The White House (via OMB) strongly protests Congressional efforts within the FY 2027 NDAA to prohibit the purchase of warships from foreign shipyards. The Administration argues that these restrictions undermine national security by limiting flexibility and hindering its strategy of leveraging allied yards, such as in the 'Finland model,' to drive investment into U.S. shipbuilding capacity. This signals a significant policy shift toward integrating international partners into advanced naval construction, suggesting the Pentagon is prepared to bypass traditional domestic build requirements for future combat vessels.
Cross-strait crossroads: Pathways for America’s Taiwan policy
English Summary
This Brookings-RAND joint initiative examines whether current U.S. policy toward Taiwan and cross-strait relations remains adequate amid a deteriorating security environment in the Taiwan Strait. Through a series of expert workshops, the project explores five distinct policy pathways: limiting U.S. commitments while boosting Taiwan's self-defense, calibrating diplomacy to stabilize cross-strait dynamics, pursuing a more active denial strategy, and shifting toward strategic clarity. The analysis weighs how each option would affect U.S. deterrence posture, Taiwan's domestic politics, Beijing's strategic calculus, and broader Indo-Pacific security. The initiative signals growing mainstream debate within the U.S. policy community about whether the longstanding framework of strategic ambiguity should be revised or replaced, with significant implications for alliance management and escalation risk in the region.
中文摘要
此布魯金斯學會與蘭德公司聯合研究計畫探討，在台灣海峽安全環境持續惡化之際，美國現行對台及兩岸關係政策是否仍足以因應當前局勢。該計畫透過一系列專家工作坊，評估五種不同的政策路徑：限縮美國承諾同時強化台灣自我防衛能力、校準外交手段以穩定兩岸動態、採取更積極的拒止戰略，以及轉向戰略清晰。分析權衡每一選項對美國嚇阻態勢、台灣內部政治、北京戰略考量及更廣泛印太安全的影響。該倡議反映出美國政策圈內部就長期以來的戰略模糊框架是否應予修正或取代，正展開日益主流化的辯論，對區域聯盟管理及升級風險具有重大意涵。
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