The White House (via OMB) strongly protests Congressional efforts within the FY 2027 NDAA to prohibit the purchase of warships from foreign shipyards. The Administration argues that these restrictions undermine national security by limiting flexibility and hindering its strategy of leveraging allied yards, such as in the 'Finland model,' to drive investment into U.S. shipbuilding capacity. This signals a significant policy shift toward integrating international partners into advanced naval construction, suggesting the Pentagon is prepared to bypass traditional domestic build requirements for future combat vessels.
Building tomorrow's digital public infrastructure
English Summary
The panel argues that digital public infrastructure (DPI) is now core state infrastructure, and the key policy question is governance: whether identity, payments, and data-sharing rails are built in the public interest rather than left to fragmented or purely private control. Speakers cite international evidence that open and interoperable approaches can scale quickly and cheaply, including India’s Aadhaar/UPI, Brazil’s Pix, Estonia/X-Road adoption elsewhere, and reported cost and inclusion gains from open-source deployments in countries like the Philippines and Rwanda. They contend the UK’s main constraints are not just funding but weak political leadership, low-trust rollout choices (especially around digital ID framing), rigid Treasury/procurement models, and limited iterative delivery capacity. The strategic implication is to pursue small, high-value pilots that build trust, then scale through clear political ownership, procurement reform, open standards, and multi-stakeholder governance to balance sovereignty, resilience, and innovation.
中文摘要
該座談指出，數位公共基礎設施（DPI）已成為國家核心基礎建設，而關鍵政策問題在於治理：身分識別、支付與資料共享等底層軌道，是否以公共利益為導向建置，而非任由碎片化或純私人部門控制。與談者援引國際證據，認為開放且可互通的方法可快速、低成本擴張，包括印度的 Aadhaar/UPI、巴西的 Pix、愛沙尼亞 X-Road 在他國的採用，以及菲律賓、盧安達等國開源部署所報告的成本下降與包容性提升。他們主張，英國的主要限制不僅是資金，更在於政治領導薄弱、低信任的推動策略（尤其是數位身分的論述方式）、僵化的財政部／採購制度，以及有限的迭代式交付能力。其戰略意涵是先推動小規模、高價值試點以建立信任，再透過明確的政治主責、採購改革、開放標準與多方利害關係人治理進行擴張，以平衡主權、韌性與創新。
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