The White House (via OMB) strongly protests Congressional efforts within the FY 2027 NDAA to prohibit the purchase of warships from foreign shipyards. The Administration argues that these restrictions undermine national security by limiting flexibility and hindering its strategy of leveraging allied yards, such as in the 'Finland model,' to drive investment into U.S. shipbuilding capacity. This signals a significant policy shift toward integrating international partners into advanced naval construction, suggesting the Pentagon is prepared to bypass traditional domestic build requirements for future combat vessels.
The Year Ahead in Commodity Markets
English Summary
CFR panelists argued that commodity markets have shifted from a demand-led cycle to a supply- and policy-driven regime, with metals (especially gold and silver) rising while oil remains structurally softer. They cited evidence including sustained central-bank gold purchases since the 2022 reserve-freeze shock, growing investor hedging demand, tariff uncertainty under Section 232, and OPEC+/non-OPEC supply conditions that cap oil despite geopolitical tensions. The speakers assessed that oil spikes are still possible from Iran-related disruptions or labor shocks, but likely temporary unless a major outage occurs; baseline Brent expectations clustered around the high-$50s to low-$60s. Strategically, governments and firms should treat commodities as instruments of national security and currency power (including dollar-denominated oil flows), while preparing for persistent precious-metal strength, selective industrial-metal volatility, and policy tradeoffs in U.S.-Venezuela-Canada energy alignment.
中文摘要
CFR 小組與談人指出，商品市場已從需求主導的循環，轉向由供給與政策驅動的格局；金屬（尤其是黃金與白銀）走升，而石油在結構上仍偏弱。他們引用的證據包括：自 2022 年外匯儲備凍結衝擊以來，各國央行持續買入黃金、投資人避險需求升高、《232 條款》下的關稅不確定性，以及 OPEC+ 與非 OPEC 的供給條件在地緣政治緊張下仍對油價形成上限。講者評估，與伊朗相關的干擾或勞動衝擊仍可能引發油價飆升，但除非出現重大供應中斷，影響多半僅屬暫時；布蘭特原油的基準預期大致集中於每桶 50 美元後段至 60 美元前段。從策略上看，政府與企業應將商品視為國家安全與貨幣權力（包括以美元計價的石油流）工具，同時為貴金屬持續偏強、工業金屬的選擇性波動，以及美國—委內瑞拉—加拿大能源協調中的政策權衡預作準備。
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