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The Upside of U.S.-Chinese Strategic Competition: Institutional Balancing and Order Transition in the Asia Pacific

Foreign Affairs | 2026-02-17 | china_indopacific

Topics: China, Nuclear, United States

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English Summary

The analysis argues that U.S.-Chinese strategic competition is unlikely to escalate into military conflict due to nuclear deterrence and deep economic interdependence. Instead, the rivalry is channeled through multilateral institutions, which forces constructive reforms and generates positive regional dividends. Key evidence includes China's establishment of the AIIB, which spurred reform in other development banks, and the subsequent strengthening of organizations like ASEAN and the UN. Policymakers should view this great-power competition not merely as a source of friction, but as a powerful, albeit challenging, mechanism driving institutional balancing and positive order transition across the Asia Pacific.

中文摘要

本分析認為,由於核威懾和深層經濟相互依賴,美中之間的戰略競爭不太可能升級為軍事衝突。相反地,這場競爭正透過多邊機構進行引導,從而促成建設性改革並產生積極的區域紅利。關鍵證據包括中國建立亞洲基礎設施投資銀行(AIIB),這激勵了其他開發銀行進行改革,並進一步鞏固了東盟和聯合國等組織。政策制定者應將這種大國競爭視為不單單是摩擦的來源,而是一個強大但充滿挑戰的機制,推動亞太地區的制度平衡和積極秩序轉型。

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