The global fertility crisis is fundamentally driven by the structural demands of 'modernity'—the complex, specialized nature of contemporary life—rather than simply by economic development. Key evidence shows that the traditional correlation between wealth and low fertility has reversed, with affluent, educated households now having higher birth rates, indicating that children are increasingly an economic luxury. This demographic shift is projected to accentuate existing economic and social inequalities, creating significant demographic fissures. Policymakers must recognize that this widening gap between the 'affordability' of children and the cost of modern life will stoke internal and international tensions, potentially leading to increased instability and conflict.
How a surge in defence and dual-use technology investment could reconfigure the global AI race
English Summary
The Chatham House analysis argues that deteriorating global security and heightened concerns over technological vulnerability are shifting the AI race away from a simple US-China binary toward a more fragmented and multipolar market. This trend is driven by nations prioritizing tech sovereignty and defense-driven innovation, leading to a surge in dual-use technology investment. Consequently, the global AI industry is becoming more securitized, challenging the ability of the current leaders to maintain unchallenged dominance over the entire value chain or its global rollout. Policymakers must anticipate this fragmentation and prepare for a geopolitical restructuring of AI supply chains.
中文摘要
查塔姆學會的分析指出,全球安全環境惡化和對技術脆弱性的擔憂加劇,正促使人工智慧(AI)的發展競賽從簡單的美中二元對立,轉向一個更為分片化且多極化的市場。這一趨勢的驅動力是各國將技術主權和國防驅動的創新置於首位,從而導致軍民兩用技術投資激增。結果是,全球AI產業正日益「安全化」(securitized),這挑戰了現有領導者在整個價值鏈或全球推廣過程中維持不受質疑的支配地位。政策制定者必須預期這種碎片化,並為AI供應鏈的地緣政治重組做好準備。
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