The White House (via OMB) strongly protests Congressional efforts within the FY 2027 NDAA to prohibit the purchase of warships from foreign shipyards. The Administration argues that these restrictions undermine national security by limiting flexibility and hindering its strategy of leveraging allied yards, such as in the 'Finland model,' to drive investment into U.S. shipbuilding capacity. This signals a significant policy shift toward integrating international partners into advanced naval construction, suggesting the Pentagon is prepared to bypass traditional domestic build requirements for future combat vessels.
De-Hamasification of the Gaza Strip: Learning from Western and Arab Models of Deradicalization
English Summary
The memorandum argues that rebuilding Gaza after the October 7 war requires more than disarmament and infrastructure repair; it requires a deliberate "de-Hamasification" process to dismantle Hamas’s ideological and institutional dominance. INSS contends that Western deradicalization templates (e.g., postwar Germany and Japan) are poorly suited to Gaza’s current social and political conditions, and instead highlights contemporary Arab "civic-transformative" models as more applicable. Its reasoning emphasizes a combined approach: sustained security demilitarization, Arab-led religious and political legitimization, re-education toward tolerance, and economic rehabilitation tied to a credible political horizon. Strategically, the paper implies that Israel and regional partners should pursue an integrated security-political-religious framework to build a durable post-Hamas governing alternative and reduce long-term instability.
中文摘要
該備忘錄主張，於 10 月 7 日戰爭後重建加薩，不能僅止於解除武裝與修復基礎設施；更需要一套有意識、具規劃性的「去哈瑪斯化」進程，以瓦解哈瑪斯在意識形態與制度層面的主導地位。INSS 認為，西方去激進化範本（如戰後德國與日本）與加薩當前社會與政治條件契合度不足，因而強調當代阿拉伯「公民轉型」模式更具適用性。其論證重點在於綜合性路徑：持續性的安全去軍事化、由阿拉伯方面主導的宗教與政治正當化、導向寬容的再教育，以及與可信政治前景掛鉤的經濟復健。就戰略層面而言，本文意涵是以色列與區域夥伴應推動一體化的安全—政治—宗教框架，以建立可持續的後哈瑪斯治理替代方案，並降低長期不穩定風險。
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