The White House (via OMB) strongly protests Congressional efforts within the FY 2027 NDAA to prohibit the purchase of warships from foreign shipyards. The Administration argues that these restrictions undermine national security by limiting flexibility and hindering its strategy of leveraging allied yards, such as in the 'Finland model,' to drive investment into U.S. shipbuilding capacity. This signals a significant policy shift toward integrating international partners into advanced naval construction, suggesting the Pentagon is prepared to bypass traditional domestic build requirements for future combat vessels.
‘Littoral Deep Battle’
English Summary
The recent Balikatan exercise in the Philippines showcased a new U.S. Army concept called 'Littoral Deep Battle,' designed to counter potential amphibious landings, particularly in the context of a Taiwan contingency. The exercise involved combined forces from the U.S., Philippines, Japan, and Canada, utilizing drone swarms, HIMARS rocket systems, and layered defenses to simulate repelling an invasion. This approach integrates lessons from Ukraine, emphasizes unmanned systems, and demonstrates a shift towards a more distributed and lethal coastal defense posture, with implications for regional security and alliance interoperability.
中文摘要
近期於菲律賓舉行的「巴利卡坦」(Balikatan) 聯合軍演，展示了美國陸軍的一項新概念，名為「近岸深海作戰」(Littoral Deep Battle)，旨在應對潛在的兩棲登陸行動，尤其是在台灣海峽情境下。此次演習匯集了美國、菲律賓、日本和加拿大等國的聯合作戰力量，運用無人機集群、HIMARS 火力系統以及分層防禦體系，模擬反擊入侵。此策略整合了烏克蘭戰爭的經驗教訓，強調無人系統的運用，並展現出向更分散、更具殺傷力的近岸防禦陣容轉變的趨勢，對區域安全與盟軍間的互操作性具有重要影響。
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