The White House (via OMB) strongly protests Congressional efforts within the FY 2027 NDAA to prohibit the purchase of warships from foreign shipyards. The Administration argues that these restrictions undermine national security by limiting flexibility and hindering its strategy of leveraging allied yards, such as in the 'Finland model,' to drive investment into U.S. shipbuilding capacity. This signals a significant policy shift toward integrating international partners into advanced naval construction, suggesting the Pentagon is prepared to bypass traditional domestic build requirements for future combat vessels.
Hauser Symposium: America at 250
English Summary
The Hauser Symposium examines the evolution of the U.S.-led international order across three critical phases: the post-WWII commitment to global engagement, the lost promise of post-Cold War optimism for liberal order and unipolarity, and the disruptive effects of Trump-era policy shifts. The symposium argues that U.S. foreign policy has been shaped by foundational decisions made in each era, with the post-Cold War period's hopes for expanded globalization and convergence ultimately giving way to renewed great power competition. The discussion suggests the U.S. faces a structural inflection point requiring reassessment of its global role and strategic choices in a multipolar international system.
中文摘要
豪瑟研討會探討美國主導的國際秩序在三個關鍵階段的演變：二戰後對全球參與的承諾、冷戰後對自由主義秩序與美國單極地位的期許未實現，以及特朗普時代政策轉變所造成的破壞性衝擊。研討會主張美國外交政策受到各時代基礎性決策的深刻塑造，冷戰後時期對全球化擴展與世界收斂的樂觀願景，最終讓位於新興大國競爭的復興。討論表明，美國正面臨結構性轉折點，需要在多極國際體系中重新評估其全球角色與戰略選擇。
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