The White House (via OMB) strongly protests Congressional efforts within the FY 2027 NDAA to prohibit the purchase of warships from foreign shipyards. The Administration argues that these restrictions undermine national security by limiting flexibility and hindering its strategy of leveraging allied yards, such as in the 'Finland model,' to drive investment into U.S. shipbuilding capacity. This signals a significant policy shift toward integrating international partners into advanced naval construction, suggesting the Pentagon is prepared to bypass traditional domestic build requirements for future combat vessels.
Iran–United States: Toward an Agreement or a Confrontation?
English Summary
INSS argues that the U.S.-Iran track is in a temporary de-escalation, but absent major Iranian concessions the risk of renewed military confrontation remains high. The analysis cites deep gaps over Iran’s missile program and proxy support, Trump’s credibility pressures after a large U.S. force buildup, and Iran’s regime-survival mindset amid severe domestic unrest and repression as reasons diplomacy may stall. It also notes that Tehran may show limited flexibility on nuclear issues, especially after damage to enrichment capabilities, while refusing concessions on missiles and regional allies. Strategically, a nuclear-only deal with sanctions relief could stabilize the Iranian regime without resolving core regional security threats, leaving Israel and Gulf partners exposed and requiring continued coercive leverage alongside diplomacy.
中文摘要
INSS 主張，美伊互動目前處於暫時性降溫階段，但若伊朗未作出重大讓步，軍事對抗再起的風險仍然偏高。該分析指出，伊朗飛彈計畫與代理人支持問題上的深層分歧、美國在大規模軍力部署後川普所承受的可信度壓力，以及伊朗政權在嚴重國內動盪與鎮壓下以政權存續為優先的思維，皆可能使外交進程陷入停滯。分析亦提到，德黑蘭可能在核議題上展現有限彈性，尤其是在濃縮能力受損之後，但仍會拒絕在飛彈與區域盟友問題上讓步。從戰略層面看，若僅達成聚焦核問題且附帶制裁鬆綁的協議，雖可能穩定伊朗政權，卻無法化解區域核心安全威脅，將使以色列與波灣夥伴持續暴露於風險之中，並需要在外交之外維持持續性的強制槓桿。
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