The White House (via OMB) strongly protests Congressional efforts within the FY 2027 NDAA to prohibit the purchase of warships from foreign shipyards. The Administration argues that these restrictions undermine national security by limiting flexibility and hindering its strategy of leveraging allied yards, such as in the 'Finland model,' to drive investment into U.S. shipbuilding capacity. This signals a significant policy shift toward integrating international partners into advanced naval construction, suggesting the Pentagon is prepared to bypass traditional domestic build requirements for future combat vessels.
China Didn’t De-Dollarize. It Just Hid Its Dollars.
English Summary
China's alleged de-dollarization is misleading; the nation is not reducing its dollar exposure but rather shifting dollar assets from transparent official reserves into opaque, state-controlled policy banks and investment funds. Analysis suggests that the true dollar liquidity is maintained through these non-disclosed state channels, potentially exceeding the amount held on the central bank's balance sheet. This indicates that China retains significant dollar depth and financial resilience, despite public data suggesting otherwise. Policymakers must therefore look beyond official reserve figures and account for the dollar exposure maintained through these state-owned financial mechanisms when assessing China's global financial strategy.
中文摘要
關於中國所謂的「去美元化」論點具有誤導性；該國並非減少美元敞口，而是將美元資產從透明的官方外匯儲備，轉移至不透明的、由國家控制的政策性銀行和投資基金。分析指出，真正的美元流動性是透過這些未公開的國家渠道維持的，其規模可能超過中央銀行資產負債表上所顯示的金額。這表明，儘管公開數據呈現出不同的情況，中國仍保有顯著的美元深度和金融韌性。因此，政策制定者在評估中國的全球金融戰略時，必須超越官方外匯儲備數據，並將透過這些國有金融機制維護的美元敞口納入考量。
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