The White House (via OMB) strongly protests Congressional efforts within the FY 2027 NDAA to prohibit the purchase of warships from foreign shipyards. The Administration argues that these restrictions undermine national security by limiting flexibility and hindering its strategy of leveraging allied yards, such as in the 'Finland model,' to drive investment into U.S. shipbuilding capacity. This signals a significant policy shift toward integrating international partners into advanced naval construction, suggesting the Pentagon is prepared to bypass traditional domestic build requirements for future combat vessels.
Draghi wants real decision-making power in Europe, not a federal Big Bang
English Summary
The article argues that Mario Draghi is not calling for an immediate EU superstate, but for "pragmatic federalism" that gives Europe real decision-making authority in strategic domains. It reasons that loose intergovernmental coordination, especially in defense and foreign policy, leaves the EU economically strong but politically weak, while examples like the euro and the ECB show that functional federal-style authority can work without full constitutional federalism. Draghi therefore favors flexible integration among willing states, potentially outside formal EU structures at first, with late entry open to others, similar to Schengen’s path. Strategically, this implies prioritizing coalition-based institutional deepening in defense, industrial policy, taxation, and diplomacy to increase European power without waiting for politically unlikely treaty-level overhaul.
中文摘要
該文主張，馬里奧·德拉吉並非呼籲立即建立歐盟超級國家，而是倡議「務實聯邦主義」，使歐洲在戰略領域獲得真正的決策權。文章論證，鬆散的政府間協調，尤其在國防與外交政策上，使歐盟在經濟上強勁卻在政治上薄弱；同時，歐元與歐洲央行等案例顯示，即使沒有完整的憲政聯邦制，具功能性的聯邦式權力安排仍可運作。因此，德拉吉支持由有意願的國家先行推動彈性整合，初期甚至可在正式歐盟架構之外展開，並對其他國家保留後續加入的空間，路徑類似申根體系。從戰略層面看，這意味應優先透過以聯盟為基礎的制度深化，在國防、產業政策、稅制與外交領域提升歐洲實力，而非等待政治上不太可能實現的條約層級全面改革。
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