ThinkTankWeekly

How is the Iran War Impacting China's Economy

CSIS | 2026-05-04

Topics: China, Middle East

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English Summary

Reduced Export Demand: The war has weakened global economic growth, with the IMF cutting its 2026 global GDP forecast to 3.1%. Major Chinese export markets — including India, Southeast Asian nations, and the UAE — have seen sharp declines in projected import growth. Since nearly one-third of China's GDP growth in 2025 came from net exports, this drop in foreign demand threatens to further dampen China's economic momentum. Energy Disruptions: Over one-third of China's crude oil supply transits the Strait of Hormuz annually. Since the war began, domestic gasoline prices in China have surged 39% and LNG prices by 42% — record increases surpassing even the spike following Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Nevertheless, China is better insulated than most economies thanks to its massive strategic oil reserves (~1.4 billion barrels), diversified energy suppliers, heavy reliance on domestic coal, and comparatively high EV adoption rates. Supply Chain Challenges: Rising energy and commodity costs are squeezing Chinese manufacturers. Semiconductors face shortages of helium and naphtha; agriculture is being hit by soaring fertilizer and pesticide prices; and the plastics industry is under severe strain, with polypropylene prices rising 40% between February and mid-April. Investment Risks: The Middle East was China's top overseas investment destination in 2025, with over $26 billion committed. Iranian retaliatory strikes have already damaged Chinese-linked infrastructure, and ongoing instability threatens both existing and future Chinese investments across the region. In conclusion, while China is more resilient than many neighbors, the Iran War poses substantial short-term headwinds across multiple dimensions of its economy.

中文摘要

2026年2月28日伊朗戰爭爆發後,霍爾木茲海峽的通航受阻,對全球經濟造成嚴重衝擊,中國作為世界第二大經濟體,面臨多方面的重大威脅。 出口需求下滑:戰爭導致全球經濟成長放緩,IMF將2026年全球GDP成長預測下修至3.1%,中國的主要出口市場(如印度、東南亞國家、阿聯酋等)進口需求大幅萎縮。中國2025年近三分之一的GDP成長依賴淨出口,外需下滑將直接拖累其經濟表現。 能源衝擊:中國每年超過三分之一的原油供應須途經霍爾木茲海峽,戰爭導致中國國內汽油零售價自3月初至4月中旬上漲39%,LNG價格更飆升42%,創歷史新高。不過,中國憑藉全球最大的戰略石油儲備(約14億桶)、多元化的能源來源、煤炭自給能力及較高的電動車普及率,抵禦能源衝擊的能力優於許多鄰國。 供應鏈壓力:能源與原物料價格飆漲衝擊中國製造業。半導體所需的氦氣與石腦油、農業所需的化肥與農藥、以及塑膠製品的生產成本均大幅上升,各產業面臨利潤侵蝕與供應短缺的雙重壓力。 投資風險:中東是2025年中國海外投資的最大目的地,總額逾260億美元。伊朗的反擊行動已波及中國在科威特等地的基礎設施,區域不穩定性也令未來的投資信心承壓。 總體而言,伊朗戰爭對中國經濟構成多重挑戰,雖然中國的抗壓韌性優於多數亞洲鄰國,但短期衝擊仍相當顯著。

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