The White House (via OMB) strongly protests Congressional efforts within the FY 2027 NDAA to prohibit the purchase of warships from foreign shipyards. The Administration argues that these restrictions undermine national security by limiting flexibility and hindering its strategy of leveraging allied yards, such as in the 'Finland model,' to drive investment into U.S. shipbuilding capacity. This signals a significant policy shift toward integrating international partners into advanced naval construction, suggesting the Pentagon is prepared to bypass traditional domestic build requirements for future combat vessels.
Who Should Shape the Future of Development, and How?
English Summary
As global development assistance declines following USAID's closure and reduced ODA funding, CSIS proposes reimagining international development by centering local rightsholders in decision-making through three key stakeholders: civil society, philanthropy, and the private sector. The analysis, based on roundtables held 2025–2026, identifies critical gaps: global ODA dropped $56 billion (2023–2025) while philanthropic giving remains ~$17 billion annually, and over 70% of civil society organizations have cut staff. Key recommendations include shifting philanthropy from project grants to unrestricted multiyear funding, strengthening civil society resource diversification, and aligning corporate private sector engagement with local institutional capacity-building rather than control. The proposals emphasize that without coordinated stakeholder alignment and genuine power transfer to impacted communities, development's sustainability and effectiveness will remain constrained.
中文摘要
隨著 USAID 關閉及官方發展援助（ODA）資金減少，全球發展援助面臨挑戰。因此，戰略與國際問題研究中心（CSIS）提出重新構想國際發展模式，主張透過三大關鍵利害關係人——民間社會、慈善機構和私營部門——將決策權核心化，交予地方權益持有者。本分析基於 2025–2026 年召開的圓桌會議，指出幾個關鍵缺口：全球 ODA 在 2023–2025 年間下降了 560 億美元；雖然慈善捐贈每年仍維持在約 170 億美元，但超過 70% 的民間社會組織已裁員。核心建議包括：將慈善捐贈從專案撥款轉向無限制的多年期資金；加強民間社會的資源多元化；並將企業私營部門的參與，與地方制度能力建設接軌，而非控制。提案強調，若缺乏利害關係人之間的協調一致性，以及真正的權力轉移給受影響社區，發展工作的永續性與有效性仍將受到限制。
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