ThinkTankWeekly

A Guide to Trump’s Section 232 Tariffs, in Maps

CFR | 2026-02-22 | economy

Topics: China, Europe, Indo-Pacific, NATO, Nuclear, Taiwan, Trade, United States

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English Summary

The Trump administration is aggressively expanding Section 232 tariffs across strategic sectors—from semiconductors to pharmaceuticals—to mitigate national security risks and encourage domestic manufacturing. While aimed at countering China, these tariffs disproportionately affect close allies like Canada and Mexico, who remain the primary suppliers of steel, aluminum, and auto parts. This strategy risks trade friction with partners while highlighting persistent vulnerabilities in supply chains, particularly regarding Chinese control of active pharmaceutical ingredients, critical minerals, and drone components.

中文摘要

川普政府正積極將《232條款》關稅擴大至從半導體到製藥的各個戰略領域,以緩解國家安全風險並鼓勵國內製造。雖然這些關稅旨在對抗中國,但卻對加拿大和墨西哥等密切盟友造成了不成比例的影響,而這些國家仍是鋼鐵、鋁及汽車零組件的主要供應國。此策略在增加與合作夥伴貿易摩擦風險的同時,也凸顯了供應鏈中持續存在的脆弱性,特別是針對中國在活性藥物成分、關鍵礦物及無人機組件方面的控制。

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