The White House (via OMB) strongly protests Congressional efforts within the FY 2027 NDAA to prohibit the purchase of warships from foreign shipyards. The Administration argues that these restrictions undermine national security by limiting flexibility and hindering its strategy of leveraging allied yards, such as in the 'Finland model,' to drive investment into U.S. shipbuilding capacity. This signals a significant policy shift toward integrating international partners into advanced naval construction, suggesting the Pentagon is prepared to bypass traditional domestic build requirements for future combat vessels.
Iran’s Internal Dynamics and U.S. Objectives
English Summary
This CFR panel examines the U.S.-Israel military campaign against Iran launched in late February 2026, exploring how decades of Iranian nuclear ambition, proxy warfare, and the regime's brutal suppression of domestic protests converged to trigger the strikes. Panelists note that Iran's selection of Mojtaba Khamenei as supreme leader signals hardline continuity rather than reform, while the opposition remains fragmented and outgunned by the IRGC. The war has exposed Iran's lack of reliable great-power allies, as neither Russia nor China intervened meaningfully, and has severely degraded Iranian military and proxy capabilities including Hezbollah. However, experts warn that the Trump administration lacked adequate planning for day-after scenarios, civilian evacuations, and energy market disruption, and that a weakened but surviving regime could become more repressive domestically while periodically requiring future military action to prevent rearmament.
中文摘要
此場 CFR 座談探討美國與以色列於 2026 年 2 月底對伊朗發動的軍事行動，分析伊朗數十年來的核武野心、代理人戰爭，以及該政權對國內抗議的殘酷鎮壓如何共同促成了此次軍事打擊。與談者指出，伊朗選擇莫吉塔巴·哈梅內伊出任最高領袖，顯示強硬路線的延續而非改革，而反對派仍處於分裂狀態且在伊斯蘭革命衛隊面前力量懸殊。這場戰爭暴露了伊朗缺乏可靠的大國盟友——俄羅斯與中國均未進行實質性干預——並嚴重削弱了伊朗的軍事及代理人作戰能力，包括真主黨。然而，專家警告川普政府對戰後情境、平民撤離及能源市場衝擊缺乏充分規劃，且一個被削弱但仍存續的政權可能在國內更加高壓，同時未來可能需要持續的軍事行動以阻止其重新武裝。
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