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Trump, Iran, and Diego Garcia: Inside the Fight Over a Remote Military Base

CFR | 2026-03-28 | defense

Topics: China, Europe, Indo-Pacific, Middle East, Russia, United States, Defense

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English Summary

The UK-Mauritius agreement to return the Chagos Archipelago grants Mauritius sovereignty while allowing the U.S. to maintain the critical Diego Garcia military base for 99 years (potentially renewable indefinitely) at no cost, securing strategic access to the Indian Ocean for operations in the Middle East and East Africa. Trump's opposition to the deal, citing national security concerns, appears rooted in geopolitical leverage disputes with UK leadership rather than genuine military vulnerabilities; experts argue the arrangement actually strengthens U.S. interests by providing legal clarity and perpetual access. Iran's March 2026 ballistic missile attack on Diego Garcia—the base's first direct targeting—demonstrates extended Iranian strike capability and validates the base's critical role in U.S. regional defense, though the agreement preserves full American operational control. The proposed framework represents a strategic win for all parties: Mauritius regains sovereignty, the UK resolves international legal liability, and the U.S. secures cost-free long-term access to a strategically vital facility.

中文摘要

英毛協議將查戈斯群島主權歸還毛里求斯,同時允許美國以零成本維持戰略關鍵的迪亞哥加西亞軍事基地99年(潛在可無限期續約),確保美國對印度洋的戰略進入,支援中東及東非地區行動。川普以國家安全為由反對該協議,其根本動因似乎源於與英國領導層的地緣政治籌碼爭議,而非真實軍事脆弱性;專家認為該安排實際上通過提供法律確定性和永久進入權來強化美國利益。伊朗於2026年3月對迪亞哥加西亞軍事基地發動的彈道飛彈攻擊——該基地首次遭受直接攻擊——展示伊朗具備遠程打擊能力,驗證該基地在美國地區防衛中的關鍵作用,儘管協議保留美國的完全行動控制權。所提議框架對所有各方均屬戰略勝利:毛里求斯恢復主權、英國化解國際法律責任,美國確保對戰略至為關鍵設施的無成本長期進入。

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