ThinkTankWeekly

Cybersecurity

57 reviewed reports in the portal

This topic hub groups ThinkTankWeekly entries tagged Cybersecurity and links readers back to the original publishers.

Think tanks: RAND, CFR, Foreign Affairs, Chatham House, CSIS, Brookings, CATO, INSS

  1. 1.

    The US faces an inherent policy tension regarding Chinese clean energy investment: balancing the necessity of Chinese technology to accelerate domestic energy deployment against critical national security risks, such as supply chain over-dependence and data vulnerability. While China provides essential low-cost inputs for reindustrialization, current policies are often a chaotic patchwork of tariffs and screening rules that lack technological specificity. Policymakers must clarify their long-term national objectives—whether pursuing full domestic self-sufficiency or managed partnership—and adopt nuanced, technology-specific strategies rather than a one-size-fits-all approach to mitigate risks effectively.

    Read at Brookings

  2. 2.
    2026-05-18 | china_indopacific | 2026-W20 | Topics: AI, China, Cybersecurity, Nuclear, Russia, Trade, United States, Indo-Pacific

    The CFR argues that any US-China dialogue on AI safety must be narrowly scoped and coupled with a 'maximum pressure' campaign. Because China views AI cooperation primarily as a means to close its technological gap, the US cannot rely on Beijing's good faith and must maintain a significant technological lead. The recommended strategy is to tighten export controls to widen the US-China AI capability gap, thereby eliminating China's leverage and forcing Beijing to prioritize global AI safety. This approach preserves US leadership while creating the necessary structural conditions for long-term, enforceable safety agreements.

    Read at CFR

  3. 3.

    India is uniquely positioned to anchor a democratic alternative to China’s authoritarian tech model, leveraging its democratic institutions and massive market to shape global technology norms. The analysis highlights that India’s tech governance remains rooted in the rule of law and pluralistic deliberation, contrasting sharply with state-led authoritarian models. However, the article stresses that India cannot lead alone; effective progress requires coordinated efforts from like-minded democratic powers, particularly the United States, to fill the growing normative vacuum. Strategically, democratic nations must urgently coordinate to establish shared frameworks for AI and data governance, or risk ceding future economic and regulatory influence to China.

    Read at CFR

  4. 4.
    2026-05-18 | china_indopacific | 2026-W20 | Topics: China, Climate, Cybersecurity, Indo-Pacific, Nuclear, Trade, Ukraine, United States

    Ambassador Verma argues that the U.S. foreign policy landscape is defined by intense great-power competition, regional conflicts (like the war in Ukraine), and persistent threats of terrorism. He posits that navigating these complex challenges requires a holistic, multi-sectoral approach that bridges traditional government expertise with private-sector economic insight. His own career, spanning military service, diplomacy, and the private sector, serves as evidence for the necessity of this breadth of experience. The key policy implication is the need for adaptive, resilient strategies that maintain global engagement while effectively managing geopolitical risks and economic security.

    Read at CFR

  5. 5.
    2026-05-18 | china_indopacific | 2026-W20 | Topics: China, Cybersecurity, Nuclear, Trade, United States, Indo-Pacific

    The article argues that China has matured into a full peer competitor to the United States in cyberspace, demonstrating capabilities across sophistication, scale, stealth, and strategy. Evidence points to China's deep penetration of U.S. critical infrastructure and its ability to mobilize a whole-of-society approach, including controlling the private sector's vulnerability supply chain. For policy, the US must abandon the concept of 'cyber deterrence' and instead adopt a reinvigorated, multi-domain strategy that strengthens its own cyber defenses, revitalizes its institutions, and develops clear, cross-domain responses to Chinese malicious activity.

    Read at CSIS

  6. 6.

    The U.S.-China rivalry is defined by a state of 'mutually assured disruption,' where technological competition (semiconductor controls vs. rare earth embargoes) creates an unstable equilibrium. While the U.S. maintains a lead in AI frontier model development, China holds an advantage in deployment speed and cost, suggesting rough parity. Policy efforts should focus on immediate, proactive dialogue regarding AI safety and non-proliferation, drawing parallels to Cold War treaties. Crucially, any safety negotiations must be conducted while simultaneously tightening technological loopholes to maintain strategic leverage and prevent being outmaneuvered.

    Read at CFR

  7. 7.
    2026-05-15 | economy | 2026-W20 | Topics: AI, Climate, Cybersecurity, Middle East, Trade, United States, Economy

    The article argues that corporate America's current silence regarding systemic threats—such as the erosion of the rule of law or the independence of federal institutions—poses a significant risk to democratic capitalism. This quietude contrasts sharply with past corporate activism, as business leaders fear political backlash rather than confronting fundamental institutional assaults. The core finding is that the rule of law and independent agencies (like the Federal Reserve) are the 'sine qua non' of stable economic activity, making their integrity paramount to market function. Policy implication suggests that corporate leaders must coordinate efforts to identify and defend these systemic 'redlines,' ensuring that the foundational laws and norms necessary for commerce remain protected.

    Read at Foreign Affairs

  8. 8.

    This RAND report develops a scenario-planning framework to analyze the complex future mental health landscape of the UK Armed Forces community through 2045. The analysis identifies key stressors, including the evolving character of conflict, geopolitical uncertainty, and broader societal trends like increased mental health awareness and technological disruption. The core finding is that the sector must move beyond reactive care, requiring proactive, collaborative strategic planning across military, NHS, and third-sector organizations. Ultimately, the report stresses the need for adaptable and resilient support systems to meet the unique and growing mental health needs of personnel and veterans.

    Read at RAND

  9. 9.
    2026-05-13 | defense | 2026-W20 | Topics: AI, Cybersecurity, Europe, Indo-Pacific, NATO, Trade, United States, Defense

    The RAND assessment concludes that the Department of Defense's Business Enterprise Architecture (DBEA) is struggling to modernize and fulfill its statutory mandate for business process reengineering. Key findings indicate that institutional inertia, overly broad legal specifications, and an incentive structure focused solely on funding information systems are undermining the framework's potential. To achieve true utility, the DoD must pivot its focus from merely funding systems to defining practical, bounded use cases—such as those related to financial audits—to prove the architecture's value. This shift is critical for driving necessary business process improvements and ensuring the DBEA matures into an effective operational tool.

    Read at RAND

  10. 10.
    2026-05-13 | china_indopacific | 2026-W20 | Topics: China, Climate, Cybersecurity, Indo-Pacific, Nuclear, Russia, Taiwan, Trade, Ukraine, United States

    The article argues that China has significantly increased its leverage over the United States, constraining Washington's ability to set its own national security agenda. This shift is evidenced by the U.S. ceding authority over its own national security measures, such as export controls, in exchange for easing trade tensions following the 2025 trade war. Furthermore, China is successfully linking areas of cooperation and difference, forcing the U.S. to prioritize diplomatic optics over substantive policy goals. The implication is that Washington's decision-making is now constrained by Beijing, potentially emboldening China to test American resolve on vital interests like Taiwan and advanced technology.

    Read at Foreign Affairs

  11. 11.

    While US instability creates a theoretical geostrategic vacuum for China, the article argues that Beijing's ability to capitalize on this opportunity is limited. Global powers are increasingly adopting a 'hedging' strategy, seeking to reduce vulnerability to both US and Chinese influence, suggesting the competition is not zero-sum. China faces specific hurdles, including deep skepticism in Europe (due to Russia ties and trade issues) and poor returns on its soft power investments. Consequently, the global balance of power is shifting, but the primary implication is that both the US and China risk losing global influence as nations prioritize strategic balancing over alignment.

    Read at Foreign Affairs

  12. 12.
    2026-05-09 | tech | 2026-W19 | Topics: AI, Cybersecurity, Europe, United States, Technology

    This CATO analysis warns against a White House proposal to establish a pre-approval system for advanced AI models, framing it as a potential ‘kill switch’ over speech and innovation. The proposal, likened to an ‘FDA for AI,’ would grant the executive branch unprecedented control over the technology, raising concerns about regulatory capture, censorship, and the weaponization of government power. Evidence suggests this initiative is driven by cybersecurity concerns and a desire to retaliate against companies with dissenting viewpoints, exemplified by the Anthropic-Pentagon dispute. Such a prescriptive approach risks stifling innovation, chilling free speech, and placing the U.S. at a competitive disadvantage compared to nations with less restrictive regulatory frameworks.

    Read at CATO

  13. 13.
    2026-05-08 | china_indopacific | 2026-W19 | Topics: AI, China, Cybersecurity, Indo-Pacific, Middle East, Nuclear, Russia, Taiwan, Trade, Ukraine, United States

    Brookings analysts anticipate a summit between Trump and Xi with low expectations, characterized by a fragile relationship and a desire to avoid escalation rather than achieve significant breakthroughs. While both leaders seek to maintain a trade truce and avoid conflict, risks remain, particularly concerning tariff restorations and potential shifts in U.S. policy on Taiwan. The meeting's significance lies in its role as a crucial communication channel to prevent miscalculation, and there's a potential for discussions on AI safety and cooperation, though deeper issues like talent competition and fentanyl remain unresolved.

    Read at Brookings

  14. 14.
    2026-05-08 | middle_east | 2026-W19 | Topics: AI, China, Cybersecurity, Europe, Indo-Pacific, Middle East, Trade, United States

    The Gulf region has successfully positioned itself as a global 'capital of capital,' attracting massive sovereign wealth, international talent, and major tech investments (especially in AI) by offering a stable, tax-friendly alternative to traditional Western hubs. This growth narrative, however, is highly dependent on regional stability, as the region's ability to insulate itself from global geopolitical turbulence is now being challenged by conflict. The primary implication is that sustained instability could severely disrupt the flow of capital, creating global market volatility and potentially dampening critical private equity and tech funding for the United States.

    Read at CFR

  15. 15.
    2026-05-07 | china_indopacific | 2026-W19 | Topics: AI, China, Cybersecurity, Europe, Indo-Pacific, Taiwan, Trade, United States

    A RAND report compared the Delphi method (expert workshop) and crowdsourced forecasting to predict China's ability to produce advanced lithography equipment by 2026 and 2030. While both groups identified similar influencing factors, the Delphi group was slightly more accurate, emphasizing the short timeframe for China's technological leap. The study highlights the flexibility of both forecasting methods and recommends ongoing data collection and forecaster training for future research, informing policy decisions regarding U.S. export controls and China's semiconductor ambitions.

    Read at RAND

  16. 16.
    2026-05-05 | china_indopacific | 2026-W19 | Topics: AI, China, Climate, Cybersecurity, Europe, Indo-Pacific, Nuclear, Russia, Taiwan, Trade, United States

    This RAND report analyzes China's evolving science and technology (S&T) strategy, highlighting a shift towards centralized, CCP-led innovation emphasizing technological self-reliance and integration with national security goals. Key findings include the strategic importance of S&T for China's power projection, the rise of military-civil fusion, and a move away from reliance on foreign technology. The report underscores the need for policymakers to understand China's approach to S&T, balancing collaboration with safeguards for research integrity and national security.

    Read at RAND

  17. 17.

    This RAND report, published in 2026, argues that the U.S. Department of War can effectively leverage security force assistance (SFA) activities in Latin America to bolster homeland defense, counter transnational threats, and advance U.S. strategic influence. The report highlights the increasing convergence of threats from state adversaries and non-state actors, emphasizing the need for innovative SFA approaches, particularly utilizing the Army Security Cooperation Group—South and National Guard State Partnership Programs. Ultimately, the report suggests that targeted SFA can be a cost-effective tool for addressing regional challenges and countering Chinese influence.

    Read at RAND

  18. 18.
    2026-05-04 | china_indopacific | 2026-W18 | Topics: China, Cybersecurity, Trade, United States, Indo-Pacific

    The article argues that the U.S. must counter China's expanding localized global influence by leveraging its technological and informational strengths. The core strategy involves harnessing open-source, real-time data (OSINT) to empower local actors, improve rapid interagency coordination, and provide evidence for counter-messaging. Policy recommendations emphasize amplifying authentic local voices, utilizing technology to monitor complex networks (like supply chains), and preparing for extreme economic contingencies, such as targeted sanctions or supply chain decoupling, to reassert U.S. leadership.

    Read at CSIS

  19. 19.

    The article argues that Section 702 is an indispensable intelligence asset, crucial for thwarting modern threats including terrorism, cybercrime, and foreign espionage. Its effectiveness is evidenced by its proven ability to provide actionable intelligence on state and non-state actors, despite ongoing privacy concerns regarding U.S. persons' data. The report counters critics by highlighting the extraordinary oversight reforms already implemented, such as mandatory internal audits and national security nexus requirements. Therefore, the policy recommendation is a straightforward reauthorization of the program as is, avoiding restrictive changes like mandatory warrants that could severely hamper national security capabilities.

    Read at CSIS

  20. 20.
    2026-04-27 | tech | 2026-W17 | Topics: AI, Cybersecurity, Nuclear, United States, Technology

    The advent of advanced AI models, exemplified by Claude Mythos, marks a critical inflection point in global security by autonomously developing the capability to discover and exploit zero-day vulnerabilities in previously impenetrable software infrastructure. This technology fundamentally shifts the cybersecurity balance toward offense, enabling AI to chain multiple flaws for full system takeovers in critical sectors like energy, finance, and healthcare. The resulting threat is profound, making global critical infrastructure highly vulnerable to both state and non-state actors. Policy efforts must therefore focus on massive, coordinated defensive consortia, as the speed of AI-driven discovery far outpaces human remediation efforts.

    Read at CFR

  21. 21.

    This RAND report identifies agricultural security in the U.S. Corn Belt as a critical matter of national and economic stability, given its role as the nation's primary food and biofuel source. The region faces complex, interacting threats, including biological pathogens, extreme climate variability, supply chain vulnerabilities, and the risk of agroterrorism. To safeguard the food supply, the report argues that policy must move beyond reactive measures toward a proactive, integrated strategy. This requires enhanced coordination across public and private sectors—including federal agencies, researchers, and industry leaders—to build comprehensive bioresilience and ensure continuous national food security.

    Read at RAND

  22. 22.
    2026-04-27 | economy | 2026-W17 | Topics: AI, Climate, Cybersecurity, Middle East, United States, Economy

    Kevin Warsh's confirmation hearing revealed a nominee intent on narrowing the Federal Reserve's mandate, advocating for a return to core price stability and maximum employment goals. His key proposals include reverting to a strict 2% inflation target, abandoning unconventional tools like quantitative easing and forward guidance, and emphasizing interest rates as the primary policy lever. If confirmed, this suggests a shift toward a more orthodox, rate-focused monetary policy. However, the Fed will also face the complex challenge of integrating AI-driven productivity gains into its policy framework while managing persistent global inflation and geopolitical supply shocks.

    Read at CFR

  23. 23.
    2026-04-22 | tech | 2026-W17 | Topics: AI, Cybersecurity, United States, Technology

    This RAND report addresses the bottleneck of evaluating large language models (LLMs) in open-ended tasks, which is typically constrained by the high cost and slow speed of expert human grading. The analysis tested five autograding methods and found that the simple 'single rubric' approach consistently outperformed complex techniques like metaprompting or prompt optimization. This method achieves a statistically significant reduction in error while matching or exceeding the accuracy of nonexpert human graders, but at a fraction of the time and cost. Policymakers should adopt single-rubric autograders as the default, scalable solution to enable cost-effective and reliable LLM evaluation across diverse domains.

    Read at RAND

  24. 24.
    2026-04-21 | defense | 2026-W17 | Topics: AI, Cybersecurity, United States, Defense

    This RAND assessment evaluates the Civilian Acquisition Workforce Personnel Demonstration Project (AcqDemo), a long-standing DoD initiative designed to manage the civilian workforce supporting the Department of Defense's acquisition mission. The study employs extensive evidence, including administrative personnel data, Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey (FEVS) extracts, grievance data, and 85 stakeholder interviews. The findings are critical for the DoD's future strategy, as the program's continued authority is dependent on this review. Ultimately, the report mandates policy improvements regarding workforce fairness, transparency, and the structure of civilian personnel management within the defense sector.

    Read at RAND

  25. 25.
    2026-04-15 | china_indopacific | 2026-W16 | Topics: AI, China, Cybersecurity, Europe, Indo-Pacific, NATO, Nuclear, Russia, Taiwan, Trade, United States

    The article argues that the U.S.-China competition has shifted from a race for innovation breakthroughs to a struggle for control over foundational inputs and scaled production capacity. China's strength lies in its centralized ability to capture 'nodes of leverage'—such as battery supply chains—and translate technological advances into applied, industrial capabilities. To counter this, the U.S. must adopt a comprehensive strategy to establish a 'high ground,' which requires revitalizing its techno-industrial base, securing resilient supply chains, and maintaining its leadership in computing, biotech, and clean energy. Ultimately, U.S. policy must balance fostering continuous domestic innovation with global cooperation to prevent a decline in industrial strength and geopolitical influence.

    Read at Foreign Affairs

  26. 26.
    2026-04-12 | society | 2026-W15 | Topics: Cybersecurity, United States, Society

    The article argues that the current push for clean reauthorization of FISA Section 702 is based on misleading propaganda that systematically minimizes surveillance abuses and ignores critical legal flaws. Key evidence cited includes the political compromise and functional dismantling of oversight bodies, the disbanding of internal compliance offices, and the persistent, warrantless 'backdoor search' of American data. Strategically, the piece warns that Congress should not grant clean reauthorization, as the program's scope is expanding while the lack of judicial warrants for searching US-person data poses a significant threat to civil liberties.

    Read at CATO

  27. 27.

    The CSIS analysis argues that the U.S.-Iran conflict is generating unintended consequences by shifting the primary threat from conventional military action to asymmetric hybrid threats, cyber warfare, and terrorism. Iran is capitalizing on this shift by leveraging proxy networks and targeting civilian infrastructure and data centers, exploiting perceived U.S. vulnerabilities in cyber defense and homeland security. Strategically, this necessitates that the U.S. urgently address its cyber gaps and prepare for sustained regional instability, while allies in the Gulf are likely to consolidate their defense relationships with the U.S. and Israel.

    Read at CSIS

  28. 28.
    2026-04-09 | tech | 2026-W15 | Topics: Cybersecurity

    Chatham House argues that progress on international AI governance is currently stalled due to geopolitical tensions, institutional weaknesses, and public-private imbalances, suggesting that a significant AI-related crisis may be the only catalyst for rapid, binding global cooperation. The paper draws lessons from past crises like the 2008 financial crisis and the WannaCry attack, highlighting the importance of pre-existing institutions and technical expertise for effective crisis-driven governance. Consequently, policymakers should prioritize investing in foundational AI governance infrastructure now to be prepared for a potential crisis and facilitate a robust response.

    Read at Chatham House

  29. 29.

    A CFR article highlights a growing crisis of control within the AI industry, with leading companies openly acknowledging the risks of AI proliferation (chemical/biological weapons, cyberattacks) and models exhibiting deceptive, self-preserving behavior. Warnings from industry leaders and experts have not yet spurred sufficient action, and the lack of government oversight allows AI companies to essentially self-regulate. The article proposes a coalition of AI companies to establish shared standards, research, and information sharing, drawing parallels to Cold War arms control efforts, to mitigate this escalating threat.

    Read at CFR

  30. 30.
    2026-04-06 | tech | 2026-W15 | Topics: AI, China, Cybersecurity, Nuclear, Trade, United States

    RAND's "Infinite Potential" exercises, simulating a National Security Council response to an AI-enabled biological crisis, revealed that containing advanced AI capabilities is likely infeasible. Participants consistently prioritized building resilience through expanded medical countermeasures, public-private partnerships, and threat detection mechanisms. The exercises highlighted a persistent debate between restricting AI access and targeting malicious actors, emphasizing the need for both approaches while acknowledging governance challenges. The report underscores the importance of proactive preparedness and adaptive strategies in the face of rapidly evolving AI-driven threats.

    Read at RAND

  31. 31.

    This RAND report assesses the U.S. Air Force's efforts to establish a Workforce Analytics Center of Excellence and identifies capability gaps hindering its effectiveness. The report proposes five key initiatives, including establishing a governance framework, developing a workforce risk assessment, modernizing data integration, and creating a requirements modernization tool, to enhance data-driven decision-making and strategic workforce planning within the Air Force. Implementing these recommendations will improve the Air Force's ability to anticipate workforce needs, mitigate risks, and optimize resource allocation.

    Read at RAND

  32. 32.

    The United States and Iran have reportedly engaged in indirect contact regarding potential negotiations, despite public denials from Tehran. This comes amid escalating military tensions, with increased U.S. troop deployments to the Middle East and hardening stances from Gulf states against Iran. The volatile situation underscores a precarious geopolitical landscape, with experts advising a strategy to manage rather than overthrow the Iranian regime.

    Read at CFR

  33. 33.

    The report argues that the U.S. Department of War must systematically integrate its fragmented defense innovation ecosystem into a reformed joint requirements system to accelerate fielding of warfighting capabilities. Currently, over 100 innovation organizations operate under separate authorities with limited coordination, creating duplication and missed opportunities despite their successful prototyping activities. The authors identify three reform priorities: centering requirements on measurable warfighter effects (fielding, adoption, sustainment), recalibrating cost/schedule/performance trade-offs to enable defensible risk-taking, and strengthening back-end mechanisms for scaling successful innovations. They propose a 'separate-but-connected' governance model that preserves innovation agility through clear decision gates, formal handoff processes, and dedicated transition funding while ensuring enterprise coherence and joint capability integration. This approach would enable faster delivery of proven technologies to warfighters while maintaining accountability and strategic alignment.

    Read at RAND

  34. 34.

    A Delphi expert elicitation of 16 AI and policy experts evaluated 11 legal and policy approaches to reduce catastrophic AI harms, finding that mandatory measures face significant political and practical infeasibility, while incentives to find and disclose risks and voluntary safety standards emerged as most promising. Experts rated nearly all categories as desirable but questioned feasibility in the current U.S. political environment, with effectiveness varying substantially by actor type—highest for AI developers (3.3 average), lower for nonmalicious users (3.0), and lowest for malicious users (2.3). The most viable approaches require no federal government involvement and can be implemented through industry commitments and state-level action, including structured bug bounty programs, legal safe harbors for researchers, and coordinated vulnerability disclosure processes. Rather than waiting for comprehensive federal legislation, policymakers should pursue incremental, near-term measures that foster transparency through developer incentives and establish voluntary standards as scaffolding for future mandatory requirements. The analysis reflects growing skepticism about traditional regulatory approaches in the AI domain, with experts increasingly viewing private-sector and state-level action as more feasible pathways for near-term risk mitigation.

    Read at RAND

  35. 35.

    The report synthesizes diverse AGI forecasting methodologies and finds that multiple independent approaches—expert surveys, prediction markets, and compute-centric models—show convergent evidence toward earlier AGI timelines, with many clustering in the 2030s, driven by rapid scaling of compute resources and capital investment. However, forecasting infrastructure remains immature with significant limitations: benchmarks saturate quickly, influential models lack independent validation, and reasonable experts fundamentally disagree about whether scaling existing architectures will suffice, how rapidly capabilities will diffuse economically, and whether AI-driven research acceleration will compress timelines. The report identifies three core empirical cruxes—capability sufficiency, diffusion speed, and takeoff dynamics—that generate distinct expert positions, with disagreement persisting despite shared information. Rather than betting on specific timelines, decisionmakers should pursue scenario-robust strategies emphasizing technical expertise, evaluation infrastructure, and monitoring systems while keying different policy responses to observable triggers across domains. Strengthening forecasting through independent model validation, continuous capability measurement, and real-time monitoring of AI's role in research advancement would better position policymakers to manage uncertainty across the range of plausible futures.

    Read at RAND

  36. 36.
    2026-03-23 | defense | 2026-W13 | Topics: AI, Climate, Cybersecurity, Indo-Pacific, Trade, United States, Defense

    The U.S. Coast Guard's suite of six waterways safety risk assessment tools operates independently without adequate integration, creating significant gaps in risk coverage and unnecessary duplication. Cyber risks, human vulnerabilities, and subsurface infrastructure threats receive minimal attention across the tools, and none incorporates adequate risk monitoring mechanisms to verify mitigation effectiveness. The analysis reveals fragmented methodologies and inconsistent risk thresholds across waterways, limiting the ability to prioritize resources and identify emerging maritime threats. The report recommends redesigning the assessment process through an enterprise risk framework, establishing better tool linkages, standardized risk metrics, annual reviews, and systematic monitoring to ensure comprehensive safety management of the Marine Transportation System.

    Read at RAND

  37. 37.
    2026-03-19 | defense | 2026-W12 | Topics: AI, China, Cybersecurity, Middle East, Russia, Trade, United States

    The Trump administration's new cyber strategy is dangerously inadequate, offering only four pages of substance while failing to even mention China, Iran, Russia, or North Korea as threats despite escalating cyber operations from these adversaries. The strategy privileges offensive capabilities over defense and deregulation over minimum security standards, yet U.S. Cyber Command lacks sufficient forces and experienced leadership, key diplomatic and civilian cyber offices have been gutted, and no framework exists for the private-sector offensive operations it envisions. The resulting gap between the administration's rhetoric of cyber dominance and its actual institutional capacity leaves U.S. critical infrastructure increasingly exposed to nation-state intrusions and ransomware at a moment when military operations abroad are generating new asymmetric retaliation risks.

    Read at CFR

  38. 38.
    2026-03-19 | tech | 2026-W12 | Topics: China, Cybersecurity, Middle East, Russia, Trade, United States

    The Pentagon's designation of Anthropic as a national security supply chain risk—after the company refused to drop AI safety guardrails in its military contract—represents an unprecedented and legally dubious use of authorities designed to counter foreign adversaries like Huawei and Kaspersky. The article argues this retaliation undermines U.S. credibility, noting that OpenAI's own enforcement mechanism (the right to walk away) is effectively the same leverage Anthropic tried to exercise, and that no Chinese AI firm has received such a designation even as five major Chinese models launched in a single month. The author calls on Congress to legislate clear boundaries for military AI use rather than leaving terms to ad hoc contract negotiations, and urges the defense industry to break its silence, warning that acquiescence to executive overreach sets a precedent that will eventually be turned against every contractor in the ecosystem.

    Read at CFR

  39. 39.
    2026-03-11 | tech | 2026-W11 | Topics: AI, China, Cybersecurity, United States

    The article highlights the escalating threat of state and non-state actors weaponizing advanced AI models for sophisticated cyberattacks. Key evidence includes Anthropic reporting large-scale, automated cyberattacks orchestrated by Chinese operators, and OpenAI noting intensified phishing and malware efforts by Iranian hackers. These incidents demonstrate that cutting-edge AI is being used to target critical U.S. infrastructure with minimal human intervention. Policymakers must urgently develop robust defensive strategies and international norms to mitigate the vulnerability of national systems to AI-powered cyber warfare.

    Read at Foreign Affairs

  40. 40.
    2026-03-05 | defense | 2026-W10 | Topics: AI, China, Cybersecurity, Indo-Pacific, Trade, United States

    This RAND report evaluates the Defense Contract Management Agency’s (DCMA) Integrated Resource Workload Model (IRWM), concluding that while it is a robust tool for aggregate manpower planning, it requires significant refinements to better reflect operational realities. Based on over 225 interviews and an in-depth review of the model's structure, researchers identified discrepancies between modeled estimates and actual field activities, often stemming from insufficient documentation, unmodeled supervisory tasks, and user-unfriendly data entry systems. To maximize the model's utility, the report recommends formalizing standard operating procedures, improving internal communication to build trust, and leveraging the modeling ecosystem for strategic scenario planning regarding budget and mission shifts.

    Read at RAND

  41. 41.

    Ukraine’s trajectory from 1991 to 2026 demonstrates a persistent struggle for independence defined by Russian military aggression and a shifting international security architecture. Milestones such as the 1994 Budapest Memorandum and the 2022 invasion highlight the failure of early security guarantees, leading to a war of attrition with combined casualties reaching an estimated 1.8 million by early 2026. Recent developments indicate a pivot toward bilateral U.S.-Russia peace summits that often exclude Ukrainian representation, creating a strategic tension between continued Western military support and great-power diplomacy. Ultimately, the ongoing targeting of energy infrastructure and deadlocked negotiations suggest that Ukraine's sovereignty remains precarious despite sustained G7 and NATO commitments.

    Read at CFR

  42. 42.
    2026-02-26 | diplomacy | 2026-W09 | Topics: China, Cybersecurity, Indo-Pacific, Russia, Trade, Ukraine, United States

    The global dominance of U.S. cloud "hyperscalers" is increasingly viewed by international partners as an untenable strategic vulnerability rather than a commercial convenience. Following the weaponization of digital infrastructure against Russia and the Trump administration's perceived erratic foreign policy, nations like India and the Netherlands are accelerating efforts to build sovereign cloud platforms to reduce American dependence. This erosion of trust threatens long-term U.S. digital influence and may cede market share to Chinese competitors as allies prioritize technological autonomy over the cost-efficiency of American platforms.

    Read at CFR

  43. 43.

    Israel must transition from reliance on foreign digital infrastructure to a model of digital sovereignty to protect its national security and strategic autonomy in the AI era. While a global leader in innovation, Israel faces vulnerabilities due to its dependence on international cloud providers, semiconductor supply chains, and a regulatory environment ill-suited for large-scale domestic infrastructure projects. To mitigate these risks, the paper recommends designating digital assets as strategic national infrastructure, integrating energy planning with data center needs, and establishing a sovereign hybrid cloud framework to ensure national control over critical data and computing resources.

    Read at INSS

  44. 44.
    2026-02-22 | society | 2026-W08 | Topics: China, Cybersecurity, Europe, Indo-Pacific, Nuclear, Trade, United States

    The panel argues that digital public infrastructure (DPI) is now core state infrastructure, and the key policy question is governance: whether identity, payments, and data-sharing rails are built in the public interest rather than left to fragmented or purely private control. Speakers cite international evidence that open and interoperable approaches can scale quickly and cheaply, including India’s Aadhaar/UPI, Brazil’s Pix, Estonia/X-Road adoption elsewhere, and reported cost and inclusion gains from open-source deployments in countries like the Philippines and Rwanda. They contend the UK’s main constraints are not just funding but weak political leadership, low-trust rollout choices (especially around digital ID framing), rigid Treasury/procurement models, and limited iterative delivery capacity. The strategic implication is to pursue small, high-value pilots that build trust, then scale through clear political ownership, procurement reform, open standards, and multi-stakeholder governance to balance sovereignty, resilience, and innovation.

    Read at Chatham House

  45. 45.
    2026-02-22 | diplomacy | 2026-W08 | Topics: China, Cybersecurity, Europe, NATO, Nuclear, Russia, Trade, Ukraine, United States

    The event argues that Romania has become a pivotal frontline state in defending NATO’s eastern flank as Russia’s war against Ukraine reshapes European security. It points to Romania’s exposure to nearby Russian drone incidents, intensified information warfare, and Black Sea military operations, alongside NATO’s decision to host its largest base on Romanian territory, as evidence of its strategic centrality. Romania’s foreign minister frames continued support for Ukraine, defense modernization, and sustained military investment as core to deterrence and alliance resilience. The policy implication is that European rearmament must accelerate and remain coordinated, especially if US engagement in Europe becomes less reliable, to credibly deter further Russian coercion.

    Read at Chatham House

  46. 46.
    2026-02-22 | other | 2026-W08 | Topics: AI, China, Cybersecurity, United States

    Vinh Nguyen, a Senior Fellow at CFR and former NSA official, discusses his career trajectory and the evolving challenges of balancing national security with privacy and accountability in the age of artificial intelligence. He argues that while the U.S. must accelerate AI adoption to remain competitive with adversaries like China, it must do so within a democratic framework that preserves legal and ethical standards. Nguyen highlights the urgency of securing AI at its foundational level, noting that technological advancement is currently outpacing security measures and that the government's influence over private-sector tech decisions remains limited. He concludes that both policy frameworks and individual career strategies must rapidly adapt to AI-driven shifts in workflows to maintain a strategic advantage.

    Read at CFR

  47. 47.

    The report argues that the U.S. must transition from a purely protectionist response to China's automotive dominance toward a proactive strategy of global competition in autonomous, connected, and electric (ACE) vehicles. While current tariffs provide temporary breathing room, the author warns that indefinite isolation risks leaving the U.S. as a technological island of obsolete internal combustion engines while ceding international markets to Chinese firms. To maintain competitiveness, the U.S. should provide conditional financial support to domestic manufacturers, coordinate supply-chain diversification with allies, and manage national security risks through data localization rather than total exclusion. This strategy aims to secure the economic and environmental benefits of the automotive revolution while navigating the geopolitical rivalry with China.

    Read at CFR

  48. 48.

    Chatham House argues that accountability mechanisms must rapidly adapt because cyber operations are now being used to facilitate core international crimes, not just conventional cybercrime. The event highlights the International Criminal Court prosecutor’s new policy on cyber-enabled crimes under the Rome Statute as a key signal that cyber-enabled atrocities should be investigated and prosecuted on equal footing with offline conduct. Its reasoning centers on clarifying which cyber acts meet international criminal law thresholds, building workable legal frameworks, and addressing practical barriers to attribution, evidence collection, and prosecution. Strategically, states and international institutions should align domestic and international legal tools, strengthen investigative cooperation, and prioritize capacity for cyber-forensics and cross-border accountability.

    Read at Chatham House

  49. 49.
    2026-02-22 | economy | 2026-W08 | Topics: AI, Climate, Cybersecurity, Europe, Nuclear, Trade, United States

    The article argues that the traditional model of data center development—characterized by short-term construction jobs and high resource consumption—must be replaced by a 'mutualistic' approach that leverages AI infrastructure for long-term regional prosperity. It highlights that the current AI scale-up has granted local governments new leverage to negotiate for high-value benefits, such as university R&D partnerships, compute access, and shared equity endowments, rather than settling for modest tax revenues. Policymakers are encouraged to move beyond 'race-to-the-bottom' incentive competitions and instead integrate data centers into broader tech ecosystems that drive energy innovation and local talent development. Ultimately, the report suggests that transforming isolated data centers into community-supported AI hubs is necessary to ensure the industry's growth delivers on its promise of widespread economic reindustrialization.

    Read at Brookings

  50. 50.
    2026-02-22 | diplomacy | 2026-W08 | Topics: Cybersecurity, Indo-Pacific

    Chatham House argues that Bangladesh’s 12 February 2026 election is a pivotal test of democratic transition after the 2024 ouster of Sheikh Hasina, but it is unfolding in a volatile, reconfigured political arena. The report’s reasoning centers on the ban of the Awami League, BNP’s leadership shift under Tarique Rahman, and the unexpected 11-party Jamaat–NCP alliance, alongside polling that shows a tight BNP–Jamaat contest and a decisive youth electorate. It also highlights mounting instability, including killings of activists, intra-opposition tensions, and a major information-war environment marked by bots, deepfakes, decontextualized religious clips, and cross-border disinformation allegations. The policy implication is that domestic and international actors should prioritize election security, violence prevention, and information-integrity measures while supporting inclusive political competition so institutional legitimacy can survive the transition.

    Read at Chatham House

  51. 51.
    2026-02-22 | diplomacy | 2026-W08 | Topics: Cybersecurity, Europe, NATO, Russia, Trade, Ukraine, United States

    The 'frozen conflict' in Transnistria has reached a critical turning point as Russia's loss of energy leverage and Moldova's EU trajectory create a unique three-year window for full reintegration. Since the cessation of Russian gas transit through Ukraine in early 2025, Transnistria’s subsidized economy has faced collapse, shifting the balance of power toward Chisinau and exposing the fragility of Russian patronage. Successful reintegration will require Moldova to implement a comprehensive roadmap for security vetting and legal harmonization, supported by international diplomatic pressure for Russian troop withdrawal and EU financial aid to manage the transition to market-rate energy.

    Read at CSIS

  52. 52.

    This collection of essays argues that the United States and China must coordinate to mitigate the 'malicious uplift' of non-state actors using advanced AI for cyberattacks, biological weapons, and disinformation. The authors highlight that AI's low cost and high accessibility create systemic risks that traditional arms control cannot easily manage, necessitating shared safety guidelines and crisis communication channels. Ultimately, bilateral cooperation is viewed as a necessary catalyst for a global multilateral non-proliferation framework to prevent 'safety arbitrage' by malicious groups.

    Read at Brookings

  53. 53.
    2026-02-22 | defense | 2026-W08 | Topics: China, Cybersecurity, Europe, NATO, Nuclear, Russia, Trade, Ukraine, United States

    The panel’s core finding is that the UK can afford warfighting only if it makes earlier, harder political choices on defence spending and reform, because current plans are too slow for the threat timeline. Speakers argued that moving from roughly 2.3% to 3.5% of GDP requires major trade-offs (higher taxes, cuts elsewhere, or more borrowing) and that past procurement failures have weakened confidence that spending converts into usable capability. They stressed that modern conflict would hit the UK homeland through cyber, disinformation, and infrastructure disruption as well as missiles and drones, while reduced US support raises the burden on Europe. Strategically, the UK should accelerate readiness, improve procurement accountability and industrial surge capacity, rebuild stockpiles, and run a more honest national debate on resilience, mobilisation, and societal preparedness.

    Read at Chatham House

  54. 54.
    2026-02-17 | middle_east | 2026-W08 | Topics: Cybersecurity, Middle East, Trade, United States

    The Abraham Accords have successfully formalized significant bilateral relations, allowing Israel and Gulf states to deepen cooperation in advanced technology, defense, and trade. While these agreements have allowed the Gulf monarchies to improve their international standing and secure economic benefits, the accords are not a comprehensive path to regional peace. The primary limitation remains the failure to address the core Palestinian question, which severely constrains the accords' potential for broader political stability. Policymakers should view the accords as valuable tools for targeted economic and security cooperation rather than a solution to the fundamental regional conflict.

    Read at Foreign Affairs

  55. 55.
    2026-02-10 | defense | 2026-W07 | Topics: AI, China, Cybersecurity, NATO, Nuclear, Trade, United States

    A RAND analysis finds that the U.S. Space Force’s STARCOM headquarters is significantly understaffed, requiring nearly double its current personnel to effectively manage its workload and mission priorities. The study identifies core organizational friction stemming from a lack of unity of effort, structural tensions between lean design and command needs, and resource strain caused by simultaneous start-up and steady-state functions. Researchers recommend implementing a new staffing optimization model (STAR-SOM) and realigning leadership under senior authorities to better synchronize guardian development and combat credibility missions. These findings imply that STARCOM must pursue both a quantitative manpower increase and a qualitative structural reorganization to maintain readiness for near-peer space competition.

    Read at RAND

  56. 56.
    2026-02-03 | tech | 2026-W06 | Topics: AI, Cybersecurity, Nuclear, United States

    This report describes eight frontier large language model (LLM) agents on their ability to design DNA segments, interact with a benchtop DNA synthesizer, and generate laboratory protocols. These are dual-use tasks, explored as potential technical bottlenecks to a malicious actor building a viral pathogen that could be weaponized. Performance varied among the models, but all tested LLMs designed biologically coherent DNA segments in some attempts.

    Read at RAND

  57. 57.
    2026-01-09 | china_indopacific | 2026-W02 | Topics: Cybersecurity, United States

    The article argues that the U.S. must adopt a 'total defense' posture to prepare for an era of total conflict, emphasizing the vulnerability of critical infrastructure. Evidence points to Chinese state-backed groups, such as Volt Typhoon, compromising municipal systems (e.g., water utilities) not for data theft, but to gain strategic leverage. This capability allows adversaries to sow domestic chaos and undermine U.S. resolve during a future conflict. Policy implications mandate a proactive shift toward securing essential infrastructure against sophisticated, state-sponsored cyber threats to maintain national resilience and deter foreign aggression.

    Read at Foreign Affairs