The article argues that modern conflicts are increasingly defined by attrition, driven by three strategic gaps: the difference between nominal military power and usable capacity; the difficulty of achieving breakthroughs in a technologically advanced battlefield; and the detachment of military means from clear political objectives. Evidence from Ukraine and the Middle East demonstrates that sustained logistics, rapid technological adaptation, and proxy networks are now more decisive than sheer military size. For policymakers, this implies a strategic shift away from seeking short, decisive victories toward preparing for prolonged, high-cost engagements, requiring a focus on sustainable supply chains and defining concrete, attainable political end-states.
Infrastructure Of Insecurity Deterring Maritime Incidents In The Malacca Straits
English Summary
The paper argues that maritime deterrence in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore is highly localized: security infrastructure reduces risk only in small, place-specific zones, while low-level piracy and armed robbery persist in nearby choke points. Using ReCAAP incident data from 2007 to August 2025, the authors show crime is strongly clustered rather than random, with hotspots concentrated within roughly 50 nautical miles of security infrastructure and much weaker clustering beyond 200 nautical miles. The study reasons that this pattern reflects geography and offender adaptation to predictable patrols, not simple enforcement failure, as criminals shift routes, timing, and tactics around fixed monitoring systems. Policy implication: states should treat SOMS maritime crime as a continuous risk-management problem by reducing surveillance blind spots, increasing patrol unpredictability and operational flexibility, and better synchronizing local enforcement with regional coordination mechanisms.
中文摘要
該論文主張，麻六甲與新加坡海峽的海上嚇阻具有高度在地化特性：安全基礎設施僅能在小範圍、特定地點的水域降低風險，而鄰近咽喉航道中的低強度海盜與武裝搶劫仍持續存在。作者運用 ReCAAP 於2007年至2025年8月的事件資料指出，相關犯罪呈現明顯群聚而非隨機分布；熱點多集中於距離安全基礎設施約50海里內，超過200海里後群聚效應則顯著減弱。研究認為，此一型態反映的是地理條件與犯案者對可預測巡邏的適應，而非單純執法失靈，因犯罪者會繞開固定監控系統，調整航線、時機與手法。政策意涵是：各國應將SOMS海上犯罪視為持續性的風險管理課題，透過縮減監偵盲區、提高巡邏不可預測性與作業彈性，並更有效同步在地執法與區域協調機制。
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