The White House (via OMB) strongly protests Congressional efforts within the FY 2027 NDAA to prohibit the purchase of warships from foreign shipyards. The Administration argues that these restrictions undermine national security by limiting flexibility and hindering its strategy of leveraging allied yards, such as in the 'Finland model,' to drive investment into U.S. shipbuilding capacity. This signals a significant policy shift toward integrating international partners into advanced naval construction, suggesting the Pentagon is prepared to bypass traditional domestic build requirements for future combat vessels.
Is the MENA region stabilizing or spiralling?
English Summary
The panel’s core judgment is that MENA is showing “stabilization in name only”: open wars are partly contained, but underlying drivers of conflict are intensifying. Speakers pointed to converging internal and external pressure on Iran, a Gaza ceasefire that is effectively fragile and incomplete, renewed Saudi-UAE competition (including in Yemen), and Syria’s unsettled political order with Turkey-Israel rivalry layered on top. They also argued that a fragmented global system is producing multi-alignment rather than clear blocs, with licit and illicit financial networks blurring traditional binaries and complicating sanctions and governance. The strategic implication is that regional and Western policymakers should move beyond ad hoc conflict management toward coordinated, multi-actor political processes, while preparing for cross-border spillovers (security, migration, and economic disruption) if current flashpoints reignite.
中文摘要
該小組的核心判斷是，中東與北非（MENA）呈現的是「名義上的穩定化」：公開戰爭雖部分受控，但衝突的深層驅動因素正在加劇。與談人指出，伊朗正面臨內外壓力匯聚；加薩停火實際上脆弱且不完整；沙烏地與阿聯之間的競爭再起（包括在葉門）；以及敘利亞未定型的政治秩序上，又疊加土耳其與以色列的對抗。他們亦主張，全球體系碎片化正促成多重結盟，而非清晰陣營；合法與非法金融網絡的交錯正在模糊傳統二分法，並使制裁與治理更為複雜。其戰略意涵在於，區域與西方決策者應從權宜式衝突管理，轉向協調一致、涵蓋多方行為者的政治進程，並為當前熱點再度升級時可能引發的跨境外溢效應（安全、移民與經濟衝擊）預作準備。
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