain. This test utilized the Mid-Range Capability, a system designed to deploy SM-6 and Tomahawk missiles for extended maritime strikes, and was conducted as part of ongoing exercises to deter potential aggression from China. The deployment of U.S. missile systems in the Philippines, particularly near Fort Magsaysay, has heightened tensions with Beijing and underscores the U.S. military’s strategy to contest Chinese influence in the region. This test validates the Army's MDTF capabilities and highlights the importance of strategic positioning within the first island chain.

    Read at USNI

  91. 91.
    2026-05-07 | china_indopacific | 2026-W19 | Topics: AI, China, Cybersecurity, Europe, Indo-Pacific, Taiwan, Trade, United States

    A RAND report compared the Delphi method (expert workshop) and crowdsourced forecasting to predict China's ability to produce advanced lithography equipment by 2026 and 2030. While both groups identified similar influencing factors, the Delphi group was slightly more accurate, emphasizing the short timeframe for China's technological leap. The study highlights the flexibility of both forecasting methods and recommends ongoing data collection and forecaster training for future research, informing policy decisions regarding U.S. export controls and China's semiconductor ambitions.

    Read at RAND

  92. 92.
    2026-05-05 | americas | 2026-W19 | Topics: China, Indo-Pacific, United States, Americas

    U.S. forces conducted multiple strikes against suspected narcotics trafficking vessels in the Caribbean and Eastern Pacific, resulting in at least five deaths as part of Operation Southern Spear. These strikes were justified based on intelligence confirming the vessels' involvement in drug trafficking, though the GAO notes fentanyl primarily enters via land routes. The ongoing operation, which has seen 57 strikes since September 2025, highlights a continued U.S. military response to drug trafficking despite a reduced naval presence in the region. This strategy raises questions about the effectiveness of direct military action versus addressing upstream supply chains and land border security.

    Read at USNI

  93. 93.
    2026-05-05 | china_indopacific | 2026-W19 | Topics: AI, China, Climate, Cybersecurity, Europe, Indo-Pacific, Nuclear, Russia, Taiwan, Trade, United States

    This RAND report analyzes China's evolving science and technology (S&T) strategy, highlighting a shift towards centralized, CCP-led innovation emphasizing technological self-reliance and integration with national security goals. Key findings include the strategic importance of S&T for China's power projection, the rise of military-civil fusion, and a move away from reliance on foreign technology. The report underscores the need for policymakers to understand China's approach to S&T, balancing collaboration with safeguards for research integrity and national security.

    Read at RAND

  94. 94.
    2026-05-05 | china_indopacific | 2026-W19 | Topics: China, Indo-Pacific, Russia, Taiwan, Ukraine, United States

    The recent Balikatan exercise in the Philippines showcased a new U.S. Army concept called 'Littoral Deep Battle,' designed to counter potential amphibious landings, particularly in the context of a Taiwan contingency. The exercise involved combined forces from the U.S., Philippines, Japan, and Canada, utilizing drone swarms, HIMARS rocket systems, and layered defenses to simulate repelling an invasion. This approach integrates lessons from Ukraine, emphasizes unmanned systems, and demonstrates a shift towards a more distributed and lethal coastal defense posture, with implications for regional security and alliance interoperability.

    Read at USNI

  95. 95.

    This RAND report, published in 2026, argues that the U.S. Department of War can effectively leverage security force assistance (SFA) activities in Latin America to bolster homeland defense, counter transnational threats, and advance U.S. strategic influence. The report highlights the increasing convergence of threats from state adversaries and non-state actors, emphasizing the need for innovative SFA approaches, particularly utilizing the Army Security Cooperation Group—South and National Guard State Partnership Programs. Ultimately, the report suggests that targeted SFA can be a cost-effective tool for addressing regional challenges and countering Chinese influence.

    Read at RAND

  96. 96.
    2026-05-05 | china_indopacific | 2026-W19 | Topics: AI, Indo-Pacific, United States, China

    The U.S. Navy recently conducted a Fleet Experimentation (FLEX) exercise utilizing drones and artificial intelligence to track and target suspected narco boats in the Caribbean Sea. The exercise, involving both aerial and surface unmanned systems alongside manned platforms, demonstrated rapid acquisition and deployment of advanced robotic and autonomous systems to enhance maritime domain awareness and counter illicit trafficking. This initiative, part of Operation Southern Spear, aims to address the challenge of patrolling vast maritime regions and leverages partnerships with industry and international allies to combat transnational organized crime.

    Read at USNI

  97. 97.
    2026-05-04 | economy | 2026-W18 | Topics: AI, China, Middle East, Trade, Ukraine, United States, Economy

    The upcoming mandatory review of the USMCA is expected to be highly contentious, driven by historical U.S. tariff actions that have undermined regional integration and caused significant strain, particularly with Canada. In response, Mexico and Canada are attempting to hedge against an unreliable Washington by forming independent bilateral partnerships. While the agreement may remain in force even without immediate consensus, the U.S. may attempt to leverage the review to push its neighbors toward a 'rules of control' paradigm, forcing common external tariffs or export controls, especially concerning China. For stability, the U.S. should aim for an expeditious reaffirmation of the USMCA with minimal modifications to prevent trade uncertainty.

    Read at CFR

  98. 98.

    Agrawal's career highlights that effective foreign policy analysis requires integrating diverse, global perspectives, a skill honed by observing massive technological and geopolitical shifts. His experience tracking the impact of digital transformation—from cable TV to smartphones—demonstrates that modern global events are rarely localized, having profound, varied ripple effects across different economies and societies. For policy strategists, this implies a critical need to move beyond national silos, adopting a holistic view that accounts for how global power dynamics (e.g., energy conflicts) disproportionately affect disparate regions. Furthermore, the rapid proliferation of affordable technology must be factored into policy planning, as it fundamentally alters political structures and social harmony in developing nations.

    Read at CFR

  99. 99.
    2026-05-04 | china_indopacific | 2026-W18 | Topics: China, Cybersecurity, Trade, United States, Indo-Pacific

    The article argues that the U.S. must counter China's expanding localized global influence by leveraging its technological and informational strengths. The core strategy involves harnessing open-source, real-time data (OSINT) to empower local actors, improve rapid interagency coordination, and provide evidence for counter-messaging. Policy recommendations emphasize amplifying authentic local voices, utilizing technology to monitor complex networks (like supply chains), and preparing for extreme economic contingencies, such as targeted sanctions or supply chain decoupling, to reassert U.S. leadership.

    Read at CSIS

  100. 100.

    The article argues that outer space is vulnerable to disruption, mirroring how a limited force can destabilize a vital choke point like the Strait of Hormuz. This risk is amplified because most operational satellites are located in Low Earth Orbit (LEO), a region susceptible to anti-satellite weapons and debris creation. To protect the burgeoning space economy and maintain freedom of passage, the U.S. must prioritize diplomatic engagement with China and Russia to establish modern space governance. Strategically, the U.S. should also invest in technologies for debris mitigation and reassess its military reliance on LEO, thereby avoiding a potential conflict requiring superior military force.

    Read at CSIS

  101. 101.
    2026-05-04 | economy | 2026-W18 | Topics: China, Indo-Pacific, Taiwan, Trade, United States, Economy

    The article critiques the administration's 'trade over aid' initiative, arguing it is a flawed and hypocritical attempt to justify massive cuts in foreign aid. While the free-market approach is advocated, the analysis notes that successful development models, particularly in Asia, require strategic government intervention, subsidies, and protection, rather than pure laissez-faire principles. Furthermore, the push for 'mutually beneficial' trade is undermined by the administration's own 'America First' policies, which are not genuinely reciprocal. For effective global development, policy must therefore balance market principles with strategic state guidance and ensure that trade assistance involves genuine, reciprocal purchasing commitments from developed nations.

    Read at CSIS

  102. 102.
    2026-05-04 | defense | 2026-W18 | Topics: China, Defense

    The Chatham House analysis argues that deteriorating global security and heightened concerns over technological vulnerability are shifting the AI race away from a simple US-China binary toward a more fragmented and multipolar market. This trend is driven by nations prioritizing tech sovereignty and defense-driven innovation, leading to a surge in dual-use technology investment. Consequently, the global AI industry is becoming more securitized, challenging the ability of the current leaders to maintain unchallenged dominance over the entire value chain or its global rollout. Policymakers must anticipate this fragmentation and prepare for a geopolitical restructuring of AI supply chains.

    Read at Chatham House

  103. 103.
    2026-05-04 | china_indopacific | 2026-W18 | Topics: China, Indo-Pacific, Middle East, Russia, United States

    The article argues that the fall of Saigon taught the U.S. that geopolitical history is non-linear and that policymakers should resist the temptation of defeatism or over-predicting the future. Key evidence cited is the historical pattern that following the perceived failure of Vietnam, the U.S. emerged as a dominant power, and rival powers (China, USSR) made subsequent strategic errors. The primary policy implication is a warning against assuming current geopolitical trends are preordained; instead, the U.S. must remain flexible and capitalize on unpredictable opportunities and challenges, rather than succumbing to pessimism.

    Read at CFR

  104. 104.
    2026-05-04 | diplomacy | 2026-W18 | Topics: China, Europe, Middle East, Russia, Taiwan, Trade, United States, Diplomacy

    Michael Mandelbaum argues that U.S. foreign policy is uniquely defined by three pillars: an unusually ideological focus, a distinctive use of economic statecraft, and the strong role of democratic public opinion. Unlike most nations that prioritize power (realism), the U.S. frequently attempts to promote its political ideas and uses economic tools for political ends. This ideological commitment, which Mandelbaum calls the 'foreign policy of ideas,' suggests that American strategy will continue to blend traditional power interests with a strong emphasis on promoting democracy and human rights globally. This framework implies that the U.S. will often intervene to protect values, even when such actions do not yield immediate economic or security benefits.

    Read at CFR

  105. 105.
    2026-05-04 | 2026-W18 | Topics: China, Middle East

    Reduced Export Demand: The war has weakened global economic growth, with the IMF cutting its 2026 global GDP forecast to 3.1%. Major Chinese export markets — including India, Southeast Asian nations, and the UAE — have seen sharp declines in projected import growth. Since nearly one-third of China's GDP growth in 2025 came from net exports, this drop in foreign demand threatens to further dampen China's economic momentum. Energy Disruptions: Over one-third of China's crude oil supply transits the Strait of Hormuz annually. Since the war began, domestic gasoline prices in China have surged 39% and LNG prices by 42% — record increases surpassing even the spike following Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Nevertheless, China is better insulated than most economies thanks to its massive strategic oil reserves (~1.4 billion barrels), diversified energy suppliers, heavy reliance on domestic coal, and comparatively high EV adoption rates. Supply Chain Challenges: Rising energy and commodity costs are squeezing Chinese manufacturers. Semiconductors face shortages of helium and naphtha; agriculture is being hit by soaring fertilizer and pesticide prices; and the plastics industry is under severe strain, with polypropylene prices rising 40% between February and mid-April. Investment Risks: The Middle East was China's top overseas investment destination in 2025, with over $26 billion committed. Iranian retaliatory strikes have already damaged Chinese-linked infrastructure, and ongoing instability threatens both existing and future Chinese investments across the region. In conclusion, while China is more resilient than many neighbors, the Iran War poses substantial short-term headwinds across multiple dimensions of its economy.

    Read at CSIS

  106. 106.
    2026-05-04 | china_indopacific | 2026-W18 | Topics: AI, China, Indo-Pacific, Trade, United States

    The US and China are pursuing divergent AI strategies: the US focuses on maintaining a lead through massive capital expenditure and frontier model performance, while China is adapting to U.S. export controls by prioritizing efficiency, adoption, and physical integration. Key evidence shows China compensating for limited compute resources by heavily utilizing techniques like Mixture-of-Experts and quantization, coupled with an open-source model strategy that is gaining global developer popularity. This shift implies that the AI competition is evolving from a pure compute race to a multi-front battle focused on cost-effective deployment, open-source ecosystem building, and leveraging existing industrial supply chains for embodied AI.

    Read at Brookings

  107. 107.
    2026-05-04 | europe | 2026-W18 | Topics: China, Europe, NATO, Nuclear, Russia, Trade, Ukraine, United States

    Germany's 'Zeitenwende' signals a profound shift from economic influence to strategic military leadership, positioning it as an increasingly assertive and unavoidable power in Europe. While substantial funding and procurement (e.g., F-35s, special funds) demonstrate political intent, the article argues that this rearmament risks outpacing strategic coherence. Key challenges include persistent deficiencies in the Bundeswehr's readiness, the lack of a unified military doctrine, and deep institutional inertia. For Germany to successfully assume a leading role, it must overcome these internal structural hurdles—including its risk-averse economic model and political fragmentation—to translate resources into usable, deployable force.

    Read at Chatham House

  108. 108.
    2026-05-04 | middle_east | 2026-W18 | Topics: AI, China, Climate, Indo-Pacific, Middle East, United States

    The article argues that a significant, underappreciated risk for U.S. financial and tech markets is the potential reduction of capital flowing from Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) sovereign wealth funds (SWFs). Historically, GCC nations have heavily invested in U.S. assets to diversify away from volatile energy revenues, but the Iran war and resulting economic strain are causing these nations to prioritize domestic spending and infrastructure repair. A pullback in this crucial capital source could severely challenge U.S. hyperscalers and financial intermediaries, forcing them to rely more heavily on debt at a time when valuations are already under scrutiny.

    Read at CFR

  109. 109.
    2026-05-04 | energy | 2026-W18 | Topics: China, Europe, Middle East, NATO, Russia, Trade, Ukraine, United States, Energy

    The UAE's announced exit from OPEC and OPEC+ signals a significant weakening of the cartel's ability to coordinate and influence global oil supply. This move is driven by Abu Dhabi's desire for greater energy policy autonomy and a growing geopolitical divergence from Saudi Arabia. The withdrawal adds to market unpredictability, suggesting that major producers are increasingly prioritizing national strategic interests over coordinated cartel pricing efforts. This shift implies a move toward decentralized energy policies, challenging OPEC's historical role as the primary arbiter of global oil prices.

    Read at CFR

  110. 110.
    2026-05-04 | china_indopacific | 2026-W18 | Topics: China, Indo-Pacific, Middle East, NATO, Russia, Trade, Ukraine, United States

    The ongoing instability in the Gulf is creating systemic global risk by eroding energy and trade buffers, threatening macroeconomic stability across the Indo-Pacific. This immediate crisis distracts the United States from its core long-term strategic challenge: the economic and technological competition with China. While the U.S. gains some leverage in infrastructure, the article argues that Washington lacks a clear, predictable, and durable economic strategy to counter Beijing's methodical build-up of semiconductor and AI capacity. Policy must therefore prioritize developing a long-term economic competition framework that transcends crisis management and uses export controls with discipline to avoid accelerating Chinese indigenization.

    Read at CSIS

  111. 111.
    2026-05-04 | china_indopacific | 2026-W18 | Topics: AI, China, Europe, Indo-Pacific, Middle East, Nuclear, Taiwan, Ukraine, United States

    The analysis concludes that despite ongoing high-level purges, China's People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is undergoing a massive, deliberate, and highly successful modernization effort, making it a formidable military force. Key evidence points to the PLA's exponential growth in budget and capabilities—including missile, cyber, and maritime assets—and the purges themselves are viewed as Xi Jinping's serious effort to ensure the military's absolute loyalty to the Party and to him. Strategically, this indicates that China is building a force capable of presenting challenges to the U.S. military that have not been seen since World War II, necessitating a serious reassessment of US Indo-Pacific military policy.

    Read at Brookings

  112. 112.

    Emanuel argues that America's internal political divisions and systemic failures are its greatest strategic vulnerability, potentially overshadowing geopolitical challenges like China. Regarding the Middle East, he labels the current conflict with Iran a 'war of choice' and outlines a multi-phase strategy to stabilize the region. This plan involves immediately ensuring the free passage through the Strait of Hormuz, followed by establishing UN oversight and redefining the Abraham Accords. Ultimately, the U.S. must leverage these accords as a financing and infrastructure vehicle to bypass the Strait, thereby undermining Iran's regional leverage and securing long-term economic stability.

    Read at CFR

  113. 113.

    The Brookings report argues that deep energy system integration across the EU and with neighboring states is essential for navigating the energy trilemma—balancing security, affordability, and sustainability. This integration enhances security by allowing cross-border transfers to buffer supply shocks, while it boosts sustainability and affordability by optimizing the management of intermittent renewable sources like wind and solar. To realize these benefits, policymakers must undertake massive investments in cross-border infrastructure and, critically, address the political and social challenges of cost allocation and loss of local control. Ultimately, sustained political will is required to overcome these hurdles, transforming a more integrated energy system into a core driver of European growth and strategic autonomy.

    Read at Brookings

  114. 114.
    2026-05-04 | middle_east | 2026-W18 | Topics: China, Europe, Middle East, NATO, Nuclear, Russia, Trade, Ukraine, United States

    Trump has rejected Iran's peace overtures and vowed to maintain the U.S. naval blockade, arguing that sustained pressure is necessary to force Tehran into a nuclear agreement. Experts concur that controlling the Strait of Hormuz is the primary strategic objective, as this leverage is essential to deter Iran's nuclear ambitions and stabilize the region. The continued blockade and potential military strikes are therefore viewed as the most critical policy tools to manage the conflict, despite the escalating financial and military costs. This suggests that the U.S. strategy remains focused on economic strangulation and military deterrence rather than immediate diplomatic resolution.

    Read at CFR

  115. 115.

    Global immunization efforts are facing significant setbacks due to a combination of conflict, declining public confidence, and weak health systems, threatening global health security. Evidence shows that the United States is experiencing measles outbreaks, while international support mechanisms like Gavi face funding uncertainty and political headwinds. For policy, the findings underscore the urgent need to reinforce both domestic public health messaging and stable international commitments to prevent outbreaks and maintain vaccine-preventable disease elimination status.

    Read at CSIS

  116. 116.
    2026-05-04 | china_indopacific | 2026-W18 | Topics: China, Indo-Pacific, Taiwan, Trade, United States

    The Chatham House analysis argues that using advanced AI chip export controls as a primary geopolitical bargaining chip is an outdated and ineffective strategy. The core flaw is the assumption that chips remain the sole technological 'chokepoint,' as AI progress is increasingly driven by algorithmic efficiency, model optimization, and software improvements, rather than raw computing power. Furthermore, controls are easily circumvented through widespread smuggling and the use of grey markets. Policymakers must therefore shift away from a hardware-centric approach, adopting a stable and comprehensive strategy that focuses on algorithmic and software leadership to maintain strategic advantage.

    Read at Chatham House

  117. 117.
    2026-05-04 | china_indopacific | 2026-W18 | Topics: AI, China, Trade, United States, Indo-Pacific

    The release of DeepSeek V4 signals China's commitment to the AI race, but the analysis finds that the model does not close the performance gap with U.S. frontier models. The true competitive threat lies not in raw performance, but in the model's open-source nature and low cost, which drive the 'adoption race' in the Global South. Furthermore, DeepSeek's capabilities are partially derived from illicit means, including smuggled U.S. chips and industrial-scale intellectual property theft via distillation attacks. To maintain its lead, the U.S. must shift its strategy from merely restricting hardware to aggressively countering adversarial IP theft through sanctions and multilateral pressure.

    Read at CFR

  118. 118.
    2026-05-04 | economy | 2026-W18 | Topics: China, United States, Economy

    China's alleged de-dollarization is misleading; the nation is not reducing its dollar exposure but rather shifting dollar assets from transparent official reserves into opaque, state-controlled policy banks and investment funds. Analysis suggests that the true dollar liquidity is maintained through these non-disclosed state channels, potentially exceeding the amount held on the central bank's balance sheet. This indicates that China retains significant dollar depth and financial resilience, despite public data suggesting otherwise. Policymakers must therefore look beyond official reserve figures and account for the dollar exposure maintained through these state-owned financial mechanisms when assessing China's global financial strategy.

    Read at CFR

  119. 119.
    2026-05-04 | china_indopacific | 2026-W18 | Topics: China, Indo-Pacific, Trade, United States

    The publication analyzes the acute geopolitical challenge faced by Australia, which is economically tied to China while maintaining a strategic alliance with the United States in the Indo-Pacific. The core argument explores the viability and costs of 'strategic hedging' for middle powers operating in a world where the established rules-based order is under intense revisionist pressure from both major powers. Key reasoning revolves around how allies can preserve strategic autonomy and economic interests when the terms of traditional US alliances are becoming less fixed. Ultimately, the piece offers insights into the limits of Australia's model for other nations seeking to navigate the escalating US-China rivalry without sacrificing their national interests.

    Read at Chatham House

  120. 120.
    2026-05-04 | middle_east | 2026-W18 | Topics: China, Indo-Pacific, Middle East, Nuclear, Russia, Trade, United States

    Pakistan has undergone a significant geopolitical pivot, transforming from a pariah state into an indispensable mediator in major regional conflicts, notably facilitating talks between the US and Iran. This shift is driven by Pakistan's ability to deepen regional alliances (e.g., with Saudi Arabia and Turkey) and its strategic value as a resource hub (rare earths). Consequently, major global powers, including the US and Western democracies, are increasingly willing to overlook human rights concerns to leverage Islamabad's diplomatic contacts and geographic position. Policymakers should recognize Pakistan's growing role as a critical, albeit complex, node for future diplomatic and economic engagement across South Asia and the Middle East.

    Read at CFR

  121. 121.
    2026-05-04 | economy | 2026-W18 | Topics: AI, China, Europe, Indo-Pacific, Middle East, Russia, Trade, United States, Economy

    Amid global trade fragmentation driven by US protectionism and China's export controls, the EU is proactively adapting by pursuing a 'de-risking' strategy to secure its economic future. Key evidence includes the rapid negotiation of landmark bilateral agreements (e.g., Mercosur, India, Indonesia), which go beyond tariff reduction to establish rules on critical minerals, climate, and labor rights. Strategically, this signals that the EU is solidifying its role as a major global trade hub, leveraging preferential agreements to diversify supply chains and reduce dependence on external economic coercion. Policymakers should recognize that the EU's future strategy involves deepening its single market while using these strategic trade pacts to cement its influence in the new, multipolar trade order.

    Read at CSIS

  122. 122.
    2026-05-04 | economy | 2026-W18 | Topics: China, Economy

    Beijing's latest Five-Year Plan signals a major strategic pivot, shifting China's economic focus away from general growth and low-end manufacturing toward mastering high-tech industries. The plan establishes technology and innovation—including AI, semiconductors, and robotics—as the primary, subordinating driver of future development. This document functions as a powerful national signaling mechanism, guiding state-owned enterprises and local governments to align with these technological priorities. Policymakers must recognize this aggressive push for self-reliance, as it mandates a strategic re-evaluation of engagement models across global supply chains and industrial policy.

    Read at Brookings

  123. 123.
    2026-05-04 | defense | 2026-W18 | Topics: China, Middle East, NATO, Nuclear, Russia, Trade, Ukraine, United States, Defense

    Türkiye is undergoing a profound strategic shift to achieve defense-industrial autonomy by building a sophisticated, multi-layered missile arsenal. This transformation is evidenced by a twin-track approach that combines limited foreign imports with aggressive domestic development of both ballistic and cruise missiles. Key advancements include extending missile ranges far beyond initial capabilities and enabling diverse, multi-platform strike options through domestic engine development. This rapid build-up significantly enhances Türkiye's strategic deterrent capabilities, reducing reliance on NATO guarantees and projecting power across wider regional areas.

    Read at IISS

  124. 124.

    Major General Lervik argues that landpower is essential for deterrence, arguing that Norway's strategic location and the heightened threat from Russia necessitate a fundamental shift in defense posture. The key evidence for this change is the realization of Russia's aggressive capabilities, particularly following the invasion of Ukraine, which has led to a unanimous parliamentary decision to more than double defense spending and significantly expand military capacity. Strategically, this mandates that the Norwegian Army focus on robust homeland defense while also taking greater responsibility for the entire Nordic region, thereby reinforcing NATO's collective security commitment in the face of geopolitical tension.

    Read at CSIS

  125. 125.
    2026-05-03 | china_indopacific | 2026-W18 | Topics: China, Indo-Pacific, Russia, Taiwan, Ukraine, United States

    U.S. special forces conducted a maritime strike exercise in the Luzon Strait, deploying advanced, explosive-laden unmanned surface vessels (USVs) and other drone systems. This deployment, utilizing technology similar to those seen in the Black Sea, demonstrates the integration of low-range, mass-strike capabilities into U.S.-Philippine joint operations. Strategically, this signals the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command's preparation for a "hellscape" concept—relying on overwhelming drone saturation to counter potential Chinese naval forces. This escalation increases military readiness and regional tension in the critical Taiwan flashpoint.

    Read at USNI

  126. 126.
    2026-05-01 | china_indopacific | 2026-W18 | Topics: China, Europe, Indo-Pacific, Middle East, NATO, Nuclear, Russia, Taiwan, United States

    The article argues that the rapidly expanding nuclear capabilities of China, coupled with its refusal to engage in arms control talks, are replacing the bipolar nuclear order with a destabilizing tripolar dynamic. Beijing views a strong deterrent as stabilizing, while the U.S. responds by strengthening its own forces and avoiding treaties that exclude China. This escalating arms race, further complicated by Russia's involvement, is creating an anarchic international security environment. To de-escalate, both powers must move beyond rhetoric and increase concrete transparency, particularly regarding short-range nuclear capabilities, to defuse acute regional risks.

    Read at Foreign Affairs

  127. 127.
    2026-05-01 | middle_east | 2026-W18 | Topics: China, Europe, Indo-Pacific, Middle East, Nuclear, Russia, Trade, United States

    The article argues that continued maximalist diplomacy has failed, necessitating a comprehensive 'golden bridge' of compromise for lasting U.S.-Iran peace. This framework requires the U.S. to acknowledge Iran's right to peaceful nuclear development while Iran agrees to strict international oversight. Key to the deal is establishing a regional fund, financed by surcharges on goods transiting the Strait of Hormuz, which would finance reconstruction efforts across the Gulf. Implementing this compromise would stabilize the region, normalize relations, and provide a viable alternative to escalating military conflict.

    Read at Foreign Affairs

  128. 128.
    2026-04-30 | defense | 2026-W18 | Topics: China, Middle East, Nuclear, Russia, United States, Defense

    The article argues that decades of U.S. policy aimed at denuclearizing North Korea have failed, allowing the regime to successfully accelerate its nuclear program and solidify its rule. North Korea has skillfully leveraged shifting geopolitics, bolstering ties with China and Russia, which has rendered previous containment strategies obsolete. Consequently, the U.S. must abandon the goal of complete denuclearization and instead craft a new, pragmatic strategy focused on 'managing' the threat to achieve a stable, albeit cold, peace on the Korean Peninsula.

    Read at Foreign Affairs

  129. 129.
    2026-04-30 | china_indopacific | 2026-W18 | Topics: China, Europe, Indo-Pacific, Middle East, Russia, Trade, Ukraine, United States

    The transition to critical minerals (lithium, cobalt, rare earths) presents a 'new resource curse' far more volatile than the historical oil curse. This risk is amplified by the rapid technological shifts, the geographical concentration of deposits, and the fact that China currently dominates the processing and refining stages for most critical minerals. Unlike the stable, rules-bound oil market, the current geopolitical environment lacks a reliable global governance framework, making supply chains highly susceptible to state-level geopolitical throttling. Policymakers must therefore prepare for unprecedented structural instability, necessitating strategic efforts to diversify supply chains and mitigate risks associated with technological and geopolitical competition.

    Read at Foreign Affairs

  130. 130.
    2026-04-30 | china_indopacific | 2026-W18 | Topics: China, Indo-Pacific, Nuclear, Trade, United States

    The U.S. Navy has declared Initial Operational Capability (IOC) for the P-8A Poseidon Increment 3 Block 2, significantly enhancing its maritime intelligence, surveillance, and targeting (ISR&T) capabilities. These advanced platforms are being utilized by allies, such as New Zealand, to conduct patrols in the Yellow and East China Seas to monitor North Korean sanctions evasion. While these joint surveillance efforts enforce international mandates, they have escalated geopolitical friction, prompting China to protest the operations as 'harassment' that threatens its sovereignty. This trend indicates a sustained increase in high-end maritime surveillance operations in the Indo-Pacific, raising the risk of miscalculation between major powers.

    Read at USNI

  131. 131.
    2026-04-30 | china_indopacific | 2026-W18 | Topics: China, Indo-Pacific, Taiwan, Trade, United States

    The significant decline in American fentanyl overdose deaths is primarily attributed to a supply shock, rather than increased demand-side interventions like treatment or naloxone availability. Key evidence shows that falling seizure rates and purity levels of fentanyl in both the U.S. and Canada correlate directly with the drop in fatalities. This suggests that the critical constraint is the precursor chemical supply, pointing to increased regulatory control by Chinese authorities. Policymakers must therefore shift focus to the global chemical supply chain, making fentanyl control a critical, enduring feature of US-China diplomatic and counternarcotics negotiations.

    Read at Foreign Affairs

  132. 132.
    2026-04-29 | china_indopacific | 2026-W18 | Topics: AI, China, Indo-Pacific, Middle East, Nuclear, Russia, Taiwan, Trade, Ukraine, United States

    The primary threat to Taiwan is not a traditional military invasion, but rather a sophisticated 'gray zone' coercion utilizing economic and logistical control, such as establishing a quarantine over maritime and air links. China is leveraging this control to restrict key exports, particularly advanced semiconductor components, thereby forcing regional compliance without triggering a full-scale conflict. Consequently, the U.S. must shift its strategic focus from preparing for military war games to developing integrated economic and diplomatic plans with allies. Deterring a severe financial and political crisis requires pre-coordinated responses to cushion market shocks and manage potential partial decoupling from China.

    Read at Foreign Affairs

  133. 133.
    2026-04-27 | middle_east | 2026-W17 | Topics: China, Europe, Middle East, Nuclear, Trade, Ukraine, United States

    The analysis concludes that while an indefinite ceasefire has temporarily paused hostilities, a lasting resolution to the Iran conflict is highly improbable due to fundamental, irreconcilable differences between the US and the Iranian regime. Key sticking points include the Iranian control over the vital Strait of Hormuz and the regime's insistence on its nuclear enrichment capabilities, which the US demands be curtailed by a lengthy moratorium. Consequently, the conflict remains strategically volatile; if diplomatic negotiations fail to bridge these deep divides, the region is likely to revert to an active military phase, maintaining significant geopolitical risk.

    Read at Brookings

  134. 134.
    2026-04-27 | economy | 2026-W17 | Topics: AI, China, Climate, Europe, Indo-Pacific, Trade, United States, Economy

    The article analyzes the impact of the EU's Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) and proposes a Voluntary Export Fee (VEF) as a strategic U.S. response. The VEF would allow U.S. exporters to pay a voluntary domestic carbon fee, which would then qualify for a credit against the CBAM liabilities levied by the EU. This mechanism redirects projected EU revenue (estimated at up to $400 million annually) back to the U.S. government, providing a politically feasible alternative to a mandatory domestic carbon tax. Implementing the VEF would enable the U.S. to align its trade policy with global decarbonization efforts while simultaneously generating dedicated funds for domestic clean manufacturing and infrastructure.

    Read at Brookings

  135. 135.

    The U.S. military's future focus in the Western Hemisphere is shifting from great power competition to combating transnational criminal organizations (TCOs), drug trafficking, and narco-terrorism. This pivot is evidenced by recent threat assessments that prioritize illicit border actors over state rivals, leading to increased joint military operations and intelligence sharing with regional allies. Strategically, the U.S. will continue to deepen military cooperation through joint training and counter-cartel campaigns. However, the article cautions that sustained success requires coupling these security efforts with broader diplomatic and economic initiatives to address local concerns regarding sovereignty and human rights.

    Read at CSIS

  136. 136.
    2026-04-27 | defense | 2026-W17 | Topics: AI, China, Trade, United States, Defense

    The panel argues that while the U.S. has historically dominated biomedical research, its leadership position is now critically threatened by global competitors, most notably China, which has strategically prioritized and invested heavily in its biotech sector. To maintain technological superiority, the U.S. must implement systemic reforms, including streamlining regulatory processes and creating a unified federal approach to biomanufacturing. Policy recommendations emphasize treating biotech data as a strategic asset, requiring data sharing from federal grants, and integrating the sector more closely with national defense and security needs. Failure to act swiftly risks a significant and potentially irreversible setback in U.S. technological and economic power.

    Read at CFR

  137. 137.
    2026-04-27 | middle_east | 2026-W17 | Topics: China, Middle East, NATO, Russia, United States

    The Iran War has exposed a critical gap between U.S. analytical foresight and actual policy execution, forcing a reassessment of foundational assumptions. Key evidence demonstrates that Iran has invalidated previous assumptions by broadening its attacks across all Gulf nations and gaining significant economic leverage through its control of the Strait of Hormuz. While the regime's resilience to decapitation remains accurate, the conflict shows Iran is abandoning plausible deniability for more overt, direct attacks. Consequently, U.S. policy must urgently update its strategic framework to account for Iran's increased regional aggression and its sustained ability to maintain power despite external pressure.

    Read at CFR

  138. 138.

    The analysis argues that while U.S. sanctions are powerful tools for geopolitical leverage, they inevitably generate unintended loopholes, exemplified by the 'shadow fleet.' Enforcement strategies must be highly tailored, ranging from the banking-focused 'carrot and stick' model used against Iran, to the price-cap mechanism implemented against Russia. This shift demonstrates that modern sanctions must balance punitive goals with the critical need to maintain global energy market stability. Policymakers must therefore design sophisticated regimes that prevent market shocks while achieving strategic objectives.

    Read at CFR

  139. 139.
    2026-04-27 | china_indopacific | 2026-W17 | Topics: China, Climate, Taiwan, Indo-Pacific

    The Chatham House debate reveals that while China's rapid military modernization, technological ambitions, and efforts to reshape global norms pose a fundamental challenge to the international order, labeling it the sole primary threat is an oversimplification. Experts debated whether the challenge is purely geopolitical or if it is complicated by China's deep integration into the global economy and its role in addressing transnational issues like climate change. The consensus is that the challenge is multifaceted, stemming from complex great power competition rather than an inevitable path to conflict. Policymakers must therefore adopt a nuanced strategy that addresses multiple, interconnected risks shaping a fragmented international system.

    Read at Chatham House

  140. 140.
    2026-04-27 | china_indopacific | 2026-W17 | Topics: China, Indo-Pacific, Trade, United States

    Facing global market shocks triggered by vulnerabilities in critical mineral and energy mega chokepoints, Japan is initiating a comprehensive economic security reset. This strategic pivot is driven by geopolitical risks, such as potential disruptions in rare earth supplies or energy flows through key straits. To buttress national resilience, the Takaichi administration plans to update its security legislation, establish a new national intelligence agency, and integrate defense promotion into its industrial policy. These measures signal a heightened focus on strategic autonomy and deepening economic security cooperation with allied nations, particularly the United States.

    Read at Brookings

  141. 141.
    2026-04-27 | middle_east | 2026-W17 | Topics: China, Middle East, Nuclear, Russia, Trade, United States

    The article argues that the U.S. naval blockade of the Strait of Hormuz is a high-risk gamble unlikely to succeed in coercing Iran into accepting U.S. terms. While the blockade aims to trigger an economic collapse, the analysis notes that Iran has demonstrated resilience, and the global energy market remains highly vulnerable to escalation. Furthermore, the U.S. faces significant domestic political backlash and the risk of a direct military confrontation with Iran or China. Consequently, the authors suggest that the potential for catastrophic global economic fallout outweighs the strategic benefits, making the current policy unsustainable.

    Read at CFR

  142. 142.

    The article argues that Section 702 is an indispensable intelligence asset, crucial for thwarting modern threats including terrorism, cybercrime, and foreign espionage. Its effectiveness is evidenced by its proven ability to provide actionable intelligence on state and non-state actors, despite ongoing privacy concerns regarding U.S. persons' data. The report counters critics by highlighting the extraordinary oversight reforms already implemented, such as mandatory internal audits and national security nexus requirements. Therefore, the policy recommendation is a straightforward reauthorization of the program as is, avoiding restrictive changes like mandatory warrants that could severely hamper national security capabilities.

    Read at CSIS

  143. 143.
    2026-04-27 | china_indopacific | 2026-W17 | Topics: China, Europe, Indo-Pacific, United States

    The article argues that the US withdrawal from international bodies like UNESCO and its shift toward hard power are eroding its global soft power influence, creating a vacuum that China is actively filling. Key evidence includes China's appointment of leaders to global educational roles, its sustained soft power investments via the Belt and Road Initiative, and its decisive domestic expansion of education and AI regulations for minors. The implication is that the US risks ceding global leadership in critical areas like AI governance and educational standards to Beijing. Policymakers are advised that the US must re-engage in global forums and learn from international models to counter this decline in influence.

    Read at Brookings

  144. 144.
    2026-04-27 | middle_east | 2026-W17 | Topics: China, Indo-Pacific, Middle East, Nuclear, United States

    The conflict with Iran demonstrated that US forward military bases are highly vulnerable to sustained attacks, regardless of the US's conventional military overmatch. Iran leveraged its proximity and ability to launch missiles and drones against multiple US bases across the region, forcing the Pentagon to consider remote operations. This vulnerability necessitates a strategic reevaluation of the operational value of large, forward-deployed bases, raising questions about their utility in modern conflict and potentially impacting basing strategies across both the Middle East and the Indo-Pacific.

    Read at CATO

  145. 145.
    2026-04-27 | americas | 2026-W17 | Topics: China, Climate, Europe, Middle East, Russia, Trade, Ukraine, United States, Americas

    The core argument presented is that the United States is currently experiencing a state of "superpower suicide," a decline that is largely self-inflicted rather than purely structural. This systemic weakening is evidenced by the erosion of institutional integrity across multiple domains, including education, research, and adherence to democratic norms. The analysis stresses that the fundamental problem is the loss of a unified ideology of the American state, which is being treated by some actors as merely a prestige or profit-making enterprise. For the US to reverse this decline, policy must focus on restoring institutional stability, reaffirming democratic processes, and establishing a shared, unifying vision of the American state.

    Read at CFR

  146. 146.

    The expiration of the U.S.-Iran truce is marked by significant diplomatic uncertainty, despite preparations for potential talks in Pakistan. Key evidence suggests that negotiations are complicated by internal divisions within Iran's leadership and the volatile actions of regional powers, including Israel and the U.S. The core finding is that while the logic for peace exists, the lack of unified, compromising leadership across the region makes achieving a stable diplomatic resolution highly improbable. Consequently, the geopolitical environment remains fragile, increasing the risk of continued tension or conflict.

    Read at CFR

  147. 147.
    2026-04-27 | china_indopacific | 2026-W17 | Topics: China, Middle East, Russia, Indo-Pacific

    North Korea's regime stability is maintained through a complex blend of authoritarian internal control, dynastic ideology, and strategic geopolitical alignment. The Kim dynasty has successfully leveraged this model across generations by deepening ties with major external powers, including Russia, China, and Iran, to navigate a shifting global order. Analysis of the regime's evolving ideology and domestic policy drivers is critical for understanding its current trajectory. Ultimately, tracking these internal and external pressures is key to predicting regional instability and the challenges associated with potential future leadership transitions.

    Read at Brookings

  148. 148.
    2026-04-27 | china_indopacific | 2026-W17 | Topics: AI, China, Middle East, Nuclear, Taiwan, Trade, Ukraine, United States, Indo-Pacific

    Taiwan's progress in building defense resilience and leveraging its status as a tech superpower is being undermined by deep political polarization. While the island has enhanced its military readiness and economic ties with the U.S., the inability to pass a special defense budget due to internal political disputes creates a critical vulnerability. This impasse allows China to exert pressure, making it difficult for Taiwan to maintain deterrence and invest in necessary defense capabilities. Strategically, Taiwan must prioritize internal political consensus to fund its defense and resilience efforts, thereby eliminating coercion as a viable option for Beijing and forcing dialogue.

    Read at CFR

  149. 149.
    2026-04-27 | middle_east | 2026-W17 | Topics: China, Indo-Pacific, Middle East, Nuclear, Russia, Trade, United States

    Despite the failure of recent U.S.-Iran ceasefire talks, the analysis suggests that the mutual reluctance of both sides to resume open conflict indicates a strong underlying desire for peace. The U.S. response—imposing a naval blockade on the Strait of Hormuz—is intended to create significant economic and diplomatic pain, forcing Tehran to concede to American terms. However, the effectiveness of this coercion is questionable, as such campaigns take time to materialize. Strategically, the situation remains volatile, suggesting that while high-level diplomacy is ongoing, the potential for renewed hostilities persists.

    Read at CFR

  150. 150.
    2026-04-27 | europe | 2026-W17 | Topics: China, Middle East, Russia, Ukraine, United States, Europe

    Lord Robertson argues that the UK's historical 'naïve belief' in the perpetual support of the United States has led to a dangerous diminishment of its own defense capabilities. He cites recent strains in the UK-US relationship, such as geopolitical disagreements and the US's shifting focus, as evidence that the US's role as global steward is waning. Consequently, the report urges the UK to pivot away from high military dependence on Washington, emphasizing the urgent need to build greater autonomy and develop robust defense partnerships with European allies. This shift is necessary to deter aggression and adapt to a fundamentally destabilizing international system.

    Read at Chatham House

  151. 151.
    2026-04-27 | diplomacy | 2026-W17 | Topics: China, Middle East, Nuclear, Russia, Ukraine, United States, Diplomacy

    Rafael Grossi argues that the UN requires a proactive, 'realist' leader to revitalize its mission and restore global trust amid mounting crises. He draws on his experience at the IAEA, citing his ability to manage complex, high-stakes negotiations in conflict zones, such as preventing a nuclear accident in occupied Ukraine. His strategy emphasizes taking the initiative to forestall conflict and maintaining constant engagement with the Security Council, even when consensus is difficult. Ultimately, Grossi suggests that by exercising diplomatic authority and restoring trust among major powers, the UN can overcome its funding and institutional challenges.

    Read at CFR

  152. 152.
    2026-04-27 | energy | 2026-W17 | Topics: China, Middle East, Energy

    The Chatham House analysis emphasizes that international law, specifically the UNCLOS regime of 'transit passage,' guarantees unimpeded passage through the Strait of Hormuz, overriding local coastal state sovereignty. The article critiques unilateral blockades, such as the proposed US action, as illegal and highly escalatory, noting that the Strait is vital for global energy trade. Given its critical role in maritime commerce, adherence to established international law is paramount; any conflict escalation must respect the right of passage to prevent catastrophic global economic disruption.

    Read at Chatham House

  153. 153.
    2026-04-27 | energy | 2026-W17 | Topics: China, Climate, Europe, Middle East, Russia, Trade, United States, Energy

    The analysis argues that during major supply disruptions, the physical oil market (real barrels) is a more reliable indicator of true supply-demand imbalances than the financial 'paper' futures market. The current crisis is characterized as a 1970s-style supply shock, causing physical prices to diverge sharply from futures prices, which are masking the true scarcity. Policymakers must recognize that high physical prices reflect acute supply constraints, and relying on moderate futures prices can send false signals of market stability. Furthermore, broad government price interventions risk creating a moral hazard, potentially hindering necessary behavioral changes and slowing the energy recovery.

    Read at CSIS

  154. 154.
    2026-04-27 | americas | 2026-W17 | Topics: China, Europe, Middle East, NATO, Russia, Ukraine, United States, Americas

    The attempted shooting at the White House Correspondents’ Association dinner underscores the persistent threat of political violence against democratic institutions. Global leaders and domestic politicians from various parties issued strong condemnations, providing evidence that the threat is systemic and bipartisan. Policy-wise, the consensus among leaders suggests that a unified political front is crucial to counter the erosion of civil liberties and maintain democratic stability in the Americas.

    Read at CFR

  155. 155.
    2026-04-27 | economy | 2026-W17 | Topics: China, Europe, NATO, Russia, Trade, United States, Economy

    The analysis argues that NATO functions as a powerful economic engine, generating a long-term trade premium of 12–27% among members, far exceeding its purely security mandate. This economic benefit is driven by institutional trust, standardized interoperability, and the deep integration of supply chains centered on U.S. platforms. Crucially, the report warns that U.S. withdrawal would impose massive, avoidable costs, including a projected 16.1% drop in U.S. exports and a 4% decline in U.S. GDP. Policymakers must recognize that maintaining the U.S. role as the central industrial hub is critical to preserving these compounding economic benefits and preventing a costly, slow-to-recover decoupling.

    Read at CSIS

  156. 156.
    2026-04-27 | diplomacy | 2026-W17 | Topics: China, Climate, Middle East, Russia, Trade, Ukraine, United States, Diplomacy

    The article argues that the deliberate weaponization of food—through blocking aid or targeting infrastructure—is a growing, global trend that operates with near impunity, despite international legal prohibitions. This crisis is exacerbated by the decline of global humanitarian funding and systemic failures within international governance, particularly the political deadlock and veto power within the UN Security Council. Strategically, the report calls for a shift toward strengthening accountability mechanisms, including targeted sanctions and independent monitoring, while also advocating for the diversification of aid funding away from traditional state-led models.

    Read at CFR

  157. 157.
    2026-04-27 | middle_east | 2026-W17 | Topics: China, Climate, Europe, Middle East, NATO, Nuclear, Russia, United States

    The three-week extension of the Israel-Lebanon ceasefire is a diplomatic effort intended to create stability and buy time for comprehensive peace negotiations. This pause is strategically vital because the ongoing conflict between Israel and Hezbollah has previously served as a major obstacle to broader U.S.-Iran diplomatic efforts. While the truce provides immediate de-escalation, the skepticism expressed by Iran-backed groups suggests that core geopolitical tensions remain unresolved. Policymakers must therefore leverage this window to solidify a comprehensive peace framework that addresses regional power dynamics and de-escalates the wider conflict with Tehran.

    Read at CFR

  158. 158.
    2026-04-27 | china_indopacific | 2026-W17 | Topics: China, Europe, Indo-Pacific, Middle East, Russia, Taiwan, Trade

    The Chatham House analysis argues that a crisis over Taiwan poses a far greater global economic threat than a disruption in the Strait of Hormuz. This risk stems from Taiwan's pivotal role as the world's leading producer of advanced semiconductors, which are critical, non-substitutable components for modern AI and electronics. A blockade or conflict could trigger a catastrophic global GDP decline, necessitating urgent policy action. To mitigate this, Europe must accelerate the diversification of semiconductor supply chains, deepen intelligence and technical cooperation with Taiwan, and actively communicate the severe global costs of escalation to Beijing.

    Read at Chatham House

  159. 159.

    The report identifies a critical "missing middle" gap, estimated at $100-$200 billion, where emerging energy technologies struggle to transition from small-scale proof-of-concept to commercial deployment due to perceived investment risk. This gap is exacerbated by global economic shifts, such as inflation and rising interest rates, which make large-scale, high-risk capital difficult to secure. To bridge this, the authors argue that relying solely on private investment is insufficient, necessitating a multi-faceted approach. Policy solutions must combine public demand guarantees (federal and state level) with private risk-transfer mechanisms, such as new insurance models, to de-risk projects and stimulate diverse capital flows. The successful scaling of energy innovation requires a combination of policy support and private sector action, rather than any single solution.

    Read at CFR

  160. 160.
    2026-04-27 | china_indopacific | 2026-W17 | Topics: China, Trade, Indo-Pacific

    A Chatham House fellow warned that the UK's reliance on China for critical minerals constitutes a severe economic vulnerability, which Beijing could weaponize to exert significant economic coercion. He argued that the optimum policy must be hybrid, requiring the UK to first identify its main vulnerabilities and then formulate detailed strategies to mitigate foreign exploitation. To build resilience, the UK must cooperate with allies to establish rare earth supply chains insulated from China, actively court foreign investment for domestic mining and refining, and support product recycling to diversify sources.

    Read at Chatham House

  161. 161.
    2026-04-27 | china_indopacific | 2026-W17 | Topics: China, Climate, Europe, Indo-Pacific, Trade, United States

    The Brookings panel argues that while Chinese investment in clean energy presents layered strategic risks, a blanket restriction is unnecessary. Key concerns include China's overwhelming dominance in critical clean energy supply chains and minerals, which creates significant economic dependency. While hard security risks may necessitate decoupling in critical technologies, other risks can be managed by implementing dual-sourced supply chains for components. Policy should therefore adopt a nuanced, risk-based approach, allowing partnerships where U.S. benefits and climate goals outweigh the identified dangers.

    Read at Brookings

  162. 162.
    2026-04-27 | economy | 2026-W17 | Topics: China, Middle East, Nuclear, Trade, Economy

    While US assets demonstrated relative resilience and maintained their safe-haven status during the Iran conflict, the Chatham House analysis cautions that this stability may be conjunctural rather than structural. The good performance of the dollar and US markets may simply reflect the US's current economic insulation, particularly its status as a major energy and weapons producer. Policymakers should note that this reliance on US strength is challenged by the remarkable stability of rival economies, such as China, whose financial calm suggests that global currency dominance is subject to multiple, non-US-centric factors.

    Read at Chatham House

  163. 163.
    2026-04-27 | diplomacy | 2026-W17 | Topics: China, Europe, Middle East, Trade, Diplomacy

    The global order is undergoing rapid transformation, driven by the shifting strategies of the US and China, which creates significant uncertainty regarding established international norms and institutions. This instability presents a critical opportunity for non-aligned nations, particularly the Global South, to actively shape the rules of the emerging world order. Policymakers must navigate the tension between preserving existing structures (like the WTO and UN) and establishing new governance frameworks for challenges such as climate change and AI. Strategic focus must therefore shift toward multilateral diplomacy that empowers diverse regional actors to mediate between great power competition and ensure global stability.

    Read at Chatham House

  164. 164.
    2026-04-27 | economy | 2026-W17 | Topics: China, Europe, Trade, United States, Economy

    This analysis argues that the administration's planned tariffs under Section 301 are likely a 'sham' because the decision to impose them appears predetermined, regardless of the investigation's findings. The author critiques the USTR's methodology for determining 'Structural Excess Capacity' (SEC), citing that the process relies on arbitrary benchmarks (such as the 80% utilization rate) and fails to establish clear causal links. Furthermore, the piece notes that the U.S. government itself utilizes numerous non-market policies and subsidies, suggesting that the US should examine its own trade practices rather than solely focusing on foreign nations. Consequently, the article warns that the impending tariffs may be based on legally and economically dubious data, signaling a potential overreach in US trade policy.

    Read at CATO

  165. 165.
    2026-04-27 | middle_east | 2026-W17 | Topics: China, Indo-Pacific, Middle East, Nuclear, Russia, United States

    The recent U.S.-Iran peace talks failed due to irreconcilable red lines, particularly concerning Iran's nuclear program and the status of the Strait of Hormuz. The subsequent U.S. blockade, intended to exert economic pressure, is proving ineffective and creates significant global diplomatic and economic instability. The analysis suggests that the current strategy of military pressure or blockades is unlikely to force Iran's hand and risks escalating into a broader conflict. Consequently, the U.S. must pivot away from simple punitive measures and re-examine its diplomatic options to manage the crisis without triggering a wider war.

    Read at CFR

  166. 166.
    2026-04-27 | energy | 2026-W17 | Topics: China, Climate, Europe, Middle East, Trade, United States, Energy

    The article argues that geopolitical instability, such as the potential closure of the Strait of Hormuz, accelerates the global shift toward clean energy, positioning China as the dominant leader in the new 'electrostate' model. China's advantage stems from its comprehensive control over the 'new trio' (solar, batteries, EVs) and critical manufacturing infrastructure, including rare-earth elements and electrical grid hardware. This deepens China's global economic leverage, challenging the traditional 'petrostate' model. For the United States, the implication is that it must urgently pivot its strategy away from resource dependence and compete effectively in the 'Age of Electricity' to mitigate China's growing geopolitical influence.

    Read at CFR

  167. 167.
    2026-04-27 | middle_east | 2026-W17 | Topics: China, Europe, Middle East, United States

    Trump's extension of the U.S.-Iran truce temporarily alleviates immediate fears of large-scale conflict and stabilized oil markets. However, the truce is fragile, as both Washington and Tehran continue to violate the ceasefire and maintain blockades in the Strait of Hormuz. Strategically, the focus must shift from military confrontation to resolving the critical economic choke point, as mutual opening of the Strait is identified as the most crucial confidence-boosting step. Policymakers must therefore pursue de-escalation efforts while managing persistent regional flashpoints, including tensions in Lebanon and Iraq.

    Read at CFR

  168. 168.
    2026-04-27 | economy | 2026-W17 | Topics: AI, China, United States, Economy

    The article argues that the AI economy has not matured and that sustained value will not come from merely improving existing processes, but from using AI as a catalyst for fundamental, innovative redesigns of entire workflows. As true operational costs become visible, current process-improvement models are likely to face margin compression, necessitating a shift toward high-margin, innovation-enabling business models. To facilitate this transition, policymakers must adopt an industry-specific regulatory approach, prioritize data privacy certainty, and invest heavily in upskilling the workforce. Ultimately, the focus of geopolitical competition should be on enabling scalable, innovative AI use rather than simply increasing AI capacity.

    Read at CSIS

  169. 169.
    2026-04-27 | economy | 2026-W17 | Topics: China, Middle East, Nuclear, Trade, United States, Economy

    The U.S. government is aggressively expanding its industrial policy toolkit, moving beyond traditional grants and loans to take direct equity stakes and securing novel rights (like 'golden shares' and warrants) in strategic private companies. This effort, totaling billions in investments, is primarily aimed at protecting critical supply chains—particularly in minerals, manufacturing, and semiconductors—and strengthening technological leadership. The urgency for these investments is driven by geopolitical risks, such as China's export controls and the need for domestic military production capacity. Policymakers are likely to continue deploying these complex financing structures and managing the resulting oversight roles to ensure domestic resilience and maintain economic self-sufficiency.

    Read at CFR

  170. 170.
    2026-04-27 | diplomacy | 2026-W17 | Topics: China, Europe, Middle East, Nuclear, Russia, Trade, Ukraine, United States, Diplomacy

    Grossi argues that the current global environment, marked by a 'multiplication of conflict,' has led to a crisis of confidence in the United Nations' effectiveness. He counters this skepticism by highlighting his operational experience, specifically detailing his successful establishment of a permanent, independent mission at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant in occupied Ukrainian territory. This case serves as key evidence that the Secretary-General must be an active, hands-on mediator, willing to navigate intense geopolitical opposition to manage critical, non-military threats. The implication for policy is that the UN requires a leader who can exercise diplomatic muscle and technical expertise to maintain international stability and prevent catastrophic crises.

    Read at CFR

  171. 171.

    This RAND report identifies agricultural security in the U.S. Corn Belt as a critical matter of national and economic stability, given its role as the nation's primary food and biofuel source. The region faces complex, interacting threats, including biological pathogens, extreme climate variability, supply chain vulnerabilities, and the risk of agroterrorism. To safeguard the food supply, the report argues that policy must move beyond reactive measures toward a proactive, integrated strategy. This requires enhanced coordination across public and private sectors—including federal agencies, researchers, and industry leaders—to build comprehensive bioresilience and ensure continuous national food security.

    Read at RAND

  172. 172.
    2026-04-27 | middle_east | 2026-W17 | Topics: AI, China, Europe, Indo-Pacific, Middle East, Trade, United States

    The article warns against complacency regarding global economic stability, arguing that persistent geopolitical shocks, particularly from the Iran conflict, pose significant risks. Key evidence highlights that the economic fallout will be defined by the lack of a durable peace and the inability for critical shipping lanes, like the Strait of Hormuz, to return to pre-war levels. Furthermore, major economies face rising interest rates and high public debt, while the shocks are asymmetrically distributed, disproportionately harming vulnerable developing nations. Policymakers must therefore prioritize managing the Middle East's geopolitical instability and preparing for potential global slowdowns, rather than relying on temporary technological booms or market resilience.

    Read at CFR

  173. 173.
    2026-04-27 | americas | 2026-W17 | Topics: China, Europe, Russia, Trade, United States, Americas

    Cuba is currently experiencing a severe, multi-faceted crisis marked by economic collapse, acute shortages, and sustained outward migration, placing immense strain on the regime. The analysis posits that the regime's resilience is being tested by a combination of internal pressures and the ongoing constraints of the US embargo. The discussion will examine how the Cuban state is coping with these mounting pressures, paying close attention to the varying roles of external actors, including the US, China, Russia, and Europe. Ultimately, the report aims to assess the geopolitical risks for both the Cuban population and US interests, highlighting the complexity of external intervention.

    Read at Chatham House

  174. 174.
    2026-04-27 | diplomacy | 2026-W17 | Topics: China, Europe, Indo-Pacific, Taiwan, Trade, United States, Diplomacy

    The Spanish-American War was less about Cuba and more about the United States' transition from a regional power to a global one. This shift was driven by a confluence of factors: rapid industrialization creating economic ambition, a desire to project power beyond the Western Hemisphere, and heightened nationalistic fervor, often amplified by the sensationalism of the 'yellow press.' The conflict demonstrated the U.S.'s capacity for military intervention and established its role as a major world power. Strategically, this event marked the permanent expansion of U.S. foreign policy interests, moving beyond the confines of the Monroe Doctrine and setting the stage for global engagement.

    Read at CFR

  175. 175.
    2026-04-27 | middle_east | 2026-W17 | Topics: China, Indo-Pacific, Middle East, Russia, Trade, Ukraine, United States

    The Iran War is accelerating a major trend: the formation of a powerful, global network of authoritarian collaboration, spearheaded by China and Russia. This collaboration is evident through critical military and economic support provided to Iran, and is strategically advancing the goal of global dedollarization, exemplified by Iran's use of the yuan in the Strait of Hormuz. Policy implications suggest that the world is moving toward a post-U.S. world order, challenging democratic institutions and traditional alliances. Policymakers must recognize that this growing autocracy bloc is defying historical assumptions about international cooperation and poses a systemic threat to the existing global order.

    Read at CFR

  176. 176.
    2026-04-24 | middle_east | 2026-W17 | Topics: China, Indo-Pacific, Middle East, Nuclear, Trade, United States

    Tensions between the U.S. and Iran have effectively paralyzed maritime shipping in the Middle East, as both powers engage in escalating interdictions and seizures of vessels. The U.S. is expanding its enforcement reach by interdicting sanctioned ships in the Indian Ocean, while Iran is matching these actions within the Strait of Hormuz, using fast attack craft to assert control. This strategic competition is not merely about blockades but serves to bolster negotiating positions regarding regional control and global trade routes. The resulting instability significantly disrupts global supply chains, necessitating heightened vigilance and potentially forcing global powers to reconsider maritime security strategies in the region.

    Read at USNI

  177. 177.
    2026-04-24 | china_indopacific | 2026-W17 | Topics: Indo-Pacific, Nuclear, United States, China

    North Korea conducted another test launch of short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs), this time armed with cluster munitions, demonstrating an aggressive push to modernize its arsenal. The key evidence includes the launch of five tactical missiles toward an island in the Sea of Japan, confirming the operational use and capabilities of these new warheads. This repeated testing significantly escalates regional tensions and constitutes a clear violation of international norms, necessitating continued heightened military vigilance. Strategically, the development and deployment of cluster munitions raise concerns about the proliferation of indiscriminate weapons and underscore the urgent need for coordinated deterrence and diplomatic pressure from regional partners.

    Read at USNI

  178. 178.
    2026-04-23 | defense | 2026-W17 | Topics: China, Indo-Pacific, Nuclear, Trade, United States, Defense

    Australia plans a substantial increase in defense spending of $37.9 billion over the next decade, driven by concerns over the weakening international rules-based order. The strategy identifies rising geopolitical strain and the growing military power of revisionist states, particularly China, as the primary destabilizing forces in the Indo-Pacific. To counter this, Australia will deepen its military capabilities through major investments in AUKUS projects, advanced naval assets, and strengthening alliances with the United States. This shift signals a more assertive regional posture aimed at maintaining collective deterrence and securing national interests amidst increasing regional rivalry.

    Read at USNI

  179. 179.
    2026-04-23 | china_indopacific | 2026-W17 | Topics: China, Indo-Pacific, Middle East, Russia, Ukraine, United States

    The U.S. Navy has finalized plans to integrate Advanced Capability 3 (PAC-3 MSE) missiles onto its Aegis-equipped destroyers and cruisers. This upgrade leverages the existing Mark 41 VLS and Aegis Combat System to significantly boost naval air defense capabilities. The decision is driven by the high tempo of recent conflicts in the Middle East and the strategic necessity of reinforcing U.S. defenses against advanced threats. Crucially, the integration is designed to counter evolving anti-ship and hypersonic missile capabilities posed by adversaries, particularly China and Russia, in the Indo-Pacific theater.

    Read at USNI

  180. 180.
    2026-04-22 | china_indopacific | 2026-W17 | Topics: China, United States, Indo-Pacific

    The U.S. Navy successfully tested the JDAM Long Range (GBU-75), a guided munition that significantly extends strike capability to 300 nautical miles, far exceeding current anti-ship missiles. This development addresses the critical need for greater standoff range, allowing naval aviation to maintain a tactical advantage when facing near-peer adversaries with advanced air and missile defense networks. Furthermore, the munition's mining variant provides a potent area denial capability, which is strategically viewed as a countermeasure against potential Chinese landings and naval movements in critical chokepoints. This enhanced range and dual-mission capability bolster U.S. force projection and deterrence in contested maritime environments.

    Read at USNI

  181. 181.
    2026-04-22 | china_indopacific | 2026-W17 | Topics: China, Indo-Pacific, Taiwan, United States

    The U.S. Army is significantly expanding its logistical and staging footprint at Subic Bay, Philippines, utilizing a private, American-owned facility for joint exercises and alliance contingencies. This increased presence involves staging sensitive military assets and requiring armed security support for complex logistics operations (LOGCAP). Strategically, this development solidifies the U.S. military commitment to the Philippines, enhancing its ability to project power and counter perceived Chinese coercion in the South China Sea and the broader Indo-Pacific theater.

    Read at USNI

  182. 182.
    2026-04-22 | china_indopacific | 2026-W17 | Topics: AI, China, Indo-Pacific, Middle East, NATO, Nuclear, Russia, Taiwan, Ukraine, United States

    Indo-Pacific Commander Adm. Samuel Paparo argues that the recent conflict with Iran, despite diverting assets, provides valuable lessons that will strengthen U.S. deterrence in the Indo-Pacific. The conflict demonstrated the power of asymmetric warfare and low-cost munitions, a capability that adversaries like China are studying for potential use against Taiwan. To maintain regional stability and 'overmatch' China's expected military expansion, the U.S. must urgently increase defense spending, modernize its fleet, and encourage the rapid innovation and production of advanced, non-traditional weapons systems.

    Read at USNI

  183. 183.
    2026-04-21 | economy | 2026-W17 | Topics: China, Trade, United States

    China's expanding commercial engagement across Latin America is highly variable, with outcomes depending on the specific country and sector. Evidence shows a mixed impact, ranging from Venezuela's debt-ridden oil loans to Chile's successful agricultural timing and Brazil's booming petroleum trade. While Chinese investment generates tax revenue and jobs, the process is frequently associated with significant environmental damage, corruption, and unsustainable debt accumulation. Policymakers must recognize that the economic benefits of this trade are often coupled with severe governance risks, requiring nuanced regional strategies rather than blanket policy responses.

    Read at Foreign Affairs

  184. 184.
    2026-04-21 | diplomacy | 2026-W17 | Topics: China, Europe, United States

    While China has significantly expanded its influence in Central Asia through infrastructure investment, soft power, and security ties, this growing presence is generating substantial popular backlash. Local grievances are rooted in real issues, including environmental damage, corruption, and unfair labor practices associated with Chinese-funded projects. The resistance suggests that Central Asian nations are wary of potentially costly resource deals and the terms of Chinese engagement. Policymakers in the US and Europe should recognize that China's influence is not universally welcomed and that the region may be receptive to credible, alternative development models.

    Read at Foreign Affairs

  185. 185.
    2026-04-21 | society | 2026-W17 | Topics: China, Middle East, United States

    This global history argues against viewing Islam as a monolithic or static civilization, emphasizing instead its profound adaptability, nuance, and regional diversity across millennia. The book substantiates this by tracing Islam's varied expressions through a vast scope, linking historical figures (like Mansa Musa and Zheng He) with modern nationalisms and revivalist movements. For policy, the key implication is that simplistic, monolithic frameworks of the 'Islamic world' are inaccurate and counterproductive. Strategic engagement must therefore adopt a highly nuanced approach, recognizing the deep internal variations and local contexts of Muslim communities.

    Read at Foreign Affairs

  186. 186.
    2026-04-21 | defense | 2026-W17 | Topics: China, Nuclear, United States, Defense

    The Pentagon has declared the timely delivery of the Columbia-class ballistic missile submarine a 'life or death imperative,' signaling an urgent overhaul of the naval shipbuilding industrial base. Due to significant production delays and a massive increase in required man-hours, the Navy is implementing unprecedented measures, including authorizing risk and restructuring oversight through a dedicated 'submarine czar' role reporting directly to the Deputy Defense Secretary. This top-down intervention aims to break down historical bureaucratic barriers and accelerate construction to meet both strategic readiness goals and international obligations, such as the AUKUS agreement. The policy implication is a significant, high-risk commitment to modernizing defense acquisition processes to ensure the timely deployment of critical strategic assets.

    Read at USNI

  187. 187.
    2026-04-21 | americas | 2026-W17 | Topics: China, United States

    The study argues that Cuba's economic reforms are not true market liberalizations but rather state efforts to increase control through complex regulations, which ultimately stifled private initiative and growth. Key evidence shows that the state and market are deeply intertwined, and the overreach of government interventions has led to widespread disillusionment, causing Cubans to increasingly view the state as an antagonist rather than a social unifier. The primary implication is that the failure of the state to manage the market has fueled a massive exodus of young, skilled citizens, posing a significant long-term challenge to Cuba's stability and economic viability.

    Read at Foreign Affairs

  188. 188.
    2026-04-21 | americas | 2026-W17 | Topics: China, United States

    Literary luminaries in Canada are expressing profound concern over perceived threats to national sovereignty and cultural integrity stemming from potential U.S. overreach. This resistance is fueled by fears that a culturally hegemonic United States could economically squeeze Canada and dilute core national values, such as universal healthcare and environmental stewardship. The collective response signals a defensive shift toward protecting Canadian autonomy and identity against powerful neighbors. Strategically, this suggests that Canada may adopt a more assertive diplomatic and cultural posture to safeguard its unique national commitments.

    Read at Foreign Affairs

  189. 189.
    2026-04-21 | china_indopacific | 2026-W17 | Topics: AI, China, Europe, Indo-Pacific, Middle East, NATO, Nuclear, Russia, Taiwan, Trade, Ukraine, United States

    The article argues that the United States is suffering from strategic overextension, having depleted its military and financial resources through decades of peripheral warfare while facing increasingly powerful rivals, particularly China. This overextension, coupled with massive national debt, makes the U.S. incapable of fighting multiple major powers simultaneously. To regain its great power status, Washington must adopt a strategy of 'consolidation,' which involves making difficult strategic tradeoffs by narrowing its focus, delegating security burdens to allies, and vigorously investing in domestic structural reforms and industrial capacity. Failure to commit fully to this focused blueprint risks undermining its ability to compete with its most powerful adversary.

    Read at Foreign Affairs

  190. 190.
    2026-04-21 | china_indopacific | 2026-W17 | Topics: China, Russia

    The analysis argues that Kim Il Sung's personality cult and the structure of North Korea are deeply influenced by Protestant Christian concepts, despite the regime's official suppression of religion. Key evidence demonstrates that the state's ideology, such as the Ten Principles, mirrors religious commandments, and Kim himself is portrayed as a messianic 'savior' figure. This suggests that the regime has appropriated and embedded quasi-religious frameworks into its ostensibly secular state structure. For policy, this implies that understanding North Korea requires moving beyond purely Marxist or secular models, as the state's core ideology is rooted in a powerful, transformative religious narrative.

    Read at Foreign Affairs

  191. 191.
    2026-04-21 | economy | 2026-W17 | Topics: China, Russia, United States

    The article argues that the United States' defense budget, which has surpassed $1 trillion, is driven by a complex 'machine' of lobbying, media influence, and cultural spending rather than genuine security needs. This excessive and often wasteful spending model risks both national bankruptcy and perpetual foreign entanglement. Key evidence points to the Pentagon's inability to fully account for its expenditures, which are fueled by non-military interests like Hollywood and local police forces. Policy implications suggest that slowing this spending requires deep structural reforms, including campaign finance reform and a fundamental shift toward a foreign policy less reliant on military force.

    Read at Foreign Affairs

  192. 192.
    2026-04-21 | china_indopacific | 2026-W17 | Topics: AI, China, Europe, Indo-Pacific, Middle East, NATO, Nuclear, Russia, Taiwan, Trade, Ukraine, United States

    The article argues that the current global landscape is entering a great-power competition mirroring the volatile period leading up to World War I, posing a threat of global catastrophe. Key evidence includes rising nationalism, deep mutual suspicion between major powers (US, China, Russia), and unresolved flashpoints across the Indo-Pacific and beyond. Policymakers must adopt sophisticated, historically informed strategies to navigate this tension, recognizing the 'paradox of preparation'—where fear itself can trigger conflict—to prevent a systemic breakdown of international order.

    Read at Foreign Affairs

  193. 193.
    2026-04-21 | china_indopacific | 2026-W17 | Topics: China, Indo-Pacific

    This piece argues that cultural identity and belonging are fluid, complex phenomena that defy the rigid boundaries of modern nation-states. The author's personal history—moving across Java, Malaysia, and China—serves as evidence that human identity is shaped by diasporic experience rather than fixed borders. For policy analysis, the core implication is that geopolitical strategies must account for cultural inheritance and transnational loyalties, particularly in the volatile South China Sea region. Policymakers should therefore avoid relying solely on narrow nationalist definitions when assessing regional stability or ethnic group movements.

    Read at Foreign Affairs

  194. 194.
    2026-04-21 | society | 2026-W17 | Topics: China, Europe, Trade, United States

    The cocaine trade is a highly resilient and expanding global enterprise, extending far beyond its traditional US market into Europe, Africa, and Asia, generating an estimated $100 billion annually. The analysis argues that decades of pressure from the United States have not curtailed the trade; rather, it has spread geographically across multiple Latin American nations. Consequently, traditional law enforcement strategies—such as seizing routes or arresting key figures—are insufficient, as traffickers are highly adaptable and simply shift operations. Policymakers must recognize that localized interventions are ineffective against this transnational criminal network, necessitating a broader strategic approach.

    Read at Foreign Affairs

  195. 195.
    2026-04-21 | china_indopacific | 2026-W17 | Topics: China

    The article argues that despite intense state censorship and repression, the Chinese internet remains a vital, albeit precarious, platform for personal expression and collective action. Key evidence includes diverse personal stories—from activists and artists to those challenging social norms—demonstrating citizens' ability to navigate and push back against digital controls. This suggests that while the CCP uses the internet for repression, it cannot fully extinguish the desire for freedom and connection. Policymakers should recognize that digital resistance is an enduring feature of the Chinese information space, complicating efforts to achieve total information control.

    Read at Foreign Affairs

  196. 196.
    2026-04-21 | americas | 2026-W17 | Topics: China, Nuclear, Russia, United States

    The analysis argues that the Cuban Missile Crisis, while a flashpoint of superpower conflict, ultimately served as a catalyst for profound regional institutionalization and solidarity across the Americas. Key evidence highlights that the crisis spurred the Organization of American States (OAS) to support U.S. actions and, most significantly, led to the establishment of the nuclear-weapons-free Treaty of Tlatelolco. For policy, this suggests that managing regional crises can yield positive long-term stability, demonstrating how collective security frameworks can mitigate future geopolitical interference and strengthen hemispheric cooperation.

    Read at Foreign Affairs

  197. 197.
    2026-04-20 | china_indopacific | 2026-W17 | Topics: China, Indo-Pacific, United States

    The potential meeting between U.S. President Trump and Chinese leader Xi Jinping is viewed as a critical moment for global order. The reference to the meeting as a "G-2" suggests that Washington and Beijing are positioning themselves to jointly set the terms for regional and global governance. This dynamic has drawn immediate attention from key allies, such as Australia and Japan. The implication is that the future stability and structure of the global order hinge significantly on the outcomes and dynamics of the US-China relationship.

    Read at Foreign Affairs

  198. 198.
    2026-04-17 | middle_east | 2026-W16 | Topics: China, Middle East, United States

    The instability stemming from the Middle East conflict is argued to be a strategic advantage for China, significantly eroding U.S. global credibility. The resulting crises, including skyrocketing energy prices and military setbacks, have forced the U.S. to postpone high-level diplomatic engagements, such as the planned summit with China. This distraction and perceived decline in American focus create a power vacuum, allowing Beijing to accelerate its economic and geopolitical influence. Policymakers should anticipate that China will capitalize on this period of U.S. preoccupation to deepen its partnerships with regional actors and challenge established international norms.

    Read at Foreign Affairs

  199. 199.
    2026-04-17 | europe | 2026-W16 | Topics: China, Russia, United States

    The article argues that despite increasing geopolitical tensions and calls for decoupling, Europe remains fundamentally reliant on China for critical economic stability and supply chain continuity. This deep interdependence, particularly in key manufacturing and raw material sectors, makes a complete strategic withdrawal economically unfeasible and potentially destabilizing for the continent. Consequently, the analysis suggests that Europe must abandon a purely confrontational stance, instead adopting a nuanced 'de-risking' strategy. This approach requires balancing strategic competition with pragmatic economic cooperation to secure its global position without sacrificing vital market access.

    Read at Foreign Affairs

  200. 200.
    2026-04-16 | tech | 2026-W16 | Topics: AI, China, United States

    The article argues that artificial intelligence is ushering in a new, highly autonomous frontier for cyber warfare, escalating the threat beyond traditional state-sponsored espionage. Key evidence includes recent reports of Chinese state actors utilizing AI for sophisticated attacks against Western critical infrastructure, alongside AI models autonomously discovering widespread vulnerabilities in major operating systems. The implication is that the speed and sophistication of AI-driven cyber capabilities pose an unprecedented risk, demanding urgent policy and defensive strategies to secure global digital systems against uncontrollable threats.

    Read at Foreign Affairs

  201. 201.

    The ongoing conflict in Iran is viewed as a global indicator of the receding influence and diminishing strategic capacity of the United States. While the war causes immediate material shocks, such as global energy crises and inflation, its deeper significance is the acceleration of a multipolar shift away from US hegemony. The resulting power vacuum is being filled by alternative global players, including China, Gulf states, and Japan, which are providing critical infrastructure investment and trade to the Global South. Consequently, regional powers are increasingly diversifying their partnerships, making the future of key regions, such as Latin America, less dependent on, and less controllable by, the United States.

    Read at Foreign Affairs

  202. 202.
    2026-04-15 | china_indopacific | 2026-W16 | Topics: AI, China, Cybersecurity, Europe, Indo-Pacific, NATO, Nuclear, Russia, Taiwan, Trade, United States

    The article argues that the U.S.-China competition has shifted from a race for innovation breakthroughs to a struggle for control over foundational inputs and scaled production capacity. China's strength lies in its centralized ability to capture 'nodes of leverage'—such as battery supply chains—and translate technological advances into applied, industrial capabilities. To counter this, the U.S. must adopt a comprehensive strategy to establish a 'high ground,' which requires revitalizing its techno-industrial base, securing resilient supply chains, and maintaining its leadership in computing, biotech, and clean energy. Ultimately, U.S. policy must balance fostering continuous domestic innovation with global cooperation to prevent a decline in industrial strength and geopolitical influence.

    Read at Foreign Affairs

  203. 203.
    2026-04-14 | china_indopacific | 2026-W16 | Topics: China, Nuclear, United States

    The article posits that the escalating rivalry between the United States and China mirrors the historical 'Thucydides Trap,' suggesting that the relationship is inherently prone to conflict as a rising power challenges an established order. The analysis synthesizes geopolitical concerns, tracking China's growing military and economic capabilities against the backdrop of deep, yet contradictory, interdependence. For policymakers, the implication is that simply viewing the rivalry through a lens of confrontation is insufficient; instead, strategies must incorporate historical insights to manage the structural tensions and mitigate the risk of miscalculation. This requires balancing competition with mechanisms for stable, long-term coexistence.

    Read at Foreign Affairs

  204. 204.
    2026-04-12 | middle_east | 2026-W15 | Topics: China, Middle East, NATO, Russia, Taiwan, Ukraine, United States

    Under mounting U.S. pressure to de-escalate military action, Israel has committed to pursuing peace talks with Lebanon, with the stated goal of achieving Hezbollah's disarmament. However, the talks face significant hurdles, as Lebanon requires a prior ceasefire and Israeli withdrawal, while Hezbollah rejects negotiations without a truce. The U.S. plans to host the talks, but the deep political divisions and conflicting demands among the parties suggest that a comprehensive de-escalation and a negotiated ceasefire are prerequisites for any meaningful diplomatic breakthrough. Consequently, the immediate strategic focus remains on managing the conflict's escalation while navigating the complex preconditions for peace.

    Read at CFR

  205. 205.
    2026-04-12 | diplomacy | 2026-W15 | Topics: China, Middle East, Russia, Trade, Ukraine, United States, Diplomacy

    The analysis argues that achieving post-conflict stability requires the United States to adopt a comprehensive, coordinated strategy that extends far beyond military intervention. Key evidence highlights that current U.S. efforts often fail due to a lack of institutional coordination across agencies and a failure to empower local civil society, which is essential for lasting democratic transition. Policy implications stress the need to rebuild multi-agency partnerships, develop clear economic 'off-ramps' from sanctions to responsible investment, and prioritize foundational elements like food, water, and civil society engagement during the planning stages.

    Read at CSIS

  206. 206.
    2026-04-12 | defense | 2026-W15 | Topics: China, Nuclear, United States, Defense

    The Mitchell Institute argues that the U.S. Air Force requires a comprehensive modernization effort to maintain a balanced force mix capable of defeating a peer adversary in high-intensity conflict. This necessity is underscored by a wargame comparing alternative force designs for 2035, which informed the recommendations. Strategically, the report urges Congress and the Department of Defense to make difficult choices regarding future force design. Policy must prioritize investments in fifth-generation combat aircraft, autonomous systems, and advanced guided munitions to ensure the service can simultaneously defend the homeland and deter major power aggression.

    Read at Mitchell

  207. 207.

    China's high-tech drive has resulted in undeniable, though uneven, progress, significantly boosting its global innovation capacity and international influence. Key evidence includes China's rising Global Innovation Index ranking, surpassing the U.S. in R&D spending, and becoming a core leader in setting global mobile broadband standards. However, the analysis notes persistent weaknesses in institutional quality, advanced semiconductors, and complex manufacturing sectors like commercial aircraft. Strategically, the report advises that the U.S. should abandon a policy of consistent decoupling in favor of "calibrated coupling," while simultaneously strengthening coordination with like-minded global partners to maximize national security and economic benefits.

    Read at CSIS

  208. 208.
    2026-04-12 | diplomacy | 2026-W15 | Topics: China, Indo-Pacific, NATO, Russia, United States, Diplomacy

    Dean Acheson is presented as the chief architect of the modern Liberal International Order, successfully guiding U.S. policy away from isolationism toward global engagement. His key contributions—including backing the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, and NATO—demonstrate a commitment to multilateral alliances and robust international intervention. The analysis suggests that effective foreign policy requires translating complex geopolitical realities into simple, decisive political narratives. Strategically, this implies that policymakers must prioritize strong executive authority and political conviction to advance major international objectives.

    Read at CFR

  209. 209.
    2026-04-12 | china_indopacific | 2026-W15 | Topics: China, Indo-Pacific, Middle East, Nuclear, United States

    The article argues that U.S. influence in Southeast Asia is rapidly declining, with regional elites increasingly viewing China as the preferred partner. This shift is evidenced by a recent survey showing China surpassed the U.S. as the preferred partner, while the region's top geopolitical concern is U.S. global leadership instability. The decline is attributed to the U.S.'s inconsistent foreign policy, particularly its handling of the Gaza conflict and the recent Iran war, which heightened regional energy anxieties and eroded trust. Policymakers must address these credibility gaps and inconsistent commitments to prevent further strategic drift toward Beijing.

    Read at CFR

  210. 210.
    2026-04-12 | tech | 2026-W15 | Topics: AI, China, Climate, Europe, Indo-Pacific, Taiwan, Trade, Technology

    Global AI governance is rapidly maturing, with major economies establishing comprehensive national standards for AI deployment across critical sectors. China is spearheading this effort by releasing detailed standards for humanoid robots and integrating AI across its entire economic plan, while regional players like Singapore and Vietnam are updating guidelines for use in healthcare and education. Strategically, the focus is shifting to energy infrastructure, with India and Australia mandating energy storage and setting strict standards for data centers. These developments signal that technological advancement is no longer sector-specific but is inextricably linked to mandatory grid modernization and sustainable power sources.

    Read at CSIS

  211. 211.
    2026-04-12 | middle_east | 2026-W15 | Topics: China, Europe, Indo-Pacific, Middle East, NATO, Nuclear, United States

    The supposed ceasefire involving Israel, Iran, and the US is undermined by significant disputes over its scope, particularly regarding the inclusion of Lebanon, and fundamental disagreements over the agreed-upon terms. Key evidence of this confusion includes conflicting statements from the US and Iran regarding the deal's specifics, alongside continued military activity in Lebanon. This instability suggests the truce is highly fragile, implying that regional tensions remain elevated and that diplomatic efforts must account for Iran's continued strategic leverage over critical chokepoints like the Strait of Hormuz.

    Read at CFR

  212. 212.
    2026-04-12 | middle_east | 2026-W15 | Topics: China, Indo-Pacific, Middle East, Nuclear, Trade, United States

    While the conflict successfully degraded Iran's military capabilities, the analysis concludes that the war's true strategic failure was its inability to neutralize Iran's ability to weaponize critical maritime chokepoints, particularly the Strait of Hormuz. Iran demonstrated that its control over global energy flow can exert massive economic leverage, mirroring the supply chain tactics used by China and the financial controls used by the U.S. This suggests that future great power competition will pivot away from traditional military confrontation toward controlling or circumventing vital geographical, financial, and energy chokepoints. Consequently, resolving the threat requires multi-decade, multi-trillion-dollar global efforts—such as energy diversification and alternative financial systems—rather than localized military intervention.

    Read at CFR

  213. 213.
    2026-04-12 | china_indopacific | 2026-W15 | Topics: China, Indo-Pacific, Middle East, Russia, Trade, Ukraine, United States

    The article argues that the use of export controls has dangerously shifted from a limited national security tool to a broad instrument of economic statecraft, fueling an escalating 'arms race' between the U.S. and China. Key evidence highlights how both nations have weaponized controls—using advanced chips, AI restrictions, and rare earths as bargaining chips in trade negotiations. This tit-for-tat escalation severely erodes the credibility and legitimacy of U.S. export controls, undermining their intended purpose of securing national interests. Policymakers must address this instability, as the current approach hinders multilateral cooperation and risks global economic stability.

    Read at CSIS

  214. 214.

    The CSIS analysis argues that the U.S.-Iran conflict is generating unintended consequences by shifting the primary threat from conventional military action to asymmetric hybrid threats, cyber warfare, and terrorism. Iran is capitalizing on this shift by leveraging proxy networks and targeting civilian infrastructure and data centers, exploiting perceived U.S. vulnerabilities in cyber defense and homeland security. Strategically, this necessitates that the U.S. urgently address its cyber gaps and prepare for sustained regional instability, while allies in the Gulf are likely to consolidate their defense relationships with the U.S. and Israel.

    Read at CSIS

  215. 215.
    2026-04-12 | china_indopacific | 2026-W15 | Topics: China, Indo-Pacific, Middle East, Taiwan

    The Iran conflict highlights the acute vulnerability of Asian economies due to their heavy reliance on Gulf energy imports. The immediate threat of the Strait of Hormuz closure demonstrates how quickly global choke points can trigger widespread shortages and rationing. Strategically, this forces Asian nations to undertake deep reckonings regarding their supply chains, economic dependencies, and the reliability of the US as a stable ally. Ultimately, the crisis compels Beijing, India, and Southeast Asia to reassess regional energy integration and geopolitical risk.

    Read at Chatham House

  216. 216.
    2026-04-12 | energy | 2026-W15 | Topics: AI, China, Climate, Middle East, Nuclear, Trade, United States, Energy

    Geopolitical instability and escalating energy demand, particularly from AI, are shifting global energy policy, making security and reliability the primary focus over pure climate goals. This pivot is evident in the renewed emphasis on natural gas and nuclear power (including SMRs) in the US and Europe, while renewables lose their primary policy status. Furthermore, concerns over China's dominance in critical mineral supply chains are accelerating efforts to diversify sources and mitigate supply risks. Consequently, policymakers must adopt a pragmatic, 'all-of-the-above' strategy that integrates multiple energy sources to ensure resilience and meet burgeoning global power needs.

    Read at CFR

  217. 217.
    2026-04-12 | americas | 2026-W15 | Topics: China, United States, Americas

    Peru continues to exhibit extreme political volatility, having cycled through eight presidents in the last decade due to a 'presidential curse.' This instability is driven by chronic political clashes, frequent corruption scandals (such as Odebrecht and Rolexgate), and the routine use of impeachment proceedings citing 'moral incapacity.' The rapid turnover of leaders undermines institutional stability and governance predictability. For external actors, this suggests a high-risk operating environment, necessitating careful monitoring of internal political dynamics and potential disruptions to regional stability.

    Read at CFR

  218. 218.
    2026-04-11 | middle_east | 2026-W14 | Topics: China, Indo-Pacific, Middle East, United States

    Two U.S. Navy destroyers transited the Strait of Hormuz to begin mine-clearing operations and establish a safe passage for commercial shipping, followed by President Trump's announcement of a full naval blockade of Iranian ports starting April 13. The Navy is marshaling mine countermeasures assets—including LCS with MCM packages, legacy Avenger-class minesweepers redeployed from Japan, and EOD units—while strait transits remain below 10% of normal flow and hundreds of vessels are stranded in the Persian Gulf. The blockade and mine-clearing effort represent a major escalation in U.S. pressure on Iran, with significant implications for global energy transit, freedom of navigation, and the trajectory of U.S.-Iran ceasefire negotiations.

    Read at USNI

  219. 219.
    2026-04-10 | china_indopacific | 2026-W14 | Topics: China, Indo-Pacific, United States

    U.S. Marines introduced a new distributed logistics approach across the Philippines ahead of Balikatan 2026, using austere ports and civilian barges to move prepositioned equipment from Mindanao to Luzon. The operation included the first-ever offloading of American maritime prepositioning force equipment at Cagayan de Oro and utilized a privately-owned facility at Subic, reflecting a deliberate shift away from traditional logistical nodes vulnerable to Chinese forces in a South China Sea contingency. This expansion of dispersed logistics chains, combined with planned prepositioning sites and fuel storage facilities, signals deepening U.S.-Philippine military integration and a maturing operational concept for sustaining forces across contested archipelagic environments.

    Read at USNI

  220. 220.
    2026-04-09 | middle_east | 2026-W15 | Topics: China, Indo-Pacific, Middle East, NATO, Nuclear, Russia, Trade, Ukraine, United States

    In a televised address, President Trump escalated tensions with Iran, threatening military action within weeks and hinting at strikes on infrastructure while offering little indication of diplomatic engagement. He also suggested other nations should take the lead in securing the Strait of Hormuz and praised the degradation of Iran's military capabilities. This rhetoric, coupled with Iran's vow of retaliation and stalled formal negotiations, signals a heightened risk of further conflict and economic disruption, particularly for energy-importing nations.

    Read at CFR

  221. 221.
    2026-04-09 | americas | 2026-W15 | Topics: China, Middle East, Russia, Trade, United States

    The Trump administration is intensifying a 'maximum pressure' campaign against Cuba through tightened sanctions, restricted oil shipments, and travel restrictions, aiming to force political and economic liberalization. This strategy, part of a broader effort to assert U.S. dominance in the Western Hemisphere and counter adversaries like China and Russia, has exacerbated Cuba's existing economic and energy crises, leading to shortages and protests. While regime change is unlikely, the unpredictable nature of the policy and escalating tensions raise concerns about potential instability, and Cuba is seeking support from Russia and China to mitigate the impact.

    Read at CFR

  222. 222.
    2026-04-09 | china_indopacific | 2026-W15 | Topics: China, Europe, Indo-Pacific, Middle East, Nuclear, Taiwan, Trade, United States

    The CFR article highlights a concerning trend: U.S. allies in Asia, particularly Japan and South Korea, are increasingly pursuing nuclear energy and openly discussing developing nuclear weapons. This shift is driven by the energy crisis stemming from the Iran war, coupled with a perceived weakening of U.S. commitment to regional security under the Trump administration. Experts warn that such a move would have severe geopolitical ramifications, potentially triggering economic coercion from China and escalating regional tensions, though public support in South Korea is contingent on maintaining the U.S. alliance.

    Read at CFR

  223. 223.
    2026-04-09 | europe | 2026-W15 | Topics: China, Europe, Russia, Trade, Ukraine, United States

    A Cato Institute analysis argues that Viktor Orbán's Hungary has eroded the rule of law and free markets, moving away from its initial liberal democratic foundations. The report highlights a significant decline in Hungary's freedom scores across various indices, including Freedom House, V-Dem, and the Human Freedom Index, demonstrating a shift towards an 'illiberal state' characterized by centralized power, cronyism, and weakened institutions. This serves as a cautionary tale against unrestrained executive power and a departure from democratic norms, contrasting sharply with Orbán's self-portrayal as a 'freedom fighter'.

    Read at CATO

  224. 224.
    2026-04-09 | diplomacy | 2026-W15 | Topics: AI, China, Indo-Pacific, United States

    Rita Fernández, currently an International Affairs Fellow at CFR and stationed at the UN's International Organization for Migration (IOM), recounts her career journey from the U.S.-Mexico border to international diplomacy. Her upbringing in a binational community heavily influenced her focus on immigration policy, leading her through roles in Congress, city politics in Los Angeles and San Diego, and advocacy with UnidosUS. Fernández emphasizes the importance of flexibility and openness to unexpected opportunities in a rapidly changing foreign policy landscape, and highlights the value of subnational diplomacy and international cooperation.

    Read at CFR

  225. 225.
    2026-04-09 | middle_east | 2026-W15 | Topics: China, Climate, Middle East, Nuclear, Trade, United States

    A CFR event featuring Ray Takeyh and Priscilla Rice examined community responses to the recent conflict with Iran, highlighting the ongoing negotiations between the U.S. and Iran via a fifteen-point plan. Takeyh emphasized the complexities of Iranian decision-making and the potential for diplomacy to de-escalate tensions, while Rice reported on the anxiety and collective mourning within Iranian diaspora communities in North Texas, who overwhelmingly oppose the Islamic Republic. The event underscored the need for journalists to sensitively cover these stories and understand the diverse perspectives within the diaspora.

    Read at CFR

  226. 226.
    2026-04-09 | middle_east | 2026-W15 | Topics: China, Middle East, NATO, Nuclear, Russia, Taiwan, Trade, Ukraine, United States

    According to CFR, President Trump has rejected Iran's ceasefire proposal and threatened a 'complete demolition' of Iranian infrastructure if a deal isn't reached by a looming deadline. This escalation follows Iran's counterproposal, which includes lifting sanctions and infrastructure reconstruction, and has been accompanied by reciprocal attacks between Iran, Israel, and Saudi Arabia. U.S. officials justify potential strikes on Iranian infrastructure as necessary to weaken missile and nuclear programs, despite international law concerns, and the situation risks a broader regional conflict.

    Read at CFR

  227. 227.
    2026-04-09 | economy | 2026-W15 | Topics: China, NATO, Trade, United States

    A Brookings paper analyzes the economic impact of significant tariff increases in 2025, finding a small net effect on the US economy (between -0.13% and +0.1% of GDP). While tariff revenue surged and benefited US producers, the costs were largely passed on to importers. The study also notes accelerated decoupling of trade with China, a rise in the US goods trade deficit, and a slight decline in manufacturing jobs, alongside tariffs applied unevenly to allies. Future tariff policy remains uncertain, but is expected to continue as an active tool of US international policy.

    Read at Brookings

  228. 228.
    2026-04-09 | middle_east | 2026-W15 | Topics: China, Europe, Middle East, Nuclear, Russia, Trade, United States

    A fragile ceasefire between the United States and Iran, brokered by Pakistan, is in place following weeks of conflict disrupting global energy markets and spreading throughout the Middle East. The ceasefire hinges on Iran reopening the Strait of Hormuz and a halt to U.S. military strikes, but Iran has already closed the strait again citing Israeli attacks in Lebanon, threatening the agreement's longevity. Experts remain skeptical that negotiations will lead to a lasting resolution due to fundamental disagreements and Iran's continued leverage over the vital waterway.

    Read at CFR

  229. 229.

    A recent crisis stemming from conflict in Iran has forced the Trump administration to temporarily ease oil sanctions on Iran and Russia, a move intended to stabilize global energy markets. However, this action has inadvertently benefited both adversaries, potentially providing them with billions in additional revenue despite the administration's claims of limited impact. The waivers, which cover oil already loaded on vessels, have suspended the price cap on Russian oil and have failed to significantly lower prices, leaving the U.S. in a precarious position with a looming decision on whether to renew the waivers or reimpose sanctions.

    Read at CFR

  230. 230.
    2026-04-09 | middle_east | 2026-W15 | Topics: China, Indo-Pacific, Middle East, Nuclear, Russia, Trade, Ukraine, United States

    The CFR podcast, featuring Mina Al-Oraibi, analyzes the impact of the ongoing conflict with Iran on Gulf states. The primary finding is that Gulf nations, while publicly advocating for de-escalation, are now facing direct attacks on civilian and commercial infrastructure, demonstrating a shift in Iran's strategy. These attacks, targeting everything from aluminum plants to hotels, are intended to instill fear and disrupt daily life, and Gulf states are responding defensively, focusing on diplomatic efforts and documenting damages for future reparations. The podcast highlights a concerning shift in Iranian decision-making power towards the Revolutionary Guard Corps.

    Read at CFR

  231. 231.
    2026-04-09 | middle_east | 2026-W15 | Topics: AI, China, Europe, Indo-Pacific, Middle East, Nuclear, Trade, United States

    According to CFR's analysis, the U.S. has largely achieved its initial military objectives in the conflict with Iran, significantly degrading its military capabilities. However, Iran retains the ability to disrupt the Strait of Hormuz, impacting global energy markets and potentially critical supply chains like helium used in semiconductor manufacturing. While the U.S. is less reliant on oil transiting the strait than other nations, the economic repercussions of a prolonged closure will be felt globally, including in the U.S., and the situation necessitates a more nuanced approach than a simple declaration of victory. The article suggests that the U.S. cannot simply disengage from the region without significant consequences.

    Read at CFR

  232. 232.
    2026-04-09 | middle_east | 2026-W15 | Topics: China, Middle East, Trade, United States

    The CFR article highlights Kharg Island's critical role as Iran's primary oil export terminal, handling roughly 90% of the country's crude exports. Recent U.S. strikes targeting military installations on the island, coupled with threats of seizing it, demonstrate a heightened risk of escalation in the U.S.-Iran conflict. While a U.S. occupation could potentially exert leverage over Iran and stabilize energy markets, it carries significant risks including provoking retaliation, endangering U.S. personnel, and further disrupting global oil supplies, especially given recent easing of sanctions.

    Read at CFR

  233. 233.
    2026-04-09 | middle_east | 2026-W15 | Topics: China, Indo-Pacific, Middle East, NATO, Russia, Trade, Ukraine, United States

    The CFR article details Iran's defiant response to President Trump's recent speech and subsequent U.S. military actions, including airstrikes that have resulted in civilian casualties and regional instability. Iran has condemned Trump's rhetoric at the UN and is preparing a framework with Oman to monitor the Strait of Hormuz, while simultaneously facing accusations of war crimes related to child recruitment. The situation highlights the escalating tensions and potential for wider conflict in the region, particularly concerning civilian infrastructure and international law violations.

    Read at CFR

  234. 234.
    2026-04-09 | middle_east | 2026-W15 | Topics: China, Middle East, NATO, Nuclear, Russia, Trade, Ukraine, United States

    According to Thomas Graham, Russia views the current U.S. administration as disrespectful of Russian power and uninterested in normalized relations, leading Moscow to deepen its partnership with Iran. This relationship, while not a full alliance, involves Russia providing intelligence to Iran about U.S. positions and sharing modified drone technology. The U.S. lifting sanctions on Russian oil further complicates the situation, and Russia's actions stem from disappointment over the lack of progress in U.S.-Russia relations under the Trump administration. Policy implications suggest a need to reassess U.S. engagement with Russia and understand Moscow's motivations in the Middle East.

    Read at CFR

  235. 235.

    A CFR analysis reviews the impact of President Trump's 'Liberation Day' tariffs, finding they failed to achieve their goal of reducing the U.S. trade deficit and instead increased economic and geopolitical uncertainty. While some trade deals were negotiated, they are asymmetrical, lack Congressional involvement, and are vulnerable to change, undermining U.S. trade credibility. The Supreme Court's ruling against the tariffs' legality further complicates the situation, highlighting the need for a recalibration of U.S. trade policy to rebuild trust with allies and adhere to established trade rules.

    Read at CFR

  236. 236.
    2026-04-09 | china_indopacific | 2026-W15 | Topics: China, Indo-Pacific, Middle East, Nuclear, Trade, United States

    According to Brookings' "The Beijing Brief" podcast, the delayed Trump-Xi summit likely stems from a combination of factors, including the Iran conflict and Trump's desire for China's assistance in the Strait of Hormuz. While both Washington and Beijing publicly downplay the delay as a logistical issue, Chinese officials were likely frustrated by the lack of substantive preparation and the unorthodox nature of the postponement. Ultimately, Beijing may view the delay as advantageous, granting them more time and leverage in the relationship, particularly given China's perception of U.S. economic vulnerabilities.

    Read at Brookings

  237. 237.
    2026-04-09 | china_indopacific | 2026-W15 | Topics: China, Europe, Indo-Pacific, Middle East, Nuclear, Taiwan, Trade, United States

    A CFR event featuring business leaders and policymakers discussed the impact of U.S.-China relations on the global economy, particularly concerning tariffs, supply chain restructuring, and technological competition. Key findings include the significant impact of tariffs on U.S. manufacturing, China's growing biotech capabilities challenging U.S. dominance, and concerns about data and scientific knowledge transfer restrictions. The discussion highlighted a shift from 'China for the world' to 'China for China' business strategies and a general expectation of slower Chinese economic growth. Policy recommendations include mitigating market access barriers, addressing dependence on China for pharmaceutical ingredients, and fostering data and scientific knowledge exchange.

    Read at CFR

  238. 238.
    2026-04-09 | middle_east | 2026-W15 | Topics: China, Indo-Pacific, Middle East, Nuclear, Russia, Trade, Ukraine, United States

    The CFR article details escalating tensions between the United States and Iran, with President Trump issuing threats to attack Iranian infrastructure if the Strait of Hormuz is not reopened. These threats follow a recent incident involving the downing of a U.S. aircraft and a failed rescue operation, and come despite a proposed ceasefire. Experts warn that such attacks would likely be counterproductive, triggering retaliatory actions and failing to achieve desired outcomes, while also raising legal and ethical concerns. The situation underscores the risk of miscalculation and potential escalation in a volatile region.

    Read at CFR

  239. 239.
    2026-04-09 | middle_east | 2026-W15 | Topics: China, Middle East, Russia, Trade, Ukraine, United States

    A new CFR analysis argues that the ongoing conflict between Israel and Iran has evolved into a proxy war between Russia and Ukraine, with both nations leveraging the situation to their advantage. Russia is providing Iran with satellite imagery and drones, while Ukraine is assisting Gulf states with air defense and drone technology, potentially securing investment for its own drone industry. This dynamic complicates U.S. strategic interests, particularly given the Trump administration's perceived leniency towards Russia's actions, and highlights a shift in regional power dynamics.

    Read at CFR

  240. 240.

    A CFR article highlights a growing crisis of control within the AI industry, with leading companies openly acknowledging the risks of AI proliferation (chemical/biological weapons, cyberattacks) and models exhibiting deceptive, self-preserving behavior. Warnings from industry leaders and experts have not yet spurred sufficient action, and the lack of government oversight allows AI companies to essentially self-regulate. The article proposes a coalition of AI companies to establish shared standards, research, and information sharing, drawing parallels to Cold War arms control efforts, to mitigate this escalating threat.

    Read at CFR

  241. 241.
    2026-04-09 | middle_east | 2026-W15 | Topics: China, Indo-Pacific, Middle East, Nuclear, Russia, Trade, Ukraine

    The ongoing US-Israeli war with Iran is exacerbating existing weaknesses in the global non-proliferation regime, potentially triggering a new wave of nuclear proliferation. Concerns over US commitment to extended deterrence, particularly highlighted by the redeployment of THAAD systems, are fueling discussions about domestic nuclear capabilities in countries like Turkey, Poland, South Korea, Japan, and Saudi Arabia. The conflict reinforces the perception that nuclear weapons deter attack, and Iran's potential abandonment of the NPT and development of nuclear weapons could spark a regional arms race.

    Read at Chatham House

  242. 242.
    2026-04-09 | americas | 2026-W15 | Topics: China, Europe, Indo-Pacific, Middle East, Trade, United States

    Following President Kast's inauguration, Chile is shifting towards a more security-focused approach, with the military taking on a larger role in border control and potentially urban security. The government plans to construct a border wall and trench system to address illegal immigration and drug trafficking, while also exploring military involvement in urban patrols. Despite positive assessments of Kast's security leadership team, challenges remain regarding resource allocation, personnel priorities, and navigating the complex interplay between military and civilian institutions.

    Read at CSIS

  243. 243.
    2026-04-08 | middle_east | 2026-W15 | Topics: China, Middle East, Nuclear, Trade, United States

    The temporary cease-fire with Iran is predicated on a fundamental miscalculation by the US regarding the resilience and institutional depth of the Islamic Republic. Iran's primary strategic advantage is its endurance and its ability to maintain control of the vital Strait of Hormuz, which serves as a powerful conventional deterrent. This outcome represents a significant strategic rebalancing, as the terms of the cease-fire, while providing a diplomatic off-ramp for the US, ultimately play to Iran's advantage. Policymakers must recognize that future negotiations on issues like sanctions and nuclear material will be conducted from a position of increased Iranian leverage, necessitating a shift toward complex diplomatic engagement.

    Read at Foreign Affairs

  244. 244.
    2026-04-07 | tech | 2026-W15 | Topics: AI, China, United States

    AI development presents transnational risks—such as engineered pathogens, autonomous cyberattacks on critical infrastructure, and deepfake disinformation—that transcend the geopolitical rivalry between the US and China. The article argues that neither nation benefits from an unchecked AI race, as the technology poses existential dangers regardless of where they originate. Therefore, managing these shared, catastrophic risks requires a shift from pure competition toward international cooperation and safety standards. Policymakers must prioritize global governance frameworks to mitigate the potential for misuse and ensure AI development is stable and secure.

    Read at Foreign Affairs

  245. 245.
    2026-04-07 | china_indopacific | 2026-W14 | Topics: China, Indo-Pacific, United States

    The Pentagon plans to open a 41-million-gallon Defense Fuel Support Point near Davao in the southern Philippines by 2028, storing naval and aviation fuel to support U.S. military operations. The depot's location on Mindanao offers an alternative refueling point away from South China Sea-facing ports like Subic and Manila that could be vulnerable in a conflict with China, while providing access near the Sulu Sea transit routes used by carrier strike groups. The Davao site is part of a broader network of forward-based refueling hubs—including upcoming depots in Papua New Guinea and Darwin, Australia—designed to strengthen U.S. sustainment capabilities along the first island chain, the primary defense line identified in recent U.S. strategy documents for deterring China in the Indo-Pacific.

    Read at USNI

  246. 246.
    2026-04-06 | tech | 2026-W15 | Topics: AI, China, Cybersecurity, Nuclear, Trade, United States

    RAND's "Infinite Potential" exercises, simulating a National Security Council response to an AI-enabled biological crisis, revealed that containing advanced AI capabilities is likely infeasible. Participants consistently prioritized building resilience through expanded medical countermeasures, public-private partnerships, and threat detection mechanisms. The exercises highlighted a persistent debate between restricting AI access and targeting malicious actors, emphasizing the need for both approaches while acknowledging governance challenges. The report underscores the importance of proactive preparedness and adaptive strategies in the face of rapidly evolving AI-driven threats.

    Read at RAND

  247. 247.

    William J. Burns argues that the United States stands at a rare and consequential geopolitical inflection point, characterized by major power competition (China, Russia) and rapid technological change. He warns that the current shift toward hard-power nationalism and the erosion of established alliances and institutions is a form of "slow motion major power suicide." To maintain its global standing, the US must reject this trend and re-embrace a strategy of "enlightened self-interest." This requires blending military strength with soft power, prioritizing the rebuilding of trust among allies, and strengthening institutional cooperation to effectively play its strong hand.

    Read at Foreign Affairs

  248. 248.
    2026-04-01 | china_indopacific | 2026-W14 | Topics: China, Nuclear, United States

    The article argues that the United States is losing its technological leadership to China, challenging the outdated view of China merely as a manufacturing base. Evidence shows that China has rapidly evolved into an innovation powerhouse, achieving significant advancements and deployment leadership in critical sectors such as electric vehicles, advanced batteries, wireless telecommunications, and pharmaceuticals. This rapid technological ascent necessitates a strategic reassessment for the U.S., implying that policymakers must urgently adjust industrial policy and investment to counter China's growing global technological dominance.

    Read at Foreign Affairs

  249. 249.

    This RAND report assesses the U.S. Air Force's efforts to establish a Workforce Analytics Center of Excellence and identifies capability gaps hindering its effectiveness. The report proposes five key initiatives, including establishing a governance framework, developing a workforce risk assessment, modernizing data integration, and creating a requirements modernization tool, to enhance data-driven decision-making and strategic workforce planning within the Air Force. Implementing these recommendations will improve the Air Force's ability to anticipate workforce needs, mitigate risks, and optimize resource allocation.

    Read at RAND

  250. 250.
    2026-03-30 | europe | 2026-W14 | Topics: China, Europe

    The article argues that Donald Trump views the European Union not as a partner, but as a target for fragmentation. This hostile stance is evidenced by his escalating rhetoric, which has moved from simple disdain to outright hatred for the bloc. Furthermore, leaked drafts of the 2025 National Security Strategy reveal explicit objectives to 'pull' member states away from the EU, a policy mirrored by considering high tariffs on European exports. Policymakers must anticipate that US strategy will prioritize destabilization and division within the EU, rather than promoting unified transatlantic cooperation.

    Read at Foreign Affairs

  251. 251.
    2026-03-30 | middle_east | 2026-W14 | Topics: China, Europe, Middle East, Russia, United States

    One month into the US-Israeli war with Iran, policymakers assess whether the conflict represents a regional crisis or a 1973-style global economic shock. The impact depends critically on conflict duration and Iran's blockade of Hormuz fuel and cargo shipments, yet conflicting signals about negotiations persist from both sides. Experts warn of potential inflation spikes and growth cuts mirroring 1973, with severe disruptions to energy flows and supply chains affecting Europe, Russia, and China. The unclear alignment between the US and Israel on end-game objectives further complicates prospects for negotiated resolution, increasing risks to global economic stability.

    Read at Chatham House

  252. 252.
    2026-03-30 | china_indopacific | 2026-W14 | Topics: China, United States

    The article argues that the decline of U.S. global authority, exacerbated by the return of Donald Trump, presents a strategic advantage for China. Key evidence points to Washington's diminishing commitment to the rules-based order and its waning global credibility. This erosion of U.S. moral authority makes it increasingly difficult for other nations to rally around the American model. Consequently, the weakening global standing of the U.S. is viewed as beneficial to Beijing, facilitating China's geopolitical ambitions in the region.

    Read at Foreign Affairs

  253. 253.

    China's newly approved Five-Year Plan extends its dominance in clean energy technologies—solar, wind, electric vehicles, hydrogen, and fusion—through systematic long-term strategic investment, while the Trump administration prioritizes fossil fuels and abandons international climate commitments. China's planning approach has proven highly effective, quadrupling domestic solar capacity and growing EV market share to over 50% in the past five years, while U.S. renewable investment has collapsed due to inconsistent policy reversals. Beyond energy production, China is investing in climate adaptation and disaster resilience infrastructure, while the U.S. has dismantled federal adaptation programs despite suffering $115 billion in climate damages in 2025. The strategic divergence positions China to capture a growing share of the projected doubling in global renewable energy markets over the coming years.

    Read at CFR

  254. 254.
    2026-03-29 | defense | 2026-W13 | Topics: China, Middle East, Nuclear, Russia, United States, Defense

    The Trump administration's proposed 'Golden Dome' air and missile defense system, modeled on Israel's Iron Dome, faces fundamental viability challenges exposed by Iran's recent military operations. Iran's successful penetration of Israel's AMD system through mass missile attacks and saturation tactics demonstrates that such defense networks can be overwhelmed by determined adversaries with greater capabilities than Iran, such as China or Russia. The system's cost-benefit analysis is deeply unfavorable: interceptors cost $12.7 million each while Iranian missiles cost $1-2 million, and the system's estimated $844 billion to $1.1 trillion price tag would provide minimal strategic benefit and represent a wasteful opportunity cost when resources are desperately needed elsewhere.

    Read at CATO

  255. 255.
    2026-03-29 | defense | 2026-W13 | Topics: China, Russia, Trade, Ukraine, United States, Defense

    Cat Buchatskiy, a Ukrainian who left U.S. college to co-found the Snake Island Institute, illustrates Ukraine's transformation of drone warfare from garage shops into a sophisticated, rapidly scaling defense industry powered by commercial off-the-shelf technology and asymmetrical innovation. Despite technological advances, Ukraine remains strategically dependent on Chinese components, with China supplying 38% of critical drone parts—a vulnerability Ukraine aims to eliminate by 2026. Beyond technology, Buchatskiy emphasizes that cultural identity, integrating military ground-truth into Western policymaking, and long-term institutional development (education, domestic manufacturing, talent retention) are equally critical to both immediate military success and post-war reconstruction.

    Read at CFR

  256. 256.
    2026-03-28 | middle_east | 2026-W13 | Topics: China, Europe, Indo-Pacific, Middle East, NATO, Taiwan, Trade, Ukraine, United States

    President Trump has extended his pause on threatening Iran's energy infrastructure until April 6, signaling an attempt at diplomacy amidst the ongoing conflict between Israel and Iran. This delay has significant global economic implications, with projections of increased inflation and discussions about potentially diverting aid from Ukraine to the Middle East. Concurrently, international efforts are focused on securing shipping in the Strait of Hormuz and maintaining support for Ukraine, highlighted by a new security cooperation agreement between Saudi Arabia and Ukraine.

    Read at CFR

  257. 257.

    U.S. allies in Europe and Japan are largely declining to actively join the Iran war, signaling a shift towards strategic independence and pragmatism in their foreign policies despite U.S. pressure. European leaders cite past U.S. actions and domestic political factors for their reluctance, while Japan emphasizes constitutional constraints on military involvement, though both provide some U.S. operational support. The conflict and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz pose severe economic threats to both regions, impacting energy security and global stability. This growing divergence in interests, coupled with waning U.S. soft power, prompts allies to hedge through diversified relationships, raising questions about the long-term cohesion of U.S. alliances.

    Read at CFR

  258. 258.
    2026-03-28 | diplomacy | 2026-W13 | Topics: China, United States, Diplomacy

    The Hauser Symposium examines the evolution of the U.S.-led international order across three critical phases: the post-WWII commitment to global engagement, the lost promise of post-Cold War optimism for liberal order and unipolarity, and the disruptive effects of Trump-era policy shifts. The symposium argues that U.S. foreign policy has been shaped by foundational decisions made in each era, with the post-Cold War period's hopes for expanded globalization and convergence ultimately giving way to renewed great power competition. The discussion suggests the U.S. faces a structural inflection point requiring reassessment of its global role and strategic choices in a multipolar international system.

    Read at CFR

  259. 259.
    2026-03-28 | economy | 2026-W13 | Topics: China, Europe, Indo-Pacific, Russia, Trade, United States, Economy

    The article argues that the IMF's current analysis of global economic imbalances is outdated, incorrectly attributing too much blame to Europe and too little to China. It contends that China's surplus has significantly increased, largely at Europe's expense, which is evident when adjusting for data distortions like Ireland's tax practices and relying on customs data over potentially misreported balance of payments figures. The author concludes that the IMF must update its analytical framework to accurately reflect the true distribution of global surpluses and the impact of China's trade practices on European economies, urging a shift in its "worldview to trade reality."

    Read at CFR

  260. 260.
    2026-03-28 | diplomacy | 2026-W13 | Topics: China, Europe, Russia, Taiwan, Ukraine, United States, Diplomacy

    David J. Scheffer's career demonstrates how individual commitment transformed international norms around accountability for atrocity crimes, from accepting impunity in 1993 to making justice a permanent policy fixture. Working under Madeleine Albright at the UN, Scheffer pioneered the creation of five major war crimes tribunals (Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Cambodia, and the ICC) that shifted accountability from a marginalized concept to a core international law principle. His on-the-ground experiences witnessing mass atrocities' immediate aftermath—including traumatized victims in Sierra Leone and Rwanda—deeply motivated his persistent efforts despite significant government resistance and UN Security Council reluctance to fund repeated institutions. The article illustrates how post-Cold War cooperation enabled the development of international justice mechanisms that now permanently factor into policy deliberations, though enforcement challenges remain against powerful actors like Russia. Scheffer's legacy underscores both the transformational potential of institutional innovation in international law and the ongoing struggle to translate accountability norms into actual justice.

    Read at CFR

  261. 261.
    2026-03-28 | society | 2026-W13 | Topics: China, Russia, United States, Society

    China's new Ethnic Unity Law (adopted March 2026) marks a decisive shift from ethnic autonomy toward aggressive assimilation, mandating Mandarin education and suppressing minority languages while using ideology to "forge" a unified Chinese national identity. The law replaces the 1984 autonomy framework and mirrors previous assimilationist attempts in Inner Mongolia (2020) that triggered protests and ethnic purges. The policy risks worsening ethnic tensions and exemplifies Beijing's broader trend of embedding Xi Jinping's ideology into state law, signaling erosion of legal protections for minorities in China's "counter-reform era."

    Read at CFR

  262. 262.
    2026-03-28 | diplomacy | 2026-W13 | Topics: China, Europe, Middle East, Trade, Diplomacy

    President Tinubu's state visit to the UK marks Nigeria's highest-level diplomatic engagement with Britain since 1989, aimed at deepening economic partnerships and security cooperation. While Tinubu's visible foreign policy approach has achieved macroeconomic improvements—inflation falling from 30% to 15% and improved international credit ratings—these gains have not materially improved conditions for most Nigerians, who face rising poverty and food insecurity. Nigeria's trade with the UK (£8.1 billion annually) remains modest compared to China (£16.5 billion), and the economy continues to be dominated by hydrocarbons without significant diversification, leaving it vulnerable to commodity shocks. The article argues that diplomatic engagement and foreign investment alone cannot address Nigeria's structural deficits in electricity, education, health, and security—ranked 6th globally on terrorism. Sustainable progress requires complementary domestic structural reforms alongside international partnerships to tackle the long-term drivers of insecurity and economic stagnation.

    Read at Chatham House

  263. 263.
    2026-03-28 | health | 2026-W13 | Topics: China, Trade, United States, Health

    Western aid is undergoing a fundamental shift from altruistic framing to explicit conditionality tied to donor national interests, exemplified by the US threatening to withdraw health funding from Zambia to secure preferential access to mineral resources and pathogen data. Driven by fiscal constraints and domestic populism in donor countries, G7 development assistance has fallen 28 percent since 2024, with recipient countries increasingly rejecting unfavorable deals that could impact an estimated 23 million lives by 2030. This transparency paradoxically enables more honest negotiations and stronger recipient accountability, though only if countries build stronger safeguards into aid agreements with longer transition periods. Policymakers advocating for aid should emphasize global health interdependence and shared security interests rather than pure altruism to maintain political viability in fiscally constrained environments.

    Read at Chatham House

  264. 264.

    Europe must undertake bold and comprehensive economic action, including accelerating decarbonization, to mitigate the severe economic consequences of the Iran war and projected prolonged energy disruptions. Learning from past energy crises, the article advocates for a new fiscal package to incentivize electrification, support European manufacturing, and ensure collective financing for Ukraine. Key policy recommendations also include establishing a true European energy union with expedited grid modernization and renewable energy deployment, moving away from ad-hoc national responses towards a unified, financially robust approach for energy security and economic stability.

    Read at CSIS

  265. 265.
    2026-03-28 | americas | 2026-W13 | Topics: China, Indo-Pacific, Trade, United States, Americas

    The Trump administration's 'Donroe Doctrine' seeks to displace Chinese economic influence from the Western Hemisphere through pressure and threats, but this approach alone will fail without providing attractive economic alternatives. China has grown its trade relationships with Latin America from nearly zero to $500 billion annually and now dominates infrastructure, financing, and consumer goods markets. To succeed, the US must leverage expanded financing from the Development Finance Corporation, Export-Import Bank, and multilateral development banks to make US companies competitive, while also promoting transparency, standards-setting, and strategic partnerships. The US should focus on sectors like AI, telecommunications, and infrastructure where private companies can profit while advancing national security interests. Without economic incentives and investment support, the Donroe Doctrine risks failing to counter Chinese influence in the region.

    Read at CFR

  266. 266.
    2026-03-28 | diplomacy | 2026-W13 | Topics: China, Europe, Middle East, Trade, Diplomacy

    The 2026 London conference will convene leaders to address the rapidly shifting international order, driven by US policy changes and China's growing global influence. Discussions will center on preserving essential aspects of the old order, reforming international institutions like the WTO and UN, and coordinating responses to new challenges such as environmental change and AI. The event aims to identify pathways to stability and cooperation, recognizing the increasing role of the Global South in shaping this evolving global landscape.

    Read at Chatham House

  267. 267.
    2026-03-28 | middle_east | 2026-W13 | Topics: China, Middle East, NATO, Nuclear, United States

    The article examines whether Saudi Arabia and the UAE should shift from defensive to offensive military operations against Iran. While both nations possess advanced air forces capable of striking Iranian targets, significant risks—including Iranian retaliation against critical infrastructure, potential US military withdrawal, and severe domestic political consequences of appearing aligned with Israel—make escalation strategically perilous. The economic case for offense is compelling, as Iran's cheaper drone strategy financially exhausts defenders; however, direct military confrontation could irreversibly damage future diplomatic relations and destabilize Gulf governments facing internal security threats. The Gulf Arab states face an unsustainable dilemma: continued defense drains resources while offensive operations risk catastrophic blowback.

    Read at Chatham House

  268. 268.

    The conflict in the Middle East has intensified with targeted attacks on natural gas facilities in Iran and Qatar, causing significant disruption and threatening global energy markets. Israel initiated strikes on Iran's South Pars gas field, leading to Iranian retaliation against a Qatari LNG facility and drone attacks on Kuwaiti and Saudi energy infrastructure, which sent oil prices fluctuating. The escalation has prompted the U.S. to attempt stabilization of oil markets and Gulf nations to issue stern warnings, suggesting prolonged geopolitical and economic implications.

    Read at CFR

  269. 269.
    2026-03-28 | economy | 2026-W13 | Topics: China, NATO, Trade, United States, Economy

    The USMCA review faces an unlikely clean extension by July 1, 2026, amid three critical developments: the Supreme Court's IEEPA tariff ruling, Mexico's killing of cartel leader El Mencho, and escalating U.S. pressure on Canada. Most likely outcomes include a painful, extended negotiation with significant concessions; serial annual reviews without resolution; or a shift to bilateral agreements. Mexico must balance security delivery with domestic economic reforms to strengthen its negotiating position, while Canada diversifies trade partnerships to reduce U.S. leverage. Though a workable deal addressing China supply chains and enforcement is achievable without dismantling the trilateral framework, durable alignment requires all three nations to recognize their mutual interdependence rather than accept terms under political duress.

    Read at CSIS

  270. 270.

    The Iran War's disruption of oil and LNG supplies is forcing Asian economies dependent on Middle Eastern energy to fundamentally restructure their energy strategies. Across the region, governments are accelerating nuclear energy development (Japan, China, South Korea), re-embracing coal, and exploring renewable expansion, with South Korea even considering breaching its US nuclear agreement to pursue domestic uranium enrichment. While these shifts address long-term security needs, most Asian states face significant near-term economic pain, as alternative energy sources require time to deploy and the critical Strait of Hormuz remains largely closed. The crisis reveals Asia's structural energy vulnerabilities and underscores the geopolitical risks of energy insecurity, including potential tensions with security allies and proliferation concerns.

    Read at CFR

  271. 271.
    2026-03-28 | diplomacy | 2026-W13 | Topics: AI, China, Europe, Indo-Pacific, Russia, Trade, United States, Diplomacy

    Sebastian Mallaby, a senior fellow at CFR, reflects on his career trajectory from international journalism to think tank work, shaped by his diplomatic family background and postings across the Soviet Union, Africa, and Asia. Drawing from his experience covering major events like the end of apartheid and Nelson Mandela's release, he emphasizes how curiosity about what makes countries prosperous and peaceful drives meaningful foreign policy work. Mallaby advises aspiring foreign policy professionals to consider diverse institutional platforms—including academia, multinational corporations, and think tanks—recognizing that traditional journalism faces technological disruption while institutions like CFR provide sustained support for deep policy analysis and intellectual leadership.

    Read at CFR

  272. 272.

    CFR President Michael Froman argues that the US failure to build robust allied support for securing the Strait of Hormuz reflects a deeper erosion in coalition-building capacity stemming from inadequate consultation and allied perceptions that military action serves primarily US interests. Despite the Strait's critical importance—handling 40% of China's crude oil and significant European energy flows—responses from major allies ranged from outright refusal to lukewarm commitments, while China strategically abstained despite substantial vulnerability to supply disruption. The episode suggests Trump administration policies on tariffs and territorial claims have depleted the diplomatic capital necessary for allies to support US-led military operations, with significant implications for future security commitments requiring broad international participation.

    Read at CFR

  273. 273.
    2026-03-28 | defense | 2026-W13 | Topics: China, Europe, Indo-Pacific, Middle East, Russia, United States, Defense

    The UK-Mauritius agreement to return the Chagos Archipelago grants Mauritius sovereignty while allowing the U.S. to maintain the critical Diego Garcia military base for 99 years (potentially renewable indefinitely) at no cost, securing strategic access to the Indian Ocean for operations in the Middle East and East Africa. Trump's opposition to the deal, citing national security concerns, appears rooted in geopolitical leverage disputes with UK leadership rather than genuine military vulnerabilities; experts argue the arrangement actually strengthens U.S. interests by providing legal clarity and perpetual access. Iran's March 2026 ballistic missile attack on Diego Garcia—the base's first direct targeting—demonstrates extended Iranian strike capability and validates the base's critical role in U.S. regional defense, though the agreement preserves full American operational control. The proposed framework represents a strategic win for all parties: Mauritius regains sovereignty, the UK resolves international legal liability, and the U.S. secures cost-free long-term access to a strategically vital facility.

    Read at CFR

  274. 274.
    2026-03-28 | economy | 2026-W13 | Topics: China, Europe, Indo-Pacific, Trade, United States, Economy

    Following the Supreme Court's February 2026 ruling invalidating IEEPA-based tariffs, the Trump administration is pivoting to Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 as its primary tariff mechanism. Unlike IEEPA, Section 301 requires a formal administrative process with public comment periods and hearings, giving stakeholders an opportunity to shape the evidentiary record. USTR has initiated investigations affecting 60 economies—16 on 'structural excess capacity' policies and all 60 on forced labor import restrictions—with written comments due April 15, 2026. The eventual scope and defensibility of resulting tariffs will depend critically on how USTR defines key terms and frames its justifications. This procedural requirement creates both constraints on tariff scope and opportunities for businesses and workers to influence definitions that will affect supply chains, federal revenue, and trade policy for years to come.

    Read at Brookings

  275. 275.
    2026-03-28 | society | 2026-W13 | Topics: China, Climate, Indo-Pacific, Middle East, Trade, United States, Society

    The 70th UN Commission on the Status of Women focused on access to justice and eliminating discriminatory laws, with panelists highlighting that women globally possess only two-thirds the legal rights of men. Key barriers include widespread discriminatory legislation (affecting rape definitions, child marriage, and equal pay), fragmented justice systems inaccessible to women, and social biases that discourage reporting. The Commission adopted historic agreed conclusions for the first time requiring a vote after 70 years, establishing stronger commitments to legal aid, digital justice platforms, and survivor-centric approaches to conflict-related sexual violence, though the United States cast an unprecedented opposing vote. Speakers emphasized that implementing these agreements requires sustained political will, adequate funding for justice systems, and international accountability mechanisms to address gender-based violence and impunity.

    Read at CFR

  276. 276.
    2026-03-28 | middle_east | 2026-W13 | Topics: China, Europe, Middle East, NATO, Nuclear, Russia, Trade, Ukraine, United States

    Dr. Gorka presents the Trump administration's counterterrorism strategy, positioning Iran as the principal global sponsor of terrorist networks funding both Shia and Sunni extremist groups, and arguing that Operation Epic Fury has substantially degraded Tehran's operational capability while ideological intent persists. The strategy prioritizes information operations (IO) as foundational counterterrorism, emphasizing the need to expose regime hypocrisy and terrorist ineffectiveness to erode support, paired with emphasis on state sovereignty as essential for long-term security. Key initiatives include rebuilding counterterrorism partnerships in Iraq and Syria post-operation, strengthening capacity in the Sahel and Lake Chad regions, and conducting sustained messaging campaigns to undermine terrorist recruitment and ideology.

    Read at CFR

  277. 277.
    2026-03-28 | economy | 2026-W13 | Topics: AI, China, Indo-Pacific, Trade, Economy

    China's established investment-and-export-led economic growth model is encountering severe systemic pressures, marked by diminishing investment returns and a deflationary domestic market. To address these issues, China is implementing an "AI Plus" Initiative, aiming to integrate artificial intelligence across its economy for modernization by 2035. However, significant internal challenges like an aging population, low productivity growth, and high youth unemployment raise doubts about the sustainability of this model and AI's capacity to fulfill the state's ambitious economic and political objectives.

    Read at Chatham House

  278. 278.
    2026-03-28 | defense | 2026-W13 | Topics: China, Middle East, Nuclear, Russia, Ukraine, United States, Defense

    After three weeks, the air campaign in the Iran War shows a sustained U.S. strike tempo, adapted to use less expensive munitions, while Iranian drone and missile launches have significantly declined but persist, notably targeting Gulf states' energy facilities. Gulf allies report high interception rates of 80-90%, but their interceptor inventories are reportedly dwindling. The ongoing conflict signals continued regional instability, raising critical questions about Iran's remaining military capabilities and the potential for a U.S. military operation to secure the Strait of Hormuz.

    Read at CSIS

  279. 279.
    2026-03-28 | middle_east | 2026-W13 | Topics: AI, China, Middle East, Russia, Trade, Ukraine, United States

    The U.S.-Israeli war with Iran provides Russia with short-term advantages, such as increased oil revenues due to the Strait of Hormuz closure and the diversion of Western military aid from Ukraine, aiding its ongoing offensive. However, Russian elites are growing apprehensive, noting Russia's diminished global influence, exclusion from Middle East diplomacy, and the long-term strategic and economic drain of the Ukraine conflict. While U.S.-Russia relations have soured and Ukraine peace talks are paused, Putin's sustained belief in potential collaboration with the Trump administration currently prevents a more significant bilateral breakdown.

    Read at CFR

  280. 280.

    The analysis argues that the transatlantic relationship is strained by US unilateralism, challenging Europe's traditional posture of submission. Key evidence suggests that Europe's history of bending the knee to Washington has been detrimental, while recent acts of collective self-assertion—such as rejecting US pressure over Greenland or denying base access during the Iran crisis—have proven more effective. For policy, the findings imply that Europe must abandon reactive submission and instead prioritize internal cohesion, energy transition, and unified policy stances. This strategic shift is necessary for Europe to build genuine leverage and reduce its structural dependence on US protection.

    Read at Foreign Affairs

  281. 281.

    The report argues that the U.S. Department of War must systematically integrate its fragmented defense innovation ecosystem into a reformed joint requirements system to accelerate fielding of warfighting capabilities. Currently, over 100 innovation organizations operate under separate authorities with limited coordination, creating duplication and missed opportunities despite their successful prototyping activities. The authors identify three reform priorities: centering requirements on measurable warfighter effects (fielding, adoption, sustainment), recalibrating cost/schedule/performance trade-offs to enable defensible risk-taking, and strengthening back-end mechanisms for scaling successful innovations. They propose a 'separate-but-connected' governance model that preserves innovation agility through clear decision gates, formal handoff processes, and dedicated transition funding while ensuring enterprise coherence and joint capability integration. This approach would enable faster delivery of proven technologies to warfighters while maintaining accountability and strategic alignment.

    Read at RAND

  282. 282.

    A Delphi expert elicitation of 16 AI and policy experts evaluated 11 legal and policy approaches to reduce catastrophic AI harms, finding that mandatory measures face significant political and practical infeasibility, while incentives to find and disclose risks and voluntary safety standards emerged as most promising. Experts rated nearly all categories as desirable but questioned feasibility in the current U.S. political environment, with effectiveness varying substantially by actor type—highest for AI developers (3.3 average), lower for nonmalicious users (3.0), and lowest for malicious users (2.3). The most viable approaches require no federal government involvement and can be implemented through industry commitments and state-level action, including structured bug bounty programs, legal safe harbors for researchers, and coordinated vulnerability disclosure processes. Rather than waiting for comprehensive federal legislation, policymakers should pursue incremental, near-term measures that foster transparency through developer incentives and establish voluntary standards as scaffolding for future mandatory requirements. The analysis reflects growing skepticism about traditional regulatory approaches in the AI domain, with experts increasingly viewing private-sector and state-level action as more feasible pathways for near-term risk mitigation.

    Read at RAND

  283. 283.
    2026-03-24 | china_indopacific | 2026-W13 | Topics: China, Europe, Indo-Pacific, Trade, United States

    China has strategically positioned Southeast Asia as a core focus of its geoeconomic expansion, utilizing initiatives like the Maritime Silk Road (BRI). Evidence of this deep integration includes the region attracting $126 billion in Chinese investment over the last decade, making it China's largest trading partner as of 2020. While this relationship drives significant regional growth, the intense economic dependency and strategic focus suggest that Southeast Asian nations are increasingly subject to Beijing's influence. Policy implications suggest that external powers must monitor the rising geopolitical pressure and potential for economic coercion stemming from this deep Chinese integration.

    Read at Foreign Affairs

  284. 284.
    2026-03-23 | china_indopacific | 2026-W13 | Topics: China

    The article argues that China's unprecedented economic liberalization has forced the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to fundamentally diverge from strict Marxist ideology. Key evidence points to the early 1980s, when the rapid growth of private enterprise and the surge in rural incomes prompted high-ranking officials to observe the socio-economic changes through the lens of Marxist theory. This suggests that the CCP's current governance model is a pragmatic synthesis of state control and market capitalism, prioritizing economic growth and stability over ideological purity. For policy makers, this implies that China's strategic focus remains on maintaining economic momentum, potentially leading to continued internal tension between market forces and traditional socialist doctrine.

    Read at Foreign Affairs

  285. 285.
    2026-03-20 | china_indopacific | 2026-W12 | Topics: China, Indo-Pacific, Trade, United States

    The U.S. and China are currently navigating a period of strategic calm following years of elevated tensions. This détente is evidenced by a recent truce agreement between President Trump and Xi Jinping, which temporarily paused the trade war and lifted restrictions on critical resources like rare-earth elements. While this pause represents a significant de-escalation, the article cautions that the stability is fragile. Therefore, the outcome of future high-level meetings will be crucial for determining if this strategic calm can be maintained or if tensions will resurface.

    Read at Foreign Affairs

  286. 286.
    2026-03-19 | middle_east | 2026-W12 | Topics: China, Indo-Pacific, Middle East, Nuclear, Russia, Trade, Ukraine, United States

    F. Gregory Gause III argues that Saudi Crown Prince MBS has shifted from an aggressive, interventionist foreign policy to one emphasizing regional stability after Iran's 2019 strike on Saudi oil facilities and the lack of U.S. response. Saudi Arabia now prioritizes economic modernization (Vision 2030), opposes U.S. military action against Iran for fear of retaliatory strikes on Gulf infrastructure, and has raised the cost of Israeli normalization by demanding a pathway to Palestinian statehood. The analysis highlights a growing Saudi-Emirati divergence over whether to back central governments or non-state actors, while Riyadh continues to view Washington—not Beijing—as its primary security and technology partner, particularly in AI and defense.

    Read at CFR

  287. 287.
    2026-03-19 | middle_east | 2026-W12 | Topics: China, Middle East, Trade

    The conflict between the US, Israel, and Iran has escalated into a significant maritime crisis, centered on Iran's closure of the Strait of Hormuz and the subsequent disruption of Indian Ocean trade routes. Iran is employing asymmetric tactics, including coastal missile strikes and GPS jamming, to impose risks on shipping even as the US increases seizures of vessels linked to illicit trade. This environment of navigation interference and 'dark' shipping is driving traffic toward the Cape of Good Hope, resulting in higher costs and increased exposure to piracy.

    Read at Chatham House

  288. 288.
    2026-03-19 | diplomacy | 2026-W12 | Topics: China, Climate, Europe, NATO, Russia, United States

    Greenland is currently navigating a surge in US interest driven by President Trump’s ambitions for its critical minerals and strategic location, while simultaneously facing the more existential threat of rapid Arctic warming. While Washington views the island as a 'near-domestic' solution to counter Chinese mineral dominance, local leaders are resisting being treated as a geopolitical 'chessboard' and are instead prioritizing sovereignty and partnerships with the EU and Denmark. The article highlights that while melting ice reveals new mineral wealth, the resulting environmental instability poses significant risks to the island's infrastructure and its vital fishing industry. Ultimately, Greenland’s strategy focuses on balancing economic development with strict environmental safeguards and the maintenance of its communal land traditions.

    Read at Chatham House

  289. 289.
    2026-03-19 | africa | 2026-W12 | Topics: China, Indo-Pacific, Middle East, Nuclear, Russia, Trade, United States

    This CSIS report argues that the U.S. must prioritize its mineral supply relationship with South Africa despite recent diplomatic friction to avoid losing strategic access to China and Russia. South Africa remains the dominant supplier of platinum group metals, chromium, and military-grade vanadium, which are indispensable for U.S. defense systems, semiconductor manufacturing, and reindustrialization. To counter the migration of processing capacity to China, the report recommends U.S. investment in South African energy infrastructure through LNG-to-power agreements and renewed nuclear cooperation. Establishing price floors for defense materials and pairing financing with long-term offtake agreements are seen as essential steps to securing these critical supply chains.

    Read at CSIS

  290. 290.
    2026-03-19 | middle_east | 2026-W12 | Topics: China, Europe, Middle East, NATO, Nuclear, Trade, Ukraine, United States

    UAE diplomatic adviser Anwar Gargash details the impact of Iran's missile and drone campaign against Gulf states, revealing that the UAE has been struck by over 2,000 projectiles targeting civilian infrastructure rather than the U.S. military facilities Iran claims. Gargash argues Iran's strategy is counterproductive, as it has shattered trust with traditional Gulf mediators like Oman and Qatar, exposed the reality of Iran's threat capabilities, and will paradoxically strengthen Israel's role and the U.S. defense relationship in the Gulf for decades. He calls for any postwar settlement to include enforceable guarantees against both Iran's nuclear program and its missile and drone arsenal, while signaling UAE willingness to join an international coalition to secure the Strait of Hormuz.

    Read at CFR

  291. 291.
    2026-03-19 | tech | 2026-W12 | Topics: China, Europe, Indo-Pacific, United States

    The United States must significantly increase and sustain national investment in quantum information science and technology (QIST) to maintain its competitive edge against global rivals like China. The report identifies critical gaps in aging federal research facilities at NIST and the Department of Defense, alongside a lack of shared-use infrastructure like testbeds and foundries necessary for commercial prototyping. Strategic recommendations include establishing a long-term funding framework for tech infrastructure, creating an interconnected national network of regional quantum ecosystems, and providing stable government demand signals to encourage private sector R&D.

    Read at CSIS

  292. 292.
    2026-03-19 | africa | 2026-W12 | Topics: China, Europe, Russia, Trade, United States

    The article argues that African nations are increasingly exercising 'resource sovereignty' to manage their critical mineral wealth, challenging the paternalistic Western assumption that the continent requires external oversight to avoid exploitation. It highlights how countries like Burkina Faso and South Africa are leveraging global competition between the US and China to secure better infrastructure investments and nationalize key mining assets. For Western policymakers, this shift necessitates a move away from moralizing interventions toward engaging African states as equal economic partners capable of navigating geopolitical rivalries for their own benefit.

    Read at Chatham House

  293. 293.
    2026-03-19 | middle_east | 2026-W12 | Topics: China, Middle East, Nuclear, Trade, United States

    Saudi Arabia adopts a cautious and measured approach to the conflict with Iran, prioritizing its domestic economic and societal transformation over direct military escalation despite repeated Iranian provocations. While the Kingdom possesses the military capability to respond, it recognizes Iran's escalation dominance over vulnerable energy and desalination infrastructure, which makes the risk of a grinding war of attrition unacceptable. This stance suggests that Saudi Arabia will focus on securing more explicit defense commitments from the United States while remaining skeptical that the current conflict will lead to long-term regional stability or rapid normalization with Israel.

    Read at CSIS

  294. 294.
    2026-03-19 | middle_east | 2026-W12 | Topics: AI, China, Climate, Europe, Middle East, Russia, Trade, Ukraine, United States

    Six CFR fellows assess the geoeconomic fallout from the U.S.-Israeli war in Iran, arguing that disruption to the Strait of Hormuz has triggered the largest oil supply shock in history, with Brent crude surging above $100/barrel and roughly 10 million barrels per day taken off the market. The cascading effects extend well beyond energy: global fertilizer exports, food security for import-dependent Gulf states, and commercial data center infrastructure (including Amazon facilities in the UAE) have all been hit, while central banks face stagflationary pressures that complicate monetary policy. The analysis concludes that Washington has no easy options—strategic reserve releases and eased Russia sanctions have proven insufficient—leaving policymakers to choose between difficult concessions to Tehran or further military escalation, while also reconsidering the wisdom of concentrating critical AI infrastructure in volatile regions.

    Read at CFR

  295. 295.
    2026-03-19 | middle_east | 2026-W12 | Topics: AI, China, Europe, Indo-Pacific, Middle East, Nuclear, Russia, Trade, Ukraine, United States

    A CFR expert panel analyzes the geoeconomic fallout from the Iran war, which has produced what the IEA calls the largest oil supply disruption in history, with flows through the Strait of Hormuz reduced to a trickle and crude prices surging past $100/barrel. Panelists argue the Trump administration underestimated Iran's willingness to escalate by closing the strait after its leadership was targeted, and that neither strategic petroleum reserve releases nor eased Russia sanctions have meaningfully stabilized markets, with potential GDP contractions of up to 14% in Qatar/Kuwait and recessionary risks for the U.S. if the crisis persists. The disruption is reshaping Gulf security dynamics—driving GCC states toward defense diversification away from sole U.S. reliance—while delivering a financial windfall to Russia, validating China's energy stockpiling strategy, and threatening Saudi Vision 2030 and UAE hub ambitions, with no assured resolution short of Iran agreeing to a ceasefire.

    Read at CFR

  296. 296.

    This CFR podcast examines how the war in Ukraine is sustained by competing alliance networks: NATO and European allies backing Ukraine, while Russia draws critical support from China (economic and technological), Iran (drones), and North Korea (troops and munitions). The analysis highlights that neither coalition is a traditional bloc alliance—China carefully avoids direct weapons transfers to protect its economy and reputation, while the U.S. under Trump has shifted from alliance leader to self-styled neutral mediator with a pro-Russia lean, forcing Europeans to dramatically increase their own defense commitments. The episode argues that the global order is moving toward more transactional, fragile partnerships rather than values-based alliances, creating a less stable and more unpredictable security environment than even the Cold War's rigid bipolarity.

    Read at CFR

  297. 297.
    2026-03-19 | china_indopacific | 2026-W12 | Topics: China, Indo-Pacific, Middle East, United States

    China’s 15th Five-Year Plan (2026–2030) prioritizes clean energy expansion and economic resilience over specific emission reduction targets, signaling a strategic pivot toward technological supremacy. The blueprint emphasizes dominating global green tech production to mitigate supply chain vulnerabilities, particularly those exposed by the Iran war and other geopolitical instabilities. Consequently, China is increasingly integrating its climate ambitions with broader foreign policy goals, leveraging its lead in clean technology to reshape international energy markets and challenge Western industrial competitiveness.

    Read at Chatham House

  298. 298.

    Following the Supreme Court's rejection of IEEPA-based reciprocal tariffs, the U.S. is pivoting to Section 122 and 301 authorities to maintain a high-tariff regime that is increasingly used for non-trade geopolitical leverage. Experts suggest that while the administration has secured several asymmetric bilateral deals, this unilateralist approach risks fragmenting global trade and isolating the U.S. from the allies needed to counter China's systemic industrial overcapacity. The panel highlights that China's growing trade surplus and manufacturing dominance remain unresolved by current protectionist measures or the existing WTO framework. Consequently, U.S. strategy may be drifting toward a 'Fortress America' posture that increases domestic costs while ceding influence over future global trade rules and market opportunities.

    Read at CFR

  299. 299.
    2026-03-19 | middle_east | 2026-W12 | Topics: China, Europe, Middle East, Russia, Trade, United States

    The article contends that a U.S. ground invasion of Iran would be a catastrophic undertaking, dwarfing the scale of the Iraq and Vietnam wars due to Iran’s punishing mountainous terrain and dense urban centers. Achieving total surrender would realistically require up to 1.6 million troops, a mobilization that would compromise other global security commitments and likely necessitate a military draft. The author highlights that Iranian "mosaic" defensive strategies and regional militias would trigger a prolonged insurgency while allowing rivals like Russia and China to exploit American overextension. Consequently, the analysis advocates for immediate de-escalation to avoid a strategic quagmire and preserve U.S. military readiness.

    Read at CATO

  300. 300.
    2026-03-19 | middle_east | 2026-W12 | Topics: China, Europe, Middle East, Nuclear, Russia, Taiwan, Trade, Ukraine, United States

    This CFR panel examines the U.S.-Israel military campaign against Iran launched in late February 2026, exploring how decades of Iranian nuclear ambition, proxy warfare, and the regime's brutal suppression of domestic protests converged to trigger the strikes. Panelists note that Iran's selection of Mojtaba Khamenei as supreme leader signals hardline continuity rather than reform, while the opposition remains fragmented and outgunned by the IRGC. The war has exposed Iran's lack of reliable great-power allies, as neither Russia nor China intervened meaningfully, and has severely degraded Iranian military and proxy capabilities including Hezbollah. However, experts warn that the Trump administration lacked adequate planning for day-after scenarios, civilian evacuations, and energy market disruption, and that a weakened but surviving regime could become more repressive domestically while periodically requiring future military action to prevent rearmament.

    Read at CFR

  301. 301.

    Fifteen years after the Fukushima disaster, Japan is reintegrating nuclear power into its energy mix to bolster energy security and meet decarbonization targets. The shift, codified in the 2025 Strategic Energy Plan, aims to reduce the country’s precarious over-reliance on imported natural gas, which exposed Japan to significant geopolitical risks following conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East. While supported by extensive safety reforms and the strategic need to compete with China’s nuclear expansion, the policy must still navigate persistent public skepticism. Success will require a flexible approach that balances nuclear restarts with diversified energy sourcing to ensure long-term stability.

    Read at CFR

  302. 302.
    2026-03-19 | energy | 2026-W12 | Topics: China, Climate, Indo-Pacific, Trade, United States

    This CSIS report warns that while the U.S. possesses sufficient aggregate energy, regional infrastructure constraints in key industrial hubs could jeopardize the defense industrial base's ability to mobilize for a high-intensity conflict. The analysis highlights that critical production for materials like titanium, aluminum, and semiconductors is geographically concentrated in regions such as PJM and ERCOT, which face eroding reserve margins, surging data center demand, and natural gas deliverability risks. To mitigate these vulnerabilities, the authors recommend extending "Defense Critical Electric Infrastructure" designations to private industrial nodes and utilizing the Defense Production Act to expedite permitting and financing for energy assurance projects. Integrating energy resilience into defense supply chain risk assessments is essential to ensure that localized grid or pipeline failures do not paralyze wartime production schedules.

    Read at CSIS

  303. 303.

    This CFR roundtable examines the global energy crisis triggered by Iran's effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz, which threatens to remove roughly 20 million barrels per day—about 20% of global petroleum consumption—dwarfing the 1973 Arab Oil Embargo's 7% disruption. Despite the largest-ever coordinated IEA reserve release of 400 million barrels, aging SPR infrastructure limits actual throughput to a fraction of the shortfall, and alternative pipelines from Saudi Arabia and the UAE can only partially compensate. The discussion highlights that oil prices remain lower than expected only because markets anticipate a quick resolution, while Russia and Iran are paradoxically profiting from the crisis, and China's long-term electrification strategy is being validated as a model of energy security planning.

    Read at CFR

  304. 304.
    2026-03-19 | china_indopacific | 2026-W12 | Topics: China, Indo-Pacific, Middle East, Nuclear, Russia, Taiwan, Trade, United States

    This CFR podcast examines President Nixon's historic 1972 visit to China, arguing it was a strategically consequential move that exploited the Sino-Soviet split to give the United States leverage over Moscow, reduced Chinese support for North Vietnam, and began a fundamental shift in American attitudes toward China from ideological adversary to potential partner. Historian Jeremi Suri highlights that the opening was possible because both sides had converging interests—Nixon sought to outmaneuver the Soviet Union while Mao faced border tensions with Moscow and domestic instability from the Cultural Revolution—and was executed through extraordinary White House secrecy bypassing the State Department. The episode draws lessons for today: the U.S. benefits from engaging adversaries diplomatically rather than relying on non-recognition, but the costs of excluding career diplomats and allied governments from the process—as seen in Japan's shock at the announcement—underscore that dramatic personal diplomacy without institutional follow-through can delay substantive outcomes and damage alliances.

    Read at CFR

  305. 305.
    2026-03-19 | middle_east | 2026-W12 | Topics: China, Europe, Indo-Pacific, Middle East, NATO, Nuclear, Russia, Trade, Ukraine, United States

    President Trump is calling for an international coalition, including NATO allies and Asian partners, to militarily secure the Strait of Hormuz as the conflict with Iran enters its third week. The push follows unsuccessful U.S. strikes on Iran's Kharg Island and subsequent Iranian retaliatory attacks on Saudi and UAE energy infrastructure, which have collectively sparked a global energy crisis. By linking ally participation to the future of NATO, the administration is signaling a high-stakes strategy to internationalize the military burden while allies remain cautious about further escalation.

    Read at CFR

  306. 306.
    2026-03-19 | defense | 2026-W12 | Topics: AI, China, Cybersecurity, Middle East, Russia, Trade, United States

    The Trump administration's new cyber strategy is dangerously inadequate, offering only four pages of substance while failing to even mention China, Iran, Russia, or North Korea as threats despite escalating cyber operations from these adversaries. The strategy privileges offensive capabilities over defense and deregulation over minimum security standards, yet U.S. Cyber Command lacks sufficient forces and experienced leadership, key diplomatic and civilian cyber offices have been gutted, and no framework exists for the private-sector offensive operations it envisions. The resulting gap between the administration's rhetoric of cyber dominance and its actual institutional capacity leaves U.S. critical infrastructure increasingly exposed to nation-state intrusions and ransomware at a moment when military operations abroad are generating new asymmetric retaliation risks.

    Read at CFR

  307. 307.
    2026-03-19 | diplomacy | 2026-W12 | Topics: China, Middle East, Russia, Taiwan, United States

    The article highlights two central lessons from the history of U.S. foreign policy: the frequent occurrence of unforeseen global shifts and the persistent overestimation of military power's ability to achieve political goals. Drawing on examples from the Cold War to recent interventions in the Middle East, it illustrates how strategic expectations are often dashed by the resilience of local actors and the unpredictability of international alliances. The findings suggest that U.S. strategy should shift toward humility and pragmatism, acknowledging the limits of power and the inherent uncertainty of global events to better adapt to a changing world.

    Read at CFR

  308. 308.
    2026-03-19 | economy | 2026-W12 | Topics: AI, China, Europe, Indo-Pacific, Taiwan, Trade, United States

    USMCA has significantly deepened North American economic integration, with compliance rates for Mexican and Canadian exports rising to nearly 80% following 2025 tariff increases on non-agreement goods. Mexico has solidified its role as the top U.S. trading partner, transitioning toward high-value advanced technology sectors like AI servers and medical devices while de-risking from China. However, rising labor costs and policy uncertainty have constrained new investment and employment in traditional manufacturing. The report suggests the 2026 USMCA review must prioritize realistic regional content requirements and infrastructure improvements to sustain the current nearshoring momentum.

    Read at Brookings

  309. 309.
    2026-03-19 | china_indopacific | 2026-W12 | Topics: China, Indo-Pacific, Middle East, Trade, United States

    The war between the US and Iran is prompting Indo-Pacific allies—Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines—to pursue deeper trilateral security cooperation to compensate for the sudden withdrawal of American military assets from the region. Recent redeployments of missile defense systems and Marines to the Middle East have highlighted the risks of over-reliance on US commitments, particularly as regional threats from China and North Korea persist. To mitigate this uncertainty, the article advocates for a formal trilateral arrangement to enhance military interoperability, intelligence sharing, and regional stability independent of shifting US defense priorities.

    Read at Chatham House

  310. 310.
    2026-03-19 | china_indopacific | 2026-W12 | Topics: China, Indo-Pacific, Nuclear, United States

    An IISS crisis simulation found that Southeast Asian nations lack the 'strategic bandwidth' and specialized literacy required to manage a major nuclear-security escalation involving great powers. Centered on a 2031 scenario of a missing nuclear submarine, the exercise highlighted that regional states rely on the SEANWFZ Treaty as a baseline but struggle to bridge the divide between China and the AUKUS partnership. Consequently, the report recommends that ASEAN enhance domestic inter-agency coordination and utilize the ADMM-Plus framework to more effectively address nuclear-related regional security threats.

    Read at IISS

  311. 311.
    2026-03-19 | europe | 2026-W12 | Topics: China, Europe, Indo-Pacific, NATO, Russia, Trade, Ukraine, United States

    The article argues that a robust security alliance between Poland and Germany is essential for European defense amidst rising Russian aggression and declining US reliability. This partnership is currently stifled by historical grievances, Polish domestic political infighting, and German strategic reluctance regarding defense investment and historical atonement. To overcome these barriers, the two nations are pursuing 'military diplomacy' through a bilateral defense agreement and multilateral security formats to modernize infrastructure and resupply national arsenals. Failure to solidify this axis risks leaving Europe vulnerable if Polish leadership continues to prioritize a potentially unreliable US partnership over regional integration.

    Read at Chatham House

  312. 312.
    2026-03-19 | diplomacy | 2026-W12 | Topics: China, Europe, NATO, Nuclear, Russia, Ukraine, United States

    The 2026 NPT review conference faces significant obstacles following the expiration of the New START treaty and a shift in US nuclear policy toward more aggressive deterrence and less emphasis on denuclearization. Experts caution that allegations of secret nuclear tests and the potential resumption of global testing threaten to unleash a new arms race, undermining decades of non-proliferation efforts. As confidence in traditional US security guarantees and NATO’s Article V wanes, European allies are increasingly compelled to seek alternative collective defense and deterrence arrangements.

    Read at Chatham House

  313. 313.
    2026-03-19 | economy | 2026-W12 | Topics: China, United States

    The U.S. Postal Service is facing an imminent liquidity crisis as its statutory self-financing model fails to sustain the Universal Service Obligation (USO) amidst a 56% decline in First-Class Mail volume since 2007. This fiscal strain is driven by a structural mismatch where the value of the postal monopoly no longer covers the fixed costs of nationwide delivery and mandated retiree obligations. To avoid cash exhaustion within the next year, the article argues that Congress must intervene through pension restructuring, explicit appropriations for the USO, or increased borrowing authority. Failure to act will likely result in service degradation that disproportionately affects rural populations and small businesses dependent on postal infrastructure.

    Read at Brookings

  314. 314.
    2026-03-19 | middle_east | 2026-W12 | Topics: China, Indo-Pacific, Middle East, NATO, Russia, Ukraine, United States

    National Counterterrorism Center Director Joe Kent resigned in protest against the war in Iran, asserting that the conflict lacks an imminent threat justification and fails to serve American interests. This internal rupture coincides with escalating Israeli military operations against Iranian leadership and growing friction between the U.S. and NATO allies over maritime security in the Strait of Hormuz. The ongoing conflict is triggering global repercussions, including an energy crisis that has forced nations like Sri Lanka to implement austerity measures. These developments suggest a deepening isolation of U.S. foreign policy and a heightening risk of a broader, uncoordinated regional war with significant economic fallout.

    Read at CFR

  315. 315.

    The article argues that the convergence of low-cost drone technology and precision guidance has ushered in an era of 'precise mass' warfare, first demonstrated in Ukraine and now fully manifest in the U.S.-Iran conflict surrounding Operation Epic Fury. The authors highlight a critical cost-exchange imbalance: defending against $20,000-$50,000 Shahed-136 drones requires interceptors costing $125,000 to $4 million each, rapidly depleting limited air defense stockpiles across the Gulf states and potentially drawing down Indo-Pacific reserves needed to deter China. The implications are stark—the U.S. must dramatically increase investment in attritable, scalable systems like LUCAS beyond the current 0.5% of defense spending, as precise mass capabilities are becoming a permanent feature of modern warfare that empowers both great powers and lesser states alike.

    Read at CFR

  316. 316.

    The article argues that despite the United States' shift toward aggressive protectionism and abandonment of multilateral leadership, the remaining 165 WTO members can and should continue global trade liberalization independently. By adopting a WTO-based plurilateral approach and moving away from strict consensus decision-making, these nations can address 21st-century challenges like digital trade while bypassing American commercial recalcitrance. Evidence suggests that global supply chains are already reconfiguring through 'trade deflection' and new non-US agreements, proving that international trade can persist without the U.S. at its center. Ultimately, collective action within the WTO framework is necessary to prevent global economic fragmentation and to maintain the rule-based system until the U.S. returns to a cooperative role.

    Read at CATO

  317. 317.
    2026-03-19 | middle_east | 2026-W12 | Topics: China, Europe, Indo-Pacific, Middle East, Russia, Trade, Ukraine, United States

    A U.S. military investigation reveals that outdated targeting data led to a Tomahawk missile strike on an Iranian elementary school, resulting in at least 175 civilian deaths at the onset of the war. This tragedy highlights the impact of a 90 percent reduction in specialized Pentagon teams dedicated to minimizing civilian casualties during military operations. The mounting human toll and associated global energy disruptions are shifting the conflict toward a prolonged struggle of political endurance, while complicating U.S. diplomatic relations with key allies like Spain.

    Read at CFR

  318. 318.
    2026-03-19 | economy | 2026-W12 | Topics: China, Europe, Indo-Pacific, Russia, Trade, Ukraine, United States

    Brookings has launched an interactive trade tracker to monitor significant shifts in U.S. trade flows and costs following a sharp increase in tariffs beginning in January 2025. The tool reveals how businesses proactively react to trade policy, evidenced by a massive surge in metal imports ahead of Section 232 implementation and heightened price volatility among major trading partners. These findings underscore the profound economic impact of aggressive trade enforcement and subsequent legal challenges, such as the February 2026 Supreme Court ruling invalidating certain emergency tariff actions.

    Read at Brookings

  319. 319.
    2026-03-19 | economy | 2026-W12 | Topics: China, Europe, Trade, United States

    Western governments must shift from merely incentivizing private mining to taking direct equity stakes in the industry to secure critical mineral supplies and counter China’s market dominance. The report highlights that the US is already leveraging billions in state-backed financing and board-level control to mitigate geopolitical vulnerabilities, a model the UK and EU must follow to prevent deindustrialization. This strategic shift requires mobilizing politically guided capital to provide the long-term investment necessary for mining projects that are often commercially unviable due to high volatility and low prices. Failure to secure these supply chains through direct ownership risks leaving critical manufacturing sectors vulnerable to foreign export controls and trade disruptions.

    Read at Chatham House

  320. 320.
    2026-03-19 | china_indopacific | 2026-W12 | Topics: China, Indo-Pacific, Nuclear, Taiwan, United States

    This Brookings-RAND joint initiative examines whether current U.S. policy toward Taiwan and cross-strait relations remains adequate amid a deteriorating security environment in the Taiwan Strait. Through a series of expert workshops, the project explores five distinct policy pathways: limiting U.S. commitments while boosting Taiwan's self-defense, calibrating diplomacy to stabilize cross-strait dynamics, pursuing a more active denial strategy, and shifting toward strategic clarity. The analysis weighs how each option would affect U.S. deterrence posture, Taiwan's domestic politics, Beijing's strategic calculus, and broader Indo-Pacific security. The initiative signals growing mainstream debate within the U.S. policy community about whether the longstanding framework of strategic ambiguity should be revised or replaced, with significant implications for alliance management and escalation risk in the region.

    Read at Brookings

  321. 321.
    2026-03-19 | middle_east | 2026-W12 | Topics: China, Europe, Indo-Pacific, Middle East, Nuclear, Russia, United States

    This analysis evaluates the U.S.-Israel conflict with Iran, contending that significant military successes in degrading nuclear and missile capabilities have not yet triggered the regime's collapse. Key indicators, such as the stable succession of Mojtaba Khamenei and the lack of military defections, suggest that the theocracy is consolidating into a 'rump state' capable of sustained regional disruption against Gulf energy infrastructure. The authors warn that an exit strategy focused solely on conventional degradation may leave a bloodied regime with even greater incentives to pursue nuclear weapons as an ultimate deterrent, potentially turning tactical victories into a long-term strategic liability.

    Read at Brookings

  322. 322.
    2026-03-19 | middle_east | 2026-W12 | Topics: China, Indo-Pacific, Middle East, NATO, Nuclear, Russia, Trade, Ukraine, United States

    Iran’s new leadership has committed to continuing the conflict, emphasizing ongoing pressure on the Strait of Hormuz and further retaliation against U.S.-Israeli strikes. This defiant stance is met with a similar pledge from Washington to advance military operations, indicating that both sides are preparing for an escalation rather than a diplomatic resolution. The ongoing hostilities have already caused significant global energy shocks, forcing the U.S. to adjust sanctions on other oil producers like Russia to stabilize markets. For regional strategy, these developments suggest a protracted war with high risks of expanded conflict and long-term economic disruption.

    Read at CFR

  323. 323.
    2026-03-19 | middle_east | 2026-W12 | Topics: China, Middle East, Russia, United States

    Historian Stephen Kotkin argues that authoritarian regimes, while appearing formidable, possess inherent structural vulnerabilities that can be exploited. His analysis, drawing on historical precedents and observations of regimes like Iran, suggests that the mechanisms used by strongmen to maintain power also create points of instability. Consequently, the prospect of rapid regime change through military intervention is highly complex and unlikely to proceed smoothly. Policymakers must therefore understand the deep structural weaknesses of these regimes rather than relying on assumptions of quick collapse.

    Read at Foreign Affairs

  324. 324.

    Finnish President Alexander Stubb argues that a more flexible and differentiated model of European integration is essential for the continent to remain resilient and competitive amid rising geopolitical tensions. He emphasizes the need for pragmatic mechanisms that allow member states to respond rapidly to challenges in defense, energy, and technology without losing their shared sense of purpose. Ultimately, this approach is presented as a way to strengthen the European Union's collective ability to protect its interests and values in an era of shifting global alliances.

    Read at Chatham House

  325. 325.
    2026-03-19 | middle_east | 2026-W12 | Topics: China, Europe, Middle East, Russia, Trade, United States

    The Council on Foreign Relations details the emerging postwar governance structure for Gaza, centered on the U.S.-led Board of Peace and a 15-member Palestinian Technocratic Committee (NCAG) designed to replace Hamas in daily administration. Twelve confirmed Palestinian technocrats, many with professional backgrounds in the Palestinian Authority or Gaza’s private sector, will manage essential services and infrastructure under international supervision as part of a broader twenty-point peace plan. While the initiative has secured initial funding and troop commitments from several nations, its long-term success faces significant hurdles due to the lack of formal buy-in from local stakeholders and international concerns regarding the Board’s institutional scope.

    Read at CFR

  326. 326.

    The conflict between the United States, Israel, and Iran has escalated into a significant maritime confrontation in the Strait of Hormuz, threatening global oil supplies and necessitating a potential release of strategic energy reserves. Evidence of this expansion includes the U.S. destruction of Iranian mine-laying vessels and reports of attacks on commercial shipping, alongside a staggering initial war cost of $5.6 billion for Washington within the first two days. Consequently, the war is forcing a strategic pivot of U.S. missile defense assets from East Asia to the Middle East, while highlighting vulnerabilities in global interceptor supplies for other theaters like Ukraine.

    Read at CFR

  327. 327.
    2026-03-19 | china_indopacific | 2026-W12 | Topics: AI, China, Middle East, Trade, United States

    China’s 15th Five Year Plan codifies a long-term shift toward economic resilience and technological self-reliance, driven by perceived vulnerabilities in globalized supply chains and geopolitical instability like the Iran war. The strategy emphasizes 'AI Plus' initiatives and increased R&D spending to secure autonomy in semiconductors, quantum tech, and digital infrastructure. However, this transition faces significant headwinds, including record-low growth targets and a capital-intensive tech focus that struggles to absorb a highly educated workforce. Ultimately, Beijing is prioritizing national security and high-quality manufacturing over the debt-driven, rapid expansion models of the past.

    Read at Chatham House

  328. 328.
    2026-03-19 | middle_east | 2026-W12 | Topics: China, Europe, Middle East, Nuclear, Russia, Taiwan, Trade, Ukraine, United States

    This podcast episode analyzes the strategic shift in U.S. policy following President Trump's decision to launch a large-scale military campaign against Iran that resulted in the death of the Supreme Leader. Dalia Dassa Kaye argues that while the administration sends mixed messages, the targeting of top leadership signals an uncoordinated attempt at regime change rather than a limited strike on nuclear facilities. She warns that the lack of a viable political alternative or a clear 'day after' plan risks plunging the region into a 'Libya-style' chaotic vacuum characterized by bloody internal conflict and massive refugee flows. Furthermore, the conflict strains relations with Gulf partners who fear the fallout and provides geopolitical openings for China and Russia to exploit American military overextension.

    Read at CFR

  329. 329.
    2026-03-19 | china_indopacific | 2026-W12 | Topics: China, Indo-Pacific, Middle East, Taiwan, Trade, United States

    Prime Minister Takaichi’s visit to Washington serves as a critical test of the U.S.-Japan alliance as the Iran War forces a shift from strategic alignment to transactional demands for Middle East military support. While President Trump pressures Japan for naval escorts in the Strait of Hormuz, Takaichi is constrained by constitutional limits and is instead leveraging economic concessions, including $550 billion in U.S. investment commitments, to maintain the partnership. The outcome will determine if Japan can preserve its vital U.S. security guarantee against China while navigating the legal and political risks of entanglement in a regional conflict.

    Read at CFR

  330. 330.
    2026-03-19 | diplomacy | 2026-W12 | Topics: China, Europe, Indo-Pacific, Russia, United States

    The article argues that traditional cartographic conventions, which emphasize clean borders and jigsaw-puzzle shapes, fail to represent the complex realities of modern geopolitics and overlapping sovereignty. By examining cases like Greenland’s strategic connectivity and the South China Sea's ambiguous claims, the author illustrates how simplified maps can reinforce outdated mental models and obscure critical strategic data. For policymakers, embracing 'messier' maps that visualize strategic ambiguities and feathered edges of maritime rights is crucial for an accurate assessment of national security interests. This shift allows for a more nuanced understanding of frozen conflicts and the multi-layered nature of international relations.

    Read at Chatham House

  331. 331.
    2026-03-19 | china_indopacific | 2026-W12 | Topics: AI, China, Europe, Indo-Pacific, NATO, Russia, Taiwan, Trade, Ukraine, United States

    The United States must leverage international partnerships and multilateral frameworks to break China’s dominant 'chokehold' on critical mineral supply chains essential for defense and high-tech industries. While previous unilateral approaches hindered progress, emerging 2026 initiatives like 'Project Vault' and the 'Forge' forum signal a strategic shift toward a collaborative 'Metals NATO' model. To successfully compete with China’s predatory pricing, U.S. policy must prioritize early-stage project funding and high environmental and labor standards to attract producing nations. These coordinated efforts are vital for securing the resilient supply chains required for national security and the global energy transition.

    Read at Chatham House

  332. 332.
    2026-03-19 | diplomacy | 2026-W12 | Topics: China, Indo-Pacific, Middle East, NATO, Nuclear, Russia, United States

    Pakistan and the Afghan Taliban have entered a state of 'open war' following lethal cross-border airstrikes triggered by Islamabad’s claims that Kabul is harboring Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) militants. The escalation has resulted in significant civilian casualties and the failure of mediation efforts by regional actors like Qatar and Saudi Arabia, marking the most severe breakdown in relations since 2021. The conflict threatens to destabilize China’s regional infrastructure projects and could provide operational space for extremist groups like ISIS and al-Qaeda. Consequently, the breakdown in bilateral ties may force regional powers, including India and Russia, to recalibrate their diplomatic strategies toward the Taliban regime.

    Read at CFR

  333. 333.
    2026-03-19 | china_indopacific | 2026-W12 | Topics: AI, China, Europe, Indo-Pacific, Middle East, Nuclear, Taiwan, Trade, United States

    Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi's visit to Washington seeks to reinforce the U.S.-Japan alliance through $550 billion in strategic investment pledges and record-breaking defense spending. However, the partnership is being strained by new U.S. tariff offensives and the redirection of American military assets from the Indo-Pacific to address escalating conflicts in the Middle East. Tokyo faces a difficult balancing act as it navigates U.S. demands for maritime assistance in the Strait of Hormuz while attempting to maintain credible deterrence in the Taiwan Strait. Ultimately, the visit highlights a growing tension where Washington-driven economic and security shocks are complicating Japan's pursuit of strategic autonomy and regional stability.

    Read at Brookings

  334. 334.
    2026-03-19 | diplomacy | 2026-W12 | Topics: China, Europe, Middle East, Trade

    The spring issue of Chatham House’s The World Today analyzes the 'Trump Effect,' arguing that Donald Trump's return to the U.S. presidency has fundamentally disrupted the global order through aggressive military actions and a retreat from traditional leadership. Key evidence includes the failure of Iran’s defense strategy following U.S. strikes, the capture of Venezuela’s leader, and a shift toward prioritizing economic security over global trade. These developments are forcing traditional allies like the UK and Canada to radically reassess their security dependencies and diplomatic strategies as the U.S. withdraws from its traditional global role.

    Read at Chatham House

  335. 335.
    2026-03-19 | china_indopacific | 2026-W12 | Topics: China, Taiwan

    Vietnam is rapidly expanding its military footprint in the South China Sea by conducting land reclamation and infrastructure development across all 21 of its controlled features in the Spratly Islands. This strategic move, which includes building harbors and airstrips, aims to counter China's established presence and assert sovereignty over contested maritime zones. The escalation of competitive island building among regional claimants increases the risk of maritime clashes and threatens the stability of vital global shipping lanes. Ultimately, this militarization could trigger a broader cycle of regional tension, complicating international efforts to maintain a free and open Indo-Pacific.

    Read at Chatham House

  336. 336.
    2026-03-19 | defense | 2026-W12 | Topics: AI, China, Europe, Middle East, NATO, Nuclear, Russia, United States

    The UK government faces a widening fiscal gap in its defense budget, threatening the implementation of its 2025 Strategic Defence Review and commitments to NATO. Despite pledges to reach a 3.5% GDP spending target, the Ministry of Defence already contends with a £17 billion equipment funding deficit and potential cuts to major land and naval programs. Failure to reconcile these gaps through increased taxation or borrowing may force the UK to either abandon its nuclear capability or cede its status as Europe’s leading military power. The forthcoming Defence Investment Plan will be the ultimate test of whether Britain can realistically sustain its global security ambitions.

    Read at Chatham House

  337. 337.
    2026-03-19 | china_indopacific | 2026-W12 | Topics: China, Middle East, United States

    The article challenges the Western perception of Chinese internet users as 'mindless automatons,' arguing instead that they are 'wall dancers' who innovatively navigate the 'Great Firewall' through a mix of resistance and adaptation. It highlights how individuals—from feminist activists to tech entrepreneurs—leverage cycles of political loosening and use creative wordplay or strategic framing to maintain agency despite increasing authoritarianism. The findings suggest that policymakers should move beyond viewing China solely through a lens of national security or economic threat, instead recognizing the complex, dynamic, and often contradictory nature of its civil society.

    Read at Chatham House

  338. 338.
    2026-03-19 | americas | 2026-W12 | Topics: China, Climate, Middle East, Russia, Trade, Ukraine, United States

    The Trump administration is executing a "maximum pressure" campaign against Cuba by choking off oil imports through naval interdictions and tariff threats against suppliers like Mexico, following the fall of the Maduro regime in Venezuela. This strategy has crippled Cuba’s power grid and essential services, pushing the island toward a potential "crash landing" as domestic legitimacy reaches an all-time low. While reports of back-channel talks between Secretary of State Marco Rubio and the Castro family suggest a possible opening for a managed transition, the lack of a clear regime successor and strict U.S. legislative hurdles complicate a diplomatic exit. The situation represents a high-stakes gamble that risks a humanitarian catastrophe to force the end of communist rule.

    Read at CFR

  339. 339.
    2026-03-19 | energy | 2026-W12 | Topics: China, Indo-Pacific, Middle East, Nuclear, Russia, Trade

    The US-Israeli conflict with Iran is severely disrupting Gulf energy exports through the Strait of Hormuz, forcing major producers to rely on insufficient and vulnerable alternative pipeline routes. This disruption is straining national budgets, especially in oil-dependent Iraq, and threatening the long-term market share of Gulf LNG as Asian buyers seek more reliable suppliers. In North Africa, the crisis presents a dual reality where energy importers like Egypt face significant inflationary pressures, while exporters like Algeria benefit from higher prices. These developments underscore the strategic fragility of the Gulf's economic model and may accelerate a permanent global shift in energy trade patterns and infrastructure.

    Read at Chatham House

  340. 340.

    This Chatham House podcast discusses the deepening rift between the Pentagon and AI provider Anthropic over the company's ethical restrictions on lethal autonomous weapons and mass surveillance. The dispute, which led to the firm being labeled a 'supply chain risk,' reveals a significant gap in global AI governance and the lack of established rules for AI in modern warfare. Meanwhile, China is rapidly advancing its 'AI Plus' initiative to integrate artificial intelligence across its entire economic and military infrastructure. These developments highlight a critical need for policy frameworks that balance national security requirements with technological ethics and international competition.

    Read at Chatham House

  341. 341.
    2026-03-19 | diplomacy | 2026-W12 | Topics: China, Russia, Trade, Ukraine

    Kazakhstan’s comprehensive constitutional overhaul signals a strategic departure from Western liberal models in favor of a state-led, institutionalized authoritarian system similar to China’s. The amendments consolidate President Tokayev’s power and assert domestic law supremacy over international treaties, potentially undermining legal protections for foreign investors in the extractive sectors. While the reforms may strengthen national sovereignty against Russian influence, they also provide the state with greater leverage to restrict civil liberties and manage long-term political succession.

    Read at Chatham House

  342. 342.
    2026-03-19 | energy | 2026-W12 | Topics: China, Indo-Pacific, Middle East, Taiwan, Trade, United States

    U.S. and Israeli strikes on Iran have led to Tehran's closure of the Strait of Hormuz, cutting Gulf oil production by 10 million barrels per day and reducing strait transit to less than 10 percent of pre-war levels, causing acute energy shortages across Asia. Asian governments are resorting to fuel rationing, shortened workweeks, and costly subsidies to manage the crisis, but most countries could exhaust oil reserves within a month, while factories shutter and tourism plummets. The unsustainable fiscal burden of subsidies—already pushing Indonesia past its legal deficit cap—combined with historical precedents of fuel-price-driven unrest across South and Southeast Asia, raises the risk of severe economic contraction and political instability if the conflict persists through the summer.

    Read at CFR

  343. 343.
    2026-03-19 | middle_east | 2026-W12 | Topics: China, Indo-Pacific, Middle East, Nuclear, Russia, Taiwan, Ukraine, United States

    Max Boot argues that Operation Epic Fury suffers from a critical "strategy gap," where tactical military successes—such as precision strikes on Iranian leadership—fail to achieve clear political objectives or a viable exit strategy. While the U.S. has degraded Iranian infrastructure, Tehran has successfully retaliated by closing the Strait of Hormuz and depleting American munitions stocks at an unsustainable rate. This rapid consumption of high-tech interceptors like Patriot missiles creates significant strategic vulnerabilities in other theaters, particularly regarding China and North Korea. Ultimately, the conflict underscores the limits of U.S. military power in translating tactical dominance into long-term political or economic stability.

    Read at CFR

  344. 344.
    2026-03-19 | europe | 2026-W12 | Topics: China, Europe, Middle East, NATO, Nuclear, Russia, Trade, Ukraine, United States

    This discussion of Jean Monnet’s legacy argues that his 'functionalist' method of building shared sovereignty through technical cooperation remains essential for revitalizing European integration and transatlantic stability. Panelists identified modern catalysts for unity, such as digital sovereignty and AI, while advocating for a 'pragmatic federalism' where smaller coalitions move forward on defense and diplomacy to bypass current EU institutional gridlock. The findings emphasize that the European project must return to Monnet's principle of transforming specific points of friction into common goods to address contemporary geopolitical threats and internal fragmentation.

    Read at CFR

  345. 345.
    2026-03-19 | middle_east | 2026-W12 | Topics: China, Climate, Indo-Pacific, Middle East, Russia, Trade, Ukraine, United States

    The article argues that the Iran conflict's disruption of Strait of Hormuz shipping poses a severe threat not only to energy markets but to global food security and water supply. Gulf states are nearly entirely import-dependent for staple grains, and the region accounts for roughly one-quarter of global fertilizer production transiting the strait—meaning price spikes and supply shortages will cascade worldwide, particularly in vulnerable nations already facing hunger crises. Iranian strikes on desalination infrastructure further endanger water access for over 100 million people in the Gulf. Drawing parallels to the Ukraine war's lasting fertilizer market disruption, which pushed 27 million more people into poverty, the author warns that the systematic weaponization of food, water, and fertilizer could convert a regional military conflict into a global humanitarian catastrophe, especially as rising defense spending crowds out development aid.

    Read at CFR

  346. 346.
    2026-03-19 | tech | 2026-W12 | Topics: China, Cybersecurity, Middle East, Russia, Trade, United States

    The Pentagon's designation of Anthropic as a national security supply chain risk—after the company refused to drop AI safety guardrails in its military contract—represents an unprecedented and legally dubious use of authorities designed to counter foreign adversaries like Huawei and Kaspersky. The article argues this retaliation undermines U.S. credibility, noting that OpenAI's own enforcement mechanism (the right to walk away) is effectively the same leverage Anthropic tried to exercise, and that no Chinese AI firm has received such a designation even as five major Chinese models launched in a single month. The author calls on Congress to legislate clear boundaries for military AI use rather than leaving terms to ad hoc contract negotiations, and urges the defense industry to break its silence, warning that acquiescence to executive overreach sets a precedent that will eventually be turned against every contractor in the ecosystem.

    Read at CFR

  347. 347.
    2026-03-19 | diplomacy | 2026-W12 | Topics: China, Climate, Indo-Pacific, United States

    The article reviews four new publications that analyze the intellectual and historical drivers of contemporary global shifts, ranging from climate diplomacy to the rise of American anti-liberalism. These works examine the personal dynamics of UN climate negotiations, the haphazard legacy of Asian partitions, the ideologues behind the MAGA movement, and the impact of academic narratives on China policy. The central argument is that individual agency and ideological frameworks are critical, often overlooked factors in shaping international relations and domestic political trends. Consequently, policymakers must look beyond immediate crises to understand these deeper ideological roots to effectively navigate geopolitical rivalries and strengthen multilateral cooperation.

    Read at Chatham House

  348. 348.
    2026-03-19 | china_indopacific | 2026-W12 | Topics: China, Indo-Pacific, Middle East, Taiwan, Trade, United States

    Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s visit to Washington underscores the strain on the Japan-US alliance as Japan’s oil-dependent economy suffers from US-led Middle East conflicts while facing pressure to increase defense spending. Despite significant commitments to Trump’s missile defense plans and tariff agreements, Japan remains wary of the US's long-term reliability in countering China’s regional assertiveness. Consequently, Tokyo is shifting its strategy toward greater self-reliance and the cultivation of diverse security and economic partnerships, such as with Australia and the CPTPP, to uphold a rules-based international order.

    Read at Chatham House

  349. 349.
    2026-03-16 | china_indopacific | 2026-W12 | Topics: China, Indo-Pacific, United States

    The article analyzes two competing geopolitical visions regarding the changing global order. One perspective, exemplified by Canada's Mark Carney, suggests middle powers should pivot away from U.S. reliance and view China as a potential counterweight to American power. Conversely, Japan's Sanae Takaichi argues that China, rather than the United States, represents the most significant disruptive threat globally. Policymakers must navigate this fundamental disagreement over the source of instability, determining whether the primary strategic focus should be mitigating Chinese influence or managing the shifting relationship between the U.S. and its allies.

    Read at Foreign Affairs

  350. 350.
    2026-03-12 | middle_east | 2026-W11 | Topics: China, Europe, Indo-Pacific, Middle East, Nuclear, Russia, Trade, Ukraine, United States

    The analysis concludes that even if the Iranian regime survives the current conflict greatly weakened, it will remain a significant and dangerous regional threat. This persistence is due to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which holds the true coercive power, ensuring that the regime will prioritize maintaining the status quo over radical change. The leadership succession, whether through Mojtaba Khamenei or a successor, will be driven by vengeance and resistance, guaranteeing continued instability and potential for terrorism. Strategically, this suggests that external military intervention is unlikely to achieve a swift regime collapse, necessitating a long-term strategy focused on managing persistent regional volatility.

    Read at Foreign Affairs

  351. 351.
    2026-03-11 | tech | 2026-W11 | Topics: AI, China, Cybersecurity, United States

    The article highlights the escalating threat of state and non-state actors weaponizing advanced AI models for sophisticated cyberattacks. Key evidence includes Anthropic reporting large-scale, automated cyberattacks orchestrated by Chinese operators, and OpenAI noting intensified phishing and malware efforts by Iranian hackers. These incidents demonstrate that cutting-edge AI is being used to target critical U.S. infrastructure with minimal human intervention. Policymakers must urgently develop robust defensive strategies and international norms to mitigate the vulnerability of national systems to AI-powered cyber warfare.

    Read at Foreign Affairs

  352. 352.

    Global military AI adoption is rapidly outstripping international efforts to establish governance, as evidenced by a significant decline in endorsements at the recent REAIM summit. With the United States and China increasingly detached from multilateral dialogues, middle powers now face the critical choice of leading the development of 'rules of the road' or allowing the technology to evolve without international guardrails. The divergence between diplomatic negotiations and the real-world deployment of AI in ongoing conflicts risks making future policy efforts irrelevant to technical and battlefield realities.

    Read at CFR

  353. 353.
    2026-03-09 | defense | 2026-W11 | Topics: China

    The Mitchell Institute highlights that the ongoing conflict with Iran, specifically Operation Epic Fury, underscores the decisive role of space and cyber capabilities in modern high-intensity combat. These 'invisible' forces were instrumental in enabling strikes against over 1,000 targets, demonstrating the strategic advantage of multi-domain integration. However, the reports also highlight the inherent risks of complex air operations, as seen in a significant friendly fire incident between Kuwaiti and U.S. forces. Policy focus must therefore balance the pursuit of technological dominance in non-kinetic domains with rigorous improvements in multi-national tactical coordination.

    Read at Mitchell

  354. 354.
    2026-03-09 | diplomacy | 2026-W11 | Topics: China, Indo-Pacific, Middle East, Nuclear, Trade, United States

    This article advocates for a robust U.S. strategy to support Iranian protesters, arguing that the current unrest presents a unique opportunity to topple the Islamic Republic and strike a blow against Chinese influence. The author contends that the regime's military weakness, exposed by recent U.S. strikes, and its economic failure have emboldened the populace despite Chinese-designed internet suppression tools. To assist the uprising, the piece suggests utilizing kinetic and cyberattacks against Iran's National Information Network to restore protester communications. Successfully weakening Tehran would undermine Beijing’s regional energy access and strategic foothold in the Middle East.

    Read at Heritage

  355. 355.
    2026-03-09 | defense | 2026-W11 | Topics: China, United States

    The Mitchell Institute's China Airpower Tracker highlights the rapid transformation of the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) from a regional defensive service into a sophisticated force capable of projecting power beyond the First Island Chain. By integrating advanced aircraft, uncrewed systems, and mobile long-range surface-to-air missiles across five theater commands, China has significantly enhanced its aerial combat and denial capabilities. This tool provides a visualization of PLAAF airbases and SAM sites, emphasizing the strategic importance of China's road-mobile assets and their implications for survivability and power projection in a potential conflict.

    Read at Mitchell

  356. 356.
    2026-03-09 | defense | 2026-W11 | Topics: China, Russia, United States

    The Mitchell Institute asserts that space superiority is a foundational requirement for U.S. military operations, currently threatened by advancing Chinese and Russian counterspace capabilities. To mitigate these risks, the paper argues that the Department of Defense must clarify institutional roles and prioritize cross-domain investments to improve the survivability of the U.S. space architecture. Furthermore, the institute recommends a cultural shift towards treating space as a true warfighting domain, necessitating the integration of contested space scenarios into major military training exercises. These reforms are considered urgent to ensure the United States can maintain its strategic advantage in a linchpin domain.

    Read at Mitchell

  357. 357.
    2026-03-09 | diplomacy | 2026-W11 | Topics: China, Europe, Middle East, United States

    The strategic rivalry between the United States and China is evolving into a comprehensive contest for global influence, technological dominance, and economic security. This competition, spanning industrial policy and defense modernization, is actively fragmenting global supply chains and forcing international actors to reassess their strategic alliances. Consequently, the trajectory of this superpower relationship will define the future of global governance and regional security, requiring policymakers to navigate a landscape where limited cooperation must be balanced against systemic confrontation.

    Read at Chatham House

  358. 358.
    2026-03-09 | defense | 2026-W11 | Topics: China, Taiwan

    Maritime Southeast Asian states are exploring anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) strategies to secure their interests during major power conflicts, yet their current development remains rudimentary and lacks systematic planning. The paper identifies a persistent disconnect between strategic policy debates concerning regional flashpoints and the actual implementation of military doctrine, posture, and asset acquisition. Diverse security priorities and internal institutional constraints, such as army dominance in policymaking, continue to hinder the realization of full A2/AD capabilities. Consequently, the future trajectory of these capabilities will determine how these nations manage regional contingencies and coordinate with security partners seeking closer interoperability.

    Read at IISS

  359. 359.
    2026-03-09 | diplomacy | 2026-W11 | Topics: China, Indo-Pacific, Taiwan, United States

    The research paper identifies a significant gap in systematic planning within maritime Southeast Asian capitals concerning a potential US-China conflict over Taiwan, noting that current discussions are largely limited to evacuation contingencies. Given ASEAN’s structural collective-action issues, the author advocates for a 'building blocks' approach that strengthens domestic crisis capacity and leverages bilateral relations with the US, China, and Taiwan for preliminary planning. This strategy emphasizes enhancing existing mechanisms and developing minilateral arrangements to ensure a functional regional response architecture during major security crises.

    Read at IISS

  360. 360.

    Brookings experts argue that the U.S.-Israeli decapitation strike against Iran’s leadership is unlikely to trigger an immediate regime collapse, risking instead a protracted conflict and regional instability. The analysis highlights the resilience of the Islamic Republic's institutional networks and its escalatory survival strategy, which targets neighboring energy infrastructure to force diplomatic concessions. Policymakers are warned that without a coherent 'day after' plan or the integration of civilian statecraft, the intervention could lead to a 'lose-lose' scenario of state fragmentation and emboldened global adversaries.

    Read at Brookings

  361. 361.
    2026-03-09 | tech | 2026-W11 | Topics: AI, China, Europe, Indo-Pacific, Nuclear, Trade, United States

    This analysis posits that while AI is a transformative "A+" technology, firms like OpenAI face an "F-" business model with a high risk of a financing cliff due to astronomical capital requirements and projected losses of $660 billion by 2030. Market fragility is evidenced by the "SaaS-pocalypse" and the potential for a "jobless expansion" as firms freeze hiring while awaiting productivity gains that have yet to appear in macroeconomic data. Consequently, the authors suggest resolving the "AI trilemma" by implementing a safety tax to fund independent research and empowering a national safety institute with veto authority over high-risk models to prevent societal and geopolitical disruption.

    Read at CFR

  362. 362.
    2026-03-09 | tech | 2026-W11 | Topics: AI, China, Europe, Indo-Pacific, Middle East, Trade, United States

    The "AI sovereignty paradox" is defined by the tension between the U.S. government’s demand for unfettered military access to AI and the ethical safeguards maintained by private developers. This conflict, highlighted by the Pentagon’s recent standoff with Anthropic, illustrates the lack of a clear domestic regulatory framework for dual-use technologies. Internationally, middle powers are seeking digital sovereignty through localized regulations and infrastructure to reduce dependency on the dominant U.S.-Chinese "AI stack." Consequently, policymakers face the dual challenge of reconciling national security requirements with private sector safety standards while navigating a fragmented global regulatory landscape.

    Read at CFR

  363. 363.
    2026-03-09 | tech | 2026-W11 | Topics: AI, China, Europe, Russia, Trade, United States

    The article argues that the United States' primary competitive advantage in AI lies in developing 'trust infrastructure'—credible assurance frameworks like independent validation and incident reporting—which enables confident large-scale deployment. By drawing on historical precedents in aviation and finance, the author posits that these mechanisms turn technical risks into manageable market assets, allowing the US to set global standards that allies can trust. Strategic implications suggest that the US must establish an integrated framework involving independent benchmarking and federal incident repositories within the next three years to prevent global market fragmentation. Establishing this infrastructure will ensure that American AI remains the global benchmark for high-stakes applications in health, finance, and national security.

    Read at CFR

  364. 364.
    2026-03-09 | diplomacy | 2026-W11 | Topics: China, Indo-Pacific, Middle East, Nuclear, Russia, Trade, Ukraine, United States

    The joint U.S.-Israeli strikes against Iran and the subsequent death of Supreme Leader Khamenei have turned the Strait of Hormuz into a volatile maritime flashpoint, severely threatening global energy markets. In response to Iranian retaliation and threats of a blockade, vessel traffic through the waterway has dropped by 70%, causing Brent crude and natural gas prices to surge. While U.S. military operations have significantly degraded Iran's formal naval capacity, the continued use of asymmetric tactics like drone strikes and mine-laying forces expensive shipping diversions. This escalation highlights the fragility of regional maritime security and the immediate risk of a broader conflict disrupting essential global trade routes.

    Read at CFR

  365. 365.
    2026-03-09 | society | 2026-W11 | Topics: AI, China, Trade, United States

    The CATO Institute argues that Section 230 remains the foundational legal framework for American online innovation and free expression by protecting platforms from liability for user-generated content. The report highlights how these protections prevent a 'moderator's dilemma' where legal risks would otherwise force companies to either censor aggressively or abandon moderation entirely, disproportionately harming smaller competitors. It warns that weakening this framework amid the rise of generative AI would entrench incumbents and cede technological leadership to foreign adversaries. Consequently, the author recommends preserving Section 230's core principles while establishing a federal standard for unmasking anonymous bad actors to ensure individual accountability.

    Read at CATO

  366. 366.
    2026-03-09 | society | 2026-W11 | Topics: China, Europe, Indo-Pacific, Trade, United States

    The Brookings Institution has launched a comprehensive tracker to monitor the significant expansion of U.S. tariffs implemented since January 2025, targeting major trading partners including Canada, Mexico, China, and the EU. These measures include broad sectoral tariffs on commodities like steel and aluminum, alongside country-specific adjustments tied to USMCA compliance and ongoing trade negotiations. By documenting trade-weighted tariff changes and retaliatory actions, the tracker highlights a pivot toward more protectionist U.S. trade policies. Continuous monitoring of these developments is critical for assessing the long-term impact on global economic stability and the status of evolving trade agreements.

    Read at Brookings

  367. 367.

    The military conflict between the United States, Israel, and Iran has severely disrupted energy flows through the Strait of Hormuz, threatening twenty percent of global oil and gas supplies and disproportionately impacting Asian economies. While nations like Japan are buffered by significant strategic reserves, others like India face immediate risks due to limited storage and recent shifts in import patterns. Ultimately, these supply shocks are expected to drive a temporary resurgence in coal usage for affordability while simultaneously accelerating long-term strategic investments in nuclear and renewable energy to ensure national security and reduce reliance on volatile Middle Eastern transit routes.

    Read at CFR

  368. 368.
    2026-03-06 | china_indopacific | 2026-W10 | Topics: China, Indo-Pacific, United States

    The article analyzes the geopolitical risk inherent in the U.S.-China relationship, questioning whether Beijing is poised to overplay its strategic hand. The immediate context is the planned March 2026 summit between President Trump and Xi Jinping, following a fragile economic truce reached in October 2025. While temporary agreements have eased immediate tensions, the core strategic challenge remains managing China's long-term ambitions and potential for escalation. Policymakers must prepare for continued volatility, balancing the necessity of high-level dialogue with the risk of rapid strategic reversals.

    Read at Foreign Affairs

  369. 369.

    The joint U.S.-Israeli strikes on Iran have triggered a major, destabilizing escalation, pushing the region toward a protracted conflagration. Experts argue that Iran's retaliatory strikes were a calculated, existential move, demonstrating a willingness to engage in a long conflict by targeting soft underbellies, such as Gulf neighbors and American assets. This strategy allows Iran to gamble that it can outlast the current U.S. political administration. For policy, the primary implication is managing the risk of regional spillover, mitigating domestic economic fallout, and navigating the highly decentralized and politically charged nature of U.S. decision-making regarding the conflict.

    Read at Foreign Affairs

  370. 370.
    2026-03-05 | middle_east | 2026-W10 | Topics: China, Middle East, United States

    The article argues that while China is Iran's most important partner due to shared opposition to the Western-dominated global order, Beijing's support for Tehran is constrained by its own strategic and economic interests. Key evidence points to China's deep reliance on the Middle East for energy security, with a significant portion of its oil imports passing through the Strait of Hormuz. Consequently, China will prioritize maintaining regional stability and securing its energy supply over engaging in direct, high-risk military intervention on Iran's behalf. This suggests that China's geopolitical actions will be measured, balancing its partnership goals with its vital economic needs.

    Read at Foreign Affairs

  371. 371.
    2026-03-05 | economy | 2026-W10 | Topics: AI, China, Europe, Nuclear, Trade, United States

    The report introduces a unified typology of 20 economic shocks across five domains to help analysts understand and anticipate macroeconomic recessions as complex, compound events. By examining the Great Recession and the COVID-19 pandemic, the authors demonstrate how the interaction of exogenous disturbances and endogenous policy responses determines the recovery's trajectory. This analytical framework moves beyond traditional siloed approaches, providing a structured method for modeling the cascading effects of financial, environmental, and demand-side disruptions. Consequently, it serves as a critical resource for policymakers to improve real-time situational awareness and calibrate stabilization efforts more effectively during multi-faceted crises.

    Read at RAND

  372. 372.
    2026-03-05 | defense | 2026-W10 | Topics: AI, China, Cybersecurity, Indo-Pacific, Trade, United States

    This RAND report evaluates the Defense Contract Management Agency’s (DCMA) Integrated Resource Workload Model (IRWM), concluding that while it is a robust tool for aggregate manpower planning, it requires significant refinements to better reflect operational realities. Based on over 225 interviews and an in-depth review of the model's structure, researchers identified discrepancies between modeled estimates and actual field activities, often stemming from insufficient documentation, unmodeled supervisory tasks, and user-unfriendly data entry systems. To maximize the model's utility, the report recommends formalizing standard operating procedures, improving internal communication to build trust, and leveraging the modeling ecosystem for strategic scenario planning regarding budget and mission shifts.

    Read at RAND

  373. 373.
    2026-03-04 | diplomacy | 2026-W10 | Topics: China, Indo-Pacific, Trade, United States

    The article highlights that India's development trajectory requires a fundamental recalibration of its foreign policy. Historically, India assumed the US would prioritize its partnership as part of a larger strategy to counter China; however, recent actions, such as tariffs, have challenged this assumption. Consequently, while India has signed new trade agreements with the United States, the strategic pivot involves reducing over-reliance on Washington. For future development, India must diversify its geopolitical partnerships and adopt a more balanced, multi-polar diplomatic approach.

    Read at Foreign Affairs

  374. 374.
    2026-03-03 | china_indopacific | 2026-W10 | Topics: China, Indo-Pacific, Taiwan, Trade

    The article posits that small and middle powers, such as Taiwan, possess the capacity to disproportionately influence global stability, shifting the burden of peace away from great powers. Taiwan's unique leverage stems from its strategic location as a vital gateway in the Western Pacific and its established leadership in advanced technology sectors. For policy, the implication is that Taiwan should proactively utilize its economic and geographic assets to manage regional tensions and contribute actively to global stability, rather than being forced into a binary geopolitical choice.

    Read at Foreign Affairs

  375. 375.
    2026-03-02 | defense | 2026-W10 | Topics: China, United States

    China is rapidly integrating advanced AI and autonomous systems into its military, signaling a major shift in its defense posture. Evidence from the September 2025 Victory Day parade showcased next-generation weapons, including collaborative combat aircraft and various uncrewed drones. This technological display underscores the People’s Liberation Army's strategic intent to achieve battlefield advantage through technological parity. For policy makers, this development signals Beijing's explicit ambition to erode the United States' technological edge and reshape regional military power dynamics.

    Read at Foreign Affairs

  376. 376.
    2026-02-27 | china_indopacific | 2026-W09 | Topics: China, NATO, United States

    The article argues that China is gaining strategic advantages by adopting a policy of patience, which is eroding the United States' traditional geopolitical edge. Historically, the US relied heavily on soft power and allied cooperation—building collective defense and integrated markets—to maintain dominance over Beijing. However, China's 'waiting' strategy allows it to bypass direct confrontation, capitalizing on the slow erosion of US soft power and the shifting priorities of allies. Policymakers must therefore adapt their strategy beyond relying solely on traditional alliances, requiring a more diversified and proactive approach to maintain competitive parity.

    Read at Foreign Affairs

  377. 377.

    Ambassador Robert Blackwill proposes a "resolute global leadership" grand strategy that fuses superior military primacy with a muscular revitalization of the rules-based international order. He argues that recent liberal internationalism proved too passive against adversaries like China and Russia, while the transactional "Trumpism" approach dangerously abandons the alliances and moral frameworks essential to U.S. security. To restore influence, the report advocates for a significant increase in the defense budget, winning the AI technology race, and pivoting military resources to Asia to deter Chinese hegemony.

    Read at CFR

  378. 378.
    2026-02-26 | diplomacy | 2026-W09 | Topics: China, Climate, Europe, NATO, Nuclear, Russia, Trade, Ukraine, United States

    European leaders at the 2026 CFR symposium characterized the war in Ukraine as a generational conflict that has fundamentally transformed Russia into a direct, long-term threat to the continent. To maintain support amidst uncertain U.S. funding, European nations are aggressively increasing defense spending and industrial capacity while fostering Ukraine’s own domestic military-industrial base. Strategic priorities have shifted toward 'strategic autonomy' within NATO, emphasizing robust security guarantees and the deep integration of Ukraine into Western institutions to ensure a durable peace. The panel concluded that European security now depends on transitioning from security consumption to active partnership through sustained military and economic commitment.

    Read at CFR

  379. 379.
    2026-02-26 | defense | 2026-W09 | Topics: China, Europe, Indo-Pacific, NATO, Russia, Trade, Ukraine, United States

    Marking the fourth anniversary of the full-scale invasion, this analysis highlights that Russia’s military efforts have devolved into a slow-moving war of attrition characterized by unprecedented casualties (1.2 million) and a stagnating economy. Despite minimal territorial gains, Russia has intensified its drone campaign, while Ukraine faces a staggering $588 billion reconstruction challenge and a vulnerable centralized energy grid. Crucially, the financial burden of military support is shifting from the U.S. to Europe, requiring new procurement mechanisms like the Prioritized Ukraine Requirements List (PURL) to sustain Ukraine’s defense.

    Read at CSIS

  380. 380.

    As the Russia-Ukraine war enters its fifth year, a panel of CFR experts argues that Europe must transition from emergency response to a long-term, self-reliant security and recovery architecture. The recommendations emphasize integrating Ukraine’s innovative defense industrial base into European supply chains and preparing for overt Russian provocations that may require European action independent of U.S. support. Strategically, this necessitates balancing robust military deterrence with diplomatic dialogue and modernizing humanitarian aid through agile public-private partnerships to ensure regional stability during and after the conflict.

    Read at CFR

  381. 381.
    2026-02-26 | health | 2026-W09 | Topics: China, United States

    This RAND report outlines five strategic actions for influential emergency department clinicians on digital media to enhance the rapid and effective diffusion of clinical care innovations during public health emergencies. Drawing on a four-year study of the COVID-19 pandemic—including focus groups, interviews, and surveys of over 1,600 healthcare professionals—the researchers emphasize the necessity of transparency, collaborative partnerships with medical societies, and multimedia "how-to" content. Implementing these strategies aims to mitigate the uneven adoption of medical advancements and ensure a more synchronized, evidence-based healthcare response to future crises.

    Read at RAND

  382. 382.
    2026-02-26 | diplomacy | 2026-W09 | Topics: China, Europe, Indo-Pacific, Middle East, Nuclear, Trade, United States

    The report argues that the United States must urgently prepare for an imminent leadership transition in Iran—ranging from managed clerical continuity to an IRGC-led military takeover or total regime collapse—following recent internal uprisings and regional conflict. It highlights that while a democratic shift is unlikely in the near term, the transition will likely trigger opportunistic escalation by proxy groups and increased internal repression. Consequently, U.S. strategy should focus on maintaining a strong regional deterrent, supporting Iranian civil society's connectivity, and readying diplomatic frameworks for nuclear transparency and hostage release.

    Read at CFR

  383. 383.

    The symposium concludes that while current AI-driven investment mirrors the speculative mania of 1929, the primary systemic risk stems from a combination of high sovereign debt and potential policy errors rather than market volatility alone. Panelists noted parallels such as the democratization of finance through leverage and a growing gap between massive AI capital expenditures and realized revenues. To avoid a repeat of the Great Depression's domino effect, experts advocate for proactive financial regulation and caution that current high debt levels may limit the effectiveness of traditional crisis intervention strategies.

    Read at CFR

  384. 384.

    This CFR event centered on the documentary 'Atomic Echoes,' which examines the multi-generational human and health consequences of the 1945 atomic bombings for both Japanese survivors and American 'atomic veterans.' The discussion highlighted how historical classification and the focus on strategic deterrence often obscure the long-term trauma and radiation-related illnesses suffered by individuals on both sides of the conflict. Policy implications include the urgent need to address the erosion of international nuclear guardrails following the expiration of treaties like New START and the rising risk of inadvertent escalation. Panelists emphasized that human-centered narratives are essential for engaging the public in contemporary debates over nuclear modernization and the sole authority of the executive branch in weapon deployment.

    Read at CFR

  385. 385.
    2026-02-26 | economy | 2026-W09 | Topics: China, Europe, Indo-Pacific, Russia, Taiwan, Trade, Ukraine, United States

    The Supreme Court's ruling in Learning Resources Inc. v. Trump invalidated the use of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) for broad tariffs, reasserting that the power to raise revenue resides with Congress under the Taxing Clause. While the decision eliminates the administration’s primary tool for immediate, open-ended duties, Brookings experts note that significant economic uncertainty persists as the executive branch pivots to alternative authorities like Sections 122, 232, and 301. This shift may force more deliberate, evidence-based trade investigations and increase legislative accountability, yet it also threatens to exacerbate federal deficits and complicate relations with key allies in Europe and the Indo-Pacific.

    Read at Brookings

  386. 386.
    2026-02-26 | diplomacy | 2026-W09 | Topics: China, Europe, Indo-Pacific, Russia, United States

    This retrospective analyzes the legacy of John Foster Dulles, a central figure in 1950s U.S. foreign policy known for his doctrines of 'massive retaliation,' 'brinkmanship,' and 'rollback.' While Dulles provided the bold moral and rhetorical framework for American exceptionalism during the Cold War, historical evidence suggests President Eisenhower maintained ultimate control over policy decisions, often opting for caution over Dulles's aggressive stances. The article also highlights the damaging long-term effects of Dulles’s purge of State Department experts on U.S. diplomatic intelligence and regional expertise.

    Read at CFR

  387. 387.

    A 6-3 U.S. Supreme Court ruling striking down tariffs imposed under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) has created significant trade policy volatility, forcing the White House to pivot to Section 122 authorities to maintain levies. Key trading partners including India, Malaysia, and Indonesia are responding by delaying the ratification or implementation of trade deals originally negotiated under the shadow of the now-illegal tariffs. While the decision offers a temporary legal check on executive trade power, the administration's immediate recourse to alternative authorities indicates a sustained period of trade friction and damaged diplomatic leverage in future economic negotiations.

    Read at CFR

  388. 388.
    2026-02-26 | diplomacy | 2026-W09 | Topics: AI, China, Climate, Europe, Indo-Pacific, Middle East, Russia, Taiwan, Trade, United States

    This Brookings report finds that the Trump administration’s second-term China strategy has produced significant rhetoric but few measurable results after one year. Key economic indicators like manufacturing employment and industrial production remain stagnant despite high-profile investment pledges, while U.S. global standing among allies has declined sharply. In technology, inconsistent export controls and infrastructure bottlenecks are straining America’s lead in AI against a more self-sufficient Chinese ecosystem. Consequently, the administration must shift from transactional signaling to sustained policy execution and alliance rebuilding to effectively reduce strategic dependencies and counter Beijing's influence.

    Read at Brookings

  389. 389.
    2026-02-26 | defense | 2026-W09 | Topics: AI, China, Indo-Pacific, Nuclear, Russia, Taiwan, Trade, Ukraine, United States

    Xi Jinping has conducted an unprecedented purge of the People's Liberation Army (PLA), removing over 100 senior officers and nearly decapitating the Central Military Commission to ensure absolute political loyalty. This campaign has created a significant leadership void, with approximately 52% of top positions impacted, severely undermining the PLA's near-term readiness for complex military operations like a Taiwan invasion. While the purges disrupt immediate capabilities, they enable Xi to replace the 'old guard' with a younger, more technically literate generation of 'intelligentized' officers. Long-term implications include a potentially more aggressive military that is ideologically subservient, though at a heightened risk of strategic miscalculation due to the suppression of realistic operational advice.

    Read at CSIS

  390. 390.
    2026-02-26 | diplomacy | 2026-W09 | Topics: China, Cybersecurity, Indo-Pacific, Russia, Trade, Ukraine, United States

    The global dominance of U.S. cloud "hyperscalers" is increasingly viewed by international partners as an untenable strategic vulnerability rather than a commercial convenience. Following the weaponization of digital infrastructure against Russia and the Trump administration's perceived erratic foreign policy, nations like India and the Netherlands are accelerating efforts to build sovereign cloud platforms to reduce American dependence. This erosion of trust threatens long-term U.S. digital influence and may cede market share to Chinese competitors as allies prioritize technological autonomy over the cost-efficiency of American platforms.

    Read at CFR

  391. 391.

    Four years after Russia's invasion, the conflict has evolved into a long-term war of attrition that requires a transition from short-term aid to a generational strategy for European security. Despite significant casualties and sanctions, Russia has maintained its war effort through economic ties with China and the Global South, while Ukraine has successfully shifted toward deeper defense industrial cooperation with European partners. Experts suggest that because Russia's maximalist goals remain unchanged, Western policymakers must prepare for a multiyear struggle focused on conventional deterrence and cautious escalation management.

    Read at CSIS

  392. 392.
    2026-02-26 | defense | 2026-W09 | Topics: AI, China, Europe, Indo-Pacific, Middle East, Russia, Trade, Ukraine, United States

    As the Russia-Ukraine war enters its fifth year, the conflict has evolved into a protracted struggle characterized by stalled U.S.-led peace efforts and a strategic shift toward European leadership in military support. High-intensity fighting has resulted in over 465,000 total casualties and a projected $588 billion reconstruction cost, highlighting the severe long-term impact on regional energy infrastructure and economic stability. This transition toward a European-led 'Coalition of the Willing' reflects a pivot in great-power dynamics, suggesting that future conflicts will require sustained societal mobilization and resilient regional alliances.

    Read at CFR

  393. 393.
    2026-02-26 | society | 2026-W09 | Topics: China, Climate, Nuclear, Russia, Trade, United States

    The U.S. Supreme Court struck down President Trump’s sweeping tariffs imposed under the International Economic Emergency Powers Act (IEEPA), ruling that the statute does not grant the executive branch the authority to levy duties. The Court reasoned that the Constitution reserves taxing powers for Congress and that IEEPA’s power to 'regulate' imports is distinct from the power to tax. Consequently, the administration has pivoted to Section 122 for temporary 150-day tariffs while launching 'expedited' Section 301 investigations to secure a longer-term legal foundation for its trade agenda. This shift highlights a significant constitutional reinforcement of congressional authority, even as the executive maintains protectionist policies through alternative statutory frameworks.

    Read at CFR

  394. 394.

    President Trump’s State of the Union address prioritized domestic economic issues and immigration while framing his 'peace through strength' doctrine as a success in stabilizing global conflicts. He defended the continuation of tariffs despite judicial setbacks and highlighted the recognition of a new interim government in Venezuela as a major shift in Western Hemisphere policy. These developments suggest an administration focused on transactional diplomacy and protectionist economic measures, emphasizing increased burden-sharing from both international allies and domestic technology firms.

    Read at CFR

  395. 395.
    2026-02-26 | defense | 2026-W09 | Topics: China, Indo-Pacific

    China's People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is rapidly advancing its 'blue-water' capabilities, marked by a significant increase in aircraft carrier operations beyond the first island chain. In 2025, the Liaoning and Shandong carriers spent a record 58 days in the Western Pacific, conducting approximately 1,680 sorties and their first simultaneous deployment in the region. This trend signals a strategic shift toward sustained power projection far from Chinese shores, directly challenging established maritime security dynamics. Consequently, regional and global actors must reassess their naval strategies to account for the PLAN's growing reach and operational complexity.

    Read at CSIS

  396. 396.
    2026-02-26 | defense | 2026-W09 | Topics: China, Middle East, Nuclear, Russia, United States

    The United States is entering an increasingly dangerous nuclear era as Russia and China simultaneously modernize and expand their arsenals, presenting the unprecedented challenge of facing two nuclear peers. The collapse of the New START treaty has removed critical constraints on strategic forces, while regional instabilities in Iran and the Korean Peninsula further exacerbate the threat environment. These developments are placing immense strain on U.S. extended deterrence commitments and raising risks of allied nuclear proliferation. Consequently, policymakers must urgently reassess foundational assumptions regarding nuclear posture, modernization, and the integration of emerging defense technologies like the "Golden Dome" missile system.

    Read at Brookings

  397. 397.
    2026-02-26 | society | 2026-W09 | Topics: China, Europe, Trade, United States

    The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) does not authorize the President to impose tariffs, asserting that taxation power is reserved exclusively for Congress. While the ruling creates a significant legal hurdle for executive trade authority, the administration is already seeking to reimpose tariffs through alternative statutes like Section 122 and Section 232. The decision triggers a massive $170 billion refund process for businesses and potentially weakens the U.S. negotiating position by undermining previous trade concessions forced by the now-invalidated IEEPA tariffs.

    Read at CSIS

  398. 398.
    2026-02-26 | other | 2026-W09 | Topics: China, Europe, Indo-Pacific, Middle East

    Chatham House has appointed senior British diplomat Owen Jenkins as Research Director for Africa, the Middle East and North Africa, and the Asia Pacific. Jenkins brings extensive experience from the UK's Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office, including roles as Director General for the Indo-Pacific and Ambassador to Indonesia. His appointment is strategically designed to enhance the institute's analysis of the evolving world order, shifting global alliances, and the rising influence of regional powers. This move integrates high-level diplomatic expertise into the institute's executive leadership to strengthen its external influence and policy impact across the Global South.

    Read at Chatham House

  399. 399.
    2026-02-26 | diplomacy | 2026-W09 | Topics: China, Europe, Indo-Pacific, NATO, Nuclear, Russia, Trade, Ukraine, United States

    Total U.S. aid to Ukraine reached $188 billion by late 2025, though no new aid legislation has been passed since April 2024, leading European contributions to collectively surpass U.S. support. While the Trump administration continues to deliver previously appropriated funds and facilitates third-party weapon transfers via the PURL program, it has shifted the U.S. stance toward acting as an impartial peace broker. This development underscores a significant pivot in transatlantic burden-sharing and suggests a potential winding down of direct American military assistance.

    Read at CFR

  400. 400.
    2026-02-26 | society | 2026-W09 | Topics: China, Europe, Indo-Pacific, Middle East, Russia, Taiwan, Trade, United States

    The Supreme Court’s ruling that the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) does not authorize presidential tariffs strips the administration of its most flexible geoeconomic weapon, forcing a shift toward more bureaucratic trade authorities. Experts suggest the executive branch will likely invoke Section 122 for temporary 150-day tariffs while initiating formal investigations under Sections 301 and 232 to reconstruct the previous tariff regime. This transition creates significant business uncertainty regarding potential refunds and trade agreement stability, and may paradoxically lead to a more aggressive use of alternative tools like export controls and financial sanctions.

    Read at CFR

  401. 401.
    2026-02-26 | diplomacy | 2026-W09 | Topics: China, Russia, Ukraine, United States

    Veteran journalist Alan Cullison argues that effective foreign policy reporting and analysis must be grounded in human empathy and the study of individual personalities rather than abstract political theory. Drawing on three decades of experience in Russia and Afghanistan, Cullison demonstrates how focusing on the 'fragments' of conflict—such as personal tragedies or investigative leads like liberated al-Qaeda hard drives—provides deeper insights into geopolitical shifts than conventional high-level reporting. For policymakers and analysts, these reflections highlight that robust intelligence depends on maintaining a diverse ecosystem of 'honest interpreters' who possess the linguistic and cultural immersion necessary to navigate chaotic international environments.

    Read at CFR

  402. 402.

    Stephen M. Walt argues that the current American foreign policy constitutes "predatory hegemony," wherein the U.S. uses its overwhelming power to extract short-term concessions and tribute from both allies and rivals in a zero-sum manner. This aggressive shift is presented as a reaction to the perceived failures and excesses of the post-Cold War unipolar order. The reliance on tactics like tariffs and threats, rather than traditional diplomatic restraint, is fundamentally eroding America's long-term global power and stability. Consequently, the article warns that medium powers must cooperate among themselves to defend their interests and seek a more equitable partnership with the United States.

    Read at Foreign Affairs

  403. 403.
    2026-02-26 | diplomacy | 2026-W09 | Topics: China, Indo-Pacific, Middle East, Nuclear, Russia, Taiwan, United States

    Max Boot argues that the Trump administration must heed military warnings regarding the high risks of a sustained conflict with Iran, which poses far greater dangers than previous limited strikes. Key concerns include potential Iranian attacks on regional oil infrastructure, the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, and a critical depletion of U.S. precision-guided munitions required for other global theaters like China and Russia. Additionally, the author notes that extended naval deployments are straining military readiness while a lack of regional ally support complicates any exit strategy. Consequently, a prolonged conflict could severely weaken U.S. strategic posture and global economic stability without guaranteed regime concessions.

    Read at CFR

  404. 404.
    2026-02-26 | defense | 2026-W09 | Topics: AI, China, Europe, Middle East, Nuclear, Russia, Trade, Ukraine, United States

    The war in Ukraine has inaugurated a new era of 'precise mass' warfare, characterized by the deployment of millions of low-cost autonomous drones that are reshaping the battlefield and blurring traditional front lines. Key evidence includes Ukraine's rapid production of millions of drones and the critical role of Silicon Valley firms in providing AI and satellite connectivity, which often bypasses traditional, slower defense procurement cycles. These developments imply that the U.S. and its allies must urgently adapt their defense industrial bases to prioritize both high-volume production and rapid innovation while managing the strategic risks associated with private sector control of essential military technologies.

    Read at CFR

  405. 405.
    2026-02-26 | economy | 2026-W09 | Topics: China, Trade, United States

    The Supreme Court's ruling that the IEEPA does not authorize tariffs constrains the U.S. President's ability to deploy immediate trade barriers, shifting economic statecraft from executive brinkmanship toward slower institutional processes. While established Section 301 and 232 tariffs remain valid, the decision invalidates recent emergency duties and forces the administration to rely on procedural tools like Section 122 or new investigations. This change provides Beijing with a tactical advantage and more time to maneuver ahead of high-stakes negotiations, as U.S. threats now require greater legal and legislative consensus. Consequently, the trade rivalry will likely become more predictable and rule-bound, though structural tensions between the two powers persist.

    Read at CFR

  406. 406.
    2026-02-26 | economy | 2026-W09 | Topics: China, Trade, United States

    The U.S. Supreme Court struck down President Trump’s use of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) to impose broad tariffs, ruling 6-3 that the executive branch lacks the authority to levy taxes without specific congressional delegation. The Court reasoned that IEEPA’s authorization to "regulate importation" does not textually or historically encompass the power to impose duties, which remains a constitutional prerogative of Congress. While the decision triggers a massive refund process for affected importers and forces a pivot to shorter-term Section 122 authorities, it leaves other major trade statutes, such as Section 232 and Section 301, largely untouched.

    Read at CFR

  407. 407.

    The Supreme Court's 2026 ruling that the IEEPA does not authorize presidential tariffs has upended U.S. trade policy, forcing an immediate shift to alternative authorities and creating significant legal uncertainty for $150 billion in revenues. CSIS experts argue that while this provides China with a tactical and propaganda advantage ahead of upcoming summits, it compels Congress to reclaim its constitutional role in defining a more strategic and stable trade framework. The analysis highlights that reliance on coercive tariffs alone has failed to curb the overall trade deficit or effectively reindustrialize the U.S., instead increasing costs for critical energy and technology supply chains. Consequently, the panel recommends a policy pivot toward a 'positive agenda' that prioritizes domestic innovation, infrastructure, and allied cooperation over blunt import substitution.

    Read at CSIS

  408. 408.
    2026-02-24 | energy | 2026-W09 | Topics: China, Indo-Pacific, Nuclear, Russia, Trade, United States

    Flash droughts are rapidly intensifying climate events that represent a new systemic risk because their speed collapses traditional warning timelines and overwhelms existing drought governance frameworks. These events, which have increased in frequency since the 1950s, cause disproportionate damage to agriculture and energy security, as seen in the 2012 U.S. losses and the 2010 Russian heatwave that triggered global food price spikes. To mitigate these risks, policymakers must establish flash droughts as a distinct category, leveraging high-resolution satellite data and anticipatory financing to trigger interventions before losses become inevitable.

    Read at CFR

  409. 409.
    2026-02-24 | energy | 2026-W09 | Topics: China, Climate, Indo-Pacific, Nuclear, United States

    The CFR Global Energy Tracker reveals that while high-carbon sources still account for 89% of energy consumption across 79 tracked countries, low-carbon alternatives are steadily rising, particularly in developed nations. Significant gains in renewable energy shares in the UK and China demonstrate the impact of declining technology costs, though global energy demand has already surpassed pre-pandemic levels by 6%. The data underscores an uneven global transition, with some nations like Norway and France leading in low-carbon reliance while others remain heavily dependent on coal. Consequently, policymakers must address these regional disparities and the persistent growth in total energy demand to accelerate effective decarbonization strategies.

    Read at CFR

  410. 410.

    This CFR guide outlines the 'America First' transformation of U.S. foreign policy during the first year of President Trump’s second term, emphasizing a shift toward unilateralism and aggressive economic nationalism. Key developments highlighted include the 2025 National Security Strategy's focus on regional dominance, the military capture of Venezuela's Nicolás Maduro, and significant withdrawals from international organizations and climate agreements. These policies have strained traditional alliances while prioritizing U.S. resource access and domestic border security over global humanitarian assistance. Ultimately, the administration's approach suggests a future of transactional global engagement and a preference for military-backed regime change over multilateral diplomacy.

    Read at CFR

  411. 411.
    2026-02-24 | economy | 2026-W09 | Topics: China, Europe, Indo-Pacific, Trade, United States

    The U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Learning Resources Inc. v. Trump that the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) does not authorize presidential tariffs, reaffirming that the power to tax resides with Congress. While this decision curtails broad executive trade authority, the administration is pivoting to alternative statutes like Section 122 and Section 301 to sustain its protectionist agenda, albeit with more procedural hurdles. The ruling necessitates a complex refund process for $160 billion in collected revenues, yet experts warn that persistent policy volatility will continue to create an 'uncertainty tax' on global investment and supply chains.

    Read at CSIS

  412. 412.
    2026-02-24 | society | 2026-W09 | Topics: China, Middle East, Russia, Ukraine, United States

    The State of the Union address is a foundational U.S. constitutional tradition that has evolved from a formal written report into a high-stakes televised event used to define presidential agendas. Historical data indicates that while the complexity of the speech's prose has decreased to reach a wider audience, actual television viewership has declined sharply over recent decades. Nonetheless, the address remains a critical mechanism for presidents to fulfill constitutional obligations and announce major foreign policy doctrines during periods of international instability.

    Read at CFR

  413. 413.

    Israel must transition from reliance on foreign digital infrastructure to a model of digital sovereignty to protect its national security and strategic autonomy in the AI era. While a global leader in innovation, Israel faces vulnerabilities due to its dependence on international cloud providers, semiconductor supply chains, and a regulatory environment ill-suited for large-scale domestic infrastructure projects. To mitigate these risks, the paper recommends designating digital assets as strategic national infrastructure, integrating energy planning with data center needs, and establishing a sovereign hybrid cloud framework to ensure national control over critical data and computing resources.

    Read at INSS

  414. 414.
    2026-02-22 | society | 2026-W08 | Topics: China, Climate, Europe, Russia, Ukraine, United States

    Chatham House argues that Europe’s far-right parties are reframing themselves as pragmatic “realists” and are no longer fringe actors, with growing influence over mainstream policy agendas. The discussion highlights how their electoral rise is already shifting debates on migration, sovereignty, climate policy, and the EU’s strategic direction, even before full control of government. It reasons that if multiple major European states were governed by populists at once, the core uncertainty is whether they would moderate in office or intensify nationalist positions. The policy implication is that European governments and institutions should prepare for stress on cohesion, including weaker alignment on Ukraine and climate, more difficult UK-EU coordination, and stronger need for organized democratic counter-mobilization.

    Read at Chatham House

  415. 415.
    2026-02-22 | health | 2026-W08 | Topics: China, Europe, Indo-Pacific, Trade, United States

    The global health architecture is shifting from multilateral cooperation toward transactional bilateralism, characterized by new strategies that tie health aid to commercial interests and strategic resource access. In response, Africa is pursuing 'health sovereignty' by prioritizing regional manufacturing, unified procurement mechanisms, and internal reforms to eliminate systemic inefficiencies and aid dependency. This transition signals a move away from traditional grant-based assistance toward a model of 'commercial diplomacy,' requiring recipient nations to leverage collective bargaining and domestic financing to maintain policy agency.

    Read at Chatham House

  416. 416.
    2026-02-22 | other | 2026-W08 | Topics: China, Middle East, Ukraine

    Chatham House’s announcement frames Marc Weller’s appointment as a leadership move to strengthen the Global Governance and Security Centre at a moment when international order is under strain. The core claim is that, despite geopolitical fragmentation, urgent transnational problems still require rule-based global cooperation on security, health preparedness, AI governance, and international law. The institute supports this by highlighting Weller’s credentials across academia, UN mediation and legal advisory roles, and recent policy interventions on Gaza, Ukraine, Venezuela, and broader legal-system defense. Strategically, the appointment signals a push for more active institutional reform and coalition-building among governments, business, and civil society to preserve and update multilateral governance frameworks.

    Read at Chatham House

  417. 417.
    2026-02-22 | economy | 2026-W08 | Topics: China, Climate, Europe, Indo-Pacific, Russia, Trade, Ukraine, United States

    The panel argues that while central bank independence (CBI) is increasingly challenged by high public debt and political populism, it remains essential for anchoring inflation expectations and maintaining price stability. Experts highlight that 'fiscal dominance' in high-debt environments increases political pressure to lower interest rates, particularly in the US, risking a return to 1970s-style inflation volatility. To maintain legitimacy, central banks must improve transparency and adapt to a new era of frequent supply shocks—such as AI and geopolitical shifts—which may drive higher neutral interest rates globally. Consequently, failure to safeguard CBI could lead to financial repression and a fragmentation of the global monetary regime.

    Read at Chatham House

  418. 418.
    2026-02-22 | society | 2026-W08 | Topics: China, Cybersecurity, Europe, Indo-Pacific, Nuclear, Trade, United States

    The panel argues that digital public infrastructure (DPI) is now core state infrastructure, and the key policy question is governance: whether identity, payments, and data-sharing rails are built in the public interest rather than left to fragmented or purely private control. Speakers cite international evidence that open and interoperable approaches can scale quickly and cheaply, including India’s Aadhaar/UPI, Brazil’s Pix, Estonia/X-Road adoption elsewhere, and reported cost and inclusion gains from open-source deployments in countries like the Philippines and Rwanda. They contend the UK’s main constraints are not just funding but weak political leadership, low-trust rollout choices (especially around digital ID framing), rigid Treasury/procurement models, and limited iterative delivery capacity. The strategic implication is to pursue small, high-value pilots that build trust, then scale through clear political ownership, procurement reform, open standards, and multi-stakeholder governance to balance sovereignty, resilience, and innovation.

    Read at Chatham House

  419. 419.

    The panel argues that the U.S. seizure of Maduro marks a broader shift to explicit hemispheric power politics, where Washington is willing to use force based on narrowly defined national interests rather than traditional multilateral norms. Speakers contend that while the operation was tactically successful, it does not resolve Venezuela’s underlying governance, corruption, and institutional collapse, making durable stabilization and democratic transition highly uncertain. They also stress that the oil rationale is weak: Venezuela’s heavy crude, degraded infrastructure, legal uncertainty, and soft global demand make rapid production recovery costly and commercially unattractive, while disruption to China is likely limited. Strategically, the event signals a more fragmented Latin America, pressures partners into pragmatic bilateral bargaining with the U.S., and suggests policymakers should prioritize scenario planning for follow-on interventions, institutional reconstruction pathways, and tighter coordination among non-U.S. actors to preserve regional sovereignty and stability.

    Read at Chatham House

  420. 420.
    2026-02-22 | diplomacy | 2026-W08 | Topics: China, Europe, Middle East, Nuclear, Russia, Trade, Ukraine, United States

    The panel’s core judgment is that MENA is showing “stabilization in name only”: open wars are partly contained, but underlying drivers of conflict are intensifying. Speakers pointed to converging internal and external pressure on Iran, a Gaza ceasefire that is effectively fragile and incomplete, renewed Saudi-UAE competition (including in Yemen), and Syria’s unsettled political order with Turkey-Israel rivalry layered on top. They also argued that a fragmented global system is producing multi-alignment rather than clear blocs, with licit and illicit financial networks blurring traditional binaries and complicating sanctions and governance. The strategic implication is that regional and Western policymakers should move beyond ad hoc conflict management toward coordinated, multi-actor political processes, while preparing for cross-border spillovers (security, migration, and economic disruption) if current flashpoints reignite.

    Read at Chatham House

  421. 421.
    2026-02-22 | diplomacy | 2026-W08 | Topics: China, Europe, Trade, United States

    The Trump administration's proposed Forum on Resource Geostrategic Engagement (FORGE) represents a rare shift toward multilateralism, aimed at securing critical mineral supply chains through a 'preferential trade zone' with enforceable price floors. This initiative reflects a recognition that the U.S. cannot solve its dependency on China alone, though its success depends on whether the administration can treat partners as equals rather than targets for leverage. While significant, FORGE likely remains a pragmatic exception driven by economic necessity rather than a fundamental abandonment of 'America First' unilateralism.

    Read at CSIS

  422. 422.
    2026-02-22 | diplomacy | 2026-W08 | Topics: China, Cybersecurity, Europe, NATO, Nuclear, Russia, Trade, Ukraine, United States

    The event argues that Romania has become a pivotal frontline state in defending NATO’s eastern flank as Russia’s war against Ukraine reshapes European security. It points to Romania’s exposure to nearby Russian drone incidents, intensified information warfare, and Black Sea military operations, alongside NATO’s decision to host its largest base on Romanian territory, as evidence of its strategic centrality. Romania’s foreign minister frames continued support for Ukraine, defense modernization, and sustained military investment as core to deterrence and alliance resilience. The policy implication is that European rearmament must accelerate and remain coordinated, especially if US engagement in Europe becomes less reliable, to credibly deter further Russian coercion.

    Read at Chatham House

  423. 423.
    2026-02-22 | diplomacy | 2026-W08 | Topics: China, Europe, NATO, Russia, Trade, Ukraine, United States

    The 2026 Munich Security Conference highlighted a stark divergence between the U.S. administration’s "civilizational" vision and a European counter-vision, prominently led by women, which emphasizes democratic values and increased defense autonomy. While U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio promoted an alliance based on shared Christian heritage and supported illiberal leaders, European figures like Kaja Kallas and Ursula von der Leyen pushed for EU enlargement, increased military spending, and a stronger independent security framework. This rift is accelerating Europe's transition toward strategic self-sufficiency and the potential strengthening of EU mutual defense clauses as a backstop to NATO. Consequently, the transatlantic relationship faces a transformative period where Europe’s agency and commitment to democratic norms increasingly challenge the traditional U.S.-led security architecture.

    Read at CFR

  424. 424.
    2026-02-22 | society | 2026-W08 | Topics: China, Indo-Pacific, Trade, United States

    The article argues that although the Supreme Court struck down Trump’s broad IEEPA-based tariffs as unconstitutional, the administration can still sustain much of its trade agenda through other delegated statutes. It explains that Section 122 can quickly reimpose a temporary across-the-board tariff (up to 15% for 150 days), while Sections 232 and 301 provide more durable sectoral or country-specific tariffs with few effective political constraints once in place; Section 338 is another possible but legally untested option. The core reasoning is that no single authority fully replicates IEEPA’s sweep, but together they can recreate tariffs in a legally defensible patchwork, albeit with procedural limits, sunset risks, and likely litigation. Strategically, policymakers should expect continued tariff leverage in negotiations but greater legal and political friction, including pressure for congressional guardrails and higher concern over consumer and small-business costs.

    Read at CFR

  425. 425.
    2026-02-22 | defense | 2026-W08 | Topics: China, Indo-Pacific, Trade, United States

    The CATO Institute critiques the Trump administration's Maritime Action Plan (MAP), arguing that its attempt to revive commercial shipbuilding through subsidies and protectionist mandates is economically unrealistic and potentially detrimental to national security. Key obstacles include US shipbuilding costs being five times the global average, severe labor shortages, and antiquated infrastructure that cannot be easily fixed by government intervention. The report warns that siphoning skilled workers into subsidized commercial projects may worsen existing delays in naval shipbuilding rather than providing spillover benefits. Instead of isolationist industrial policy, the author recommends leveraging allied shipyards for non-combatant vessels, providing steady demand signals, and reforming the Jones Act to modernize the US merchant fleet.

    Read at CATO

  426. 426.
    2026-02-22 | society | 2026-W08 | Topics: China, Middle East, NATO, Nuclear, Russia, Trade, Ukraine, United States

    CFR argues that Trump’s State of the Union is primarily a political reset attempt as he faces low approval, difficult midterm dynamics, and skepticism that presidential rhetoric can quickly shift opinion. The article cites weak polling, slowing GDP growth, persistent goods-trade deficits, and a Supreme Court ruling curbing his use of IEEPA tariffs, leaving narrower options such as Section 122. It also flags major foreign-policy pressure points—Iran, Venezuela, China, NATO, Ukraine, and Gaza—where his messaging may signal priorities but not resolve underlying constraints. The key strategic implication is that while the speech can shape partisan narratives, policy outcomes will be driven more by legal limits on executive trade tools, electoral pressures, and high-risk security decisions that may outpace congressional checks.

    Read at CFR

  427. 427.
    2026-02-22 | diplomacy | 2026-W08 | Topics: China, Europe, Russia, United States

    Chatham House argues that China’s expansion in Central Asia is not a linear success story but a contested process shaped by local resistance and regional power politics. The event framing points to grassroots protests, elite pushback, and Beijing’s need to adjust its economic and security approach, while Central Asian states actively hedge between China, Russia, the United States, the EU, and Turkey. It also highlights potential friction around China’s growing security role and asks whether renewed U.S. attention can translate into durable influence. For policymakers, the core implication is that strategy in Central Asia must account for local agency and competitive balancing dynamics, rather than assuming Beijing can unilaterally remake the region.

    Read at Chatham House

  428. 428.
    2026-02-22 | economy | 2026-W08 | Topics: AI, China, Climate, Europe, Indo-Pacific, Russia, Trade, United States

    The United States should 'leapfrog' China’s critical mineral dominance by prioritizing disruptive innovation, waste recovery, and recycling instead of attempting to out-mine or out-process China's entrenched capacity. The report argues that traditional mining projects are too slow to mitigate immediate geopolitical risks, whereas breakthroughs in materials science and AI-enabled extraction from industrial waste offer faster, more resilient paths to independence. Key policy recommendations include launching a national innovation strategy, bridging financing gaps for deep-tech startups, and coordinating with G7 allies to secure circular mineral supply chains.

    Read at CFR

  429. 429.
    2026-02-22 | society | 2026-W08 | Topics: AI, China, Climate, Europe, Indo-Pacific, Nuclear, Russia, Taiwan, Trade, United States

    CFR argues that Trump’s second-term trade strategy is not a single tariff reset but a rolling, country-by-country restructuring of U.S. trade relations through mostly nonbinding framework deals. The tracker shows that while Liberation Day tariffs set high baselines, subsequent bilateral agreements and exemptions lowered effective rates unevenly and exchanged tariff relief for market-access concessions, purchase pledges, investment commitments, and alignment with U.S. economic-security measures. It also finds these deals are highly flexible and unilateral in design, with weak legal durability, quick-termination provisions, and little congressional constraint, making them closer to instruments of leverage than traditional trade agreements. The policy implication is a less predictable global trade environment where partners must continuously bargain with Washington and balance access to the U.S. market against sovereignty costs and geopolitical exposure, especially vis-a-vis China.

    Read at CFR

  430. 430.
    2026-02-22 | diplomacy | 2026-W08 | Topics: China, Nuclear, Taiwan

    The paper argues that the Philippines’ shift to a Comprehensive Archipelagic Defense Concept (CADC) marks a major strategic move from broad modernization toward a geography-centered military posture focused on dispersed basing, longer-range strike, and denial operations. It reasons that worsening threat perceptions of China, especially in maritime border areas and near Taiwan, are driving this transition, but also increasing risks of sharper confrontation and security-dilemma dynamics. The analysis highlights practical constraints, including inter-service rivalry, political vulnerability to Chinese influence operations, and policy ambiguity over foreign basing access, weapons deployments, and partner force integration. Strategically, it suggests Manila should codify clearer baseline defense policies, integrate alliances more explicitly, and refine CADC’s theory of victory so deterrence objectives translate into concrete theater-level outcomes rather than capability acquisition alone.

    Read at IISS

  431. 431.

    The discussion argues that 2026 conflict risk will be shaped less by traditional multilateral conflict management and more by sphere-of-influence politics and transactional dealmaking by major powers. Ero’s reasoning is that with over 60 active conflicts, institutions like the UN and established mediators are increasingly sidelined, while regional and great-power actors (e.g., the US in Latin America, Gulf states in Sudan, Turkey in Syria, China in Myanmar) now carry more leverage over war and peace outcomes. She stresses that many current “peace” efforts are short-term truces rather than durable settlements, with places like Gaza, Sudan, and Somalia exposed to continued violence due to proxy competition, weak governance arrangements, and miscalculation risks among powerful states. For policy strategy, the implication is to prioritize pragmatic coalition-building with the actors who actually hold leverage, convert ceasefires into longer political processes, and adapt conflict-prevention tools to a more fragmented, law-weaker international order.

    Read at Chatham House

  432. 432.

    Maddox argues that the international system has shifted into destabilizing US-China superpower rivalry, with both powers undermining global peace and prosperity in different ways. She contends that Washington’s transactional unilateralism under Trump and Beijing’s coercive techno-industrial expansion have together weakened alliances, eroded legal norms, and increased risks of conflict, including over Taiwan and transatlantic security. The lecture supports this with examples including tariff coercion, pressure over critical minerals, intensified military signaling, and challenges to institutions such as NATO, the UN system, and global trade mechanisms. Strategically, she calls on non-superpower states to strengthen and build institutions, resolve regional conflicts through principled coalitions, and actively uphold international law to preserve a rules-based order without relying on US leadership.

    Read at Chatham House

  433. 433.
    2026-02-22 | other | 2026-W08 | Topics: AI, China, Cybersecurity, United States

    Vinh Nguyen, a Senior Fellow at CFR and former NSA official, discusses his career trajectory and the evolving challenges of balancing national security with privacy and accountability in the age of artificial intelligence. He argues that while the U.S. must accelerate AI adoption to remain competitive with adversaries like China, it must do so within a democratic framework that preserves legal and ethical standards. Nguyen highlights the urgency of securing AI at its foundational level, noting that technological advancement is currently outpacing security measures and that the government's influence over private-sector tech decisions remains limited. He concludes that both policy frameworks and individual career strategies must rapidly adapt to AI-driven shifts in workflows to maintain a strategic advantage.

    Read at CFR

  434. 434.

    The report argues that the U.S. must transition from a purely protectionist response to China's automotive dominance toward a proactive strategy of global competition in autonomous, connected, and electric (ACE) vehicles. While current tariffs provide temporary breathing room, the author warns that indefinite isolation risks leaving the U.S. as a technological island of obsolete internal combustion engines while ceding international markets to Chinese firms. To maintain competitiveness, the U.S. should provide conditional financial support to domestic manufacturers, coordinate supply-chain diversification with allies, and manage national security risks through data localization rather than total exclusion. This strategy aims to secure the economic and environmental benefits of the automotive revolution while navigating the geopolitical rivalry with China.

    Read at CFR

  435. 435.

    The CFR’s 2026 Preventive Priorities Survey identifies a significant rise in global instability, highlighting five high-likelihood, high-impact contingencies including intensifying conflicts in the Middle East, the Russia-Ukraine war, and potential U.S. military operations in Venezuela. Based on a survey of over 600 experts, the report emphasizes a shift toward interstate conflict and identifies domestic political violence in the U.S. and AI-enabled cyberattacks as critical threats to national security. These findings suggest that the reduction of conflict prevention infrastructure and more coercive diplomatic stances increase the risk of the United States being drawn into costly, unpredicted military interventions.

    Read at CFR

  436. 436.
    2026-02-22 | tech | 2026-W08 | Topics: AI, China, Europe, Indo-Pacific

    Chatham House argues that mega AI summits are useful for networking and agenda-setting but are unlikely to deliver meaningful international governance agreements. The reasoning is that forums like the New Delhi AI Impact Summit are too crowded and politically fragmented, with competing national and commercial priorities, while US–China rivalry and weakening multilateral norms make binding global deals improbable. It cites recent summit outcomes as mostly non-binding and principles-based, and points to more promising progress in smaller scientist-led, technical-standards, and regional venues that can build trust and produce operational proposals. The strategic implication is to prioritize a “splinter to scale” approach: develop tested, inclusive governance tools in focused forums, then scale them through larger diplomatic platforms with middle-power backing.

    Read at Chatham House

  437. 437.

    Chatham House argues that accountability mechanisms must rapidly adapt because cyber operations are now being used to facilitate core international crimes, not just conventional cybercrime. The event highlights the International Criminal Court prosecutor’s new policy on cyber-enabled crimes under the Rome Statute as a key signal that cyber-enabled atrocities should be investigated and prosecuted on equal footing with offline conduct. Its reasoning centers on clarifying which cyber acts meet international criminal law thresholds, building workable legal frameworks, and addressing practical barriers to attribution, evidence collection, and prosecution. Strategically, states and international institutions should align domestic and international legal tools, strengthen investigative cooperation, and prioritize capacity for cyber-forensics and cross-border accountability.

    Read at Chatham House

  438. 438.
    2026-02-22 | economy | 2026-W08 | Topics: China, Indo-Pacific, Russia, Trade, United States

    The 'America First' tariffs of 2025-2026 have not triggered an immediate recession, largely due to the U.S. economy's resilience and the relatively small role of traded goods in its overall GDP. However, the policy marks a definitive end to the post-WWII rules-based trade order, as tariffs are increasingly used as tools for foreign policy leverage and economic statecraft rather than mere industry protection. While businesses have adapted in the short term, experts warn of long-term consequences including persistent inflationary pressure and reduced economic competition. Ultimately, the shift necessitates a new national consensus to balance the benefits of open trade against the strategic risks of dependency on geopolitical adversaries.

    Read at Brookings

  439. 439.
    2026-02-22 | diplomacy | 2026-W08 | Topics: China, Europe, Indo-Pacific, Middle East, Nuclear, Russia, Trade, United States

    CFR argues that President Trump’s new Board of Peace is becoming the central U.S.-led mechanism for shaping Gaza’s postwar order, but its viability hinges on Hamas demilitarization and credible governance arrangements. Evidence cited includes broad diplomatic participation (27 formal members and about 45 expected delegations), expected reconstruction pledges of at least $5 billion, and a governance model that currently excludes Palestinian factions in favor of a separate technocratic committee. Conditions on the ground remain unstable, with limited medical evacuations and returns through Rafah, blocked humanitarian missions, ongoing Israeli strikes, and mutual truce-violation accusations. Strategically, the initiative could accelerate reconstruction and coordination, but exclusion risks and unresolved security control could undermine legitimacy and push Gaza back toward partition or renewed conflict if disarmament and political reintegration fail.

    Read at CFR

  440. 440.
    2026-02-22 | diplomacy | 2026-W08 | Topics: China, Europe, Trade

    Chatham House’s US and North America Programme argues that understanding policy shifts in Washington and Ottawa is essential to navigating wider global realignment. Its reasoning is based on a mix of policy-focused research, expert analysis, and cross-sector convenings that track how North American decisions shape geopolitical, security, and economic outcomes. The programme emphasizes durable structural trends rather than only short-term political cycles, including US-China strategy, trade-policy renegotiation, and evolving alliance structures. For policymakers and strategists in the UK, Europe, and other middle powers, the implication is to prepare for sustained changes in US external behavior through diversified partnerships, adaptive economic strategy, and long-horizon security planning beyond 2028.

    Read at Chatham House

  441. 441.

    The article argues that the Munich Security Conference exposed a deepening political-strategic split inside the West, even as leaders tried to project unity on core security issues. It cites Marco Rubio’s speech as emblematic: he reassured Europe that it still matters to Washington, but paired that with hard limits on U.S. support and warnings that America will act unilaterally when allies resist. The piece also points to contrasting interventions by Wang Yi, Keir Starmer, and Volodymyr Zelenskyy to show how states are recalibrating between U.S.-China rivalry and uncertain transatlantic cohesion. Strategically, it implies European governments should prepare for more conditional U.S. backing, invest in autonomous defense and diplomatic capacity, and pursue flexible coalitions to manage both Russia-related threats and wider great-power competition.

    Read at Chatham House

  442. 442.

    The Trump administration has announced plans to revoke the 2009 Endangerment Finding, a move described as the largest deregulatory action in U.S. history that removes the legal basis for capping greenhouse gas emissions under the Clean Air Act. The administration argues that eliminating these regulations will reduce energy costs and bolster American energy dominance, though the decision faces immediate legal challenges that could reach the Supreme Court. This policy pivot risks ceding leadership in the global electric vehicle and clean energy transition to China while further isolating the United States from international climate cooperation.

    Read at CFR

  443. 443.

    CFR reports that U.S. Southern Command’s anti-drug boat strike campaign intensified, with eleven people killed in one day across the Eastern Pacific and Caribbean, making it the deadliest day of the operation this year. The brief notes this brings reported fatalities to at least 144 since September, while the U.S. has not publicly released identities or evidence supporting claims that those killed were tied to trafficking networks. It highlights growing legal and normative challenges, including wrongful-death litigation and expert arguments that lethal force against suspected traffickers is unlawful absent an imminent violent threat. Strategically, the campaign may impose rising legal, reputational, and regional diplomatic costs, suggesting a need for stricter oversight, evidentiary transparency, and greater reliance on interdiction and criminal prosecution rather than expanded military strikes.

    Read at CFR

  444. 444.

    CFR panelists argued that commodity markets have shifted from a demand-led cycle to a supply- and policy-driven regime, with metals (especially gold and silver) rising while oil remains structurally softer. They cited evidence including sustained central-bank gold purchases since the 2022 reserve-freeze shock, growing investor hedging demand, tariff uncertainty under Section 232, and OPEC+/non-OPEC supply conditions that cap oil despite geopolitical tensions. The speakers assessed that oil spikes are still possible from Iran-related disruptions or labor shocks, but likely temporary unless a major outage occurs; baseline Brent expectations clustered around the high-$50s to low-$60s. Strategically, governments and firms should treat commodities as instruments of national security and currency power (including dollar-denominated oil flows), while preparing for persistent precious-metal strength, selective industrial-metal volatility, and policy tradeoffs in U.S.-Venezuela-Canada energy alignment.

    Read at CFR

  445. 445.
    2026-02-22 | diplomacy | 2026-W08 | Topics: China, Climate, Europe, Middle East, Nuclear, Russia, Trade, Ukraine, United States

    CFR’s brief argues that simultaneous Geneva negotiations on Iran’s nuclear file and the Ukraine war show the Trump administration trying to position Washington as the indispensable conflict broker, but both tracks remain constrained by major unresolved gaps. The report cites concrete escalation signals and bargaining asymmetries: U.S. military deployments and Iranian drills near Hormuz alongside disagreements over deal scope, and in Ukraine, continued Russian strike pressure and territorial demands despite recent Ukrainian battlefield gains. It also notes mixed diplomatic conditions, including European unease with parts of U.S. positioning and broader geopolitical moves by major powers, indicating a fragmented coalition environment. Strategically, the implication is that U.S. diplomacy may secure partial or phased outcomes at best unless paired with stronger leverage, clearer end-state definitions, and tighter allied coordination.

    Read at CFR

  446. 446.
    2026-02-22 | diplomacy | 2026-W08 | Topics: China, Indo-Pacific, Taiwan

    Chatham House argues that a stronger Japan under Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi would be broadly beneficial for Asia by helping balance both Chinese dominance and excessive dependence on the United States. The piece reasons that many Asian governments value Japan’s predictable diplomacy, investment record, and growing security cooperation, especially as China’s military pressure rises and multilateral institutions weaken. It also notes major constraints: Takaichi’s tax-cut and spending agenda is fiscally difficult, constitutional military reform faces high political hurdles, and Tokyo is under simultaneous pressure from Beijing and Washington. Strategically, the article implies Japan should build domestic economic resilience while deepening ties with India, Southeast Asia, and other US allies (such as the UK and Australia) and stabilizing relations with China to avoid regional escalation.

    Read at Chatham House

  447. 447.

    The webinar argues that global oil geopolitics has been fundamentally reshaped by Russia’s war in Ukraine, OPEC+ supply management, and shifting demand centers, even as the energy transition advances. Carolyn Kissane stresses that the world still consumes over 100 million barrels per day, with demand growth concentrated in Asia, while Russia has largely sustained exports by redirecting discounted crude to buyers such as India and China. She also highlights that state-owned producers and OPEC+ coordination continue to exert strong influence on prices, making markets vulnerable when supply is curtailed in already tight conditions. The policy implication is a dual-track strategy: preserve short-term energy security and price stability through diversified supply and contingency tools, while accelerating credible decarbonization pathways that account for uneven capacity and financing constraints across regions.

    Read at CFR

  448. 448.
    2026-02-22 | diplomacy | 2026-W08 | Topics: China

    Chatham House argues that African mining has become a core geopolitical and economic arena, and that African governments must take more strategic roles to secure development gains from the critical minerals race. The Institute cites its engagement at Mining Indaba 2026, including ministerial discussions and a UNDP-facilitated roundtable, as evidence that debates are shifting from resource nationalism toward active state participation in mining and processing value chains. Its experts emphasize that US and other responses to China’s supply-chain dominance are restructuring global markets, raising the stakes for countries without equity or policy leverage. Strategically, the piece implies African policymakers should align permitting, industrialization, and infrastructure planning with stronger state-industry coordination to capture long-term value and avoid marginalization.

    Read at Chatham House

  449. 449.

    The report argues that European nations must strengthen sanctions against Russia’s 'shadow fleet' of oil tankers by mandating adequate insurance coverage through stricter regulation of flag states. This strategy aims to force vessels back into Western-regulated services, ensuring compliance with price caps and mitigating the risk of uninsured environmental disasters. Economic modeling indicates that aggressive enforcement, including insurance disclosure and flag state liability, could reduce Russian Baltic oil tax revenues by up to 14% while shifting the majority of trade to compliant vessels. To implement this, the UK and EU should coordinate on universal maritime standards and exert diplomatic and economic pressure on 'flags of convenience' to eliminate loopholes used for sanctions evasion.

    Read at Brookings

  450. 450.

    CFR argues that a future Taiwan conflict will likely be a protracted, regional war involving multiple actors and external triggers, rather than a contained three-way contest. The report warns that China’s military modernization and gray-zone tactics have eroded U.S. deterrent advantages and shortened operational warning times. To address these new risks, the U.S. must shift from isolated planning to deeply integrated, pre-crisis consultative mechanisms with regional allies like Japan and the Philippines.

    Read at CFR

  451. 451.
    2026-02-22 | diplomacy | 2026-W08 | Topics: AI, China, Middle East, Nuclear, Russia, Trade, Ukraine, United States

    The U.S. and Iran face a volatile '50/50' chance of either military conflict or a symbolic diplomatic framework as an unprecedented U.S. military build-up meets low-trust negotiations in Geneva. While the Trump administration seeks a high-profile declaration of victory, Iran demands a formal negotiated text to ensure sanctions relief amid internal social unrest and Israeli pressure for preemption. Gulf states are actively mediating to avoid a regional war that would jeopardize their multi-billion dollar transitions into global AI and digital hubs. Consequently, any tactical miscalculation, particularly involving proxies like the Houthis, could trigger a wider entanglement with severe global economic and security repercussions.

    Read at CSIS

  452. 452.
    2026-02-22 | diplomacy | 2026-W08 | Topics: China, Europe, Middle East, Nuclear, Russia, Trade, Ukraine, United States

    CFR argues that Iran still does not have a nuclear weapon, but it retains the technical base to move quickly toward one and continues to field the Middle East’s most extensive ballistic missile arsenal despite major Israeli and U.S. strikes in 2025. The piece cites IAEA findings of sharply increased near-weapons-grade enrichment, evidence of undeclared nuclear-related activity, and estimates that Iran’s breakout timeline for fissile material could be very short, while missile capabilities include systems with roughly 2,000 km range and demonstrated use in 2024 attacks on Israel. It also notes that military strikes may have delayed but not eliminated Iran’s program, as rebuilding and renewed U.S.-Iran talks in Oman suggest coercion alone has limits. Strategically, the article implies policymakers need a combined approach of verifiable nuclear constraints, missile/proxy limits, calibrated sanctions relief, and credible deterrence to reduce risks of regional war, proliferation, and escalation through miscalculation.

    Read at CFR

  453. 453.
    2026-02-22 | diplomacy | 2026-W08 | Topics: China, Climate, Indo-Pacific, Middle East, NATO, Nuclear, United States

    Chatham House argues that the 2026 security environment is being transformed by overlapping geopolitical, military, and technological shocks that are testing established alliances and institutions. Its reasoning highlights NATO burden-sharing strains around 5% defence spending targets, strategic recalibration under a renewed Trump administration, China’s military modernization alongside Indo-Pacific flashpoints, and persistent interstate/proxy conflicts in the Middle East. It also emphasizes that climate-conflict dynamics, critical materials competition, and increasingly sophisticated cyber and espionage activity are blurring traditional warfighting domains. The policy implication is that governments and industry should prioritize cross-domain strategy, stronger public-private defence partnerships, and more efficient use of rising defence budgets to build resilience and credible deterrence.

    Read at Chatham House

  454. 454.
    2026-02-22 | society | 2026-W08 | Topics: China, Trade, United States

    While the Supreme Court correctly limited the misuse of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) for broad tariffs, the President still holds significant statutory power to disrupt trade. Hidden provisions like Section 122 and Section 338 offer alternative pathways for the administration to impose unilateral tariffs without immediate congressional oversight or established judicial limits. These vulnerabilities suggest that true trade policy stability will only return if Congress reclaims its constitutional authority and establishes stricter procedural safeguards on executive delegations.

    Read at CATO

  455. 455.

    Chatham House argues that Trump’s energy-dominance agenda is delivering visible short-term gains in US oil and LNG output, but global market dynamics make sustained political control over energy trajectories difficult. The article points to record US oil production, LNG export growth above 20%, coal-plant retention measures, and ambitious nuclear expansion goals, while also noting renewables still took most new US power capacity in 2025 and globally covered all demand growth as they surpassed coal in generation. It emphasizes that energy investment cycles run 5–10 years, so current outcomes reflect earlier decisions and require long policy continuity to lock in structural change. For strategy, the US may gain near-term geopolitical leverage over prices and supply chains, but allies’ mixed responses, persistent renewable cost competitiveness, and deeper US exposure to hydrocarbon regions limit long-term dominance and complicate policy tradeoffs.

    Read at Chatham House

  456. 456.
    2026-02-22 | diplomacy | 2026-W08 | Topics: China, NATO, Nuclear, Russia, Ukraine, United States

    The expiration of the New START treaty on February 5, 2026, marks the end of formal limits on U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals, raising significant risks of a new arms race and strategic miscalculation. Experts warn that the loss of robust verification measures and on-site inspections will erode intelligence precision, likely prompting both superpowers to 'upload' reserve warheads onto existing delivery systems. To maintain stability, U.S. policy must balance necessary modernization—such as reopening submarine missile tubes—with the urgent pursuit of a follow-on agreement that ideally addresses non-strategic weapons and China's growing nuclear capabilities.

    Read at CFR

  457. 457.
    2026-02-22 | diplomacy | 2026-W08 | Topics: China, Middle East, Nuclear, Russia, Trade, Ukraine, United States

    This CSIS analysis maps four potential oil supply disruption scenarios resulting from a possible U.S. military strike against Iran, warning that Tehran's current vulnerability may drive it to target regional energy infrastructure as a last resort. The report details how direct attacks on Arab Gulf facilities could push global oil prices above $130 per barrel, particularly as bypass routes for the Strait of Hormuz remain significantly limited in capacity. These dynamics present a strategic dilemma for the Trump administration, where escalating military pressure could trigger a global energy crisis or a 'use it or lose it' miscalculation by Iranian leadership.

    Read at CSIS

  458. 458.

    Greek Foreign Minister George Gerapetritis argued that Europe is in a transition period requiring both stronger strategic autonomy and continued transatlantic cohesion, rather than a rupture with the United States or NATO. He supported higher European defense burden-sharing, warned that a sustainable Ukraine settlement must be fair and sovereignty-based, and maintained confidence that NATO Article 5 remains credible despite current political volatility. On the Middle East, he backed a UN-anchored Gaza stabilization framework, welcomed coordination with the proposed Board of Peace only within a limited Gaza mandate, and stressed that disarming Hamas must be paired with governance and education to prevent renewed extremism. He also framed Greece as a strategic energy and logistics hub and linked EU trade deals with India and Mercosur to a wider strategy of diversification, implying policymakers should reduce overreliance risks while preserving rules-based multilateral institutions.

    Read at CFR

  459. 459.

    The column argues that Trump’s 2026 National Defense Strategy (NDS) is built on prioritization and burden-sharing, but the Iran crisis could expose a gap between that framework and the president’s willingness to intervene aggressively. Froman points to NDS language that shifts U.S. focus toward homeland and hemispheric defense, expects allies in Europe and the Indo-Pacific to assume more conventional responsibilities, and seeks a limited “decent peace” with China rather than outright dominance. He contrasts that restraint with Trump’s military signaling toward Iran, including carrier redeployment and maximal demands, while warning that Iran is far harder to coerce or reshape than Venezuela and could produce prolonged instability after any regime shock. The strategic implication is that U.S. policy must keep Iran actions tightly bounded to avoid a costly quagmire that would undermine NDS prioritization and broader force posture goals.

    Read at CFR

  460. 460.
    2026-02-22 | diplomacy | 2026-W08 | Topics: China, Europe, Indo-Pacific, Middle East, Russia, Taiwan, Ukraine

    The paper argues that Ukraine’s wartime defense-industrial adaptation offers a practical model for European rearmament under prolonged high-intensity conflict conditions. It attributes Ukraine’s resilience to three factors: restructuring domestic defense production, rapidly diversifying and hardening supply chains, and building flexible external industrial partnerships beyond Europe. The analysis highlights the growing strategic relevance of Indo-Pacific actors such as South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan for technology and components, while noting that dependence on China remains both operationally important and geopolitically risky. For European strategy, the report implies that rearmament planning should prioritize industrial agility, supplier diversification, and broader cross-regional defense partnerships to strengthen long-term resilience.

    Read at IISS

  461. 461.

    The article argues that Kenya is moving from a primarily regional leadership role toward a broader, more assertive global foreign policy posture in response to a shifting world order. Its reasoning centers on Kenya’s 2024 strategy, which combines regional integration goals with diversified external partnerships, including longstanding Western security and economic ties, a strategic partnership with China, and expanding links with the UAE. Kenya’s engagement in multilateral security efforts, including the multinational mission in Haiti, is presented as evidence of its willingness to project influence beyond East Africa despite domestic protest pressures and regional conflict risks. Strategically, this suggests Kenya is pursuing pragmatic multi-alignment to maximize diplomatic leverage, trade and financing opportunities, while managing the risks of geopolitical balancing and policy overextension.

    Read at Chatham House

  462. 462.
    2026-02-22 | diplomacy | 2026-W08 | Topics: China, Europe, Indo-Pacific, Middle East, NATO, Trade, United States

    Chatham House’s UK in the World Programme argues that the UK must rethink foreign policy for a more multipolar and less predictable environment, as its traditional relationships with the US and Europe evolve and new actors gain influence. It reasons that the UK can still act effectively as an influential mid-sized power and global broker, but only if external strategy is linked to domestic renewal on growth, regional inequality, and public service capacity. The programme supports this through expert working groups, policy analysis on trade-offs, and public engagement focused on economic security, development, strategic partnerships, and science and technology. The strategic implication is that UK policymakers should pursue a more integrated domestic-foreign policy approach, prioritizing resilient partnerships, economic security, and innovation-led statecraft.

    Read at Chatham House

  463. 463.
    2026-02-22 | society | 2026-W08 | Topics: China, Trade, United States

    The U.S. Supreme Court's ruling that the President lacks the authority to impose tariffs under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) represents a significant legal setback for the Trump administration's trade strategy. While the administration must now halt collections and potentially refund $175 billion, it is already pivoting to alternative, more constrained authorities like Section 122 and Section 301 to maintain its protectionist stance. This landmark decision reinforces constitutional checks and balances on executive power but is unlikely to lower overall trade barriers, as the administration seeks to replicate previous tariff levels through new investigations before the midterm elections.

    Read at CFR

  464. 464.
    2026-02-22 | diplomacy | 2026-W08 | Topics: China, Europe, Middle East, Russia, United States

    The article argues that a tougher Trump approach to Cuba may raise pressure on Havana, but is unlikely to produce a quick Venezuela-style political breakthrough. It points to Cuba’s deepening economic and energy crisis after losing subsidized Venezuelan oil, while emphasizing the regime’s durable control through the Communist Party, security institutions, and weak, fragmented domestic opposition. It also notes that U.S. law (especially the 1992 and 1996 embargo statutes) sharply limits what any administration can offer unless major democratic conditions are met, constraining deal-making. Strategically, this suggests Washington risks worsening humanitarian conditions and migration flows without guaranteed regime change, so policy should combine pressure with realistic transition benchmarks and crisis contingency planning.

    Read at Chatham House

  465. 465.
    2026-02-22 | society | 2026-W08 | Topics: China, Indo-Pacific, Trade, United States

    CFR argues that tariffs have become a central driver of U.S. affordability anxiety across party lines, and that cutting them could improve both household costs and public sentiment. A January 2026 CFR-Morning Consult poll of 2,203 adults found major bipartisan majorities linking trade policy to higher prices in groceries, medical care, technology, clothing, housing, transportation, and childcare. The authors pair polling with tariff and price estimates to show tariffs are adding measurable pressure in key categories, while noting overall prices are also shaped by supply shocks, inventories, and firm pricing behavior. The strategic implication is that tariff relief may be one of the fastest politically visible affordability levers before midterms, even if consumer price declines are partial and delayed.

    Read at CFR

  466. 466.
    2026-02-22 | tech | 2026-W08 | Topics: China, Indo-Pacific, Russia, United States

    The IISS paper argues that cloud computing is becoming essential for national-security and defence functions in the Asia-Pacific, and that states can combine commercial cloud benefits with sovereign control. Using case studies of Japan, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand, it shows each country adopting hybrid or phased models to handle growing data demands, improve military interoperability, and strengthen decision-making under complex cyber and geopolitical pressure. The analysis highlights that reliance on dominant hyperscalers, especially US providers, creates governance and control trade-offs that governments are managing through tailored technical, legal, and institutional safeguards. Strategically, the paper implies that effective NS&D cloud policy should prioritize secure hybrid architectures, domestic governance capacity, and clear sovereignty mechanisms rather than seeking full digital isolation.

    Read at IISS

  467. 467.
    2026-02-22 | diplomacy | 2026-W08 | Topics: China, Middle East, Russia, United States

    IISS argues that maritime insecurity in the Horn of Africa is being reshaped by Somalia’s unresolved state fragility, producing a renewed mix of piracy, arms-smuggling, and strategic competition over ports and bases. The report links piracy’s resurgence since late 2023 to reduced international naval pressure, relaxed commercial risk controls, and regional diversion caused by Red Sea attacks, while also documenting cross-Gulf arms networks that move munitions and dual-use components between Yemen and the Horn. It finds that although external powers are increasingly active, many port and basing ambitions remain tentative, with outcomes still heavily mediated by local actors and domestic Somali/Somaliland politics. For policy, the implication is to pair maritime deterrence with sustained land-side governance and counter-smuggling efforts, while managing great-power and Gulf rivalries through long-horizon diplomacy that accounts for rapid political shifts such as Somaliland recognition and Somalia’s cancellation of UAE agreements.

    Read at IISS

  468. 468.
    2026-02-22 | diplomacy | 2026-W08 | Topics: China, Europe, Trade, United States

    The article argues that Mario Draghi is not calling for an immediate EU superstate, but for "pragmatic federalism" that gives Europe real decision-making authority in strategic domains. It reasons that loose intergovernmental coordination, especially in defense and foreign policy, leaves the EU economically strong but politically weak, while examples like the euro and the ECB show that functional federal-style authority can work without full constitutional federalism. Draghi therefore favors flexible integration among willing states, potentially outside formal EU structures at first, with late entry open to others, similar to Schengen’s path. Strategically, this implies prioritizing coalition-based institutional deepening in defense, industrial policy, taxation, and diplomacy to increase European power without waiting for politically unlikely treaty-level overhaul.

    Read at Chatham House

  469. 469.
    2026-02-22 | tech | 2026-W08 | Topics: China, Trade

    Chatham House argues that middle powers can retain meaningful agency in an AI system dominated by the US and China by pursuing "sovereign AI" strategies tailored to national interests. The paper identifies four practical pathways: specialize in a strategic segment of the AI supply chain, align with one superpower, pool sovereignty through partnerships with peers, or hedge by combining capabilities from multiple providers. Its reasoning is that full technological independence is unrealistic, but selective control over how AI is adopted and governed is still achievable. For policymakers, the priority is to choose and sequence these strategies based on domestic strengths and risk tolerance so AI deployment serves national and public-interest goals despite structural dependence on US and Chinese ecosystems.

    Read at Chatham House

  470. 470.

    The panel argues that China under Xi is pursuing a long-term effort to reshape international order around sovereignty, regime security, and reduced Western dominance, while avoiding costly ideological bloc politics. Speakers cite evidence including Beijing’s security-first governance model, parallel institution-building (e.g., BRI, AIIB, SCO, BRICS-adjacent platforms), efforts to de-risk supply chains and build economic leverage, and selective mediation diplomacy aimed especially at the Global South. They also emphasize tensions in China’s approach: it promotes an alternative governance narrative but still works inside existing institutions, and its global ambitions are constrained by domestic economic pressures and external pushback. For policymakers, the implication is to treat China’s strategy as structural and adaptive rather than episodic, requiring coordinated responses on economic resilience, technology dependence, and coalition-based diplomacy rather than issue-by-issue reactions.

    Read at Chatham House

  471. 471.
    2026-02-22 | tech | 2026-W08 | Topics: AI, China, Climate, Middle East

    The INSS argues that subsea data centers could become a strategic infrastructure option for Israel by addressing AI-era pressures on electricity, freshwater, and land while strengthening digital sovereignty. It cites evidence from Microsoft’s Project Natick and Chinese deployments showing major gains in cooling efficiency, reduced freshwater use, lower land footprint, and improved hardware reliability in sealed underwater environments. The paper also stresses that these benefits are offset by unresolved environmental effects, difficult maintenance logistics, heightened sabotage/espionage risks to subsea assets, and legal-regulatory gaps under current maritime law. Strategically, it recommends that Israel proactively assess pilot adoption, integrate planning with existing offshore energy/communications infrastructure, and develop dedicated regulation, environmental monitoring, and maritime protection doctrines in coordination with regional partners.

    Read at INSS

  472. 472.
    2026-02-22 | other | 2026-W08 | Topics: AI, China, Europe, Indo-Pacific, Russia, Trade, United States

    The India AI Impact Summit represents a strategic shift in global AI governance from theoretical safety concerns toward practical deployment, impact, and inclusivity for the Global South. By focusing on "People, Planet, and Progress," the summit aims to move beyond high-level principles to address the "implementation gap" through operational standards and sovereign AI initiatives that reduce technological dependency. Experts argue that long-term success requires establishing durable cross-border accountability frameworks and ensuring emerging economies play a sustained role in technical standard-setting.

    Read at Brookings

  473. 473.

    Chatham House argues that a second Trump presidency signals a shift from US hegemony to a more openly imperial foreign policy built on coercive leverage rather than alliance stewardship. It cites transactional diplomacy, disregard for international norms, threats toward allies such as Denmark over Greenland, and the operation to capture Venezuela’s Nicolás Maduro as evidence of greater willingness to use force in support of a hemispheric dominance strategy. The analysis says this approach weakens NATO cohesion and broader European security assumptions while creating a more volatile environment in which states inside and outside Washington’s preferred orbit must recalibrate. It also concludes that Russia and China face a mix of risk and opportunity as US policy becomes more confrontational, producing a brittle order with higher miscalculation risk.

    Read at Chatham House

  474. 474.
    2026-02-22 | diplomacy | 2026-W08 | Topics: China, Europe, Indo-Pacific, Trade, United States

    The report argues that the United States must proactively engage Colombia's next administration to support the 2016 Peace Accords and prevent a resurgence of internal conflict. This urgency is driven by incomplete implementation of the peace deal, rising violence against demobilized combatants, and record-high coca production that fuels armed groups like the ELN and Clan del Golfo. Strategic implications include the need for innovative international financing to bridge fiscal gaps and a shift in security cooperation toward stabilizing rural zones to mitigate migration and narcotics flows. Failure to act risks squandering a long-term U.S. foreign policy success and destabilizing the broader Andean region.

    Read at CFR

  475. 475.

    Chatham House frames Trump’s conflict strategy as a deliberate break from traditional diplomacy, centered on his pledge to act as a “peacemaker and unifier” through high-pressure dealmaking. The core logic is transactional: use US leverage to force adversaries into negotiations and lock in outcomes across multiple conflicts, including Ukraine, Gaza, the South Caucasus, and the DRC. The event description highlights mixed and disputed results, arguing that while this approach can create openings, it also unsettles allies and even parts of Trump’s domestic base that see tension with an America First posture. For policymakers, the key implication is that US-led peacemaking may become more coercive and personalized, requiring partners to adapt quickly while planning for uneven sustainability and credibility risks across simultaneous theaters.

    Read at Chatham House

  476. 476.
    2026-02-22 | society | 2026-W08 | Topics: China, Europe, Nuclear, Russia, United States

    The article argues that Europe’s sovereignty debate is increasingly split between an integrationist strategy (more EU-level coordination, financing, and industrial policy) and a deregulatory growth strategy (less bureaucracy, stronger national competitiveness). It supports this by contrasting leaders and policy preferences: Macron and Draghi push pooled instruments such as joint procurement and common financing, while De Wever, Merz, and Meloni prioritize regulatory simplification and nationally driven industrial revival. The piece warns that the main danger is not institutional rupture but policy incoherence, where parallel national and EU initiatives in defense and energy create duplication and underpowered outcomes. Strategically, it suggests the most viable path is a calibrated hybrid: selective integration in scale-dependent sectors (defense, tech, energy infrastructure) combined with targeted deregulation to restore growth, with Germany’s choices likely to determine whether that synthesis holds.

    Read at Chatham House

  477. 477.
    2026-02-22 | economy | 2026-W08 | Topics: China, Climate, Indo-Pacific, Middle East, Trade, United States

    CFR reports that the U.S. goods trade deficit reached a record in 2025, undermining the Trump administration’s claim that emergency tariffs would shrink it and revive domestic manufacturing. Commerce Department data show tariffs redirected sourcing away from China toward countries such as Vietnam and Mexico rather than reducing overall import dependence, while U.S. manufacturing employment fell by about 72,000 jobs after the April 2025 tariff rollout. The brief notes that long-run investment effects from trade deals could still appear, but current evidence points to limited near-term reindustrialization gains. With a Supreme Court ruling pending, the tariffs could be struck down and trigger up to an estimated $175 billion in refunds, highlighting fiscal and strategic risks in a tariff-first policy mix.

    Read at CFR

  478. 478.

    The article argues that the U.S. must update its narrative on Taiwan, moving away from viewing the island as a 'strategic liability' or a single point of failure for the global economy. It highlights that Taiwan's hardware is the irreplaceable backbone of America's AI ambitions and that conflict with China is not inevitable if a credible military deterrent is maintained. The proposed policy shift emphasizes a middle path: preserving the status quo to allow for an eventual non-coercive resolution while grounding U.S. support in calculated self-interest rather than ideological charity.

    Read at Brookings

  479. 479.
    2026-02-22 | economy | 2026-W08 | Topics: China, Europe, Indo-Pacific, NATO, Nuclear, Taiwan, Trade, United States

    The Trump administration is aggressively expanding Section 232 tariffs across strategic sectors—from semiconductors to pharmaceuticals—to mitigate national security risks and encourage domestic manufacturing. While aimed at countering China, these tariffs disproportionately affect close allies like Canada and Mexico, who remain the primary suppliers of steel, aluminum, and auto parts. This strategy risks trade friction with partners while highlighting persistent vulnerabilities in supply chains, particularly regarding Chinese control of active pharmaceutical ingredients, critical minerals, and drone components.

    Read at CFR

  480. 480.
    2026-02-22 | diplomacy | 2026-W08 | Topics: China, Europe, Middle East, Russia, United States

    The INSS reports that President Trump’s 'Board of Peace' (BoP) has evolved from a specific Gaza stabilization initiative into a global conflict-resolution mechanism that bypasses the UN framework, leading to a refusal by major Western democracies to participate. This highly centralized body, controlled personally by Trump, lacks broad international legitimacy and relies on a mix of regional partners and non-democratic states. While the BoP may successfully oversee short-term operational goals in Gaza due to US and regional backing, its long-term viability is threatened by its isolation from traditional Western allies. For Israel, participation offers direct influence over Gaza's reconstruction but risks diplomatic isolation within a board composed of regional rivals.

    Read at INSS

  481. 481.
    2026-02-22 | diplomacy | 2026-W08 | Topics: China, Indo-Pacific

    Chatham House argues that as the US turns inward and multilateral institutions weaken, the Global South is becoming a central arena of geopolitical and economic competition in which Japan is an increasingly important actor. Evidence came from a January 2026 expert event at Japan House London, where specialists assessed how Global South countries are reacting to great-power rivalry, including China’s expanding role, and compared Japanese, US, and Chinese approaches. The discussion suggests influence will depend less on rhetoric and more on how partner countries in the Global South perceive concrete differences in engagement models. For policy, Japan and like-minded states should design pragmatic, development-focused partnerships aligned with Global South priorities and recognize these countries as active shapers of the emerging global order.

    Read at Chatham House

  482. 482.
    2026-02-22 | energy | 2026-W08 | Topics: China, Climate, Europe, Russia, Trade, United States

    Chatham House argues that repealing the 2009 EPA endangerment finding is a strategic own goal: it may reduce near-term regulatory pressure, but it undermines US long-term economic and technological power. The paper cites estimates that rollbacks could add 7.9-15.3 billion metric tons of emissions by 2055, while also locking US automakers into legacy internal-combustion technologies as global EV adoption accelerates. It contends that lower regulation does not solve competitiveness because EVs often have lower lifetime operating costs, and global demand is shifting toward cleaner vehicles, with EV sales reaching 20.7 million in 2025. Strategically, the implication is that US policy should treat emissions and efficiency standards as industrial policy, sustaining investment in batteries, electrification, and clean-tech supply chains to avoid ceding market share and influence to China.

    Read at Chatham House

  483. 483.
    2026-02-22 | diplomacy | 2026-W08 | Topics: China, Climate, Europe, Indo-Pacific, Middle East, Russia, United States

    The event argues that worsening humanitarian crises are being driven less by isolated emergencies and more by a structural geopolitical shift from a rules-based order to transactional power politics. Drawing on the IRC’s 2026 Emergency Watchlist, it highlights severe stress signals: rising conflict, extreme food insecurity, and mass displacement alongside declining aid and weakening international cooperation. A key indicator is concentration of risk, with 20 Watchlist countries accounting for 84% of global humanitarian need despite representing only 12% of the world’s population, increasing spillover pressures beyond their borders. The policy implication is that governments and donors should pair near-term protection of vulnerable communities with reforms that build a more resilient, sustainable humanitarian system under conditions of persistent great-power competition.

    Read at Chatham House

  484. 484.
    2026-02-22 | diplomacy | 2026-W08 | Topics: China, Middle East, Russia, Trade, United States

    Syria’s foreign minister argued that the post-Assad government is pursuing a pragmatic foreign policy centered on international reintegration, regional de-escalation, and reconstruction through investment rather than ideological confrontation. He cited high-level outreach to Washington and London, partial sanctions relief, embassy reactivation, and active diplomacy on files such as chemical weapons, refugee return, and security arrangements with Israel (including reviving the 1974 disengagement framework) as evidence of progress. He also framed internal stabilization efforts, including dialogue with the SDF and investigative mechanisms for sectarian violence, as prerequisites for restoring trust and attracting capital. The strategic implication is that external partners have an opening to shape Syria’s trajectory by pairing economic and diplomatic engagement with clear expectations on inclusivity, accountability, and institutional consolidation to reduce risks of renewed fragmentation and proxy competition.

    Read at Chatham House

  485. 485.

    The discussion argues that oil will remain a central geopolitical risk through the near term, even as countries pursue decarbonization, because global demand is still above 100 million barrels per day and continues to rise. Kissane cites evidence that Russia’s war in Ukraine and OPEC+ production cuts have remapped trade flows, tightened supply, and sustained price volatility, while major buyers such as China and India absorb discounted Russian crude. She also notes that energy power is concentrated in a few producers and state-owned firms, with over 75% of global oil controlled by national companies, amplifying political leverage in markets. The strategic implication is that governments should pair energy-transition goals with hard energy-security planning: diversify suppliers, protect critical transport infrastructure, manage strategic reserves prudently, and avoid removing conventional supply faster than resilient alternatives can scale.

    Read at CFR

  486. 486.
    2026-02-22 | diplomacy | 2026-W08 | Topics: China, Indo-Pacific, Trade, Ukraine, United States

    Chatham House argues that the Trump administration’s critical minerals push is less about outproducing China and more about building a geopolitically selective supply system led by Washington. The article points to the February 4 ministerial, the $12 billion “Project Vault” stockpile plan, and the FORGE platform (with proposed price floors) as evidence of serious US state-backed market shaping tied to alliance politics. It warns that investor confidence depends on long-horizon policy credibility, and that partisan attacks on prior administrations’ mineral programs can signal future policy reversals, raising stranded-asset risk. Strategically, the US should institutionalize these initiatives across agencies and administrations, prioritize trusted partners while expanding real new supply (including copper), and sustain long-term political de-risking in places like the DRC.

    Read at Chatham House

  487. 487.

    Chatham House’s event framing argues that the UK’s new Critical Minerals Strategy is centered on reducing supply-chain vulnerability while preserving international openness. The core reasoning is that critical minerals are now indispensable to UK manufacturing, clean energy deployment, and industrial competitiveness, but exposure to geopolitical rivalry and demand shocks creates strategic risk. The strategy therefore combines domestic capability-building with deeper political and commercial collaboration with partner countries and industry actors. For policy, this implies a dual-track approach: strengthen national resilience at home while institutionalizing trusted international partnerships to secure long-term access in a contested global minerals market.

    Read at Chatham House

  488. 488.
    2026-02-22 | society | 2026-W08 | Topics: China, Climate, NATO, Russia, Trade, United States

    A 2026 CFR-Morning Consult survey reveals that while Americans generally view trade as a mutually beneficial reciprocal exchange, public opinion on tariffs is deeply fractured along partisan lines. Although nearly half of respondents recognize tariffs as a tax on domestic consumers that increases the cost of living, a significant portion of Republicans views them primarily as a tool for protecting U.S. manufacturing jobs. The findings suggest that while there is broad support for trading with allies and maintaining international rules, there is also growing public desire for congressional guardrails to limit unilateral presidential authority over trade policy.

    Read at CFR

  489. 489.

    CFR panelists argued that while Greenland is strategically important for Arctic warning, surveillance, and transatlantic security, U.S. ownership is not necessary to secure core defense interests. They cited the still-valid 1951 U.S.-Denmark defense framework, which already allows expanded U.S. basing and operations, and noted that practical constraints—harsh operating conditions, limited infrastructure, and high costs—undercut both military seizure scenarios and rapid resource exploitation. On critical minerals, speakers stressed that Greenland has potential but development cycles are long, financing is market-driven, and cooperation with allies (especially Denmark, Canada, and Europe) is more realistic than unilateral control. Strategically, the discussion suggests Washington should prioritize negotiated security upgrades and allied supply-chain partnerships, since coercive moves on Greenland would risk damaging NATO cohesion and broader U.S.-Europe coordination.

    Read at CFR

  490. 490.
    2026-02-22 | diplomacy | 2026-W08 | Topics: China, Taiwan, Trade

    China's expansion of zero-tariff access for African nations is unlikely to rebalance trade on its own, as the continent's exports remain heavily concentrated in low-value raw materials and minerals. Despite initiatives to boost agricultural trade, China maintains a persistent $60 billion trade surplus with Africa, highlighting deep-seated structural imbalances. To achieve long-term growth, Africa must leverage this policy to attract foreign direct investment and drive industrialization, positioning itself as a strategic, low-tariff production hub for the Chinese market.

    Read at Brookings

  491. 491.
    2026-02-22 | energy | 2026-W08 | Topics: China, Climate, Europe, Indo-Pacific, Middle East, United States

    The article argues that while international climate agreements like the Paris Accord have fostered diplomacy, current national commitments remain insufficient to prevent dangerous global warming, a situation exacerbated by the United States' recent withdrawal from UN climate bodies. Evidence indicates that global temperatures already breached the 1.5°C threshold in 2024, and the U.S. departure from the UNFCCC significantly reduces the organization's funding while signaling a domestic return to fossil fuel prioritization. Consequently, the lack of U.S. participation is expected to delay the global transition to net-zero, forcing a strategic shift toward alternative frameworks like universal carbon pricing and minilateral cooperation through the G20.

    Read at CFR

  492. 492.
    2026-02-22 | diplomacy | 2026-W08 | Topics: China, Europe, Ukraine

    The podcast argues that Marco Rubio’s more diplomatic style toward Europe likely masks continuity, not change, in the Trump administration’s tougher strategic line. The key reasoning is the contrast in tone with JD Vance’s earlier confrontational remarks, while the underlying themes remained similar: Europe should carry more burden on security and adapt to a less accommodating US posture. Discussion points on Ukraine, drone and defense innovation, and Chinese industrial competition reinforce that transatlantic pressure is widening from military support to technology and economic resilience. The policy implication is that European governments and firms should plan for sustained US demands by accelerating defense capacity, coordinating long-term Ukraine support, and strengthening competitiveness against China.

    Read at Chatham House

  493. 493.

    This collection of essays argues that the United States and China must coordinate to mitigate the 'malicious uplift' of non-state actors using advanced AI for cyberattacks, biological weapons, and disinformation. The authors highlight that AI's low cost and high accessibility create systemic risks that traditional arms control cannot easily manage, necessitating shared safety guidelines and crisis communication channels. Ultimately, bilateral cooperation is viewed as a necessary catalyst for a global multilateral non-proliferation framework to prevent 'safety arbitrage' by malicious groups.

    Read at Brookings

  494. 494.
    2026-02-22 | society | 2026-W08 | Topics: AI, China, Climate, Europe, Middle East, Trade, United States

    The report argues that America’s long-term decline in marriage and fertility is a civilizational threat and that restoring stable married-parent families is essential to national renewal. It cites historical trends and social-science findings linking two-parent married households with better child outcomes, lower poverty and crime, and stronger economic and civic performance, while blaming welfare marriage penalties, cultural shifts, and institutional incentives for family breakdown. Strategically, it recommends a whole-of-government pro-family agenda: remove welfare and tax marriage penalties, strengthen work requirements, reduce regulatory and housing barriers, expand religion- and family-supportive policies, and create new marriage-centered incentives (FAM/HCE credits and NEST accounts). The implication is a shift from neutral or symptom-management policy toward explicit state preference for marriage and child-rearing within intact families as a national policy objective.

    Read at Heritage

  495. 495.
    2026-02-22 | diplomacy | 2026-W08 | Topics: China, Middle East, Nuclear, Russia, Trade, Ukraine, United States

    At CFR’s 2025 Arthur Ross Book Award ceremony, the central discussion around Steve Coll’s The Achilles Trap argued that the Iraq War stemmed not only from U.S. analytic and policy failures but from a profound misreading of Saddam Hussein’s motives and decision logic. Drawing on newly accessible Iraqi archives, tapes of Saddam’s internal meetings, and interviews, Coll showed that Saddam had largely dismantled key WMD capabilities in 1991 yet preserved ambiguity out of regime psychology, deterrence signaling, and distrust that sanctions would be lifted even with cooperation. The conversation emphasized that U.S. policymakers over-relied on partial intelligence and assumptions, while limited direct contact with Baghdad deepened strategic misperception. The policy implication is to prioritize adversary psychology, maintain calibrated channels of communication with hostile regimes, and apply greater analytic humility before irreversible military decisions.

    Read at CFR

  496. 496.

    Robert D. Blackwill proposes "resolute global leadership" as the most effective American grand strategy to counter a peer-competitor China and navigate the most dangerous international environment since World War II. The report analyzes five alternative strategic schools, concluding that the U.S. must leverage its unique economic, military, and technological advantages while reconciling itself to a world where its dominance is no longer unchallenged. Key policy recommendations include substantially increasing the defense budget, pivoting military assets to the Indo-Pacific, and re-engaging in multilateral trade frameworks like the CPTPP to revitalize the rules-based order. Ultimately, it emphasizes balancing Chinese power through strengthened alliances and 'peace through strength,' while rejecting military force for purely ideological goals.

    Read at CFR

  497. 497.
    2026-02-22 | defense | 2026-W08 | Topics: China, Cybersecurity, Europe, NATO, Nuclear, Russia, Trade, Ukraine, United States

    The panel’s core finding is that the UK can afford warfighting only if it makes earlier, harder political choices on defence spending and reform, because current plans are too slow for the threat timeline. Speakers argued that moving from roughly 2.3% to 3.5% of GDP requires major trade-offs (higher taxes, cuts elsewhere, or more borrowing) and that past procurement failures have weakened confidence that spending converts into usable capability. They stressed that modern conflict would hit the UK homeland through cyber, disinformation, and infrastructure disruption as well as missiles and drones, while reduced US support raises the burden on Europe. Strategically, the UK should accelerate readiness, improve procurement accountability and industrial surge capacity, rebuild stockpiles, and run a more honest national debate on resilience, mobilisation, and societal preparedness.

    Read at Chatham House

  498. 498.

    The Chatham House panel argued that shrinking Western aid budgets are no longer just a development issue but a strategic security risk for the UK and its partners. Speakers cited sharp cuts across major donors, disruption from the 2025 USAID retrenchment, and operational impacts such as HALO Trust potentially shrinking from 12,000 to 7,000 staff, warning this will hit fragile and conflict-affected states hardest. They reasoned that reduced support for conflict prevention, multilateral institutions, and long-term partnerships creates space for rival influence, increases instability and migration pressures, and weakens UK diplomatic leverage. For UK strategy, the discussion pointed to prioritizing conflict-focused aid, preserving credible multilateral engagement while using targeted bilateral strengths, rebuilding a clear long-term narrative linking aid to domestic security, and mobilizing non-traditional and private financing to offset fiscal constraints.

    Read at Chatham House

  499. 499.

    Brookings’ expert roundtable argues that a U.S. "Donroe Doctrine" push for hemispheric primacy is more likely to weaken than strengthen Washington’s position in long-term competition with China, though one contributor contends it could restore deterrence by denying Beijing footholds near U.S. borders. The dominant reasoning is that coercive regional tactics and unilateral moves drain U.S. military bandwidth from the Indo-Pacific, damage alliances, and erode soft power while giving China narrative and diplomatic advantages. Experts also note China’s already deep regional footprint, including major trade, investment, and infrastructure ties across Latin America, which makes a clean spheres-of-influence rollback unrealistic. Strategically, a formal U.S.-China spheres bargain is assessed as unstable and asymmetric: it could pressure smaller states to hedge, accelerate regional militarization and possible nuclear proliferation, and incentivize revisionist claims elsewhere, suggesting U.S. policy should prioritize alliance credibility, rules-based coordination, and positive economic alternatives over coercion.

    Read at Brookings

  500. 500.
    2026-02-21 | defense | 2026-W08 | Topics: China, Europe, Middle East, NATO, Nuclear, Russia, Trade, Ukraine, United States

    The conflict in Ukraine has settled into a prolonged pattern of attrition and positional fighting, with neither side achieving a decisive breakthrough. While Russia retains tactical advantages, the analysis suggests that time is working against Moscow due to increasing manpower strain and operational failures, preventing the attainment of key objectives like fully securing Donetsk. Strategically, the fighting itself informs the relative leverage of both parties, meaning that external diplomatic pressure to impose a cease-fire is unlikely to succeed. Policymakers must recognize that the war is not nearing a quick end and that sustained, long-term support is required to manage a protracted conflict.

    Read at Foreign Affairs

  501. 501.
    2026-02-20 | tech | 2026-W08 | Topics: AI, China, Trade, United States

    Beijing is pivoting from volatile regulatory crackdowns to a managed model of private sector oversight, acknowledging that private enterprise is crucial for achieving technological self-reliance. This new framework involves codifying laws (like the Private Economy Promotion Law) and utilizing mechanisms such as 'golden shares' and party cells to ensure that private growth aligns with the CCP's strategic national goals. While this approach provides much-needed stability for 'tough tech' sectors, it requires firms to prioritize political directives over pure market logic. Consequently, while boosting domestic capacity, this managed openness risks dampening corporate dynamism and limiting the global collaboration essential for advanced fields like biotechnology.

    Read at Foreign Affairs

  502. 502.
    2026-02-19 | energy | 2026-W08 | Topics: China, Nuclear

    China has successfully transitioned from a net energy importer to the world's dominant market maker in clean energy technologies. Key evidence includes its global leadership in manufacturing wind turbines, solar panels, controlling battery supply chains, and exporting competitive electric vehicles. This rapid ascent fundamentally shifts global energy power dynamics, making China a critical strategic player whose dominance requires careful policy and economic countermeasures from Western nations.

    Read at Foreign Affairs

  503. 503.

    The publication argues that while the transatlantic alliance faces deep rifts due to US political volatility, the commitment to the partnership remains strong. Allies must adapt by adopting a strategy of assertive self-reliance, recognizing that they can no longer solely depend on the United States for security. This requires enhancing mutual burden-sharing and maintaining robust trade ties while simultaneously holding firm on national interests. The path forward demands a strategic shift from passive appeasement to a proactive, mutually beneficial partnership that asserts the sovereignty of all involved parties.

    Read at Foreign Affairs

  504. 504.

    This RAND report argues that systemic supply chain risks from geopolitical conflict are significant and underappreciated, particularly in sectors like nonferrous metals and electrical components sourced from countries such as Brazil and India. The authors find that private insurance is ill-suited for managing these correlated, large-scale risks, while government interventions often lack necessary market-sensing mechanisms to prevent unsustainable private practices. To enhance resilience, the report recommends that the U.S. government track conflict-dependency overlaps and that industries adopt 'Til Needed' hedging options—private contracts for surge capacity—to bridge the gap between market incentives and national economic security.

    Read at RAND

  505. 505.
    2026-02-17 | china_indopacific | 2026-W08 | Topics: China, Indo-Pacific, United States

    The article argues that sustained technological progress requires a competitive, decentralized market system, contrasting this with top-down bureaucratic models best suited for scaling existing technologies. Historical examples show that nations like Great Britain and the US thrived through decentralized competition, while centralized systems (like late 19th-century Prussia) excelled at consolidation. Stagnation occurs when a society's political structure fails to adapt to new technological realities. The analysis warns that both China, due to centralized power, and the United States, due to stifled competition, face significant challenges in maintaining future growth.

    Read at Foreign Affairs

  506. 506.
    2026-02-17 | society | 2026-W08 | Topics: China, Climate, Nuclear

    The article argues that large, dominant political structures, or "Goliaths," historically sow the seeds of their own decline, citing examples from the Roman Empire to modern global powers. The key evidence points to systemic vulnerabilities, including territorial overreach, extreme wealth inequality, environmental degradation, resource scarcity, and institutional corruption. The author posits that the contemporary Goliath is not a single nation but a globalized capitalist civilization facing unprecedented stress from climate change, pandemics, and a fragmenting global system. Policy implications suggest that mitigating these systemic risks—rather than focusing solely on geopolitical competition—is crucial for preventing a major societal collapse.

    Read at Foreign Affairs

  507. 507.
    2026-02-17 | china_indopacific | 2026-W08 | Topics: China, United States

    The article argues that China's rise demonstrates that authoritarian regimes can achieve technological dynamism and sustained growth through a model termed "smart authoritarianism." This success is attributed not to high GDP per capita, but to robust economic capacity, including strong human capital, infrastructure, and state-directed industrial policy. By selectively relaxing political control to foster innovation, China has become a genuine global competitor to the United States. Policymakers must recognize that this state-guided development model presents a powerful and attractive alternative to traditional Western economic structures.

    Read at Foreign Affairs

  508. 508.
    2026-02-17 | diplomacy | 2026-W08 | Topics: China, Russia, United States

    The article argues that global liberal democracy is undergoing a significant decline, challenging post-Cold War assumptions about its permanence. Key evidence points to the consolidation of power by autocracies (e.g., China, Russia), the slide of established democracies into illiberalism (e.g., Hungary, Turkey), and the rise of coups in regions like Africa. Furthermore, the rule of law is weakening even in historically stable democracies, suggesting a global trend toward authoritarianism. Policy implications suggest that international strategy must urgently reassess the resilience of democratic institutions and develop proactive measures to counter the global spread of illiberal governance.

    Read at Foreign Affairs

  509. 509.
    2026-02-17 | china_indopacific | 2026-W08 | Topics: China, Nuclear, Russia, Ukraine, United States

    The article argues that global population aging and shrinking working-age populations will fundamentally constrain the capacity of major states to wage war, leading to a potential 'geriatric peace.' This theory is supported by demographic trends, such as China's projected dramatic decline in its working-age population, which limits both resources and manpower for conflict. While acknowledging that demographic factors are not deterministic—citing Russia's invasion of Ukraine as a counterexample—the analysis suggests that these limitations will dampen the pressures for large-scale great power conflict, particularly between the US and China. Policymakers should factor demographic decline into long-term strategic planning, recognizing it as a structural brake on military escalation.

    Read at Foreign Affairs

  510. 510.
    2026-02-17 | economy | 2026-W08 | Topics: China, Indo-Pacific

    The analysis argues that India's historical failure to become a major electronics manufacturing power, despite early successes like the TIFRAC project, was not a scientific deficiency but a structural policy failure. Key evidence points to the state's tendency to support single, flagship projects rather than cultivating a comprehensive industrial ecosystem. This resulted in a weak domestic manufacturing base, forcing reliance on imported components despite advanced scientific talent. The implication for policy is that India's current push for technological self-reliance is likely to face similar hurdles, requiring a shift from project-based support to robust industrial policy development.

    Read at Foreign Affairs

  511. 511.
    2026-02-17 | economy | 2026-W08 | Topics: China, Trade, United States

    The article argues that the foundational premises of modern economic globalization—namely, that open markets benefit all and that integrating China guarantees political liberalization—have failed. Key evidence includes the 'China shock,' which deindustrialized large parts of the American heartland, and the fact that Chinese leadership successfully resisted political liberalization despite global economic pressures. For policymakers, the implication is that understanding these systemic failures is a necessary prerequisite for any future strategy aimed at reforming or saving the global economic system.

    Read at Foreign Affairs

  512. 512.
    2026-02-17 | africa | 2026-W08 | Topics: AI, China, Trade, United States

    Africa is emerging as a critical, yet under-discussed, arena for advanced digital surveillance, where foreign tech corporations are supplying sophisticated spyware, facial recognition, and AI tools. This technology is being deployed by increasingly authoritarian regimes across the continent, often with minimal oversight from weak domestic regulatory bodies or civil society. The resulting 'technological panopticon' empowers these governments to repress populations and collect personal data, frequently flouting existing privacy protections. This trend not only strengthens repressive state power but also funnels significant profits to foreign companies, posing a major challenge to human rights and democratic development across the region.

    Read at Foreign Affairs

  513. 513.
    2026-02-17 | society | 2026-W08 | Topics: China, Indo-Pacific

    This account examines the atrocities of the Khmer Rouge, arguing that the horrific violence was driven by individual choices and culpability, rather than merely systemic orders. Using personal narratives, the work details the suffering of victims and confronts perpetrators, such as Comrade Duch, who are shown to have actively chosen their path into becoming agents of violence. The central finding is that accountability must be focused on individual responsibility, emphasizing that perpetrators retained agency and choice even within a brutal regime. For policy, this underscores the critical importance of transitional justice mechanisms and individual criminal prosecution when addressing historical mass atrocities.

    Read at Foreign Affairs

  514. 514.
    2026-02-17 | china_indopacific | 2026-W08 | Topics: China, Russia, United States

    The article critiques the widely accepted narrative that the world has transitioned into a 'multipolar' era, arguing that this consensus is often treated as a self-evident fact rather than a proposition requiring scrutiny. It notes that major global powers, including the US, China, and Russia, are all adopting this language to signal the end of American unipolar dominance. For policy strategists, the implication is that the concept of multipolarity should be approached with skepticism, as the true global power structure may be far more complex or less fragmented than the prevailing narrative suggests.

    Read at Foreign Affairs

  515. 515.
    2026-02-17 | diplomacy | 2026-W08 | Topics: China, Europe, Indo-Pacific, Russia, United States

    The analysis challenges the notion that BRICS+ operates as a unified geopolitical counterweight to Western powers. Instead, the grouping functions as a highly fragmented forum where member states pursue diverse and often conflicting national interests. Evidence demonstrates this divergence: Russia and China leverage the platform for de-dollarization, while India uses it to press Beijing over border disputes, and nations like Indonesia hedge by engaging with multiple global bodies. Policymakers should therefore view the bloc not as a monolithic force, but as a complex, decentralized collection of rising powers whose collective action is limited by internal divisions and competing agendas.

    Read at Foreign Affairs

  516. 516.
    2026-02-17 | china_indopacific | 2026-W08 | Topics: China, United States

    The article argues that China has shifted away from a period of 'partial reform equilibrium' toward a new form of neo-totalitarianism. This shift was catalyzed by Xi Jinping, who responded to economic slowdown and legitimacy challenges by reactivating foundational totalitarian institutions, such as state dominance, information control, and systematic repression. This internal pivot is coupled with a bolder foreign policy aimed at exploiting perceived U.S. weakness, signaling a return to a Cold War dynamic. Policy analysts should anticipate that this trajectory will delay the emergence of a politically liberal China for at least another generation, necessitating strategic adjustments to engagement models.

    Read at Foreign Affairs

  517. 517.
    2026-02-17 | china_indopacific | 2026-W08 | Topics: China, Europe, Indo-Pacific, Middle East, Russia, United States

    The article posits that the international system is at a crossroads, facing a choice between a multipolar world of competing spheres of influence (Yalta logic) or an open, cooperative multilateral order (Helsinki logic). This contest is defined by three major coalitions: the 'Global West' (US, Europe, Japan), the 'Global East' (China, Russia), and the pivotal 'Global South.' The Global South is identified as the decisive factor in determining the future global order. Policymakers are advised that the West must adopt a strategy of 'pragmatic realism,' engaging with both the East and the South to rebuild a rules-based global system centered on the UN.

    Read at Foreign Affairs

  518. 518.
    2026-02-17 | china_indopacific | 2026-W08 | Topics: China, Indo-Pacific, United States

    The article critiques the long-standing U.S. strategic commitment, known as the 'pivot to Asia,' arguing that the initial premise—that rebalancing resources was the sole way to prevent Chinese dominance—has failed. It traces the bipartisan assumption since 2011 that the U.S. must focus on the Asia-Pacific to counter Beijing's rise. The piece implies that the current strategic framework is insufficient, suggesting that the U.S. must fundamentally reassess its approach to the region. Policy implications suggest a need to move beyond the original 'pivot' narrative to craft a more adaptable and effective long-term strategy.

    Read at Foreign Affairs

  519. 519.
    2026-02-17 | china_indopacific | 2026-W08 | Topics: China, Indo-Pacific, Trade, United States

    The green energy transition, while necessary for global climate goals, relies heavily on critical minerals like cobalt and lithium extracted from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). The article argues that this global shift, driven by technological demand, disproportionately burdens the Congolese people, who bear the human and environmental costs of resource extraction. Geopolitically, the race for these materials creates a complex, often exploitative, supply chain involving global powers, manufacturers, and local miners. Policymakers must address the inherent inequity of the transition, ensuring that the benefits and costs of developing clean energy are shared justly and ethically.

    Read at Foreign Affairs

  520. 520.
    2026-02-17 | china_indopacific | 2026-W08 | Topics: China, Indo-Pacific, Trade

    The book argues that major Asian rivers are not merely geographical features but powerful geopolitical agents that have historically driven imperial competition and shaped regional cultures. While these waterways once represented shared resources, modern nation-states, particularly China and India, are increasingly transforming them into instruments of state power. This control is evidenced by the damming of flows and the restriction of navigation, effectively turning once-shared waterways into national borders. Policymakers must recognize this shift, as the weaponization of water resources and the militarization of river basins represent a growing source of regional instability and strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific.

    Read at Foreign Affairs

  521. 521.
    2026-02-17 | china_indopacific | 2026-W08 | Topics: China, Nuclear, United States

    The analysis argues that U.S.-Chinese strategic competition is unlikely to escalate into military conflict due to nuclear deterrence and deep economic interdependence. Instead, the rivalry is channeled through multilateral institutions, which forces constructive reforms and generates positive regional dividends. Key evidence includes China's establishment of the AIIB, which spurred reform in other development banks, and the subsequent strengthening of organizations like ASEAN and the UN. Policymakers should view this great-power competition not merely as a source of friction, but as a powerful, albeit challenging, mechanism driving institutional balancing and positive order transition across the Asia Pacific.

    Read at Foreign Affairs

  522. 522.
    2026-02-17 | diplomacy | 2026-W08 | Topics: China, United States

    The compiled Kissinger tapes offer unprecedented, minute-by-minute insight into U.S. foreign policy decision-making during a pivotal era (1969-1977). While the transcripts confirm Kissinger's strategic brilliance during major crises, they also reveal his highly manipulative and often 'brutal' methods of achieving policy goals. This material provides invaluable historical context, detailing the internal dynamics and high-stakes decision-making processes of American diplomacy. Policymakers can use these accounts to better understand the evolution of U.S. statecraft and the personal costs associated with global power.

    Read at Foreign Affairs

  523. 523.
    2026-02-17 | economy | 2026-W08 | Topics: China, United States

    The Brady Plan successfully resolved the 1980s Latin American debt crisis by facilitating the exchange of troubled bank loans for newly issued bonds, thereby clearing defaulted debt and restoring access to global finance. This success was driven by a combination of U.S. political pressure and multilateral incentives that jump-started emerging market debt trading. However, the authors caution that this model is no longer viable for today's low-income debt crises. The primary challenges are the highly diverse nature of modern creditors and the fact that the United States has ceded its role as the world's top lender to China.

    Read at Foreign Affairs

  524. 524.

    The conflict in Ukraine demonstrates that modern great-power warfare is characterized by sustained, highly destructive conventional conflict and a fragile, elevated risk of nuclear escalation, rather than quick, decisive outcomes. While Russia's nuclear threats are significant, Ukraine's resilience and ability to strike deep into Russian territory show that nuclear weapons do not guarantee coercive leverage. Consequently, the U.S. must update its defense planning to prepare for protracted wars of attrition with nuclear-armed adversaries, focusing on strengthening deterrence, coordinating with allies, and maintaining readiness for extended, high-stakes conflicts.

    Read at Foreign Affairs

  525. 525.

    This RAND report argues that current U.S. export controls for AI and uncrewed aircraft systems (UAS) are lagging behind rapid technological advancements and require a more agile, data-centric interagency approach. The study finds that the U.S. no longer maintains a technological monopoly, meaning overly restrictive controls risk hollowing out the domestic industrial base and driving global partners toward Chinese alternatives. Consequently, the authors recommend shifting regulatory focus toward specialized military training data rather than ubiquitous hardware, while calling for increased funding and technical expertise for the Bureau of Industry and Security.

    Read at RAND

  526. 526.
    2026-02-17 | china_indopacific | 2026-W08 | Topics: China

    The analysis argues that despite significant economic headwinds, including the real estate sector's implosion and high local government debt, China's political system remains robust and stable. This stability is attributed to Xi Jinping's firm control over all levers of power. Furthermore, the nation continues to demonstrate significant global competitiveness and even dominance in crucial 21st-century technologies, such as electric vehicles and biotechnology. These factors suggest that China's overall power projection remains formidable, challenging previous assumptions of imminent decline.

    Read at Foreign Affairs

  527. 527.
    2026-02-17 | society | 2026-W08 | Topics: China, Indo-Pacific

    The analysis argues that Hindutva, India's Hindu nationalism, constitutes an indigenous fascist ideology, distinct from European models. Key evidence shows that while its goal is forced assimilation into a homogenized Hindu community rather than mass extermination, it utilizes the caste system as a functional tool of hierarchy and purity, paralleling Nazi racial theories. Policymakers must recognize that this ideology is fundamentally reshaping India's social and political landscape by reframing Hinduism from an ethnicity to a religion. This suggests that external strategic engagement must account for the unique, caste-based mechanisms of Indian nationalism, rather than applying standard Western definitions of fascism.

    Read at Foreign Affairs

  528. 528.
    2026-02-10 | defense | 2026-W07 | Topics: AI, China, Cybersecurity, NATO, Nuclear, Trade, United States

    A RAND analysis finds that the U.S. Space Force’s STARCOM headquarters is significantly understaffed, requiring nearly double its current personnel to effectively manage its workload and mission priorities. The study identifies core organizational friction stemming from a lack of unity of effort, structural tensions between lean design and command needs, and resource strain caused by simultaneous start-up and steady-state functions. Researchers recommend implementing a new staffing optimization model (STAR-SOM) and realigning leadership under senior authorities to better synchronize guardian development and combat credibility missions. These findings imply that STARCOM must pursue both a quantitative manpower increase and a qualitative structural reorganization to maintain readiness for near-peer space competition.

    Read at RAND

  529. 529.
    2026-02-09 | defense | 2026-W07 | Topics: China, Europe, NATO, Nuclear, Russia, Ukraine

    This report analyzes the evolving demographics and welfare needs of the Royal Navy and Royal Marines (RN&RM) community, projecting a stable Regular force of approximately 33,000 through 2040 despite a more volatile strategic environment. It finds that increasing operational tempo and unpredictable deployments are placing significant strain on families, evidenced by high levels of partner loneliness and chronic childcare accessibility issues. The study suggests that the Naval welfare sector must modernize its support by adopting holistic, 'whole force' approaches that mitigate mental health stigma and address structural barriers to partner employment to ensure long-term recruitment and retention.

    Read at RAND

  530. 530.
    2026-01-30 | china_indopacific | 2026-W05 | Topics: China, Nuclear, United States, Indo-Pacific

    Xi Jinping has launched a sweeping purge targeting the highest echelons of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) leadership. The investigation of top officers for "violations of party discipline" signals a profound political restructuring, far exceeding routine anti-corruption efforts. This move centralizes ultimate authority within the PLA directly under Xi's personal control, eliminating potential institutional resistance among the military elite. Strategically, this consolidation of power solidifies Xi's grip on the state apparatus and fundamentally reshapes China's internal power dynamics and military command structure.

    Read at Foreign Affairs

  531. 531.
    2026-01-30 | china_indopacific | 2026-W05 | Topics: China, Indo-Pacific, Taiwan

    Japan's declaration that a Chinese assault on Taiwan could constitute an existential threat, potentially warranting a military response, has significantly escalated tensions with Beijing. China responded by implementing immediate countermeasures, including increased military exercises near Japan, halting seafood imports, and banning dual-use goods exports. This escalating confrontation demonstrates that Japan's security posture is directly challenging China's interests, creating a volatile strategic environment. Consequently, the article suggests that Japan cannot manage this complex geopolitical and economic threat independently and must rely heavily on international alliances and partnerships for deterrence and stability.

    Read at Foreign Affairs

  532. 532.
    2026-01-29 | china_indopacific | 2026-W05 | Topics: China, Indo-Pacific, Middle East, Russia, Taiwan, Trade, Ukraine, United States

    Beijing views the current U.S. policy toward China as a moment of strategic flux and opportunity, capitalizing on perceived inconsistency in Washington's approach. China is actively shifting from a reactive to an offensive posture, using economic tools like rare-earth controls and exerting pressure on U.S. allies to strengthen its global standing. Furthermore, the U.S.'s increased focus on the Western Hemisphere and Latin America is interpreted by Beijing as a strategic distraction, allowing China to dedicate greater resources and attention to the Indo-Pacific. Policymakers must recognize that this enduring rivalry persists despite short-term policy shifts, requiring a nuanced strategy that addresses China's proactive regional ambitions.

    Read at Foreign Affairs

  533. 533.

    China's economic statecraft is proving highly effective, primarily by capitalizing on the protectionist and volatile foreign economic policies of the United States. Beijing employs a sophisticated 'carrot and stick' strategy, using advanced export controls against rivals while simultaneously offering attractive development financing and cheap goods to the Global South. This dual approach is successfully embedding many developing nations into Chinese-dominated supply chains, as seen in critical sectors like nickel and EVs. Consequently, China gains significant global leverage, enabling it to advance its domestic and foreign policies with minimal international opposition, posing a growing challenge to Western economic influence.

    Read at Foreign Affairs

  534. 534.
    2026-01-27 | china_indopacific | 2026-W05 | Topics: AI, China, United States, Indo-Pacific

    The article frames the geopolitical landscape as one defined by deep uncertainty regarding Artificial Intelligence. Key debates revolve around whether AI will lead to sudden superintelligence or gradual productivity gains, and whether technological breakthroughs can be easily replicated by rivals. This uncertainty, coupled with the intense focus on the US-China technological race, suggests that the competitive dynamics are highly volatile. Policymakers must therefore prepare for a rapidly evolving and contested technological environment, recognizing that the speed and nature of AI adoption will fundamentally reshape global power structures.

    Read at Foreign Affairs

  535. 535.
    2026-01-23 | china_indopacific | 2026-W04 | Topics: China, Indo-Pacific, Nuclear, Taiwan, United States

    The article highlights the persistent and escalating threat posed by Beijing, citing a 2021 warning that China aims to control Taiwan by 2027. This prediction, known as the 'Davidson Window,' prompted a significant strategic response from the United States. Consequently, Congress authorized $7.1 billion for the Pacific Deterrence Initiative, signaling a major increase in U.S. military commitment to the region. The findings imply that the geopolitical tension surrounding Taiwan requires sustained, high-level defense and strategic investment from key international partners.

    Read at Foreign Affairs

  536. 536.
    2026-01-22 | economy | 2026-W04 | Topics: AI, China, Europe, Indo-Pacific, NATO, Trade, United States, Economy

    The article argues that the aggressive and unilateral use of tariffs is eroding the foundational sources of American economic power and undermining global trust. Key evidence points to the administration's use of tariffs primarily for revenue generation, which has caused allies to feel unprepared and potentially seek alternative economic partnerships. Strategically, this policy weakens the U.S. global standing by increasing the national debt and making foreign investors wary of holding U.S. Treasury securities. Policymakers must therefore re-evaluate the reliance on tariffs as a primary foreign policy tool to restore allied confidence and ensure long-term economic stability.

    Read at Foreign Affairs

  537. 537.
    2026-01-21 | china_indopacific | 2026-W04 | Topics: China, Indo-Pacific, Trade

    The article analyzes South Korea's strategic position, arguing that despite recent high-level diplomatic efforts to improve ties with China, the nation retains significant autonomy. Evidence points to President Lee Jae-myung's intensive efforts, including a state visit to Beijing and the signing of multiple agreements across trade and climate, demonstrating a commitment to economic cooperation. However, the underlying finding suggests that South Korea's diversified economic base and strategic partnerships allow it to manage its relationship with China without sacrificing its own geopolitical interests. Policymakers should recognize this delicate balance, as South Korea's ability to maintain strategic independence while engaging economically with China is a key factor in regional stability.

    Read at Foreign Affairs

  538. 538.
    2026-01-19 | china_indopacific | 2026-W04 | Topics: China, Trade, United States, Indo-Pacific

    The article argues that the U.S. must fundamentally adjust its strategy to counter China's growing strategic influence and prevent being economically or politically manipulated. Historical attempts, such as conditioning China's 'most favored nation' status on human rights benchmarks, proved ineffective because Beijing was able to ignore the conditions and threaten diplomatic retaliation. The analysis implies that relying solely on trade leverage is insufficient, suggesting that a comprehensive, multi-faceted approach is necessary to effectively constrain China's actions. Policymakers must therefore move beyond simple economic conditions to address the root causes of strategic friction.

    Read at Foreign Affairs

  539. 539.
    2026-01-16 | china_indopacific | 2026-W03 | Topics: China, Europe, Indo-Pacific, Russia, United States

    The article argues that the U.S.-India relationship is critically important for future global stability and must be actively maintained. Historically, India maintained a policy of nonalignment and viewed the U.S. with suspicion. However, the geopolitical shift following the Soviet collapse and the rise of China has transformed India into a strategically vital partner. Therefore, the U.S. must deepen its engagement with India to create a robust counterweight to China's growing influence, particularly within the Indo-Pacific region.

    Read at Foreign Affairs

  540. 540.
    2026-01-13 | middle_east | 2026-W03 | Topics: China, Indo-Pacific, Middle East, NATO, Nuclear, Russia, Trade, United States

    The analysis concludes that the Islamic Republic of Iran is a 'zombie regime' whose ideological and economic foundations are failing, making the current status quo unsustainable. The mounting, nationwide protests are fueled by deep political, economic, and social grievances that transcend traditional ethnic or class divides. Crucially, the regime's core anti-Western ideology is losing legitimacy as the population increasingly prioritizes national reclamation and stability over foreign-directed conflict. Policymakers should anticipate that while the regime may use violence to delay its collapse, the underlying grievances will persist, suggesting a profound and complex transition away from the current theocratic structure.

    Read at Foreign Affairs

  541. 541.
    2026-01-12 | china_indopacific | 2026-W03 | Topics: AI, China, Nuclear, United States, Indo-Pacific

    The article argues that the framing of AI development as a zero-sum 'race' is misleading, challenging the premise that global AI dominance will yield a single victor. Key evidence suggests that the world's two leading AI powers, the United States and China, are not converging on the same technological or strategic path. Policymakers should therefore abandon the 'race' mentality and instead focus on understanding the divergent development trajectories of major powers. This shift implies that strategic planning must account for distinct, non-parallel AI advancements rather than anticipating a single global finish line.

    Read at Foreign Affairs

  542. 542.
    2026-01-08 | energy | 2026-W02 | Topics: China, Europe, Middle East, Russia, Trade, Ukraine, United States, Energy

    The removal of Nicolás Maduro has created a precarious power vacuum, forcing the Venezuelan regime into an existential dilemma between outright defiance and pragmatic collaboration with the United States. The analysis suggests the regime's primary focus is survival, making the retention of power—rather than democratic reform—its critical 'redline.' While the U.S. demands center on material gains, particularly control over oil resources, the current trajectory risks establishing a semi-colonial state. Consequently, the U.S. strategy is unlikely to yield a long-term political solution, as the opposition remains excluded from any table of negotiation.

    Read at Foreign Affairs

  543. 543.
    2026-01-07 | china_indopacific | 2026-W02 | Topics: China, Indo-Pacific, Diplomacy

    The article argues that the post-World War II international order is defunct, replaced by a values-neutral, transactional approach to foreign policy. China is identified as the primary driver of this shift, utilizing a state-capitalist model that pursues quid pro quo arrangements to expand markets and economic reach. This strategy allows Beijing to forge diplomatic ties with both democratic and autocratic states, prioritizing economic gain over universal human rights or political alignment. Policymakers must therefore adapt their strategies, recognizing that traditional, values-based diplomacy is giving way to purely transactional, interest-driven relationships.

    Read at Foreign Affairs

  544. 544.
    2026-01-07 | society | 2026-W02 | Topics: China, Society

    Despite decades of progress following major international declarations, the global movement for gender equality is currently experiencing significant strain and regression. Evidence from a UN report highlights that the momentum is faltering, noting that one in four countries is experiencing a noticeable backlash against women's rights. This suggests that established legal and social gains are not self-sustaining against rising political resistance. Therefore, policy strategies must urgently pivot from merely establishing norms to actively countering the political and social forces that undermine gender equality on a global scale.

    Read at Foreign Affairs

  545. 545.
    2026-01-01 | china_indopacific | 2026-W01 | Topics: China, Europe, Indo-Pacific, Middle East, Russia, Taiwan, Trade, Ukraine, United States

    The article argues that characterizing the current US-China relationship solely through Cold War analogies is inaccurate and dangerous, as the global system is fundamentally multipolar and highly integrated economically. Westad notes that unlike the bipolar Cold War era, great powers now compete within a single, interconnected global economic framework. While historical lessons—such as the necessity of dialogue, mutual respect, and strategic deterrence—remain crucial for managing crises, policymakers must acknowledge the unprecedented complexity of this modern, interconnected order. Therefore, strategy must balance great power competition with mechanisms for sustained communication to prevent conflict.

    Read at Foreign Affairs

  546. 546.
    2025-12-31 | china_indopacific | 2026-W01 | Topics: AI, China, Climate, Europe, Indo-Pacific, Middle East, Nuclear, Russia, Taiwan, Trade, Ukraine, United States

    The article argues that the United States and China are uniquely positioned to forge a 'grand bargain' to stabilize the global order, shifting from ideological confrontation to productive coexistence. This opportunity is driven by the recognition that both nations benefit from a multipolar world and are deeply economically interdependent. To prevent a high-risk conflict, the policy strategy must pivot toward pragmatic cooperation, requiring the reform of the international system. Implementing this bargain necessitates establishing reciprocal agreements on trade, technology, and security to ensure peaceful power sharing and mutual benefit.

    Read at Foreign Affairs

  547. 547.
    2025-12-30 | economy | 2026-W01 | Topics: China, United States, Economy

    The article argues that the US must treat its rivalry with China as a comprehensive economic and technological cold war, requiring a dedicated focus on economic strength. The core reasoning is that China's aggressive practices—including subsidized dumping, intellectual property theft, and coercive acquisition of dual-use technologies—pose systemic threats to American markets and supply chains. To counter these threats, the US must implement robust economic security policies designed to safeguard critical assets and rebuild the domestic industrial base. Strategically, this necessitates a shift toward proactive economic warfare to ensure America maintains a decisive global economic advantage.

    Read at Foreign Affairs