The White House (via OMB) strongly protests Congressional efforts within the FY 2027 NDAA to prohibit the purchase of warships from foreign shipyards. The Administration argues that these restrictions undermine national security by limiting flexibility and hindering its strategy of leveraging allied yards, such as in the 'Finland model,' to drive investment into U.S. shipbuilding capacity. This signals a significant policy shift toward integrating international partners into advanced naval construction, suggesting the Pentagon is prepared to bypass traditional domestic build requirements for future combat vessels.
Ten conflicts to watch in 2026
English Summary
The discussion argues that 2026 conflict risk will be shaped less by traditional multilateral conflict management and more by sphere-of-influence politics and transactional dealmaking by major powers. Ero’s reasoning is that with over 60 active conflicts, institutions like the UN and established mediators are increasingly sidelined, while regional and great-power actors (e.g., the US in Latin America, Gulf states in Sudan, Turkey in Syria, China in Myanmar) now carry more leverage over war and peace outcomes. She stresses that many current “peace” efforts are short-term truces rather than durable settlements, with places like Gaza, Sudan, and Somalia exposed to continued violence due to proxy competition, weak governance arrangements, and miscalculation risks among powerful states. For policy strategy, the implication is to prioritize pragmatic coalition-building with the actors who actually hold leverage, convert ceasefires into longer political processes, and adapt conflict-prevention tools to a more fragmented, law-weaker international order.
中文摘要
該討論主張，2026年的衝突風險將較少由傳統多邊衝突管理所塑造，而更多取決於勢力範圍政治與大國之間的交易式協商。Ero的論點是，在全球超過60場活躍衝突的情勢下，聯合國及既有調停者正日益被邊緣化；相對地，區域行為體與大國（例如美國在拉丁美洲、海灣國家在蘇丹、土耳其在敘利亞、中國在緬甸）如今對戰爭與和平結果擁有更大槓桿。她強調，當前許多「和平」努力其實是短期停火，而非可持續的政治解決；加薩、蘇丹與索馬利亞等地仍因代理競爭、治理安排薄弱，以及強權間誤判風險而暴露於持續暴力之中。就政策策略而言，其意涵在於：優先與真正掌握槓桿的行為體務實建立聯盟、將停火轉化為更長期的政治進程，並使衝突預防工具適應一個更碎片化、法治約束更弱的國際秩序。
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