The White House (via OMB) strongly protests Congressional efforts within the FY 2027 NDAA to prohibit the purchase of warships from foreign shipyards. The Administration argues that these restrictions undermine national security by limiting flexibility and hindering its strategy of leveraging allied yards, such as in the 'Finland model,' to drive investment into U.S. shipbuilding capacity. This signals a significant policy shift toward integrating international partners into advanced naval construction, suggesting the Pentagon is prepared to bypass traditional domestic build requirements for future combat vessels.
The Open Centre: Reimagining Europe’s offer to a fractured world
English Summary
The article argues that Europe must redefine its global role by becoming an 'open centre'—a force for measure and equilibrium rather than a hegemonic power. This requires accepting that the world is no longer Europe-centric (decentering) and adopting a strategy of 'value-based realism.' Crucially, external relevance hinges on domestic renewal: Europe must first rebuild its internal civic bargain to restore trust and cohesion. If successful at home, Europe's new offer will be to act as a non-exclusive partner in solving concrete global problems—such as sustainable infrastructure or digital standards—by accommodating plurality without sacrificing coherence.
中文摘要
本文論述歐洲必須重新定義其全球角色，轉型為一個「開放中心」（open centre）——即一種促進衡量與平衡的力量，而非霸權力量。這要求歐洲接受世界已不再是以自身為中心的格局（去中心化），並採納「價值基礎的現實主義」戰略。關鍵在於外部相關性取決於內部更新：歐洲必須先重建其內部的公民契約，以恢復信任和凝聚力。若能在國內取得成功，歐洲新的全球定位將是作為一個非排他性的夥伴，協助解決具體的全球問題——例如永續基礎設施或數位標準——在不犧牲整體一致性的前提下，接納多元性。
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