The White House (via OMB) strongly protests Congressional efforts within the FY 2027 NDAA to prohibit the purchase of warships from foreign shipyards. The Administration argues that these restrictions undermine national security by limiting flexibility and hindering its strategy of leveraging allied yards, such as in the 'Finland model,' to drive investment into U.S. shipbuilding capacity. This signals a significant policy shift toward integrating international partners into advanced naval construction, suggesting the Pentagon is prepared to bypass traditional domestic build requirements for future combat vessels.
The Broken China Dream: How Reform Revived Totalitarianism
English Summary
The article argues that China has shifted away from a period of 'partial reform equilibrium' toward a new form of neo-totalitarianism. This shift was catalyzed by Xi Jinping, who responded to economic slowdown and legitimacy challenges by reactivating foundational totalitarian institutions, such as state dominance, information control, and systematic repression. This internal pivot is coupled with a bolder foreign policy aimed at exploiting perceived U.S. weakness, signaling a return to a Cold War dynamic. Policy analysts should anticipate that this trajectory will delay the emergence of a politically liberal China for at least another generation, necessitating strategic adjustments to engagement models.
中文摘要
本文論述中國已從「部分改革均衡」時期轉向一種新型的威權國家主義（neo-totalitarianism）。這一轉變由習近平激化，他為應對經濟放緩和合法性挑戰，重新激活了國家主導、信息控制和系統性壓制等基礎威權機構。這種內在的轉向，結合了更具野心的外交政策，旨在利用感知到的美國弱點，標誌著回歸冷戰格局。政策分析師應預期，這一軌跡將使政治自由的中國的出現至少延遲了另一個世代，從而要求對現有的參與模式進行戰略調整。
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