The White House (via OMB) strongly protests Congressional efforts within the FY 2027 NDAA to prohibit the purchase of warships from foreign shipyards. The Administration argues that these restrictions undermine national security by limiting flexibility and hindering its strategy of leveraging allied yards, such as in the 'Finland model,' to drive investment into U.S. shipbuilding capacity. This signals a significant policy shift toward integrating international partners into advanced naval construction, suggesting the Pentagon is prepared to bypass traditional domestic build requirements for future combat vessels.
With new funding, NSF’s Regional Innovation Engines are attempting to expand emerging clusters
English Summary
The National Science Foundation’s Regional Innovation Engines are receiving expanded funding – $45 million over three years – to bolster existing clusters and expand their reach across the U.S., driven by concerns about declining U.S. leadership in key technologies and recent disruptions highlighted by the COVID-19 pandemic and geopolitical events. The program, part of the CHIPS and Science Act, aims to foster place-based innovation by accelerating technology commercialization and creating self-sustaining regional economies. Evidence suggests a growing consensus that geographic concentration of innovation poses risks to knowledge spillovers and national competitiveness, necessitating a broader distribution of innovation hubs. This expansion aligns with broader White House initiatives to scale regional innovation ecosystems and bolster domestic technology innovation.
中文摘要
美國國家科學基金會（National Science Foundation）的區域創新引擎計畫（Regional Innovation Engines）將獲得擴大撥款，總計4500萬美元，用於加強現有集群並擴大其在美國的影響範圍。此舉旨在應對美國在關鍵技術領域領導力下降的擔憂，以及由COVID-19疫情和地緣政治事件引發的近期干擾。該計畫是《晶片與科學法案》（CHIPS and Science Act）的一部分，旨在通過加速技術商業化並創造自持的區域經濟，推動地方創新。證據顯示，越來越多的共識認為，創新地理集中存在知識溢出和國家競爭力方面的風險，因此需要更廣泛地分散創新樞紐。這一擴展與白宮更廣泛的倡議相一致，旨在擴大規模創新生態系統，並加強國內的技術創新。
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