The White House (via OMB) strongly protests Congressional efforts within the FY 2027 NDAA to prohibit the purchase of warships from foreign shipyards. The Administration argues that these restrictions undermine national security by limiting flexibility and hindering its strategy of leveraging allied yards, such as in the 'Finland model,' to drive investment into U.S. shipbuilding capacity. This signals a significant policy shift toward integrating international partners into advanced naval construction, suggesting the Pentagon is prepared to bypass traditional domestic build requirements for future combat vessels.
Can the UK afford to fight a war?
English Summary
The panel’s core finding is that the UK can afford warfighting only if it makes earlier, harder political choices on defence spending and reform, because current plans are too slow for the threat timeline. Speakers argued that moving from roughly 2.3% to 3.5% of GDP requires major trade-offs (higher taxes, cuts elsewhere, or more borrowing) and that past procurement failures have weakened confidence that spending converts into usable capability. They stressed that modern conflict would hit the UK homeland through cyber, disinformation, and infrastructure disruption as well as missiles and drones, while reduced US support raises the burden on Europe. Strategically, the UK should accelerate readiness, improve procurement accountability and industrial surge capacity, rebuild stockpiles, and run a more honest national debate on resilience, mobilisation, and societal preparedness.
中文摘要
該小組的核心結論是：英國唯有更早做出更艱難的國防支出與改革政治抉擇，才有能力負擔作戰需求，因為現行規劃相對於威脅時間表過於遲緩。與談者指出，將國防支出由約占 GDP 的 2.3% 提升至 3.5% 需要重大取捨（提高稅負、削減其他支出或增加舉債），而過往採購失靈也削弱了外界對「支出能轉化為可用戰力」的信心。他們強調，現代衝突不僅會透過飛彈與無人機，也會透過網路攻擊、假訊息與關鍵基礎設施干擾直接衝擊英國本土；同時，美國支持減少也提高了歐洲須承擔的負擔。就戰略而言，英國應加速戰備、強化採購問責與國防產業的快速擴產能力、重建庫存，並就韌性、動員與社會整備展開更坦誠的全國性辯論。
Related Entries
-
1.
-
2.
The Western Pacific remains a highly active theater defined by sustained U.S.-led military exercises and escalating great power competition. Key evidence includes continuous joint operations, such as RIMPAC 2026 in Hawaii and the deployment of CSGs into the South China Sea, juxtaposed with increased naval activity from both China (PLAN task groups) and Russia near Japan's critical straits. These movements underscore a strategic push by non-allied powers to assert presence and challenge regional norms. Policy implications dictate that allied nations must maintain robust multilateral cooperation and interoperability to safeguard freedom of navigation and manage escalating tensions in the Indo-Pacific.
-
3.
The article argues that the post-Cold War era of U.S. unipolarity, established by the perceived invincibility demonstrated during the Gulf War, has ended. This decline is driven by globalization and technological diffusion, which have democratized advanced military capabilities, allowing regional actors to challenge major powers. Consequently, policymakers must prepare for a more volatile international order marked by frequent crises, heightened costs for securing global trade chokepoints, and reduced predictability from American power. The new rules dictate that great powers can no longer effortlessly impose their will through force.
-
4.
The article argues that current market borrowing costs are rising independently of the Federal Reserve's policy stance, challenging the assumption that the Fed controls all rates. Evidence shows significant increases in key rates—such as 2-year Treasuries and mortgages—even while the effective federal funds rate remains steady. This divergence occurs because market rates reflect complex factors like inflation expectations, credit risk, and geopolitical volatility, which are outside the central bank's direct control. Policymakers should therefore recognize that sustainable rate moderation requires credible disinflation and disciplined government budgets, rather than relying solely on Fed intervention.
-
5.
Despite recent trade setbacks, the U.S. retains fundamental structural economic leverage over China, particularly in high-tech sectors and intermediate goods. While Beijing can temporarily weaponize specific resources like rare earths, these chokepoints are vulnerable to diversification efforts by the West. The article argues that the most effective strategy is not unilateral action but coordinated multilateral pressure from U.S. allies across Asia and Europe. Washington must therefore coordinate its economic statecraft with partners to maximize damage to China’s export-dependent model.