The paper argues that Nordic-Baltic states are increasing engagement with the Indo-Pacific, driven by shared security concerns heightened by the war in Ukraine. The most significant area of convergence is the shared threat of subsea cable disruptions, which both regions view as a critical hybrid security challenge. While the Nordic-Baltic states are inclined toward a NATO-like defense architecture, the paper notes a structural disconnect with the diverse, often national-level, responses in the Indo-Pacific. Consequently, future collaboration is projected to be domain-specific—focusing on technical issues like critical infrastructure protection—rather than encompassing broad regional military or diplomatic alignment.
IISS
This hub page collects curated ThinkTankWeekly entries for IISS and links readers back to the publisher for the original reports.
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Türkiye is undergoing a profound strategic shift to achieve defense-industrial autonomy by building a sophisticated, multi-layered missile arsenal. This transformation is evidenced by a twin-track approach that combines limited foreign imports with aggressive domestic development of both ballistic and cruise missiles. Key advancements include extending missile ranges far beyond initial capabilities and enabling diverse, multi-platform strike options through domestic engine development. This rapid build-up significantly enhances Türkiye's strategic deterrent capabilities, reducing reliance on NATO guarantees and projecting power across wider regional areas.
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The paper identifies that Europe's civil defense architecture is highly fragmented, creating a significant gap between nations with robust, whole-of-society systems and those that remain critically exposed. The core finding is that the modern threat environment, where the distinction between war and peace is increasingly blurred, demands a systemic overhaul of preparedness. Therefore, closing this defensive gap requires more than increased state spending; it necessitates a fundamental rethinking of how states, civil society, and the private sector collaboratively prepare for complex, non-traditional threats.
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This IISS report argues that European NATO allies must accelerate development of independent military space capabilities to reduce dangerous dependence on the United States in a contested space domain threatened by Russia's demonstrated counterspace capabilities. Europe currently relies heavily on the US for critical functions including satellite launch, intelligence-surveillance-reconnaissance, missile early warning, and space situational awareness. While European nations have announced significant investments totaling over $100 billion by 2030, these remain fragmented national efforts rather than a coherent strategic framework. The report concludes that burden-sharing with the US would require at least $10 billion and a decade to address critical capability gaps, while true European autonomy would require $25 billion and extend into the late 2030s. Europe requires integrated command-and-control, hardened ground infrastructure, and coordinated procurement among member states to translate space assets into actual deterrence and operational effectiveness.
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An IISS crisis simulation found that Southeast Asian nations lack the 'strategic bandwidth' and specialized literacy required to manage a major nuclear-security escalation involving great powers. Centered on a 2031 scenario of a missing nuclear submarine, the exercise highlighted that regional states rely on the SEANWFZ Treaty as a baseline but struggle to bridge the divide between China and the AUKUS partnership. Consequently, the report recommends that ASEAN enhance domestic inter-agency coordination and utilize the ADMM-Plus framework to more effectively address nuclear-related regional security threats.
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Maritime Southeast Asian states are exploring anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) strategies to secure their interests during major power conflicts, yet their current development remains rudimentary and lacks systematic planning. The paper identifies a persistent disconnect between strategic policy debates concerning regional flashpoints and the actual implementation of military doctrine, posture, and asset acquisition. Diverse security priorities and internal institutional constraints, such as army dominance in policymaking, continue to hinder the realization of full A2/AD capabilities. Consequently, the future trajectory of these capabilities will determine how these nations manage regional contingencies and coordinate with security partners seeking closer interoperability.
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The research paper identifies a significant gap in systematic planning within maritime Southeast Asian capitals concerning a potential US-China conflict over Taiwan, noting that current discussions are largely limited to evacuation contingencies. Given ASEAN’s structural collective-action issues, the author advocates for a 'building blocks' approach that strengthens domestic crisis capacity and leverages bilateral relations with the US, China, and Taiwan for preliminary planning. This strategy emphasizes enhancing existing mechanisms and developing minilateral arrangements to ensure a functional regional response architecture during major security crises.
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The paper argues that the Philippines’ shift to a Comprehensive Archipelagic Defense Concept (CADC) marks a major strategic move from broad modernization toward a geography-centered military posture focused on dispersed basing, longer-range strike, and denial operations. It reasons that worsening threat perceptions of China, especially in maritime border areas and near Taiwan, are driving this transition, but also increasing risks of sharper confrontation and security-dilemma dynamics. The analysis highlights practical constraints, including inter-service rivalry, political vulnerability to Chinese influence operations, and policy ambiguity over foreign basing access, weapons deployments, and partner force integration. Strategically, it suggests Manila should codify clearer baseline defense policies, integrate alliances more explicitly, and refine CADC’s theory of victory so deterrence objectives translate into concrete theater-level outcomes rather than capability acquisition alone.
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The paper argues that a growing number of European NATO members are rapidly pursuing deep precision strike (DPS) capabilities to address a worsening security environment and the post-INF gap in long-range conventional strike options. It finds broad strategic alignment among ELSA partners on deterrence and war-fighting utility, but highlights major national differences in doctrine, industrial capacity, technological baseline, and motivations—illustrated by France and the UK’s dual deterrence/war-fighting framing versus Germany and Poland’s stronger deterrence-by-punishment focus on Russia. Evidence centers on planned expansion from legacy air-launched systems to ground- and sea-launched cruise and ballistic missiles in the 1,000–2,000+ km range, alongside identified enablers such as ISR and kill-chain integration. Strategically, the paper suggests Europe faces difficult policy trade-offs over budgets, force mix, industrial autonomy versus urgent procurement, and unresolved risks around MTCR constraints, Russian reactions, and regional nuclear stability.
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The paper argues that South Korea is becoming a major defence exporter, especially as European states accelerate rearmament and seek reliable suppliers beyond traditional sources. It attributes Seoul’s rise to a combination of scalable industrial capacity, relatively fast delivery timelines, competitive pricing, and growing political-strategic alignment with European security priorities. The analysis also highlights constraints, including production bottlenecks, technology-transfer sensitivities, sustainment demands, and the need to balance exports with South Korea’s own military readiness and regional risks. Strategically, it suggests Europe–South Korea cooperation should move from one-off procurement to longer-term partnerships in co-production, interoperability, and supply-chain resilience.
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IISS argues that the EU’s SAFE instrument, while framed as opening some space for third-country participation, will in practice constrain non-EU defence suppliers more than many expect. The paper points to strict eligibility rules—especially the 35% non-EU component cap, EU-centered design-authority requirements, and tight 2030 delivery timelines—as major barriers, with full design-authority transfer seen as particularly unrealistic for many partners. It also cites uneven and politically difficult “enhanced terms” negotiations (e.g., late Canada agreement, UK obstacles, and no invitations for South Korea and Turkiye) as evidence that access is limited in practice. Strategically, these constraints could reduce EU access to allied technologies, weaken interoperability and joint development partnerships, and slow capability innovation in EU-funded procurement.
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12.Exploring Opportunities For European Rearmament Through Ukraines Experience And Indo Pacific Partnerships (IISS)
The paper argues that Ukraine’s wartime defense-industrial adaptation offers a practical model for European rearmament under prolonged high-intensity conflict conditions. It attributes Ukraine’s resilience to three factors: restructuring domestic defense production, rapidly diversifying and hardening supply chains, and building flexible external industrial partnerships beyond Europe. The analysis highlights the growing strategic relevance of Indo-Pacific actors such as South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan for technology and components, while noting that dependence on China remains both operationally important and geopolitically risky. For European strategy, the report implies that rearmament planning should prioritize industrial agility, supplier diversification, and broader cross-regional defense partnerships to strengthen long-term resilience.
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IISS argues that the EU is becoming a much stronger regulator and financier of Europe’s defence market, even though NATO remains the main provider of military security. It points to a sharp rise in EU-level defence funding and instruments—from virtually no dedicated budget before 2014 to major 2021–27 allocations, a proposed 2028–34 expansion, and the €150bn SAFE mechanism adopted in 2025—along with stricter rules limiting non-EU participation. The paper also notes a countervailing trend: rapidly growing national defence budgets across Europe are likely to exceed EU funds, allowing member states to bypass some Commission frameworks. Strategically, third countries should expect reduced access in EU-governed segments but may still compete in nationally controlled procurement, while closer partners could secure selective, transactional access by aligning with EU industrial and political priorities.
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14.Cloud Adoption For National Security And Defence Purposes Four Case Studies From The Asia Pacific (IISS)
The IISS paper argues that cloud computing is becoming essential for national-security and defence functions in the Asia-Pacific, and that states can combine commercial cloud benefits with sovereign control. Using case studies of Japan, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand, it shows each country adopting hybrid or phased models to handle growing data demands, improve military interoperability, and strengthen decision-making under complex cyber and geopolitical pressure. The analysis highlights that reliance on dominant hyperscalers, especially US providers, creates governance and control trade-offs that governments are managing through tailored technical, legal, and institutional safeguards. Strategically, the paper implies that effective NS&D cloud policy should prioritize secure hybrid architectures, domestic governance capacity, and clear sovereignty mechanisms rather than seeking full digital isolation.
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15.Lawless Seas Contested Shores Piracy Smuggling And The Scramble For Port Access In The Horn Of Africa (IISS)
IISS argues that maritime insecurity in the Horn of Africa is being reshaped by Somalia’s unresolved state fragility, producing a renewed mix of piracy, arms-smuggling, and strategic competition over ports and bases. The report links piracy’s resurgence since late 2023 to reduced international naval pressure, relaxed commercial risk controls, and regional diversion caused by Red Sea attacks, while also documenting cross-Gulf arms networks that move munitions and dual-use components between Yemen and the Horn. It finds that although external powers are increasingly active, many port and basing ambitions remain tentative, with outcomes still heavily mediated by local actors and domestic Somali/Somaliland politics. For policy, the implication is to pair maritime deterrence with sustained land-side governance and counter-smuggling efforts, while managing great-power and Gulf rivalries through long-horizon diplomacy that accounts for rapid political shifts such as Somaliland recognition and Somalia’s cancellation of UAE agreements.
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The paper argues that maritime deterrence in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore is highly localized: security infrastructure reduces risk only in small, place-specific zones, while low-level piracy and armed robbery persist in nearby choke points. Using ReCAAP incident data from 2007 to August 2025, the authors show crime is strongly clustered rather than random, with hotspots concentrated within roughly 50 nautical miles of security infrastructure and much weaker clustering beyond 200 nautical miles. The study reasons that this pattern reflects geography and offender adaptation to predictable patrols, not simple enforcement failure, as criminals shift routes, timing, and tactics around fixed monitoring systems. Policy implication: states should treat SOMS maritime crime as a continuous risk-management problem by reducing surveillance blind spots, increasing patrol unpredictability and operational flexibility, and better synchronizing local enforcement with regional coordination mechanisms.
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The paper argues that Syria’s post-Assad transition hinges on whether fragmented armed factions can be integrated into a credible national security architecture, and that the HTS-led interim authorities’ current approach is producing serious risks. It supports this by tracing the rapid collapse of the Assad regime in late 2024, HTS’s consolidation of control in early 2025, and subsequent violence on the coast and sectarian clashes in the south that expose weaknesses in force integration and command legitimacy. The report also maps the major armed actors (HTS, SDF, SNA, NLF, Islamic State, and regime remnants) and shows how their differing ideologies, structures, and funding streams complicate unification. Strategically, it implies that policymakers should prioritize inclusive, sequenced security-sector reform with external coordination, because narrow, faction-dominated integration is likely to fuel renewed instability and regional contestation.