The White House (via OMB) strongly protests Congressional efforts within the FY 2027 NDAA to prohibit the purchase of warships from foreign shipyards. The Administration argues that these restrictions undermine national security by limiting flexibility and hindering its strategy of leveraging allied yards, such as in the 'Finland model,' to drive investment into U.S. shipbuilding capacity. This signals a significant policy shift toward integrating international partners into advanced naval construction, suggesting the Pentagon is prepared to bypass traditional domestic build requirements for future combat vessels.
Middle Powers Take Center Stage
English Summary
The global order is not collapsing, but fragmenting into exclusive, competing coalitions, prompting middle powers to hedge their bets and form smaller, self-protective blocs. This trend is fueled by the U.S.'s own policies, such as 'friendshoring' and the Inflation Reduction Act, which create selective, invitation-only economic clubs that exclude many potential partners. This exclusionary approach risks alienating the very middle powers the U.S. needs to maintain influence. To successfully lead a new international order, Washington must pivot from selective groupings to rebuilding inclusive, shared partnerships, prioritizing broad cooperation over transactional alliances.
中文摘要
全球秩序並非崩塌，而是正在碎片化，分裂為排他性、相互競爭的聯盟。這促使中等強國採取權衡利弊的策略，組建更小、更具自我保護性的集團。此趨勢的推動力源於美國自身的政策，例如「友邦化」（friendshoring）和《通膨削減法案》（IRA），這些政策創造了選擇性、僅限受邀參與的經濟俱樂部，排除了許多潛在的合作夥伴。這種排他性的做法，有使美國疏遠其維持影響力所必需的中等強國的風險。若想成功引領新的國際秩序，華盛頓必須從選擇性群體轉向重建包容、共享的夥伴關係，將優先考慮廣泛的合作，而非僅限於交易性的聯盟。
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