The White House (via OMB) strongly protests Congressional efforts within the FY 2027 NDAA to prohibit the purchase of warships from foreign shipyards. The Administration argues that these restrictions undermine national security by limiting flexibility and hindering its strategy of leveraging allied yards, such as in the 'Finland model,' to drive investment into U.S. shipbuilding capacity. This signals a significant policy shift toward integrating international partners into advanced naval construction, suggesting the Pentagon is prepared to bypass traditional domestic build requirements for future combat vessels.
Lawless Seas Contested Shores Piracy Smuggling And The Scramble For Port Access In The Horn Of Africa
English Summary
IISS argues that maritime insecurity in the Horn of Africa is being reshaped by Somalia’s unresolved state fragility, producing a renewed mix of piracy, arms-smuggling, and strategic competition over ports and bases. The report links piracy’s resurgence since late 2023 to reduced international naval pressure, relaxed commercial risk controls, and regional diversion caused by Red Sea attacks, while also documenting cross-Gulf arms networks that move munitions and dual-use components between Yemen and the Horn. It finds that although external powers are increasingly active, many port and basing ambitions remain tentative, with outcomes still heavily mediated by local actors and domestic Somali/Somaliland politics. For policy, the implication is to pair maritime deterrence with sustained land-side governance and counter-smuggling efforts, while managing great-power and Gulf rivalries through long-horizon diplomacy that accounts for rapid political shifts such as Somaliland recognition and Somalia’s cancellation of UAE agreements.
中文摘要
IISS 主張，非洲之角的海上不安全態勢正因索馬利亞未獲解決的國家脆弱性而被重塑，進而形成海盜、武器走私與圍繞港口及基地的戰略競逐再度交織的局面。報告指出，自 2023 年底以來海盜活動回升，與國際海軍壓力減弱、商業風險控管鬆動，以及紅海襲擊引發的區域注意力轉移有關；同時亦記錄了跨海灣武器網絡，將彈藥與軍民兩用零組件在葉門與非洲之角之間流通。報告發現，儘管外部強權日益活躍，許多港口與駐軍基地布局仍屬試探性，其結果仍高度受在地行為者與索馬利亞／索馬利蘭內部政治所調節。政策意涵在於：將海上嚇阻與持續性的陸上治理及反走私行動相結合，並透過著眼長期的外交管理大國與海灣國家競爭，同時納入索馬利蘭承認與索馬利亞取消阿聯協議等快速政治變動因素。
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