The White House (via OMB) strongly protests Congressional efforts within the FY 2027 NDAA to prohibit the purchase of warships from foreign shipyards. The Administration argues that these restrictions undermine national security by limiting flexibility and hindering its strategy of leveraging allied yards, such as in the 'Finland model,' to drive investment into U.S. shipbuilding capacity. This signals a significant policy shift toward integrating international partners into advanced naval construction, suggesting the Pentagon is prepared to bypass traditional domestic build requirements for future combat vessels.
China, Not Europe, is the Source of the World’s Imbalances
English Summary
The article argues that major international organizations (IMF/OECD) are presenting a misleading picture of global imbalances by relying on flawed statistical methodologies for both China and Europe. Key evidence highlights that China's true current account surplus is significantly larger than reported, due to questionable adjustments in its balance of payments data and an underestimated investment income surplus. Furthermore, European data must be adjusted for Ireland’s massive profit-shifting impact from US multinationals, which artificially inflates the goods/services surplus. Policymakers must demand that international bodies adopt more rigorous, transparent accounting methods—such as using customs trade balances or netting out distortions—to accurately assess global savings and investment imbalances.
中文摘要
本文論點指出，主要國際組織（如國際貨幣基金組織/經濟合作暨發展組織）在評估全球失衡時，依賴於針對中國和歐洲的統計方法論存在缺陷，從而呈現了誤導性的圖景。關鍵證據顯示，由於其國際收支數據中可疑的調整以及低估的投資收入盈餘，中國真實的經常帳盈餘遠超報告數值。此外，歐盟的數據必須根據愛爾蘭來自美國跨國企業的大量利潤轉移影響進行修正，否則會人為地誇大商品/服務品剩餘額。政策制定者應要求國際機構採用更嚴謹、透明的會計方法——例如使用海關貿易平衡或抵銷扭曲因素——以準確評估全球儲蓄與投資失衡。
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