ThinkTankWeekly

Deep Precision Strike Europes Quest For Long Range Missile Capabilities

IISS | 2026-02-22 | defense

Topics: NATO, Nuclear, Russia, Trade

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English Summary

The paper argues that a growing number of European NATO members are rapidly pursuing deep precision strike (DPS) capabilities to address a worsening security environment and the post-INF gap in long-range conventional strike options. It finds broad strategic alignment among ELSA partners on deterrence and war-fighting utility, but highlights major national differences in doctrine, industrial capacity, technological baseline, and motivations—illustrated by France and the UK’s dual deterrence/war-fighting framing versus Germany and Poland’s stronger deterrence-by-punishment focus on Russia. Evidence centers on planned expansion from legacy air-launched systems to ground- and sea-launched cruise and ballistic missiles in the 1,000–2,000+ km range, alongside identified enablers such as ISR and kill-chain integration. Strategically, the paper suggests Europe faces difficult policy trade-offs over budgets, force mix, industrial autonomy versus urgent procurement, and unresolved risks around MTCR constraints, Russian reactions, and regional nuclear stability.

中文摘要

該論文主張,愈來愈多歐洲北約成員正迅速推進縱深精確打擊(DPS)能力,以因應惡化的安全環境,以及《中程核力量條約》(INF)終止後遠程常規打擊選項的缺口。研究發現,ELSA夥伴在嚇阻與作戰效用上具有廣泛戰略一致性,但也凸顯各國在作戰準則、產業能力、技術基線與政策動機上的重大差異;其中,法國與英國採取「雙重嚇阻/作戰」框架,而德國與波蘭則更強調針對俄羅斯的「懲罰性嚇阻」。證據重點在於,相關國家計畫由傳統空射系統擴展至射程約1,000至2,000公里以上的陸基與海基巡弋與彈道飛彈,並同步強化ISR與殺傷鏈整合等關鍵支撐能力。就戰略層面而言,論文指出歐洲將面臨艱難政策取捨,包括預算配置、兵力組合、產業自主與緊急採購之間的平衡,以及MTCR限制、俄方反應與區域核穩定性等尚未解決的風險。

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