The White House (via OMB) strongly protests Congressional efforts within the FY 2027 NDAA to prohibit the purchase of warships from foreign shipyards. The Administration argues that these restrictions undermine national security by limiting flexibility and hindering its strategy of leveraging allied yards, such as in the 'Finland model,' to drive investment into U.S. shipbuilding capacity. This signals a significant policy shift toward integrating international partners into advanced naval construction, suggesting the Pentagon is prepared to bypass traditional domestic build requirements for future combat vessels.
Asia After America
English Summary
The article critiques the long-standing U.S. strategic commitment, known as the 'pivot to Asia,' arguing that the initial premise—that rebalancing resources was the sole way to prevent Chinese dominance—has failed. It traces the bipartisan assumption since 2011 that the U.S. must focus on the Asia-Pacific to counter Beijing's rise. The piece implies that the current strategic framework is insufficient, suggesting that the U.S. must fundamentally reassess its approach to the region. Policy implications suggest a need to move beyond the original 'pivot' narrative to craft a more adaptable and effective long-term strategy.
中文摘要
本文批判了美國長期奉行的戰略承諾，即所謂的「轉向亞洲」（pivot to Asia）。文章指出，最初假設——即重新平衡資源是阻止中國主導地位的唯一途徑——已經證明失敗。它追溯了自 2011 年以來，兩黨共識中一直存在的假設，即美國必須將重點放在亞太地區，以應對北京的崛起。本文暗示，現行的戰略框架已經不足夠，並建議美國必須從根本上重新評估其對該地區的方法。從政策層面來看，這意味著必須超越最初的「轉向」敘事，才能制定出更具適應性和有效性的長期戰略。
Related Entries
-
1.
-
2.
The Western Pacific remains a highly active theater defined by sustained U.S.-led military exercises and escalating great power competition. Key evidence includes continuous joint operations, such as RIMPAC 2026 in Hawaii and the deployment of CSGs into the South China Sea, juxtaposed with increased naval activity from both China (PLAN task groups) and Russia near Japan's critical straits. These movements underscore a strategic push by non-allied powers to assert presence and challenge regional norms. Policy implications dictate that allied nations must maintain robust multilateral cooperation and interoperability to safeguard freedom of navigation and manage escalating tensions in the Indo-Pacific.
-
3.
The article argues that the post-Cold War era of U.S. unipolarity, established by the perceived invincibility demonstrated during the Gulf War, has ended. This decline is driven by globalization and technological diffusion, which have democratized advanced military capabilities, allowing regional actors to challenge major powers. Consequently, policymakers must prepare for a more volatile international order marked by frequent crises, heightened costs for securing global trade chokepoints, and reduced predictability from American power. The new rules dictate that great powers can no longer effortlessly impose their will through force.
-
4.
The article argues that current market borrowing costs are rising independently of the Federal Reserve's policy stance, challenging the assumption that the Fed controls all rates. Evidence shows significant increases in key rates—such as 2-year Treasuries and mortgages—even while the effective federal funds rate remains steady. This divergence occurs because market rates reflect complex factors like inflation expectations, credit risk, and geopolitical volatility, which are outside the central bank's direct control. Policymakers should therefore recognize that sustainable rate moderation requires credible disinflation and disciplined government budgets, rather than relying solely on Fed intervention.
-
5.
Despite recent trade setbacks, the U.S. retains fundamental structural economic leverage over China, particularly in high-tech sectors and intermediate goods. While Beijing can temporarily weaponize specific resources like rare earths, these chokepoints are vulnerable to diversification efforts by the West. The article argues that the most effective strategy is not unilateral action but coordinated multilateral pressure from U.S. allies across Asia and Europe. Washington must therefore coordinate its economic statecraft with partners to maximize damage to China’s export-dependent model.