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Breaking the deadlock on AI governance

Chatham House | 2026-04-09 | tech

Topics: Cybersecurity

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Chatham House argues that progress on international AI governance is currently stalled due to geopolitical tensions, institutional weaknesses, and public-private imbalances, suggesting that a significant AI-related crisis may be the only catalyst for rapid, binding global cooperation. The paper draws lessons from past crises like the 2008 financial crisis and the WannaCry attack, highlighting the importance of pre-existing institutions and technical expertise for effective crisis-driven governance. Consequently, policymakers should prioritize investing in foundational AI governance infrastructure now to be prepared for a potential crisis and facilitate a robust response.

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