The article argues that modern conflicts are increasingly defined by attrition, driven by three strategic gaps: the difference between nominal military power and usable capacity; the difficulty of achieving breakthroughs in a technologically advanced battlefield; and the detachment of military means from clear political objectives. Evidence from Ukraine and the Middle East demonstrates that sustained logistics, rapid technological adaptation, and proxy networks are now more decisive than sheer military size. For policymakers, this implies a strategic shift away from seeking short, decisive victories toward preparing for prolonged, high-cost engagements, requiring a focus on sustainable supply chains and defining concrete, attainable political end-states.
Deep Precision Strike Europes Quest For Long Range Missile Capabilities
English Summary
The paper argues that a growing number of European NATO members are rapidly pursuing deep precision strike (DPS) capabilities to address a worsening security environment and the post-INF gap in long-range conventional strike options. It finds broad strategic alignment among ELSA partners on deterrence and war-fighting utility, but highlights major national differences in doctrine, industrial capacity, technological baseline, and motivations—illustrated by France and the UK’s dual deterrence/war-fighting framing versus Germany and Poland’s stronger deterrence-by-punishment focus on Russia. Evidence centers on planned expansion from legacy air-launched systems to ground- and sea-launched cruise and ballistic missiles in the 1,000–2,000+ km range, alongside identified enablers such as ISR and kill-chain integration. Strategically, the paper suggests Europe faces difficult policy trade-offs over budgets, force mix, industrial autonomy versus urgent procurement, and unresolved risks around MTCR constraints, Russian reactions, and regional nuclear stability.
中文摘要
該論文主張，愈來愈多歐洲北約成員正迅速推進縱深精確打擊（DPS）能力，以因應惡化的安全環境，以及《中程核力量條約》（INF）終止後遠程常規打擊選項的缺口。研究發現，ELSA夥伴在嚇阻與作戰效用上具有廣泛戰略一致性，但也凸顯各國在作戰準則、產業能力、技術基線與政策動機上的重大差異；其中，法國與英國採取「雙重嚇阻／作戰」框架，而德國與波蘭則更強調針對俄羅斯的「懲罰性嚇阻」。證據重點在於，相關國家計畫由傳統空射系統擴展至射程約1,000至2,000公里以上的陸基與海基巡弋與彈道飛彈，並同步強化ISR與殺傷鏈整合等關鍵支撐能力。就戰略層面而言，論文指出歐洲將面臨艱難政策取捨，包括預算配置、兵力組合、產業自主與緊急採購之間的平衡，以及MTCR限制、俄方反應與區域核穩定性等尚未解決的風險。
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