The White House (via OMB) strongly protests Congressional efforts within the FY 2027 NDAA to prohibit the purchase of warships from foreign shipyards. The Administration argues that these restrictions undermine national security by limiting flexibility and hindering its strategy of leveraging allied yards, such as in the 'Finland model,' to drive investment into U.S. shipbuilding capacity. This signals a significant policy shift toward integrating international partners into advanced naval construction, suggesting the Pentagon is prepared to bypass traditional domestic build requirements for future combat vessels.
The New Transatlantic Bargain
English Summary
The article argues that the traditional transatlantic alliance model, which relied on US security provision and European loyalty, is obsolete due to the erosion of American primacy and the increasing autonomy of European allies. This shift requires a new bargain that is more reciprocal, selective, and grounded in mutual capabilities, as European nations are actively developing their own military, industrial, and energy resilience. For policy, the US must pivot toward a transactional partnership that extends cooperation beyond traditional defense into technology, trade, and critical supply chains. This adaptation, though less cohesive than the past, is necessary for maintaining Western strategic coherence and ensuring the long-term resilience of the alliance system.
中文摘要
本文論述，傳統的跨大西洋聯盟模式——該模式依賴美國的安全保障和歐洲的忠誠度——已因美國主導地位的削弱以及歐洲盟國獨立自主性的提升而過時。這種轉變要求建立一個新的協議框架，該框架必須更具互惠性、選擇性，並立足於共同能力，因為歐洲國家正在積極發展自身的軍事、工業和能源韌性。對於政策層面而言，美國必須轉向一種交易性夥伴關係，將合作範圍從傳統防禦領域擴展至技術、貿易和關鍵供應鏈。儘管這種調整相較於過去的凝聚力較低，但對於維持西方戰略連貫性並確保聯盟體系的長期韌性是必要的。
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