The White House (via OMB) strongly protests Congressional efforts within the FY 2027 NDAA to prohibit the purchase of warships from foreign shipyards. The Administration argues that these restrictions undermine national security by limiting flexibility and hindering its strategy of leveraging allied yards, such as in the 'Finland model,' to drive investment into U.S. shipbuilding capacity. This signals a significant policy shift toward integrating international partners into advanced naval construction, suggesting the Pentagon is prepared to bypass traditional domestic build requirements for future combat vessels.
What Are Iran’s Nuclear and Missile Capabilities?
English Summary
CFR argues that Iran still does not have a nuclear weapon, but it retains the technical base to move quickly toward one and continues to field the Middle East’s most extensive ballistic missile arsenal despite major Israeli and U.S. strikes in 2025. The piece cites IAEA findings of sharply increased near-weapons-grade enrichment, evidence of undeclared nuclear-related activity, and estimates that Iran’s breakout timeline for fissile material could be very short, while missile capabilities include systems with roughly 2,000 km range and demonstrated use in 2024 attacks on Israel. It also notes that military strikes may have delayed but not eliminated Iran’s program, as rebuilding and renewed U.S.-Iran talks in Oman suggest coercion alone has limits. Strategically, the article implies policymakers need a combined approach of verifiable nuclear constraints, missile/proxy limits, calibrated sanctions relief, and credible deterrence to reduce risks of regional war, proliferation, and escalation through miscalculation.
中文摘要
CFR認為，伊朗目前仍未擁有核武，但仍保有可迅速邁向核武的技術基礎；即使在2025年遭以色列與美國重大打擊後，仍維持中東規模最大的彈道飛彈庫。文章援引國際原子能總署（IAEA）發現：接近武器級的濃縮活動大幅增加、存在未申報的核相關活動跡象，且評估伊朗取得可裂變材料的「突破時間」可能極短；同時其飛彈能力包含射程約2,000公里的系統，並已在2024年對以色列攻擊中實際使用。文中亦指出，軍事打擊或許延緩但未消除伊朗計畫；重建跡象與美伊在阿曼重啟對話顯示，單靠脅迫手段存在侷限。從戰略上看，該文意指決策者需採取綜合方案，包括可驗證的核限制、對飛彈與代理人能力的約束、校準式制裁鬆綁，以及可信威懾，以降低區域戰爭、擴散與誤判升級風險。
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