The analysis concludes that China will hold the upper hand at the upcoming Trump-Xi summit, leveraging its dominance over critical minerals, rare earths, and magnet supply chains. This geopolitical leverage, combined with global instability (such as the Iran conflict), allows Beijing to dictate terms and buy time to consolidate its technological and industrial self-sufficiency. Strategically, the U.S. must avoid granting China a managed equilibrium by maintaining 'maximum pressure' on key sectors like AI and tech, rather than seeking broad agreements that could undermine American leadership.
Taiwan
This topic hub groups ThinkTankWeekly entries tagged Taiwan and links readers back to the original publishers.
-
1.
-
2.
The analysis cautions that the upcoming Trump-Xi summit must not result in short-term strategic concessions for the US, which risks undermining long-term stability. China is rapidly consolidating global power, leveraging US policy shifts and increasing its assertiveness across the Indo-Pacific and in technology. Strategically, the US must prioritize addressing the immediate crisis in Iran, where China holds significant leverage, and must also focus on joint cooperation on AI. Ultimately, the US must resist political impulses and pursue a robust strategy to counter China's growing challenge to global dominance.
-
3.
The U.S.-China trade relationship remains defined by intense competition, characterized by persistent tariffs and tech export controls, despite temporary truces. While the conflict is driven by concerns over trade imbalances and China's adherence to global rules, the two economies remain deeply interdependent, making complete decoupling highly unlikely. Policy efforts are shifting away from achieving a definitive 'win' and toward managing this complex interdependence. Strategically, the U.S. must navigate the tension between protecting critical domestic industries and maintaining necessary global supply chains, suggesting a need for formalized mechanisms to manage future trade agreements.
-
4.
The article argues that China views the Iran conflict as a critical case study demonstrating that military victory is unnecessary for strategic success. Iran's ability to impose costs by choking the Strait of Hormuz and spiking energy markets proved that economic disruption can be a more potent form of warfare than conventional combat. Beijing plans to apply this 'coercion over conquest' model to the Indo-Pacific, suggesting that layered campaigns of maritime quarantine, cyber disruption, and financial pressure are optimal. This strategy aims not for immediate conquest, but for cumulative pressure designed to constrain U.S. decision-making and exhaust its resources across multiple theaters.
-
5.
The article argues that the upcoming Beijing summit will be characterized by an asymmetry: President Trump's short-term political need for visible deals versus Xi Jinping's long-term strategic goal of maintaining stability and resisting compromise. Consequently, the summit is unlikely to resolve deep structural issues like China's overcapacity or the trade imbalance, instead producing only carefully choreographed, limited agreements and a temporary stabilization of the atmosphere. Policymakers should view the apparent symmetry of the meeting as a warning, indicating that underlying geopolitical and macroeconomic tensions remain unresolved, despite the superficial appearance of progress.
-
6.
The Trump-Xi summit achieved a delicate détente, establishing a baseline of 'decent peace' that prioritizes stability and commercial cooperation over major geopolitical breakthroughs. Key evidence includes agreements on energy, trade (e.g., Boeing aircraft, Nvidia chips), and regional issues like the Strait of Hormuz, while China repeatedly emphasized Taiwan as the most critical issue for future stability. Strategically, the relationship is now defined by managed competition, with the pending $14 billion arms package to Taiwan serving as the most consequential test of this new, fragile truce. The outcome of this arms deal, and whether it is used as a bargaining chip, will determine the limits of the current détente.
-
7.The Impact of Tariffs on the AI Data Center Buildout: Balancing Supply Chain Security and AI Infrastructure Leadership (CSIS)
The article argues that the U.S.'s use of broad tariffs, particularly Section 232 on semiconductors, fundamentally threatens the $2.7 trillion AI data center buildout by 2030. While tariffs on foundational metals increase costs, the most significant risk comes from semiconductor levies, which target the largest and least-substitutable portion of the capital expenditure. Implementing a broad semiconductor tariff could inflate the total buildout cost by over 50%, severely undermining U.S. AI infrastructure leadership. Policymakers must resolve the tension between supply chain security and economic ambition by exempting critical semiconductor inputs to maintain the pace and affordability of domestic AI development.
-
8.
The recent summit between Trump and Xi Jinping established a period of 'uneasy stability' rather than yielding specific, detailed commitments. Key discussions covered stabilizing trade (agriculture, aerospace), establishing protocols for AI governance, and managing tensions surrounding Taiwan. This tacit truce allows China to consolidate its technological autonomy and strengthen its economic security controls. For the United States and its allies, the implication is a narrow window to build industrial resilience and mitigate geopolitical risks in the face of continued strategic competition.
-
9.
The CFR briefing concludes that the Trump-Xi summit established a fragile, symbolic détente rather than achieving substantive structural reform. This temporary stability is largely predicated on the mutual acknowledgment of critical vulnerabilities, particularly China's control over rare earth minerals and global supply chains, which previously forced a trade truce. While the talks reduced immediate escalation risk, the underlying structural threats—including technology dependence, market access issues, and geopolitical flashpoints like Taiwan—remain unaddressed. Policymakers must therefore focus on mitigating these persistent vulnerabilities rather than relying on the diplomatic breakthroughs suggested by the summit.
-
10.
The upcoming summit between Xi and Trump is unlikely to result in direct discussions or agreements regarding China's growing nuclear arsenal or US missile defense projects. Instead, the analysis suggests that strategic stability can be advanced by focusing on shared threat assessments in emerging domains, such as artificial intelligence and outer space. Progress can be made by establishing dialogue on AI risks in escalation and reaffirming commitments to keep AI out of nuclear launch decisions. This shift allows the superpowers to build confidence and manage strategic tensions without confronting immediate nuclear limits, thereby providing a pathway for dialogue.
-
11.
The state visit signaled a desire for 'strategic stability' and economic cooperation, evidenced by China's agreement to purchase major U.S. goods. However, the summit highlighted deep geopolitical divergences, particularly regarding Taiwan and the Middle East (Iran). Beijing appears to be using economic engagement to buy time and forestall tariffs, while the U.S. is leveraging the relationship to manage the Iran conflict. Policymakers must anticipate continued strategic competition, as both nations will use upcoming multilateral forums, such as the G20, to manage their conflicting priorities and maintain influence.
-
12.
The Chatham House analysis argues that the upcoming Trump-Xi summit will focus on managing the US-China rivalry through transactional, short-term agreements rather than resolving deep structural competition. Both leaders are primarily constrained by domestic political pressures—Trump's election cycle and Xi's economic stability—leading them to prioritize immediate economic levers like trade purchases and technology access. While the US agenda is narrow and improvisational, China is leveraging its economic statecraft, particularly rare earth controls, to maintain an asymmetric stalemate. For policy makers, the report advises looking past immediate headlines, emphasizing that sustained data and execution on commitments, such as trade fulfillment, are more critical than the summit's stated outcomes.
-
13.
The article argues that Taiwan faces a critical and complex energy security challenge, intensified by global conflicts and its deep reliance on imported fossil fuels. This vulnerability is compounded by the exponential energy demands of its semiconductor industry, which underpins its strategic global value, and the geopolitical threat of resource cutoff from China. To mitigate risks, Taiwan is rapidly diversifying energy sources away from the Middle East and increasing storage capacity. Policy must therefore urgently balance massive industrial energy growth, climate transition goals, and geopolitical instability to ensure sustained national resilience.
-
14.
The paper argues that Nordic-Baltic states are increasing engagement with the Indo-Pacific, driven by shared security concerns heightened by the war in Ukraine. The most significant area of convergence is the shared threat of subsea cable disruptions, which both regions view as a critical hybrid security challenge. While the Nordic-Baltic states are inclined toward a NATO-like defense architecture, the paper notes a structural disconnect with the diverse, often national-level, responses in the Indo-Pacific. Consequently, future collaboration is projected to be domain-specific—focusing on technical issues like critical infrastructure protection—rather than encompassing broad regional military or diplomatic alignment.
-
15.
The Brookings article argues that Donald Trump's ambiguous comments regarding Taiwan—specifically suggesting that U.S. security support is negotiable leverage with China—dangerously undermine decades of established U.S. deterrence policy. By implying that Taiwan must 'cool down' and questioning the necessity of military intervention, Trump signals to Beijing that America's commitment is conditional. This shift from resolute deterrence to dealmaking will not reduce, but rather intensify, Chinese pressure on Taiwan. Therefore, the U.S. must maintain a consistent, unwavering focus on upholding stability in the Taiwan Strait and resist using Taiwan's security status as a bargaining chip with Beijing.
-
16.
The summit did not result in major breakthroughs but rather a return to managed stability in U.S.-China relations. Key outcomes include the establishment of a 'Board of Trade' and a 'Board of Investment,' which experts view as structural continuations of previous dialogues rather than radical new commitments. The discussions focused on managing existing trade flows and extending ceasefires, allowing China to maintain its economic status quo without making significant concessions. Strategically, this suggests that the U.S. must adjust its policy away from demanding fundamental systemic changes and instead focus on managing these stable, yet limited, bilateral agreements.
-
17.
The U.S.-China rivalry is defined by a state of 'mutually assured disruption,' where technological competition (semiconductor controls vs. rare earth embargoes) creates an unstable equilibrium. While the U.S. maintains a lead in AI frontier model development, China holds an advantage in deployment speed and cost, suggesting rough parity. Policy efforts should focus on immediate, proactive dialogue regarding AI safety and non-proliferation, drawing parallels to Cold War treaties. Crucially, any safety negotiations must be conducted while simultaneously tightening technological loopholes to maintain strategic leverage and prevent being outmaneuvered.
-
18.
The article argues that the concept of great power spheres of influence has evolved beyond traditional military boundaries, now manifesting in functional domains like critical technology and digital infrastructure. This shift allows powerful states, such as China, to consolidate an 'open sphere' by leveraging economic and technological influence, particularly if the United States makes unilateral concessions or is strategically distracted. The author warns that the U.S.'s willingness to make policy concessions regarding Taiwan and its diminishing reliability as a security guarantor could hasten China's consolidation of influence in the Indo-Pacific. Strategically, this necessitates that Washington update its understanding of modern spheres to prevent a major geopolitical division that could escalate into conflict.
-
19.
Despite the public appearance of stabilization, the summit failed to resolve fundamental structural disputes between the U.S. and China, suggesting the competition remains deeply entrenched. Key issues, particularly Taiwan, trade imbalances, and geopolitical rivalry, were merely 'kicked down the road' through diplomatic rhetoric of 'strategic stability.' The analysis suggests that China is unlikely to make major concessions, viewing them as signs of weakness, meaning the relationship will continue to be managed through guarded competition rather than genuine cooperation. Policymakers must therefore anticipate persistent friction points and maintain vigilance regarding unresolved flashpoints to navigate the ongoing great power rivalry.
-
20.
This RAND report develops a scenario-planning framework to analyze the complex future mental health landscape of the UK Armed Forces community through 2045. The analysis identifies key stressors, including the evolving character of conflict, geopolitical uncertainty, and broader societal trends like increased mental health awareness and technological disruption. The core finding is that the sector must move beyond reactive care, requiring proactive, collaborative strategic planning across military, NHS, and third-sector organizations. Ultimately, the report stresses the need for adaptable and resilient support systems to meet the unique and growing mental health needs of personnel and veterans.
-
21.
The article argues that China has significantly increased its leverage over the United States, constraining Washington's ability to set its own national security agenda. This shift is evidenced by the U.S. ceding authority over its own national security measures, such as export controls, in exchange for easing trade tensions following the 2025 trade war. Furthermore, China is successfully linking areas of cooperation and difference, forcing the U.S. to prioritize diplomatic optics over substantive policy goals. The implication is that Washington's decision-making is now constrained by Beijing, potentially emboldening China to test American resolve on vital interests like Taiwan and advanced technology.
-
22.
The article argues that the U.S.-China relationship is defined by a long-term, multifaceted strategic competition, which China views through a historical lens of achieving self-sufficiency and resisting foreign leverage. Beijing's approach is characterized by deep strategic planning, leading it to resist fundamental structural economic changes despite seeking temporary, mutually advantageous agreements. For policy, the analysis warns that the greatest risk lies not in disagreement, but in the misunderstanding or ambiguous interpretation of agreements following high-level summits. Therefore, managing the relationship requires both powers to clearly articulate their core, long-term objectives to prevent temporary stabilization from obscuring deep strategic divergence.
-
23.
While US instability creates a theoretical geostrategic vacuum for China, the article argues that Beijing's ability to capitalize on this opportunity is limited. Global powers are increasingly adopting a 'hedging' strategy, seeking to reduce vulnerability to both US and Chinese influence, suggesting the competition is not zero-sum. China faces specific hurdles, including deep skepticism in Europe (due to Russia ties and trade issues) and poor returns on its soft power investments. Consequently, the global balance of power is shifting, but the primary implication is that both the US and China risk losing global influence as nations prioritize strategic balancing over alignment.
-
24.
The analysis addresses the high stakes of US-China competition, particularly in the context of potential high-level meetings between leaders like Trump and Xi Jinping. It argues that the current political uncertainty within the US complicates traditional bipartisan foreign policy approaches, requiring policymakers to navigate a complex landscape. Key flashpoints discussed include trade, technology, Taiwan, and Ukraine, underscoring the breadth of the strategic rivalry. Consequently, the brief implies that US strategy must adapt to manage this intense competition while mitigating the risks posed by domestic political volatility.
-
25.
Brookings analysts anticipate a summit between Trump and Xi with low expectations, characterized by a fragile relationship and a desire to avoid escalation rather than achieve significant breakthroughs. While both leaders seek to maintain a trade truce and avoid conflict, risks remain, particularly concerning tariff restorations and potential shifts in U.S. policy on Taiwan. The meeting's significance lies in its role as a crucial communication channel to prevent miscalculation, and there's a potential for discussions on AI safety and cooperation, though deeper issues like talent competition and fentanyl remain unresolved.
-
26.
The conflict in Iran presents a mixed strategic picture for Beijing, offering diplomatic opportunities by allowing China to position itself as a neutral mediator and distracting the U.S. from the Indo-Pacific. However, these gains are offset by significant economic instability, energy market volatility, and the exposure of China's limited operational reach in the region. Strategically, Beijing's primary concern remains maintaining stability with the U.S. to ensure its continued rise, leading it to prioritize de-escalation over deep regional involvement. Ultimately, China must navigate the tension between asserting regional influence and mitigating the severe economic risks posed by disrupted global supply chains.
-
27.
The anticipated Trump-Xi summit is expected to center on extending the existing trade truce, with the U.S. seeking large-scale Chinese purchases of goods and China aiming to preserve access to U.S. technology. Beyond trade, Beijing will subtly press for rhetorical concessions on Taiwan and the adoption of a 'mutual respect' framework, signaling an implicit acceptance of China's core interests. The outcome is highly significant, as it will define the U.S.-China relationship trajectory, determining whether the relationship settles into stable, managed cooperation or escalates into deeper strategic tension across global issues like AI and the Middle East.
-
28.
According to a CSIS press briefing, the upcoming Trump-Xi summit, delayed by six weeks, aims to address five U.S. priorities ("the five Bs") and three Chinese priorities ("the three Ts") including Taiwan, tariffs, and technology. China enters the meeting in a stronger position due to recent U.S. actions and a perceived improvement in its relative power, and is likely to pressure the U.S. regarding Taiwan, potentially seeking changes to U.S. policy on arms sales and transit for Taiwanese leaders. The briefing suggests China is well-prepared and confident, while the U.S. lacks a unified approach and is not adequately investing in its long-term economic foundations.
-
29.
This Foreign Affairs article argues that the recent flurry of diplomatic visits by Western leaders to China is largely driven by a strategic hedging response to former President Trump’s increasingly adversarial relationship with the United States and its allies. Faced with what they perceive as a predatory U.S. foreign policy, countries like Canada, France, and others are seeking to maintain channels of communication with China to avoid being fully aligned with Washington. However, this approach risks legitimizing China’s authoritarianism and reinforcing Beijing’s narrative of a rising global power. The article calls for greater coordination among Western allies, setting clear redlines, and a more assertive approach from the U.S. to deter coercive behavior and safeguard shared interests, particularly regarding technological advantage and supply chain diversification.
-
30.
This Brookings report, based on a discussion with Senators Shaheen and Tillis, argues that the United States needs to proactively strengthen its domestic capabilities and refine its statecraft to maintain a strategic advantage over China. The core reasoning centers on the perceived risk of the U.S. falling behind China in critical areas like technology and military power, necessitating a renewed focus on bolstering U.S. foundations and strategic tools. Policy recommendations will likely prioritize investments in domestic innovation and a more assertive approach to international relations. Consequently, the U.S. should pursue a multi-faceted strategy encompassing both strengthening its internal power and actively shaping the geopolitical landscape.
-
31.
This CSIS analysis argues that effective policy implementation hinges on competent management, and neglecting this can undermine even well-intentioned policies. The article highlights recent mismanagement at the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS), leading to backlogs, strained industry relations, and isolation from international partners, ultimately hindering export control efforts. The author emphasizes the importance of leveraging career expertise, fostering communication with industry, and maintaining multilateral cooperation for successful policy outcomes.
-
32.How to Forecast China’s Lithography Leap: A Comparative Analysis of the Delphi Method and Crowdsourced Forecasting (RAND)
A RAND report compared the Delphi method (expert workshop) and crowdsourced forecasting to predict China's ability to produce advanced lithography equipment by 2026 and 2030. While both groups identified similar influencing factors, the Delphi group was slightly more accurate, emphasizing the short timeframe for China's technological leap. The study highlights the flexibility of both forecasting methods and recommends ongoing data collection and forecaster training for future research, informing policy decisions regarding U.S. export controls and China's semiconductor ambitions.
-
33.China's Science and Technology Strategy in Perspective: Historical Evolution, Political Drivers, and Global Implications (RAND)
This RAND report analyzes China's evolving science and technology (S&T) strategy, highlighting a shift towards centralized, CCP-led innovation emphasizing technological self-reliance and integration with national security goals. Key findings include the strategic importance of S&T for China's power projection, the rise of military-civil fusion, and a move away from reliance on foreign technology. The report underscores the need for policymakers to understand China's approach to S&T, balancing collaboration with safeguards for research integrity and national security.
-
34.
The recent Balikatan exercise in the Philippines showcased a new U.S. Army concept called 'Littoral Deep Battle,' designed to counter potential amphibious landings, particularly in the context of a Taiwan contingency. The exercise involved combined forces from the U.S., Philippines, Japan, and Canada, utilizing drone swarms, HIMARS rocket systems, and layered defenses to simulate repelling an invasion. This approach integrates lessons from Ukraine, emphasizes unmanned systems, and demonstrates a shift towards a more distributed and lethal coastal defense posture, with implications for regional security and alliance interoperability.
-
35.
The article critiques the administration's 'trade over aid' initiative, arguing it is a flawed and hypocritical attempt to justify massive cuts in foreign aid. While the free-market approach is advocated, the analysis notes that successful development models, particularly in Asia, require strategic government intervention, subsidies, and protection, rather than pure laissez-faire principles. Furthermore, the push for 'mutually beneficial' trade is undermined by the administration's own 'America First' policies, which are not genuinely reciprocal. For effective global development, policy must therefore balance market principles with strategic state guidance and ensure that trade assistance involves genuine, reciprocal purchasing commitments from developed nations.
-
36.
Michael Mandelbaum argues that U.S. foreign policy is uniquely defined by three pillars: an unusually ideological focus, a distinctive use of economic statecraft, and the strong role of democratic public opinion. Unlike most nations that prioritize power (realism), the U.S. frequently attempts to promote its political ideas and uses economic tools for political ends. This ideological commitment, which Mandelbaum calls the 'foreign policy of ideas,' suggests that American strategy will continue to blend traditional power interests with a strong emphasis on promoting democracy and human rights globally. This framework implies that the U.S. will often intervene to protect values, even when such actions do not yield immediate economic or security benefits.
-
37.
The analysis concludes that despite ongoing high-level purges, China's People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is undergoing a massive, deliberate, and highly successful modernization effort, making it a formidable military force. Key evidence points to the PLA's exponential growth in budget and capabilities—including missile, cyber, and maritime assets—and the purges themselves are viewed as Xi Jinping's serious effort to ensure the military's absolute loyalty to the Party and to him. Strategically, this indicates that China is building a force capable of presenting challenges to the U.S. military that have not been seen since World War II, necessitating a serious reassessment of US Indo-Pacific military policy.
-
38.
Emanuel argues that America's internal political divisions and systemic failures are its greatest strategic vulnerability, potentially overshadowing geopolitical challenges like China. Regarding the Middle East, he labels the current conflict with Iran a 'war of choice' and outlines a multi-phase strategy to stabilize the region. This plan involves immediately ensuring the free passage through the Strait of Hormuz, followed by establishing UN oversight and redefining the Abraham Accords. Ultimately, the U.S. must leverage these accords as a financing and infrastructure vehicle to bypass the Strait, thereby undermining Iran's regional leverage and securing long-term economic stability.
-
39.
The Chatham House analysis argues that using advanced AI chip export controls as a primary geopolitical bargaining chip is an outdated and ineffective strategy. The core flaw is the assumption that chips remain the sole technological 'chokepoint,' as AI progress is increasingly driven by algorithmic efficiency, model optimization, and software improvements, rather than raw computing power. Furthermore, controls are easily circumvented through widespread smuggling and the use of grey markets. Policymakers must therefore shift away from a hardware-centric approach, adopting a stable and comprehensive strategy that focuses on algorithmic and software leadership to maintain strategic advantage.
-
40.
U.S. special forces conducted a maritime strike exercise in the Luzon Strait, deploying advanced, explosive-laden unmanned surface vessels (USVs) and other drone systems. This deployment, utilizing technology similar to those seen in the Black Sea, demonstrates the integration of low-range, mass-strike capabilities into U.S.-Philippine joint operations. Strategically, this signals the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command's preparation for a "hellscape" concept—relying on overwhelming drone saturation to counter potential Chinese naval forces. This escalation increases military readiness and regional tension in the critical Taiwan flashpoint.
-
41.
The article argues that the rapidly expanding nuclear capabilities of China, coupled with its refusal to engage in arms control talks, are replacing the bipolar nuclear order with a destabilizing tripolar dynamic. Beijing views a strong deterrent as stabilizing, while the U.S. responds by strengthening its own forces and avoiding treaties that exclude China. This escalating arms race, further complicated by Russia's involvement, is creating an anarchic international security environment. To de-escalate, both powers must move beyond rhetoric and increase concrete transparency, particularly regarding short-range nuclear capabilities, to defuse acute regional risks.
-
42.
The significant decline in American fentanyl overdose deaths is primarily attributed to a supply shock, rather than increased demand-side interventions like treatment or naloxone availability. Key evidence shows that falling seizure rates and purity levels of fentanyl in both the U.S. and Canada correlate directly with the drop in fatalities. This suggests that the critical constraint is the precursor chemical supply, pointing to increased regulatory control by Chinese authorities. Policymakers must therefore shift focus to the global chemical supply chain, making fentanyl control a critical, enduring feature of US-China diplomatic and counternarcotics negotiations.
-
43.
The primary threat to Taiwan is not a traditional military invasion, but rather a sophisticated 'gray zone' coercion utilizing economic and logistical control, such as establishing a quarantine over maritime and air links. China is leveraging this control to restrict key exports, particularly advanced semiconductor components, thereby forcing regional compliance without triggering a full-scale conflict. Consequently, the U.S. must shift its strategic focus from preparing for military war games to developing integrated economic and diplomatic plans with allies. Deterring a severe financial and political crisis requires pre-coordinated responses to cushion market shocks and manage potential partial decoupling from China.
-
44.Chatham House Debate: Is China the primary threat to global stability in the next decade? (Chatham House)
The Chatham House debate reveals that while China's rapid military modernization, technological ambitions, and efforts to reshape global norms pose a fundamental challenge to the international order, labeling it the sole primary threat is an oversimplification. Experts debated whether the challenge is purely geopolitical or if it is complicated by China's deep integration into the global economy and its role in addressing transnational issues like climate change. The consensus is that the challenge is multifaceted, stemming from complex great power competition rather than an inevitable path to conflict. Policymakers must therefore adopt a nuanced strategy that addresses multiple, interconnected risks shaping a fragmented international system.
-
45.
The expiration of the U.S.-Iran truce is marked by significant diplomatic uncertainty, despite preparations for potential talks in Pakistan. Key evidence suggests that negotiations are complicated by internal divisions within Iran's leadership and the volatile actions of regional powers, including Israel and the U.S. The core finding is that while the logic for peace exists, the lack of unified, compromising leadership across the region makes achieving a stable diplomatic resolution highly improbable. Consequently, the geopolitical environment remains fragile, increasing the risk of continued tension or conflict.
-
46.
Taiwan's progress in building defense resilience and leveraging its status as a tech superpower is being undermined by deep political polarization. While the island has enhanced its military readiness and economic ties with the U.S., the inability to pass a special defense budget due to internal political disputes creates a critical vulnerability. This impasse allows China to exert pressure, making it difficult for Taiwan to maintain deterrence and invest in necessary defense capabilities. Strategically, Taiwan must prioritize internal political consensus to fund its defense and resilience efforts, thereby eliminating coercion as a viable option for Beijing and forcing dialogue.
-
47.A Taiwan crisis would cause far more global economic damage than Strait of Hormuz disruption (Chatham House)
The Chatham House analysis argues that a crisis over Taiwan poses a far greater global economic threat than a disruption in the Strait of Hormuz. This risk stems from Taiwan's pivotal role as the world's leading producer of advanced semiconductors, which are critical, non-substitutable components for modern AI and electronics. A blockade or conflict could trigger a catastrophic global GDP decline, necessitating urgent policy action. To mitigate this, Europe must accelerate the diversification of semiconductor supply chains, deepen intelligence and technical cooperation with Taiwan, and actively communicate the severe global costs of escalation to Beijing.
-
48.
The Spanish-American War was less about Cuba and more about the United States' transition from a regional power to a global one. This shift was driven by a confluence of factors: rapid industrialization creating economic ambition, a desire to project power beyond the Western Hemisphere, and heightened nationalistic fervor, often amplified by the sensationalism of the 'yellow press.' The conflict demonstrated the U.S.'s capacity for military intervention and established its role as a major world power. Strategically, this event marked the permanent expansion of U.S. foreign policy interests, moving beyond the confines of the Monroe Doctrine and setting the stage for global engagement.
-
49.U.S. Army Stages Equipment at American-owned Subic Bay Facility for Balikatan, Alliance Contingencies (USNI)
The U.S. Army is significantly expanding its logistical and staging footprint at Subic Bay, Philippines, utilizing a private, American-owned facility for joint exercises and alliance contingencies. This increased presence involves staging sensitive military assets and requiring armed security support for complex logistics operations (LOGCAP). Strategically, this development solidifies the U.S. military commitment to the Philippines, enhancing its ability to project power and counter perceived Chinese coercion in the South China Sea and the broader Indo-Pacific theater.
-
50.
Indo-Pacific Commander Adm. Samuel Paparo argues that the recent conflict with Iran, despite diverting assets, provides valuable lessons that will strengthen U.S. deterrence in the Indo-Pacific. The conflict demonstrated the power of asymmetric warfare and low-cost munitions, a capability that adversaries like China are studying for potential use against Taiwan. To maintain regional stability and 'overmatch' China's expected military expansion, the U.S. must urgently increase defense spending, modernize its fleet, and encourage the rapid innovation and production of advanced, non-traditional weapons systems.
-
51.
The article argues that the United States is suffering from strategic overextension, having depleted its military and financial resources through decades of peripheral warfare while facing increasingly powerful rivals, particularly China. This overextension, coupled with massive national debt, makes the U.S. incapable of fighting multiple major powers simultaneously. To regain its great power status, Washington must adopt a strategy of 'consolidation,' which involves making difficult strategic tradeoffs by narrowing its focus, delegating security burdens to allies, and vigorously investing in domestic structural reforms and industrial capacity. Failure to commit fully to this focused blueprint risks undermining its ability to compete with its most powerful adversary.
-
52.
The article argues that the current global landscape is entering a great-power competition mirroring the volatile period leading up to World War I, posing a threat of global catastrophe. Key evidence includes rising nationalism, deep mutual suspicion between major powers (US, China, Russia), and unresolved flashpoints across the Indo-Pacific and beyond. Policymakers must adopt sophisticated, historically informed strategies to navigate this tension, recognizing the 'paradox of preparation'—where fear itself can trigger conflict—to prevent a systemic breakdown of international order.
-
53.
The ongoing conflict in Iran is viewed as a global indicator of the receding influence and diminishing strategic capacity of the United States. While the war causes immediate material shocks, such as global energy crises and inflation, its deeper significance is the acceleration of a multipolar shift away from US hegemony. The resulting power vacuum is being filled by alternative global players, including China, Gulf states, and Japan, which are providing critical infrastructure investment and trade to the Global South. Consequently, regional powers are increasingly diversifying their partnerships, making the future of key regions, such as Latin America, less dependent on, and less controllable by, the United States.
-
54.
The article argues that the U.S.-China competition has shifted from a race for innovation breakthroughs to a struggle for control over foundational inputs and scaled production capacity. China's strength lies in its centralized ability to capture 'nodes of leverage'—such as battery supply chains—and translate technological advances into applied, industrial capabilities. To counter this, the U.S. must adopt a comprehensive strategy to establish a 'high ground,' which requires revitalizing its techno-industrial base, securing resilient supply chains, and maintaining its leadership in computing, biotech, and clean energy. Ultimately, U.S. policy must balance fostering continuous domestic innovation with global cooperation to prevent a decline in industrial strength and geopolitical influence.
-
55.
Under mounting U.S. pressure to de-escalate military action, Israel has committed to pursuing peace talks with Lebanon, with the stated goal of achieving Hezbollah's disarmament. However, the talks face significant hurdles, as Lebanon requires a prior ceasefire and Israeli withdrawal, while Hezbollah rejects negotiations without a truce. The U.S. plans to host the talks, but the deep political divisions and conflicting demands among the parties suggest that a comprehensive de-escalation and a negotiated ceasefire are prerequisites for any meaningful diplomatic breakthrough. Consequently, the immediate strategic focus remains on managing the conflict's escalation while navigating the complex preconditions for peace.
-
56.
China's high-tech drive has resulted in undeniable, though uneven, progress, significantly boosting its global innovation capacity and international influence. Key evidence includes China's rising Global Innovation Index ranking, surpassing the U.S. in R&D spending, and becoming a core leader in setting global mobile broadband standards. However, the analysis notes persistent weaknesses in institutional quality, advanced semiconductors, and complex manufacturing sectors like commercial aircraft. Strategically, the report advises that the U.S. should abandon a policy of consistent decoupling in favor of "calibrated coupling," while simultaneously strengthening coordination with like-minded global partners to maximize national security and economic benefits.
-
57.
Global AI governance is rapidly maturing, with major economies establishing comprehensive national standards for AI deployment across critical sectors. China is spearheading this effort by releasing detailed standards for humanoid robots and integrating AI across its entire economic plan, while regional players like Singapore and Vietnam are updating guidelines for use in healthcare and education. Strategically, the focus is shifting to energy infrastructure, with India and Australia mandating energy storage and setting strict standards for data centers. These developments signal that technological advancement is no longer sector-specific but is inextricably linked to mandatory grid modernization and sustainable power sources.
-
58.What lessons will China, India and other Asian nations draw from the Iran war? Independent Thinking Podcast (Chatham House)
The Iran conflict highlights the acute vulnerability of Asian economies due to their heavy reliance on Gulf energy imports. The immediate threat of the Strait of Hormuz closure demonstrates how quickly global choke points can trigger widespread shortages and rationing. Strategically, this forces Asian nations to undertake deep reckonings regarding their supply chains, economic dependencies, and the reliability of the US as a stable ally. Ultimately, the crisis compels Beijing, India, and Southeast Asia to reassess regional energy integration and geopolitical risk.
-
59.
The CFR article highlights a concerning trend: U.S. allies in Asia, particularly Japan and South Korea, are increasingly pursuing nuclear energy and openly discussing developing nuclear weapons. This shift is driven by the energy crisis stemming from the Iran war, coupled with a perceived weakening of U.S. commitment to regional security under the Trump administration. Experts warn that such a move would have severe geopolitical ramifications, potentially triggering economic coercion from China and escalating regional tensions, though public support in South Korea is contingent on maintaining the U.S. alliance.
-
60.
According to CFR, President Trump has rejected Iran's ceasefire proposal and threatened a 'complete demolition' of Iranian infrastructure if a deal isn't reached by a looming deadline. This escalation follows Iran's counterproposal, which includes lifting sanctions and infrastructure reconstruction, and has been accompanied by reciprocal attacks between Iran, Israel, and Saudi Arabia. U.S. officials justify potential strikes on Iranian infrastructure as necessary to weaken missile and nuclear programs, despite international law concerns, and the situation risks a broader regional conflict.
-
61.
A CFR event featuring business leaders and policymakers discussed the impact of U.S.-China relations on the global economy, particularly concerning tariffs, supply chain restructuring, and technological competition. Key findings include the significant impact of tariffs on U.S. manufacturing, China's growing biotech capabilities challenging U.S. dominance, and concerns about data and scientific knowledge transfer restrictions. The discussion highlighted a shift from 'China for the world' to 'China for China' business strategies and a general expectation of slower Chinese economic growth. Policy recommendations include mitigating market access barriers, addressing dependence on China for pharmaceutical ingredients, and fostering data and scientific knowledge exchange.
-
62.
William J. Burns argues that the United States stands at a rare and consequential geopolitical inflection point, characterized by major power competition (China, Russia) and rapid technological change. He warns that the current shift toward hard-power nationalism and the erosion of established alliances and institutions is a form of "slow motion major power suicide." To maintain its global standing, the US must reject this trend and re-embrace a strategy of "enlightened self-interest." This requires blending military strength with soft power, prioritizing the rebuilding of trust among allies, and strengthening institutional cooperation to effectively play its strong hand.
-
63.
President Trump has extended his pause on threatening Iran's energy infrastructure until April 6, signaling an attempt at diplomacy amidst the ongoing conflict between Israel and Iran. This delay has significant global economic implications, with projections of increased inflation and discussions about potentially diverting aid from Ukraine to the Middle East. Concurrently, international efforts are focused on securing shipping in the Strait of Hormuz and maintaining support for Ukraine, highlighted by a new security cooperation agreement between Saudi Arabia and Ukraine.
-
64.
U.S. allies in Europe and Japan are largely declining to actively join the Iran war, signaling a shift towards strategic independence and pragmatism in their foreign policies despite U.S. pressure. European leaders cite past U.S. actions and domestic political factors for their reluctance, while Japan emphasizes constitutional constraints on military involvement, though both provide some U.S. operational support. The conflict and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz pose severe economic threats to both regions, impacting energy security and global stability. This growing divergence in interests, coupled with waning U.S. soft power, prompts allies to hedge through diversified relationships, raising questions about the long-term cohesion of U.S. alliances.
-
65.
David J. Scheffer's career demonstrates how individual commitment transformed international norms around accountability for atrocity crimes, from accepting impunity in 1993 to making justice a permanent policy fixture. Working under Madeleine Albright at the UN, Scheffer pioneered the creation of five major war crimes tribunals (Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Cambodia, and the ICC) that shifted accountability from a marginalized concept to a core international law principle. His on-the-ground experiences witnessing mass atrocities' immediate aftermath—including traumatized victims in Sierra Leone and Rwanda—deeply motivated his persistent efforts despite significant government resistance and UN Security Council reluctance to fund repeated institutions. The article illustrates how post-Cold War cooperation enabled the development of international justice mechanisms that now permanently factor into policy deliberations, though enforcement challenges remain against powerful actors like Russia. Scheffer's legacy underscores both the transformational potential of institutional innovation in international law and the ongoing struggle to translate accountability norms into actual justice.
-
66.
The conflict in the Middle East has intensified with targeted attacks on natural gas facilities in Iran and Qatar, causing significant disruption and threatening global energy markets. Israel initiated strikes on Iran's South Pars gas field, leading to Iranian retaliation against a Qatari LNG facility and drone attacks on Kuwaiti and Saudi energy infrastructure, which sent oil prices fluctuating. The escalation has prompted the U.S. to attempt stabilization of oil markets and Gulf nations to issue stern warnings, suggesting prolonged geopolitical and economic implications.
-
67.
CFR President Michael Froman argues that the US failure to build robust allied support for securing the Strait of Hormuz reflects a deeper erosion in coalition-building capacity stemming from inadequate consultation and allied perceptions that military action serves primarily US interests. Despite the Strait's critical importance—handling 40% of China's crude oil and significant European energy flows—responses from major allies ranged from outright refusal to lukewarm commitments, while China strategically abstained despite substantial vulnerability to supply disruption. The episode suggests Trump administration policies on tariffs and territorial claims have depleted the diplomatic capital necessary for allies to support US-led military operations, with significant implications for future security commitments requiring broad international participation.
-
68.Artificial General Intelligence Forecasting and Scenario Analysis: State of the Field, Methodological Gaps, and Strategic Implications (RAND)
The report synthesizes diverse AGI forecasting methodologies and finds that multiple independent approaches—expert surveys, prediction markets, and compute-centric models—show convergent evidence toward earlier AGI timelines, with many clustering in the 2030s, driven by rapid scaling of compute resources and capital investment. However, forecasting infrastructure remains immature with significant limitations: benchmarks saturate quickly, influential models lack independent validation, and reasonable experts fundamentally disagree about whether scaling existing architectures will suffice, how rapidly capabilities will diffuse economically, and whether AI-driven research acceleration will compress timelines. The report identifies three core empirical cruxes—capability sufficiency, diffusion speed, and takeoff dynamics—that generate distinct expert positions, with disagreement persisting despite shared information. Rather than betting on specific timelines, decisionmakers should pursue scenario-robust strategies emphasizing technical expertise, evaluation infrastructure, and monitoring systems while keying different policy responses to observable triggers across domains. Strengthening forecasting through independent model validation, continuous capability measurement, and real-time monitoring of AI's role in research advancement would better position policymakers to manage uncertainty across the range of plausible futures.
-
69.
This CFR podcast examines how the war in Ukraine is sustained by competing alliance networks: NATO and European allies backing Ukraine, while Russia draws critical support from China (economic and technological), Iran (drones), and North Korea (troops and munitions). The analysis highlights that neither coalition is a traditional bloc alliance—China carefully avoids direct weapons transfers to protect its economy and reputation, while the U.S. under Trump has shifted from alliance leader to self-styled neutral mediator with a pro-Russia lean, forcing Europeans to dramatically increase their own defense commitments. The episode argues that the global order is moving toward more transactional, fragile partnerships rather than values-based alliances, creating a less stable and more unpredictable security environment than even the Cold War's rigid bipolarity.
-
70.
Following the Supreme Court's rejection of IEEPA-based reciprocal tariffs, the U.S. is pivoting to Section 122 and 301 authorities to maintain a high-tariff regime that is increasingly used for non-trade geopolitical leverage. Experts suggest that while the administration has secured several asymmetric bilateral deals, this unilateralist approach risks fragmenting global trade and isolating the U.S. from the allies needed to counter China's systemic industrial overcapacity. The panel highlights that China's growing trade surplus and manufacturing dominance remain unresolved by current protectionist measures or the existing WTO framework. Consequently, U.S. strategy may be drifting toward a 'Fortress America' posture that increases domestic costs while ceding influence over future global trade rules and market opportunities.
-
71.
This CFR panel examines the U.S.-Israel military campaign against Iran launched in late February 2026, exploring how decades of Iranian nuclear ambition, proxy warfare, and the regime's brutal suppression of domestic protests converged to trigger the strikes. Panelists note that Iran's selection of Mojtaba Khamenei as supreme leader signals hardline continuity rather than reform, while the opposition remains fragmented and outgunned by the IRGC. The war has exposed Iran's lack of reliable great-power allies, as neither Russia nor China intervened meaningfully, and has severely degraded Iranian military and proxy capabilities including Hezbollah. However, experts warn that the Trump administration lacked adequate planning for day-after scenarios, civilian evacuations, and energy market disruption, and that a weakened but surviving regime could become more repressive domestically while periodically requiring future military action to prevent rearmament.
-
72.
This CFR podcast examines President Nixon's historic 1972 visit to China, arguing it was a strategically consequential move that exploited the Sino-Soviet split to give the United States leverage over Moscow, reduced Chinese support for North Vietnam, and began a fundamental shift in American attitudes toward China from ideological adversary to potential partner. Historian Jeremi Suri highlights that the opening was possible because both sides had converging interests—Nixon sought to outmaneuver the Soviet Union while Mao faced border tensions with Moscow and domestic instability from the Cultural Revolution—and was executed through extraordinary White House secrecy bypassing the State Department. The episode draws lessons for today: the U.S. benefits from engaging adversaries diplomatically rather than relying on non-recognition, but the costs of excluding career diplomats and allied governments from the process—as seen in Japan's shock at the announcement—underscore that dramatic personal diplomacy without institutional follow-through can delay substantive outcomes and damage alliances.
-
73.
The article highlights two central lessons from the history of U.S. foreign policy: the frequent occurrence of unforeseen global shifts and the persistent overestimation of military power's ability to achieve political goals. Drawing on examples from the Cold War to recent interventions in the Middle East, it illustrates how strategic expectations are often dashed by the resilience of local actors and the unpredictability of international alliances. The findings suggest that U.S. strategy should shift toward humility and pragmatism, acknowledging the limits of power and the inherent uncertainty of global events to better adapt to a changing world.
-
74.
USMCA has significantly deepened North American economic integration, with compliance rates for Mexican and Canadian exports rising to nearly 80% following 2025 tariff increases on non-agreement goods. Mexico has solidified its role as the top U.S. trading partner, transitioning toward high-value advanced technology sectors like AI servers and medical devices while de-risking from China. However, rising labor costs and policy uncertainty have constrained new investment and employment in traditional manufacturing. The report suggests the 2026 USMCA review must prioritize realistic regional content requirements and infrastructure improvements to sustain the current nearshoring momentum.
-
75.
This Brookings-RAND joint initiative examines whether current U.S. policy toward Taiwan and cross-strait relations remains adequate amid a deteriorating security environment in the Taiwan Strait. Through a series of expert workshops, the project explores five distinct policy pathways: limiting U.S. commitments while boosting Taiwan's self-defense, calibrating diplomacy to stabilize cross-strait dynamics, pursuing a more active denial strategy, and shifting toward strategic clarity. The analysis weighs how each option would affect U.S. deterrence posture, Taiwan's domestic politics, Beijing's strategic calculus, and broader Indo-Pacific security. The initiative signals growing mainstream debate within the U.S. policy community about whether the longstanding framework of strategic ambiguity should be revised or replaced, with significant implications for alliance management and escalation risk in the region.
-
76.
The conflict between the United States, Israel, and Iran has escalated into a significant maritime confrontation in the Strait of Hormuz, threatening global oil supplies and necessitating a potential release of strategic energy reserves. Evidence of this expansion includes the U.S. destruction of Iranian mine-laying vessels and reports of attacks on commercial shipping, alongside a staggering initial war cost of $5.6 billion for Washington within the first two days. Consequently, the war is forcing a strategic pivot of U.S. missile defense assets from East Asia to the Middle East, while highlighting vulnerabilities in global interceptor supplies for other theaters like Ukraine.
-
77.
This podcast episode analyzes the strategic shift in U.S. policy following President Trump's decision to launch a large-scale military campaign against Iran that resulted in the death of the Supreme Leader. Dalia Dassa Kaye argues that while the administration sends mixed messages, the targeting of top leadership signals an uncoordinated attempt at regime change rather than a limited strike on nuclear facilities. She warns that the lack of a viable political alternative or a clear 'day after' plan risks plunging the region into a 'Libya-style' chaotic vacuum characterized by bloody internal conflict and massive refugee flows. Furthermore, the conflict strains relations with Gulf partners who fear the fallout and provides geopolitical openings for China and Russia to exploit American military overextension.
-
78.
Prime Minister Takaichi’s visit to Washington serves as a critical test of the U.S.-Japan alliance as the Iran War forces a shift from strategic alignment to transactional demands for Middle East military support. While President Trump pressures Japan for naval escorts in the Strait of Hormuz, Takaichi is constrained by constitutional limits and is instead leveraging economic concessions, including $550 billion in U.S. investment commitments, to maintain the partnership. The outcome will determine if Japan can preserve its vital U.S. security guarantee against China while navigating the legal and political risks of entanglement in a regional conflict.
-
79.
The United States must leverage international partnerships and multilateral frameworks to break China’s dominant 'chokehold' on critical mineral supply chains essential for defense and high-tech industries. While previous unilateral approaches hindered progress, emerging 2026 initiatives like 'Project Vault' and the 'Forge' forum signal a strategic shift toward a collaborative 'Metals NATO' model. To successfully compete with China’s predatory pricing, U.S. policy must prioritize early-stage project funding and high environmental and labor standards to attract producing nations. These coordinated efforts are vital for securing the resilient supply chains required for national security and the global energy transition.
-
80.
Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi's visit to Washington seeks to reinforce the U.S.-Japan alliance through $550 billion in strategic investment pledges and record-breaking defense spending. However, the partnership is being strained by new U.S. tariff offensives and the redirection of American military assets from the Indo-Pacific to address escalating conflicts in the Middle East. Tokyo faces a difficult balancing act as it navigates U.S. demands for maritime assistance in the Strait of Hormuz while attempting to maintain credible deterrence in the Taiwan Strait. Ultimately, the visit highlights a growing tension where Washington-driven economic and security shocks are complicating Japan's pursuit of strategic autonomy and regional stability.
-
81.Could Vietnam’s new South China Sea bases open a ‘Pandora’s box’ of competitive island building? (Chatham House)
Vietnam is rapidly expanding its military footprint in the South China Sea by conducting land reclamation and infrastructure development across all 21 of its controlled features in the Spratly Islands. This strategic move, which includes building harbors and airstrips, aims to counter China's established presence and assert sovereignty over contested maritime zones. The escalation of competitive island building among regional claimants increases the risk of maritime clashes and threatens the stability of vital global shipping lanes. Ultimately, this militarization could trigger a broader cycle of regional tension, complicating international efforts to maintain a free and open Indo-Pacific.
-
82.
U.S. and Israeli strikes on Iran have led to Tehran's closure of the Strait of Hormuz, cutting Gulf oil production by 10 million barrels per day and reducing strait transit to less than 10 percent of pre-war levels, causing acute energy shortages across Asia. Asian governments are resorting to fuel rationing, shortened workweeks, and costly subsidies to manage the crisis, but most countries could exhaust oil reserves within a month, while factories shutter and tourism plummets. The unsustainable fiscal burden of subsidies—already pushing Indonesia past its legal deficit cap—combined with historical precedents of fuel-price-driven unrest across South and Southeast Asia, raises the risk of severe economic contraction and political instability if the conflict persists through the summer.
-
83.
Max Boot argues that Operation Epic Fury suffers from a critical "strategy gap," where tactical military successes—such as precision strikes on Iranian leadership—fail to achieve clear political objectives or a viable exit strategy. While the U.S. has degraded Iranian infrastructure, Tehran has successfully retaliated by closing the Strait of Hormuz and depleting American munitions stocks at an unsustainable rate. This rapid consumption of high-tech interceptors like Patriot missiles creates significant strategic vulnerabilities in other theaters, particularly regarding China and North Korea. Ultimately, the conflict underscores the limits of U.S. military power in translating tactical dominance into long-term political or economic stability.
-
84.
Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s visit to Washington underscores the strain on the Japan-US alliance as Japan’s oil-dependent economy suffers from US-led Middle East conflicts while facing pressure to increase defense spending. Despite significant commitments to Trump’s missile defense plans and tariff agreements, Japan remains wary of the US's long-term reliability in countering China’s regional assertiveness. Consequently, Tokyo is shifting its strategy toward greater self-reliance and the cultivation of diverse security and economic partnerships, such as with Australia and the CPTPP, to uphold a rules-based international order.
-
85.
Maritime Southeast Asian states are exploring anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) strategies to secure their interests during major power conflicts, yet their current development remains rudimentary and lacks systematic planning. The paper identifies a persistent disconnect between strategic policy debates concerning regional flashpoints and the actual implementation of military doctrine, posture, and asset acquisition. Diverse security priorities and internal institutional constraints, such as army dominance in policymaking, continue to hinder the realization of full A2/AD capabilities. Consequently, the future trajectory of these capabilities will determine how these nations manage regional contingencies and coordinate with security partners seeking closer interoperability.
-
86.
The research paper identifies a significant gap in systematic planning within maritime Southeast Asian capitals concerning a potential US-China conflict over Taiwan, noting that current discussions are largely limited to evacuation contingencies. Given ASEAN’s structural collective-action issues, the author advocates for a 'building blocks' approach that strengthens domestic crisis capacity and leverages bilateral relations with the US, China, and Taiwan for preliminary planning. This strategy emphasizes enhancing existing mechanisms and developing minilateral arrangements to ensure a functional regional response architecture during major security crises.
-
87.
Brookings experts argue that the U.S.-Israeli decapitation strike against Iran’s leadership is unlikely to trigger an immediate regime collapse, risking instead a protracted conflict and regional instability. The analysis highlights the resilience of the Islamic Republic's institutional networks and its escalatory survival strategy, which targets neighboring energy infrastructure to force diplomatic concessions. Policymakers are warned that without a coherent 'day after' plan or the integration of civilian statecraft, the intervention could lead to a 'lose-lose' scenario of state fragmentation and emboldened global adversaries.
-
88.
The military conflict between the United States, Israel, and Iran has severely disrupted energy flows through the Strait of Hormuz, threatening twenty percent of global oil and gas supplies and disproportionately impacting Asian economies. While nations like Japan are buffered by significant strategic reserves, others like India face immediate risks due to limited storage and recent shifts in import patterns. Ultimately, these supply shocks are expected to drive a temporary resurgence in coal usage for affordability while simultaneously accelerating long-term strategic investments in nuclear and renewable energy to ensure national security and reduce reliance on volatile Middle Eastern transit routes.
-
89.
The joint U.S.-Israeli strikes on Iran have triggered a major, destabilizing escalation, pushing the region toward a protracted conflagration. Experts argue that Iran's retaliatory strikes were a calculated, existential move, demonstrating a willingness to engage in a long conflict by targeting soft underbellies, such as Gulf neighbors and American assets. This strategy allows Iran to gamble that it can outlast the current U.S. political administration. For policy, the primary implication is managing the risk of regional spillover, mitigating domestic economic fallout, and navigating the highly decentralized and politically charged nature of U.S. decision-making regarding the conflict.
-
90.
The article posits that small and middle powers, such as Taiwan, possess the capacity to disproportionately influence global stability, shifting the burden of peace away from great powers. Taiwan's unique leverage stems from its strategic location as a vital gateway in the Western Pacific and its established leadership in advanced technology sectors. For policy, the implication is that Taiwan should proactively utilize its economic and geographic assets to manage regional tensions and contribute actively to global stability, rather than being forced into a binary geopolitical choice.
-
91.
Ambassador Robert Blackwill proposes a "resolute global leadership" grand strategy that fuses superior military primacy with a muscular revitalization of the rules-based international order. He argues that recent liberal internationalism proved too passive against adversaries like China and Russia, while the transactional "Trumpism" approach dangerously abandons the alliances and moral frameworks essential to U.S. security. To restore influence, the report advocates for a significant increase in the defense budget, winning the AI technology race, and pivoting military resources to Asia to deter Chinese hegemony.
-
92.
The symposium concludes that while current AI-driven investment mirrors the speculative mania of 1929, the primary systemic risk stems from a combination of high sovereign debt and potential policy errors rather than market volatility alone. Panelists noted parallels such as the democratization of finance through leverage and a growing gap between massive AI capital expenditures and realized revenues. To avoid a repeat of the Great Depression's domino effect, experts advocate for proactive financial regulation and caution that current high debt levels may limit the effectiveness of traditional crisis intervention strategies.
-
93.
The Supreme Court's ruling in Learning Resources Inc. v. Trump invalidated the use of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) for broad tariffs, reasserting that the power to raise revenue resides with Congress under the Taxing Clause. While the decision eliminates the administration’s primary tool for immediate, open-ended duties, Brookings experts note that significant economic uncertainty persists as the executive branch pivots to alternative authorities like Sections 122, 232, and 301. This shift may force more deliberate, evidence-based trade investigations and increase legislative accountability, yet it also threatens to exacerbate federal deficits and complicate relations with key allies in Europe and the Indo-Pacific.
-
94.
This Brookings report finds that the Trump administration’s second-term China strategy has produced significant rhetoric but few measurable results after one year. Key economic indicators like manufacturing employment and industrial production remain stagnant despite high-profile investment pledges, while U.S. global standing among allies has declined sharply. In technology, inconsistent export controls and infrastructure bottlenecks are straining America’s lead in AI against a more self-sufficient Chinese ecosystem. Consequently, the administration must shift from transactional signaling to sustained policy execution and alliance rebuilding to effectively reduce strategic dependencies and counter Beijing's influence.
-
95.Assessing Xi’s Unprecedented Purges of China’s Military: Key Developments and Potential Implications (CSIS)
Xi Jinping has conducted an unprecedented purge of the People's Liberation Army (PLA), removing over 100 senior officers and nearly decapitating the Central Military Commission to ensure absolute political loyalty. This campaign has created a significant leadership void, with approximately 52% of top positions impacted, severely undermining the PLA's near-term readiness for complex military operations like a Taiwan invasion. While the purges disrupt immediate capabilities, they enable Xi to replace the 'old guard' with a younger, more technically literate generation of 'intelligentized' officers. Long-term implications include a potentially more aggressive military that is ideologically subservient, though at a heightened risk of strategic miscalculation due to the suppression of realistic operational advice.
-
96.
Four years after Russia's invasion, the conflict has evolved into a long-term war of attrition that requires a transition from short-term aid to a generational strategy for European security. Despite significant casualties and sanctions, Russia has maintained its war effort through economic ties with China and the Global South, while Ukraine has successfully shifted toward deeper defense industrial cooperation with European partners. Experts suggest that because Russia's maximalist goals remain unchanged, Western policymakers must prepare for a multiyear struggle focused on conventional deterrence and cautious escalation management.
-
97.
The Supreme Court’s ruling that the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) does not authorize presidential tariffs strips the administration of its most flexible geoeconomic weapon, forcing a shift toward more bureaucratic trade authorities. Experts suggest the executive branch will likely invoke Section 122 for temporary 150-day tariffs while initiating formal investigations under Sections 301 and 232 to reconstruct the previous tariff regime. This transition creates significant business uncertainty regarding potential refunds and trade agreement stability, and may paradoxically lead to a more aggressive use of alternative tools like export controls and financial sanctions.
-
98.
Max Boot argues that the Trump administration must heed military warnings regarding the high risks of a sustained conflict with Iran, which poses far greater dangers than previous limited strikes. Key concerns include potential Iranian attacks on regional oil infrastructure, the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, and a critical depletion of U.S. precision-guided munitions required for other global theaters like China and Russia. Additionally, the author notes that extended naval deployments are straining military readiness while a lack of regional ally support complicates any exit strategy. Consequently, a prolonged conflict could severely weaken U.S. strategic posture and global economic stability without guaranteed regime concessions.
-
99.EST Rapid Roundup: How Will the Supreme Court’s IEEPA Ruling Impact U.S.-China Tech Competition? (CSIS)
The Supreme Court's 2026 ruling that the IEEPA does not authorize presidential tariffs has upended U.S. trade policy, forcing an immediate shift to alternative authorities and creating significant legal uncertainty for $150 billion in revenues. CSIS experts argue that while this provides China with a tactical and propaganda advantage ahead of upcoming summits, it compels Congress to reclaim its constitutional role in defining a more strategic and stable trade framework. The analysis highlights that reliance on coercive tariffs alone has failed to curb the overall trade deficit or effectively reindustrialize the U.S., instead increasing costs for critical energy and technology supply chains. Consequently, the panel recommends a policy pivot toward a 'positive agenda' that prioritizes domestic innovation, infrastructure, and allied cooperation over blunt import substitution.
-
100.
This CFR guide outlines the 'America First' transformation of U.S. foreign policy during the first year of President Trump’s second term, emphasizing a shift toward unilateralism and aggressive economic nationalism. Key developments highlighted include the 2025 National Security Strategy's focus on regional dominance, the military capture of Venezuela's Nicolás Maduro, and significant withdrawals from international organizations and climate agreements. These policies have strained traditional alliances while prioritizing U.S. resource access and domestic border security over global humanitarian assistance. Ultimately, the administration's approach suggests a future of transactional global engagement and a preference for military-backed regime change over multilateral diplomacy.
-
101.Decisive Economic Advantage: Modeling the Transition from Temporary First-Mover Leads to Economic Dominance in Artificial General Intelligence (RAND)
This RAND report introduces the concept of Decisive Economic Advantage (DEA), a state where early leads in Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) become permanent dominance through self-reinforcing feedback loops between technological capability, economic deployment, and capital reinvestment. Using a dynamic economic model and Monte Carlo simulations, the author identifies two primary pathways to dominance: 'frontier-driven' intelligence explosions and 'accumulation-driven' reinvestment moats that can occur even without recursive self-improvement. The findings suggest that strategic intervention leverage decays rapidly as asymmetries widen, implying that policymakers must prioritize early detection of regime shifts and tailor responses—such as export controls or ecosystem containment—to the specific growth mechanism involved.
-
102.
CFR argues that Trump’s second-term trade strategy is not a single tariff reset but a rolling, country-by-country restructuring of U.S. trade relations through mostly nonbinding framework deals. The tracker shows that while Liberation Day tariffs set high baselines, subsequent bilateral agreements and exemptions lowered effective rates unevenly and exchanged tariff relief for market-access concessions, purchase pledges, investment commitments, and alignment with U.S. economic-security measures. It also finds these deals are highly flexible and unilateral in design, with weak legal durability, quick-termination provisions, and little congressional constraint, making them closer to instruments of leverage than traditional trade agreements. The policy implication is a less predictable global trade environment where partners must continuously bargain with Washington and balance access to the U.S. market against sovereignty costs and geopolitical exposure, especially vis-a-vis China.
-
103.
The paper argues that the Philippines’ shift to a Comprehensive Archipelagic Defense Concept (CADC) marks a major strategic move from broad modernization toward a geography-centered military posture focused on dispersed basing, longer-range strike, and denial operations. It reasons that worsening threat perceptions of China, especially in maritime border areas and near Taiwan, are driving this transition, but also increasing risks of sharper confrontation and security-dilemma dynamics. The analysis highlights practical constraints, including inter-service rivalry, political vulnerability to Chinese influence operations, and policy ambiguity over foreign basing access, weapons deployments, and partner force integration. Strategically, it suggests Manila should codify clearer baseline defense policies, integrate alliances more explicitly, and refine CADC’s theory of victory so deterrence objectives translate into concrete theater-level outcomes rather than capability acquisition alone.
-
104.
The discussion argues that 2026 conflict risk will be shaped less by traditional multilateral conflict management and more by sphere-of-influence politics and transactional dealmaking by major powers. Ero’s reasoning is that with over 60 active conflicts, institutions like the UN and established mediators are increasingly sidelined, while regional and great-power actors (e.g., the US in Latin America, Gulf states in Sudan, Turkey in Syria, China in Myanmar) now carry more leverage over war and peace outcomes. She stresses that many current “peace” efforts are short-term truces rather than durable settlements, with places like Gaza, Sudan, and Somalia exposed to continued violence due to proxy competition, weak governance arrangements, and miscalculation risks among powerful states. For policy strategy, the implication is to prioritize pragmatic coalition-building with the actors who actually hold leverage, convert ceasefires into longer political processes, and adapt conflict-prevention tools to a more fragmented, law-weaker international order.
-
105.
Maddox argues that the international system has shifted into destabilizing US-China superpower rivalry, with both powers undermining global peace and prosperity in different ways. She contends that Washington’s transactional unilateralism under Trump and Beijing’s coercive techno-industrial expansion have together weakened alliances, eroded legal norms, and increased risks of conflict, including over Taiwan and transatlantic security. The lecture supports this with examples including tariff coercion, pressure over critical minerals, intensified military signaling, and challenges to institutions such as NATO, the UN system, and global trade mechanisms. Strategically, she calls on non-superpower states to strengthen and build institutions, resolve regional conflicts through principled coalitions, and actively uphold international law to preserve a rules-based order without relying on US leadership.
-
106.
CFR reports that the White House is ending a large immigration enforcement surge in Minnesota after intense backlash, even as the administration says it remains committed to mass deportations. The drawdown follows allegations of due-process violations, aggressive tactics, and the fatal shootings of two U.S. citizens, with DHS still claiming thousands of arrests and no full public accounting yet of all detainees. Evidence in the piece suggests the shift is tactical rather than strategic: personnel are being reassigned, not a broader rollback of interior enforcement, and CBP as well as ICE have expanded domestic operations. For policymakers, this raises a near-term tradeoff between enforcement intensity and political/legal sustainability, with DHS funding negotiations likely to hinge on oversight, transparency, and limits on warrantless or masked operations.
-
107.
The CFR’s 2026 Preventive Priorities Survey identifies a significant rise in global instability, highlighting five high-likelihood, high-impact contingencies including intensifying conflicts in the Middle East, the Russia-Ukraine war, and potential U.S. military operations in Venezuela. Based on a survey of over 600 experts, the report emphasizes a shift toward interstate conflict and identifies domestic political violence in the U.S. and AI-enabled cyberattacks as critical threats to national security. These findings suggest that the reduction of conflict prevention infrastructure and more coercive diplomatic stances increase the risk of the United States being drawn into costly, unpredicted military interventions.
-
108.
Chatham House argues that accountability mechanisms must rapidly adapt because cyber operations are now being used to facilitate core international crimes, not just conventional cybercrime. The event highlights the International Criminal Court prosecutor’s new policy on cyber-enabled crimes under the Rome Statute as a key signal that cyber-enabled atrocities should be investigated and prosecuted on equal footing with offline conduct. Its reasoning centers on clarifying which cyber acts meet international criminal law thresholds, building workable legal frameworks, and addressing practical barriers to attribution, evidence collection, and prosecution. Strategically, states and international institutions should align domestic and international legal tools, strengthen investigative cooperation, and prioritize capacity for cyber-forensics and cross-border accountability.
-
109.
The article argues that the Munich Security Conference exposed a deepening political-strategic split inside the West, even as leaders tried to project unity on core security issues. It cites Marco Rubio’s speech as emblematic: he reassured Europe that it still matters to Washington, but paired that with hard limits on U.S. support and warnings that America will act unilaterally when allies resist. The piece also points to contrasting interventions by Wang Yi, Keir Starmer, and Volodymyr Zelenskyy to show how states are recalibrating between U.S.-China rivalry and uncertain transatlantic cohesion. Strategically, it implies European governments should prepare for more conditional U.S. backing, invest in autonomous defense and diplomatic capacity, and pursue flexible coalitions to manage both Russia-related threats and wider great-power competition.
-
110.
CFR reports that U.S. Southern Command’s anti-drug boat strike campaign intensified, with eleven people killed in one day across the Eastern Pacific and Caribbean, making it the deadliest day of the operation this year. The brief notes this brings reported fatalities to at least 144 since September, while the U.S. has not publicly released identities or evidence supporting claims that those killed were tied to trafficking networks. It highlights growing legal and normative challenges, including wrongful-death litigation and expert arguments that lethal force against suspected traffickers is unlawful absent an imminent violent threat. Strategically, the campaign may impose rising legal, reputational, and regional diplomatic costs, suggesting a need for stricter oversight, evidentiary transparency, and greater reliance on interdiction and criminal prosecution rather than expanded military strikes.
-
111.
Chatham House argues that a stronger Japan under Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi would be broadly beneficial for Asia by helping balance both Chinese dominance and excessive dependence on the United States. The piece reasons that many Asian governments value Japan’s predictable diplomacy, investment record, and growing security cooperation, especially as China’s military pressure rises and multilateral institutions weaken. It also notes major constraints: Takaichi’s tax-cut and spending agenda is fiscally difficult, constitutional military reform faces high political hurdles, and Tokyo is under simultaneous pressure from Beijing and Washington. Strategically, the article implies Japan should build domestic economic resilience while deepening ties with India, Southeast Asia, and other US allies (such as the UK and Australia) and stabilizing relations with China to avoid regional escalation.
-
112.
CFR argues that a future Taiwan conflict will likely be a protracted, regional war involving multiple actors and external triggers, rather than a contained three-way contest. The report warns that China’s military modernization and gray-zone tactics have eroded U.S. deterrent advantages and shortened operational warning times. To address these new risks, the U.S. must shift from isolated planning to deeply integrated, pre-crisis consultative mechanisms with regional allies like Japan and the Philippines.
-
113.
The column argues that Trump’s 2026 National Defense Strategy (NDS) is built on prioritization and burden-sharing, but the Iran crisis could expose a gap between that framework and the president’s willingness to intervene aggressively. Froman points to NDS language that shifts U.S. focus toward homeland and hemispheric defense, expects allies in Europe and the Indo-Pacific to assume more conventional responsibilities, and seeks a limited “decent peace” with China rather than outright dominance. He contrasts that restraint with Trump’s military signaling toward Iran, including carrier redeployment and maximal demands, while warning that Iran is far harder to coerce or reshape than Venezuela and could produce prolonged instability after any regime shock. The strategic implication is that U.S. policy must keep Iran actions tightly bounded to avoid a costly quagmire that would undermine NDS prioritization and broader force posture goals.
-
114.Exploring Opportunities For European Rearmament Through Ukraines Experience And Indo Pacific Partnerships (IISS)
The paper argues that Ukraine’s wartime defense-industrial adaptation offers a practical model for European rearmament under prolonged high-intensity conflict conditions. It attributes Ukraine’s resilience to three factors: restructuring domestic defense production, rapidly diversifying and hardening supply chains, and building flexible external industrial partnerships beyond Europe. The analysis highlights the growing strategic relevance of Indo-Pacific actors such as South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan for technology and components, while noting that dependence on China remains both operationally important and geopolitically risky. For European strategy, the report implies that rearmament planning should prioritize industrial agility, supplier diversification, and broader cross-regional defense partnerships to strengthen long-term resilience.
-
115.
The panel argues that China under Xi is pursuing a long-term effort to reshape international order around sovereignty, regime security, and reduced Western dominance, while avoiding costly ideological bloc politics. Speakers cite evidence including Beijing’s security-first governance model, parallel institution-building (e.g., BRI, AIIB, SCO, BRICS-adjacent platforms), efforts to de-risk supply chains and build economic leverage, and selective mediation diplomacy aimed especially at the Global South. They also emphasize tensions in China’s approach: it promotes an alternative governance narrative but still works inside existing institutions, and its global ambitions are constrained by domestic economic pressures and external pushback. For policymakers, the implication is to treat China’s strategy as structural and adaptive rather than episodic, requiring coordinated responses on economic resilience, technology dependence, and coalition-based diplomacy rather than issue-by-issue reactions.
-
116.
Chatham House argues that a second Trump presidency signals a shift from US hegemony to a more openly imperial foreign policy built on coercive leverage rather than alliance stewardship. It cites transactional diplomacy, disregard for international norms, threats toward allies such as Denmark over Greenland, and the operation to capture Venezuela’s Nicolás Maduro as evidence of greater willingness to use force in support of a hemispheric dominance strategy. The analysis says this approach weakens NATO cohesion and broader European security assumptions while creating a more volatile environment in which states inside and outside Washington’s preferred orbit must recalibrate. It also concludes that Russia and China face a mix of risk and opportunity as US policy becomes more confrontational, producing a brittle order with higher miscalculation risk.
-
117.
The article argues that the U.S. must update its narrative on Taiwan, moving away from viewing the island as a 'strategic liability' or a single point of failure for the global economy. It highlights that Taiwan's hardware is the irreplaceable backbone of America's AI ambitions and that conflict with China is not inevitable if a credible military deterrent is maintained. The proposed policy shift emphasizes a middle path: preserving the status quo to allow for an eventual non-coercive resolution while grounding U.S. support in calculated self-interest rather than ideological charity.
-
118.
The Trump administration is aggressively expanding Section 232 tariffs across strategic sectors—from semiconductors to pharmaceuticals—to mitigate national security risks and encourage domestic manufacturing. While aimed at countering China, these tariffs disproportionately affect close allies like Canada and Mexico, who remain the primary suppliers of steel, aluminum, and auto parts. This strategy risks trade friction with partners while highlighting persistent vulnerabilities in supply chains, particularly regarding Chinese control of active pharmaceutical ingredients, critical minerals, and drone components.
-
119.
China's expansion of zero-tariff access for African nations is unlikely to rebalance trade on its own, as the continent's exports remain heavily concentrated in low-value raw materials and minerals. Despite initiatives to boost agricultural trade, China maintains a persistent $60 billion trade surplus with Africa, highlighting deep-seated structural imbalances. To achieve long-term growth, Africa must leverage this policy to attract foreign direct investment and drive industrialization, positioning itself as a strategic, low-tariff production hub for the Chinese market.
-
120.
This collection of essays argues that the United States and China must coordinate to mitigate the 'malicious uplift' of non-state actors using advanced AI for cyberattacks, biological weapons, and disinformation. The authors highlight that AI's low cost and high accessibility create systemic risks that traditional arms control cannot easily manage, necessitating shared safety guidelines and crisis communication channels. Ultimately, bilateral cooperation is viewed as a necessary catalyst for a global multilateral non-proliferation framework to prevent 'safety arbitrage' by malicious groups.
-
121.
Robert D. Blackwill proposes "resolute global leadership" as the most effective American grand strategy to counter a peer-competitor China and navigate the most dangerous international environment since World War II. The report analyzes five alternative strategic schools, concluding that the U.S. must leverage its unique economic, military, and technological advantages while reconciling itself to a world where its dominance is no longer unchallenged. Key policy recommendations include substantially increasing the defense budget, pivoting military assets to the Indo-Pacific, and re-engaging in multilateral trade frameworks like the CPTPP to revitalize the rules-based order. Ultimately, it emphasizes balancing Chinese power through strengthened alliances and 'peace through strength,' while rejecting military force for purely ideological goals.
-
122.Redrawing global boundaries? The United States, China, and the viability of spheres of influence in the 21 st century (Brookings)
Brookings’ expert roundtable argues that a U.S. "Donroe Doctrine" push for hemispheric primacy is more likely to weaken than strengthen Washington’s position in long-term competition with China, though one contributor contends it could restore deterrence by denying Beijing footholds near U.S. borders. The dominant reasoning is that coercive regional tactics and unilateral moves drain U.S. military bandwidth from the Indo-Pacific, damage alliances, and erode soft power while giving China narrative and diplomatic advantages. Experts also note China’s already deep regional footprint, including major trade, investment, and infrastructure ties across Latin America, which makes a clean spheres-of-influence rollback unrealistic. Strategically, a formal U.S.-China spheres bargain is assessed as unstable and asymmetric: it could pressure smaller states to hedge, accelerate regional militarization and possible nuclear proliferation, and incentivize revisionist claims elsewhere, suggesting U.S. policy should prioritize alliance credibility, rules-based coordination, and positive economic alternatives over coercion.
-
123.Managing Systemic Supply Chain Risk to the U.S. Economy from Trade Concentration and Geopolitical Conflict: The Roles of Insurance and Other Hedging Strategies (RAND)
This RAND report argues that systemic supply chain risks from geopolitical conflict are significant and underappreciated, particularly in sectors like nonferrous metals and electrical components sourced from countries such as Brazil and India. The authors find that private insurance is ill-suited for managing these correlated, large-scale risks, while government interventions often lack necessary market-sensing mechanisms to prevent unsustainable private practices. To enhance resilience, the report recommends that the U.S. government track conflict-dependency overlaps and that industries adopt 'Til Needed' hedging options—private contracts for surge capacity—to bridge the gap between market incentives and national economic security.
-
124.
The conflict in Ukraine demonstrates that modern great-power warfare is characterized by sustained, highly destructive conventional conflict and a fragile, elevated risk of nuclear escalation, rather than quick, decisive outcomes. While Russia's nuclear threats are significant, Ukraine's resilience and ability to strike deep into Russian territory show that nuclear weapons do not guarantee coercive leverage. Consequently, the U.S. must update its defense planning to prepare for protracted wars of attrition with nuclear-armed adversaries, focusing on strengthening deterrence, coordinating with allies, and maintaining readiness for extended, high-stakes conflicts.
-
125.Export Controls on Artificial Intelligence and Uncrewed Aircraft Systems: Interagency Challenges (RAND)
This RAND report argues that current U.S. export controls for AI and uncrewed aircraft systems (UAS) are lagging behind rapid technological advancements and require a more agile, data-centric interagency approach. The study finds that the U.S. no longer maintains a technological monopoly, meaning overly restrictive controls risk hollowing out the domestic industrial base and driving global partners toward Chinese alternatives. Consequently, the authors recommend shifting regulatory focus toward specialized military training data rather than ubiquitous hardware, while calling for increased funding and technical expertise for the Bureau of Industry and Security.
-
126.
Japan's declaration that a Chinese assault on Taiwan could constitute an existential threat, potentially warranting a military response, has significantly escalated tensions with Beijing. China responded by implementing immediate countermeasures, including increased military exercises near Japan, halting seafood imports, and banning dual-use goods exports. This escalating confrontation demonstrates that Japan's security posture is directly challenging China's interests, creating a volatile strategic environment. Consequently, the article suggests that Japan cannot manage this complex geopolitical and economic threat independently and must rely heavily on international alliances and partnerships for deterrence and stability.
-
127.
Beijing views the current U.S. policy toward China as a moment of strategic flux and opportunity, capitalizing on perceived inconsistency in Washington's approach. China is actively shifting from a reactive to an offensive posture, using economic tools like rare-earth controls and exerting pressure on U.S. allies to strengthen its global standing. Furthermore, the U.S.'s increased focus on the Western Hemisphere and Latin America is interpreted by Beijing as a strategic distraction, allowing China to dedicate greater resources and attention to the Indo-Pacific. Policymakers must recognize that this enduring rivalry persists despite short-term policy shifts, requiring a nuanced strategy that addresses China's proactive regional ambitions.
-
128.
China's economic statecraft is proving highly effective, primarily by capitalizing on the protectionist and volatile foreign economic policies of the United States. Beijing employs a sophisticated 'carrot and stick' strategy, using advanced export controls against rivals while simultaneously offering attractive development financing and cheap goods to the Global South. This dual approach is successfully embedding many developing nations into Chinese-dominated supply chains, as seen in critical sectors like nickel and EVs. Consequently, China gains significant global leverage, enabling it to advance its domestic and foreign policies with minimal international opposition, posing a growing challenge to Western economic influence.
-
129.
The article highlights the persistent and escalating threat posed by Beijing, citing a 2021 warning that China aims to control Taiwan by 2027. This prediction, known as the 'Davidson Window,' prompted a significant strategic response from the United States. Consequently, Congress authorized $7.1 billion for the Pacific Deterrence Initiative, signaling a major increase in U.S. military commitment to the region. The findings imply that the geopolitical tension surrounding Taiwan requires sustained, high-level defense and strategic investment from key international partners.
-
130.
The article argues that characterizing the current US-China relationship solely through Cold War analogies is inaccurate and dangerous, as the global system is fundamentally multipolar and highly integrated economically. Westad notes that unlike the bipolar Cold War era, great powers now compete within a single, interconnected global economic framework. While historical lessons—such as the necessity of dialogue, mutual respect, and strategic deterrence—remain crucial for managing crises, policymakers must acknowledge the unprecedented complexity of this modern, interconnected order. Therefore, strategy must balance great power competition with mechanisms for sustained communication to prevent conflict.
-
131.
The article argues that the United States and China are uniquely positioned to forge a 'grand bargain' to stabilize the global order, shifting from ideological confrontation to productive coexistence. This opportunity is driven by the recognition that both nations benefit from a multipolar world and are deeply economically interdependent. To prevent a high-risk conflict, the policy strategy must pivot toward pragmatic cooperation, requiring the reform of the international system. Implementing this bargain necessitates establishing reciprocal agreements on trade, technology, and security to ensure peaceful power sharing and mutual benefit.