Saudi Arabia has shifted from a path of gradual rapprochement to a policy of strategic distancing from Israel, making normalization unlikely in the near term. This shift is fueled by overwhelming domestic public opposition, increasingly harsh rhetoric from leadership regarding the conflict in Gaza, and a non-negotiable demand for a Palestinian state based on 1967 borders. Consequently, Riyadh now views normalization as a risk to its regional standing and domestic legitimacy rather than a strategic opportunity. Any return to the normalization trajectory will require significant developments in the Palestinian arena and a fundamental reassessment of Israel's regional role.
INSS
This hub page collects curated ThinkTankWeekly entries for INSS and links readers back to the publisher for the original reports.
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Israel must transition from reliance on foreign digital infrastructure to a model of digital sovereignty to protect its national security and strategic autonomy in the AI era. While a global leader in innovation, Israel faces vulnerabilities due to its dependence on international cloud providers, semiconductor supply chains, and a regulatory environment ill-suited for large-scale domestic infrastructure projects. To mitigate these risks, the paper recommends designating digital assets as strategic national infrastructure, integrating energy planning with data center needs, and establishing a sovereign hybrid cloud framework to ensure national control over critical data and computing resources.
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The ISNAD influence campaign, linked to the Muslim Brotherhood, has pivoted from a wartime focus on ending the Gaza conflict to a long-term 'sociological warfare' strategy targeting Israel’s internal social fabric. Evidence from social media analysis indicates a shift toward narratives that delegitimize state institutions, foster extreme political polarization, and encourage emigration to undermine national cohesion. This evolution into a more professionalized and defensive operation suggests that Israel must treat such civilian-led digital campaigns as significant threats to its long-term social resilience and national security.
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INSS argues that Saudi–UAE ties have shifted from tactical coordination to a structural strategic rivalry over regional leadership, influence, and economic primacy. It cites widening divergence across conflict theaters (Yemen, Sudan, and Qatar diplomacy), competing regional alignments, and escalating economic competition tied to Saudi Vision 2030 and efforts to challenge Dubai’s hub status. The analysis contends this is not a temporary leadership dispute but part of a broader regional reordering, with implications for Gulf cohesion, Red Sea dynamics, and external actors’ planning assumptions. For policymakers, the key takeaway is to avoid treating a Saudi–Emirati bloc as fixed, hedge against further fragmentation, and for Israel in particular avoid appearing to choose sides while preserving channels to both Riyadh and Abu Dhabi.
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Following the brutal suppression of late 2025 protests, Iranian reformists have shifted from advocating gradual internal change to openly challenging the Islamic Republic's foundational legitimacy. Key leaders like Mir-Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi are now demanding national referendums on a new constitution, signaling a break from their previous commitment to the regime's core principles. While their current organizational power is weak and public trust has eroded, these figures could serve as a critical ideological bridge and moderate governing alternative during a future period of regime erosion or transition. This potential role is amplified by the lack of other viable, domestically-led opposition groups capable of managing a political shift.
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The INSS argues that subsea data centers could become a strategic infrastructure option for Israel by addressing AI-era pressures on electricity, freshwater, and land while strengthening digital sovereignty. It cites evidence from Microsoft’s Project Natick and Chinese deployments showing major gains in cooling efficiency, reduced freshwater use, lower land footprint, and improved hardware reliability in sealed underwater environments. The paper also stresses that these benefits are offset by unresolved environmental effects, difficult maintenance logistics, heightened sabotage/espionage risks to subsea assets, and legal-regulatory gaps under current maritime law. Strategically, it recommends that Israel proactively assess pilot adoption, integrate planning with existing offshore energy/communications infrastructure, and develop dedicated regulation, environmental monitoring, and maritime protection doctrines in coordination with regional partners.
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Turkey views the stability of the Iranian regime as a vital national security interest, prioritizing the regional status quo over potential democratic change or regime collapse. Ankara fears that upheaval in Tehran would trigger massive migration waves, disrupt critical energy supplies, and create a governance vacuum exploitable by Kurdish separatist groups like the PKK. Consequently, the Turkish government has framed domestic Iranian protests as foreign-led conspiracies, indicating that Turkey will likely prioritize regime continuity in Tehran to prevent regional instability and economic contagion.
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INSS argues that current U.S. force posture in CENTCOM reflects a pre-crisis phase combining coercive diplomacy with credible military readiness against Iran, while trying to avoid a long war. It cites roughly 40,000 U.S. personnel, a carrier strike group near Oman, multiple destroyers, expanded strike and ISR assets, reinforced missile defenses, and elevated airlift as evidence of preparations beyond symbolic signaling. The analysis also contends Iran is under heavy internal and external pressure but remains regime-stable, making diplomacy appear tactical and time-buying rather than genuinely de-escalatory. Strategically, this posture may strengthen deterrence and bargaining leverage, but it also raises the risk of miscalculation and rapid escalation among the U.S., Iran, and Israel.
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The INSS reports that President Trump’s 'Board of Peace' (BoP) has evolved from a specific Gaza stabilization initiative into a global conflict-resolution mechanism that bypasses the UN framework, leading to a refusal by major Western democracies to participate. This highly centralized body, controlled personally by Trump, lacks broad international legitimacy and relies on a mix of regional partners and non-democratic states. While the BoP may successfully oversee short-term operational goals in Gaza due to US and regional backing, its long-term viability is threatened by its isolation from traditional Western allies. For Israel, participation offers direct influence over Gaza's reconstruction but risks diplomatic isolation within a board composed of regional rivals.
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INSS argues that the U.S.-Iran track is in a temporary de-escalation, but absent major Iranian concessions the risk of renewed military confrontation remains high. The analysis cites deep gaps over Iran’s missile program and proxy support, Trump’s credibility pressures after a large U.S. force buildup, and Iran’s regime-survival mindset amid severe domestic unrest and repression as reasons diplomacy may stall. It also notes that Tehran may show limited flexibility on nuclear issues, especially after damage to enrichment capabilities, while refusing concessions on missiles and regional allies. Strategically, a nuclear-only deal with sanctions relief could stabilize the Iranian regime without resolving core regional security threats, leaving Israel and Gulf partners exposed and requiring continued coercive leverage alongside diplomacy.
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11.De-Hamasification of the Gaza Strip: Learning from Western and Arab Models of Deradicalization (INSS)
The memorandum argues that rebuilding Gaza after the October 7 war requires more than disarmament and infrastructure repair; it requires a deliberate "de-Hamasification" process to dismantle Hamas’s ideological and institutional dominance. INSS contends that Western deradicalization templates (e.g., postwar Germany and Japan) are poorly suited to Gaza’s current social and political conditions, and instead highlights contemporary Arab "civic-transformative" models as more applicable. Its reasoning emphasizes a combined approach: sustained security demilitarization, Arab-led religious and political legitimization, re-education toward tolerance, and economic rehabilitation tied to a credible political horizon. Strategically, the paper implies that Israel and regional partners should pursue an integrated security-political-religious framework to build a durable post-Hamas governing alternative and reduce long-term instability.
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INSS argues that Israel can economically absorb a gradual reduction in direct U.S. military aid, but the strategic and political value of the aid framework remains significant. It notes that aid now equals only about 0.5% of Israel’s GDP yet still funds roughly 15% of the defense budget, while stricter aid terms increasingly route spending to U.S. procurement and reduce direct support for Israeli industry. The paper also stresses that aid functions as a strategic anchor for U.S.-Israel ties and access to advanced U.S. systems, even as bipartisan support in the United States has weakened and aid has become more politically contested. It recommends replacing the current model with a formal transition toward defense-industrial partnership, avoiding full dollar-for-dollar budget replacement, and using the shift to drive efficiency, prioritization, and domestic capability building.