The report finds that only 37% of Colorado college students eligible for SNAP participate in the program, despite nearly one-quarter of college students nationwide struggling with food insecurity. Using linked administrative data, researchers modeled four policy levers: federal eligibility expansions (adding 2,700-5,300 students), state authorities to deem employment/training programs SNAP-eligible (3,300 students), statewide outreach campaigns (710 students), and college case management (475 students). Eligibility expansions yield substantially larger participation increases than outreach alone, suggesting states should prioritize broadening rules while combining efforts with awareness campaigns. However, even comprehensive approaches would leave many eligible students non-participating due to administrative burden, stigma, and limited benefits, requiring complementary strategies like food pantries and emergency aid. The research provides federal, state, and institutional decisionmakers with evidence for addressing college student food insecurity through multiple coordinated approaches.
2026-W24
This digest page is part of ThinkTankWeekly's portal index. It summarizes notable reports and links readers to the original source websites.
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1.Levers for Increasing College Student Access to the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program: Evidence from Colorado (RAND)
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2.
Under Xi Jinping, China has fundamentally shifted its techno-industrial strategy from prioritizing growth and catch-up to emphasizing national security, technological self-reliance, and frontier technology leadership through five integrated policy channels—fiscal instruments, financial mechanisms, real economy levers, Party-firm coordination, and overseas initiatives. The Party-state has centralized control and moved from direct subsidies to market-based but politically-directed mechanisms (tax incentives, credit guidance, mandates, capital market reforms) due to tightening fiscal constraints. Although generating impressive technological capabilities and manufacturing scale in priority sectors, the system faces structural tensions: centralization risks suppressing the local experimentation that historically drove innovation, politicized capital allocation may degrade economic efficiency, and mandates spread compliance costs to firms while underlying productivity and demand remain weak. China's unprecedented manufacturing trade surplus is generating growing international friction, compounded by real exchange rate depreciation and industrial policy subsidies that force trading partners to absorb adjustment costs. The policy's long-term effectiveness depends on resolving the central paradox: the centralization needed for strategic focus may simultaneously erode the decentralized competition and local dynamism that enabled China's prior rapid industrial development.
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3.
RAND proposes the Flagpole to Front Lines (F2FL) framework to replace the outdated JCIDS military requirements process, emphasizing problem-centric innovation over technology-driven acquisition. F2FL traces national security objectives through operational tasks to specific capability requirements using iterative agile sprints (conceptualize, build, finalize), creating transparent linkage and reducing bureaucratic complexity. By identifying operational problems first and enabling early industry collaboration, the approach accelerates capability delivery while maintaining strategic coherence. This is particularly relevant to the complex security environment the U.S. faces, including Indo-Pacific deterrence and homeland defense priorities outlined in the 2025 National Security Strategy.
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4.Navigating Duality in Space: Establishing a Foundational Understanding of Dual-Use Space Activities (RAND)
Space systems increasingly serve both civilian and military functions, creating ambiguity that could lead to dangerous misinterpretations and escalation. RAND's three-year study found that stakeholders broadly recognize most space systems as dual-use, but no universal definition exists and nations lack explicit governance frameworks—most relying on implicit or ambiguous policies. The report recommends stakeholders adopt behavior-based governance frameworks focused on observable actions rather than intent, include diverse stakeholders in framework development, and address the lag between technological innovation and policy response. Such mechanisms could reduce misperception risks while enabling continued technological advancement in space capabilities.
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5.Teacher Well-Being, Pay, and Intentions to Leave in 2026: Selected Findings from the 2026 State of the American Teacher Survey (RAND)
The 2026 State of the American Teacher survey reveals that U.S. public school teachers continue to experience significantly worse well-being than comparable working adults, with 55% reporting frequent job-related stress and persistent gender disparities—female teachers report 15 percentage points more stress than male peers. Teachers face substantial economic challenges: they earn $29,500 less in base salary than similar working adults ($75,599 vs. $105,000), only 39% received inflation-adjusted pay raises in 2025–2026, and 94% spend their own money on classroom supplies ($665 average). While teacher turnover intentions have stabilized at 18%, the profession faces structural retention challenges driven by low pay, work-life balance issues (teachers work 54 hours weekly), student behavior management pressures, and a gender-based pay gap of $7,400. These findings underscore that sustainable teacher recruitment and retention require addressing compensation gaps, working conditions, and the differential impacts on female educators.
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The 2026 State of the American Teacher survey documents K-12 public school teachers' well-being, job satisfaction, compensation, working conditions, and retention intentions through a nationally representative sample of 829 weighted responses from 2,000 teachers. Using rigorous statistical weighting methods calibrated to match national teacher population characteristics, the survey ensures representativeness across school types, poverty levels, and demographics, with a comparison survey of 498 general working adults providing context. Key measured areas include job-related stress, depression, burnout, motivation, financial well-being, school climate, student mental health support provision, and retention intentions. This comprehensive evidence base directly informs policy decisions regarding teacher compensation adequacy, working conditions, and targeted support systems needed to address teacher workforce retention and well-being challenges.
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7.
The RAND–Oxford report argues that the U.S. and UK must establish coordinated bilateral frameworks to secure frontier AI systems against sophisticated nation-state threats. Current AI lab defenses are insufficient against advanced state actors, though both countries possess deep expertise in protecting critical technologies. The report proposes a cluster-based framework organizing AI security into five interconnected domains—access controls, supply chain, monitoring/response, personnel security, and physical security—enabling risk-informed, modular implementation without requiring wholesale industry restructuring. Key recommendations include establishing joint threat intelligence infrastructure, accelerating hardware security R&D, extending government personnel vetting to labs, coordinating supply-chain security, expanding red-teaming, conducting joint crisis exercises, and establishing common security standards.
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Following US-Israeli strikes that killed Iran's Supreme Leader Khamenei, Iran's regime retaliated with missile and drone attacks while blockading the Strait of Hormuz, disrupting 20% of global oil and LNG supplies. The conflict has exposed critical US naval shortfalls, strained American alliances, enabled Chinese strategic expansion, and triggered months of energy market disruption and economic instability. The war exemplifies how US-led Middle Eastern military interventions produce widespread unintended consequences, from maritime chokepoint politicization to rebalancing of great power competition.
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9.
U.S. school boards, as locally controlled democratic institutions, faced unprecedented political polarization in the early 2020s over pandemic policies and contentious cultural issues including race, gender, and sexuality. Brookings research surveying nationally representative board members alongside media and election analysis reveals deep conflicts between local governance autonomy and national political polarization. Many school boards struggle with capacity, accountability, and representation while serving as the most accessible democratic forum for community engagement. The findings demonstrate how traditionally non-partisan local institutions have become focal points for national culture-war conflicts, highlighting tensions in American federalism.
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The DMV region's housing market is experiencing demand weakness comparable to the COVID-19 pandemic, driven by federal job losses and policy uncertainty from the second Trump administration. Asking rents have declined 1-4% across all jurisdictions in the past year, with particularly steep declines in Washington D.C. (down 14.7% since 2019), while for-sale home prices in the District have fallen 25.2% since 2019, straining local government budgets dependent on property tax revenue growth. Rising building operating costs combined with falling rental income create a challenging environment for existing rental properties and new construction financing. The authors argue local governments should use this market window to increase housing supply through zoning reforms supporting "missing middle" housing, accelerate affordable housing preservation at below-peak costs, and restructure subsidy programs toward cost-effective operating subsidies. These policy changes are critical for regional economic stabilization, as housing costs remain a significant barrier to attracting talent despite recent price declines.
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11.
Pope Leo XIV's encyclical 'Magnifica Humanitas' establishes a moral framework for AI development, warning against technocratic concentration of power and emphasizing human dignity. Using biblical metaphors of the Tower of Babel (centralized, homogenizing control) versus Nehemiah (distributed, accountable construction), the document argues that AI is inherently extractive and non-neutral, requiring governance guardrails beyond corporate 'AI for good' rhetoric. Brookings experts emphasize that technical standards alone are insufficient—AI systems encode societal biases and disproportionately impact marginalized communities, requiring diverse stakeholder participation in development. The encyclical shifts global governance conversations from 'winning the AI race' to ensuring technology serves humanity, influencing both EU enforcement approaches and US voluntary frameworks. Effective implementation requires political will, inclusive development practices, and accountability structures that give communities genuine agency over technologies affecting their lives.
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The article argues that Russia's prolonged war in Ukraine and the U.S.'s 2026 Iran conflict have revealed the limits of superpower dominance, as both Putin and Trump's military miscalculations have trapped them in costly, unwinnable conflicts that are undermining their global credibility. Ukraine and Iran, despite being militarily weaker, have inflicted massive casualties and costs on their attackers, forcing both superpowers to recognize they cannot impose their will and are losing traditional allies seeking independent security arrangements. The simultaneous distraction of both superpowers is accelerating a shift toward decentralized global security, with Europe recognizing Ukraine as a credible military asset and developing independent defense capabilities rather than relying on American guarantees. The article recommends that regional groupings like the Joint Expeditionary Force take a leading role in security coordination and that Europe facilitate an end to the Russia-Ukraine war independent of U.S. involvement.
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13.
Iran has introduced politically conditioned access to the Strait of Hormuz by selectively granting passage to vessels from allied nations (Russia, China, Pakistan) while charging tolls and requiring detailed information about ownership and crew nationality, directly challenging the 400-year-old principle of freedom of navigation. This represents a significant precedent for using maritime chokepoints as geopolitical leverage that could spread to other critical waterways like the Strait of Malacca and Taiwan Strait. Such politicization would harm smaller, trade-dependent countries most severely and shift global commerce from economically-determined to geopolitically-determined criteria, requiring major powers to sustain open transit through credible deterrence, transparency mechanisms, and resistance to competing systems of privileged access. The implications extend beyond immediate energy disruptions to fundamentally reshape how states use control of critical infrastructure for coercive purposes in an era of intensifying geopolitical rivalry.
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14.
The Iran war has unexpectedly strengthened China's global strategic position by forcing the US to deplete resources and political capital while China preserves strength and focuses on technological competition. By remaining outside the conflict, China is filling the role of economic benefactor to developing nations, dominating renewable energy technologies, and leveraging Iran's control of the Strait of Hormuz to enhance its economic centrality. The conflict reinforces China's narrative of inevitable rise and US decline, particularly pressuring Taiwan through messaging that the weakened US cannot be relied upon for defense. America must restore strategic discipline, reinvest in alliances, and concentrate on technological advancement to contest China's vision of global leadership and prevent these Chinese gains from becoming permanent.
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The article argues that the 2026 Iran war and post-October 7 context have significantly weakened Hezbollah and created an unprecedented opportunity to neutralize its military threat and strengthen the Lebanese state—but only through sustained U.S.-led efforts combining security capacity-building for the Lebanese Armed Forces, diplomatic coordination between Israel and Lebanon, and economic reconstruction that allows the government to deliver services Hezbollah has traditionally provided. Hezbollah's leadership is decapitated, its Iranian and Syrian sponsors weakened, and even its Shia base is fractured by resentment over the war's devastation, yet the Lebanese government and military remain too weak for direct confrontation without risking state collapse. The author identifies Iran as the critical constraint: Tehran will not negotiate away Hezbollah and will use any sanctions relief to revive its surrogate, requiring Washington to monitor and coordinate the Iran, Israel, and Lebanon tracks simultaneously. Success requires patience, credible state service delivery that prevents re-marginalization of the Shia, and sustained U.S. leadership—a narrow window unlikely to remain open without American attention.
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16.
Brookings research reveals a strong correlation between counties with high AI automation exposure and Democratic voting in 2024, with 62 of the 100 most AI-exposed counties voting blue. AI exposure concentrates in white-collar information work (programming, marketing, analysis) predominantly located in urban, Democratic-leaning areas. The analysis suggests workers in these AI-exposed blue counties face heightened economic anxiety about job displacement, positioning AI as a potentially divisive policy issue in upcoming elections, particularly in highly exposed blue states like California and Massachusetts.
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The article argues that artificial intelligence's concentration in the Global North—where 75% of new data center capacity is being built and advanced economies score double the AI readiness of low-income countries—threatens to widen global inequality unless addressed through deliberate policy intervention. The Global South generates vast data streams yet lacks local infrastructure to process them, resulting in 'digital extractivism' where value accrues abroad. Solutions include South-South cooperation, leveraging renewable energy advantages, building sovereign digital public infrastructure models (like India's subsidized GPU access for startups), and redefining global AI governance to center rather than marginalize the Global South. Without strategic action, this divide will harden into structural inequality; with proper intervention, Global South countries can leapfrog legacy systems and shape AI's future.
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The Strait of Hormuz—through which 20% of global oil flows—has been effectively closed by Iranian attacks and tolls since February 2026, causing the largest supply disruption in oil market history (14+ mbd lost, gasoline at $4.31/gallon as of June). While strategic reserves and alternative pipelines temporarily cushion the shock, market normalization will take months even if the strait reopens due to infrastructure damage and depleted inventories. The closure threatens freedom of navigation globally, as Iran's toll system ($1/barrel) risks inspiring similar charges at other critical chokepoints (Malacca, Gibraltar), and short-term policy measures (gas tax holidays, export bans) would be counterproductive rather than effective.
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19.
Despite the Strait of Hormuz closure eliminating 15 million barrels per day of global crude trade (one-third of total flows), oil prices remain restrained by temporary buffers worth ~5.4 mb/d (emergency strategic reserves, floating storage) and structural adjustments like pipeline bypasses offsetting ~6.4 mb/d. However, these temporary buffers will be depleted by mid-July 2026, leaving an unoffset shortfall of 7.1 mb/d (16% of global crude trade) that markets must absorb. Based on historical price elasticities, Brent crude could surge from current levels to $120–150 per barrel once the market recognizes buffer exhaustion, with non-linear price spikes and global recession risk if the strait closure persists beyond mid-July.
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20.
The 2026 oil crisis triggered by the February 28 Iran conflict has driven gasoline prices above $4 per gallon, creating acute economic strain on American households, particularly lower-income families and those in sprawling areas with limited transportation alternatives. Since American land use patterns have created long average trip distances (9+ miles) and high vehicle dependency, demand for gasoline remains inelastic despite price increases, meaning households cannot easily reduce consumption. While no viable short-term policy solutions exist, the economic disruption presents a political opportunity for policymakers to implement long-term reforms including stricter fuel economy standards, expanded EV incentives, and urban planning reforms that reduce driving demand—similar to post-1970s European strategies.
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Trump's approval ratings have collapsed among rural voters who previously supported him overwhelmingly, with his net approval among all rural voters falling from +20 to -14 since early 2025, and from +27 to -6 among white rural voters. This decline is driven by economic hardship: 77% of white rural voters rate the economy as fair or poor, farm bankruptcies surged 46% in 2025 due to tariffs and immigration restrictions, and manufacturing employment has fallen 77,000 jobs since Trump took office. The shift threatens Republican turnout in the 2026 midterms, particularly in swing rural areas like Iowa where GOP House seats are now considered toss-ups, as reduced rural enthusiasm could allow Democrats to gain ground despite limited defection to the Democratic Party.
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22.
The Supreme Court's Louisiana v. Callais decision eliminates the requirement for states to create majority-minority districts beyond Voting Rights Act compliance, potentially allowing Republicans to gerrymander Black districts in the South. Up to 12 majority-minority seats could be eliminated through 'cracking'—splitting these districts and attaching portions to surrounding Republican areas—though this also disperses Democratic voters into other districts, potentially making safe Republican seats more competitive. While the decision may reduce Democratic representation in 2026, the ultimate electoral impact remains uncertain: a strong blue wave could overcome these redistricting advantages, and Republican efforts could backfire if voters reject Trump administration policies. The complexities of redistricting mean the outcome depends heavily on broader electoral momentum rather than map changes alone.
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The article argues that while Trump's harsh immigration enforcement initially succeeded in reducing border crossings, his broader enforcement actions—including deaths of US citizens and legal immigrants—backfired politically, causing his immigration approval to plummet from 51% to 43% (March 2025-2026) and Latino support to fall from 48% to 31%. This political damage to both parties creates a potential opening for comprehensive bipartisan immigration reform, after 40 years of gridlock. The author suggests that if both Democrats and Republicans continue suffering electoral costs on the issue, they may finally have the political incentive to negotiate a realistic solution combining a path to citizenship with effective border protections and asylum reforms.
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The article argues that recess is essential for cognitive development and emotional regulation, supported by scientific consensus and international examples where high-performing school systems prioritize frequent breaks—Finland provides 75 minutes daily, while Shanghai limits lessons to 35 minutes with regular breaks. U.S. policy has neglected recess since "No Child Left Behind," leaving American children with only 26 minutes daily. A critical equity gap exists: students in high-poverty schools and students of color—those most needing recess's benefits—are most likely denied it. While state mandates improve outcomes (1.8x more likely to provide recommended recess), weak enforcement limits effectiveness, as demonstrated by Georgia's failed 2022-23 law. Effective policy requires state-level mandates with anti-punitive protections, compliance monitoring, and investment in play spaces, particularly in underserved schools.
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25.
Community colleges are essential pathways to well-paying jobs for students not pursuing bachelor's degrees, yet most students fail to complete credentials with meaningful labor market value. Research comparing high-performing colleges with underperforming ones identified five key success factors: aligning programs with local labor demands, deepening employer partnerships, offering diverse work-based learning experiences, integrating career readiness skills across curricula, and providing robust student support with low-caseload advising. Policy recommendations include outcomes-based state funding mechanisms, technical assistance for employer engagement, adequately resourced academic advising, and expanded federal workforce funding through initiatives like Workforce Pell grants. As AI reshapes labor markets, community colleges and policymakers must prioritize rigorous evaluation of these practices and emerging models, particularly for noncredit workforce programs and alternative financing like income-share agreements.
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26.Reimagining the global education agenda: What we heard from the education community across 6 continents (Brookings)
The Brookings Global Listening Survey of 308 education professionals across 64 countries documents a historic contraction in international education aid (ODA down 23.1% in 2025; education aid projected to fall 25% by 2027) that is halting programs and cutting services, but also creating an opportunity to restructure inequitable international cooperation. Respondents, predominantly from Global South civil society organizations, call for "South-to-South" collaboration and shifting power from donors to recipient countries, with flexible multi-year funding that reaches marginalized communities. Current priorities include foundational learning, teacher training, and workforce development, with EdTech, AI, and climate education expected to dominate post-2030 agendas. The survey emphasizes that future global education strategy must be co-created with communities and youth, not imposed by donors, fundamentally shifting the relationship between development institutions and education actors.
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27.Black businesses as community anchors: History, economic power, and the fight to preserve it (Brookings)
Black-owned businesses serve as critical anchors for community wealth, resilience, and cultural identity in major cities like Tulsa, Durham, New Orleans, and Birmingham. Brookings' Black Business Parity Dashboard models the economic gains—in revenue, jobs, and wages—that communities could realize if Black business ownership matched the Black population share, identifying where progress is accelerating and where ownership gaps remain entrenched. The research reveals measurable social and economic returns from closing ownership disparities while highlighting a shifting legal landscape that complicates efforts to sustain equitable economic development. Public, private, and philanthropic strategies will be essential to preserving and expanding Black business ecosystems amid heightened policy scrutiny.
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28.
Civics education has declined from school curricula despite being essential for preparing engaged, informed citizens and sustaining healthy democracy. As the nation approaches its 250th anniversary, Brookings and bipartisan senators are highlighting research showing how civics instruction strengthens democratic values and civic participation. The event emphasizes that civics education remains critical for revitalizing American democracy and instilling fundamental values of free speech and civic engagement among younger generations.
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29.
India's decade-long experience scaling electric vehicle adoption through coordinated fiscal incentives, production-linked schemes, and inter-ministerial policy coherence (linking transport, industry, power, and finance) provides a directly applicable blueprint for African nations. African stakeholders identified India's sequenced approach—balancing demand-pull incentives (FAME I), supply-push production schemes (FAME II), and structural enablers (PLI/SPMEPCI local-content rules)—as closer to their economic realities than Western models, particularly for dominant two- and three-wheeler segments. The newly launched EMBRACE platform aims to institutionalize India-Africa cooperation on policy sequencing, technology transfer, blended financing, and supply chain integration, leveraging Africa's critical mineral resources (manganese, rare earths, lithium) alongside India's downstream processing capabilities to reduce China dependence.
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30.
The 2026 World Cup across the U.S., Canada, and Mexico presents a uniquely expanded cyber threat landscape due to its vast digital infrastructure spanning three jurisdictions, millions of devices, and concurrent geopolitical tensions with Russia and Iran. Primary threats include large-scale cybercrime targeting tournament-goers through fraud and phishing, state actors seeking to disrupt critical infrastructure to damage host nations' credibility, and espionage operations targeting world leaders and officials. While the U.S. has established comprehensive preparedness measures including a White House task force and CISA coordination, vulnerabilities remain in funding adequacy and cyber security mandates for local jurisdictions. Long-term implications include establishing improved cyber security standards and resilience capabilities for future major international events.
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31.
The Trump administration imposed 10-12.5% tariffs on 60 countries for forced labor violations, confirming the author's prediction that all would be found guilty but diverging from the expected remedy of linked trade agreements. The USTR's 98-page report consists mostly of brief, unsupported assertions (2-3 paragraphs per country) rather than detailed evidence, creating significant legal vulnerability to challenges of administrative overreach. A 74-page exclusion list covering politically sensitive items (beef, tomatoes), raw materials, and intermediate goods substantially reduces the tariffs' actual economic impact. The weak evidentiary basis makes judicial invalidation a realistic possibility, while ongoing overcapacity investigations of 16 countries may still yield trade-agreement-linked remedies.
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As global development assistance declines following USAID's closure and reduced ODA funding, CSIS proposes reimagining international development by centering local rightsholders in decision-making through three key stakeholders: civil society, philanthropy, and the private sector. The analysis, based on roundtables held 2025–2026, identifies critical gaps: global ODA dropped $56 billion (2023–2025) while philanthropic giving remains ~$17 billion annually, and over 70% of civil society organizations have cut staff. Key recommendations include shifting philanthropy from project grants to unrestricted multiyear funding, strengthening civil society resource diversification, and aligning corporate private sector engagement with local institutional capacity-building rather than control. The proposals emphasize that without coordinated stakeholder alignment and genuine power transfer to impacted communities, development's sustainability and effectiveness will remain constrained.
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33.
The 2026 World Cup, despite occurring amid multiple active global conflicts, presents minimal opportunity for sports diplomacy, with only four adversarial nation pairs (0.35% of potential matchups) among 48 competitors. Historical evidence shows that major sporting events facilitate peace breakthroughs only when coupled with substantive diplomatic efforts and political will from leadership, as demonstrated by US-China ping-pong diplomacy, which required parallel secret negotiations. While the World Cup can create temporary goodwill and symbolic gestures—such as the 1998 US-Iran match featuring exchanged white roses—these moments alone cannot resolve deep-rooted geopolitical tensions. Policymakers should view international sporting events as complements to, rather than substitutes for, existing diplomatic channels. The tournament format, based on sporting qualification rather than geopolitical distribution, naturally limits direct confrontations between adversaries.
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34.
The article argues that current definitions of lethal autonomous weapon systems are outdated because they focus on physical platforms (drones, munitions) rather than the AI-orchestration software that actually makes targeting decisions. Evidence shows that Ukraine's Delta and Russia's Svod systems demonstrate how battlefield management software fusing sensor data and coordinating hundreds of platforms represents the true locus of autonomous decision-making—a capability the U.S. military currently lacks in an integrated form. The author recommends updating DoD Directive 3000.09 to redefine autonomous weapons to include orchestration software, establishing a vendor-agnostic integrated layer under DAWG, and immediately conducting autonomy experiments to match Russia's operational learning rate. The strategic implication is that the nation building the most effective autonomous orchestration layer first will gain a decisive advantage comparable to early nuclear weapon development.
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35.
The article argues that while trust with adversaries is unnecessary for successful negotiations—only verification mechanisms and clear incentive structures matter—trust with allies is essential for effective foreign policy. Drawing on former Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman's experience negotiating with Iran, the author contends that allied trust amplifies U.S. influence by facilitating information sharing, coordinated responses, and collective pressure on adversaries. The U.S. government has underinvested in cultivating this critical alliance trust, which undermines its ability to leverage collective action against rivals.
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36.
Indian states are implementing a coordinated wave of policy reforms targeting economic modernization, renewable energy integration, and social welfare expansion. Key developments include new grid-interactive renewable energy regulations (Gujarat, Karnataka, Tamil Nadu), Andhra Pradesh's aviation hub strategy, Bihar's labor law simplification, and expanded healthcare schemes across Punjab, Himachal Pradesh, and West Bengal. The pattern suggests states are systematically improving business conditions while advancing infrastructure modernization, renewable energy adoption, and social safety nets. These reforms indicate India's multi-sector push to attract investment, streamline regulations, and balance economic development with social protection.
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37.
The FY 2027 White House budget proposes sharp cuts to federal R&D funding despite record defense spending, which would weaken U.S. technological and national security advantages. Federal research cannot be replaced by private investment, as the government uniquely supports foundational basic research that de-risks early-stage innovation before the private sector can commercialize it—GPS technology exemplifies how NSF-supported atomic physics research enabled critical military applications. China has rapidly expanded state-backed R&D spending, recently surpassing the U.S. in total national R&D investment and systematically closing gaps in frontier technologies like quantum and AI. Congress should reject deep R&D cuts and maintain stable funding for science agencies to sustain technological leadership as strategic competitors accelerate their research investments.
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38.
The U.S. failed to exploit China's vulnerabilities during a 2025 trade war, revealing a fundamental gap in Washington's strategy—the absence of competitive leverage over Beijing. When China weaponized rare-earth elements in April 2025, the Trump administration quickly backed down, demonstrating Beijing's effective use of coercive economic pressure while the U.S. pursued only defensive measures. The article catalogs China's internal weaknesses (economic fragility, demographic decline, export dependence) and external dependencies (energy chokepoints through the Malacca Strait, commodity reliance, dollar-based financial system dependence) that the U.S. could systematically exploit. Rather than focusing solely on defensive supply chain resilience, the U.S. must adopt an offensive competitive strategy: tightening semiconductor technology controls with allied partners, coordinating trade restrictions on Chinese export sectors, preparing financial and energy sanctions for crisis scenarios, and exposing China's covert influence operations. This sequenced, calibrated pressure across economics, technology, and information domains would create real deterrent value and constrain Beijing's ability to coerce the U.S. and its partners.
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39.
The article examines Turkey's gradual strategic repositioning away from its traditional Western alignment, arguing that unlike past episodes of friction—such as the 2003 Iraq access vote, the 2010 Iran sanctions dissent, and the 2017 S-400 purchase—the current shift represents a more structural realignment rather than a transactional dispute. Ankara is diversifying its security and economic partnerships while maintaining its NATO membership, leveraging its geographic position to extract concessions from multiple power centers. The analysis suggests Western policymakers should treat Turkey less as an ally drifting off course and more as an increasingly autonomous actor pursuing a multi-vector foreign policy, with significant implications for NATO cohesion, Middle East diplomacy, and energy corridor politics.
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40.
The article argues that the era of the open, unregulated internet is ending as liberal democracies — led by Europe — shift from promoting internet freedom as a geopolitical ideal to asserting digital sovereignty and applying offline legal standards to online spaces. This reversal is traced from the optimism of the Arab Spring, when social media was seen as inherently liberalizing, to the current consensus that platforms require regulation to counter disinformation, hate speech, and foreign interference. The implication is a fragmenting global internet governance landscape, where even democracies now pursue regulatory frameworks that constrain platform behavior, potentially narrowing the ideological gap with authoritarian models of internet control and complicating transatlantic tech policy coordination.
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41.
The CFR argues that the U.S. must pursue a measured Belarus policy that cautiously renews ties while preparing for potential Russian annexation within two years—either through gradual institutional absorption or sudden coercive action. While Belarus's small economy offers limited material gain to Russia, its geographic position as a buffer state is strategically vital for reducing direct Russia-NATO confrontation risk. Annexation would eliminate this buffer, extend Russian power westward, potentially trigger refugee crises and military buildups on NATO's eastern border, and reshape Europe's security architecture. The U.S. should pursue a "creeping independence" strategy to enhance Belarusian autonomy without provoking Russia, while developing intelligence-based warning systems and contingency protocols with allies. Response to annexation should be calibrated to whether it occurs consensually or coercively, with enhanced NATO deterrence and targeted sanctions in the latter case.
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42.
Since January 2025, the U.S. government has invested $20.9 billion across 16 deals using direct equity stakes and sophisticated financing tools—a significant departure from traditional grants and loans aimed at strengthening supply chains and technological leadership. These investments, triggered by China's rare earth export controls and military hardware shortages, span critical minerals, semiconductors, manufacturing, and other strategic sectors, with the Department of Defense leading the effort and having mobilized an additional $4.75 billion from private and foreign partners. The government is employing flexible mechanisms including equity stakes, warrants, and golden shares to secure both financial returns and strategic control, while planning active portfolio management through 2028. This shift represents a fundamental reorientation of U.S. industrial policy toward direct state participation in private companies to address supply chain vulnerabilities.
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43.
"Financing the Missing Middle" identifies a critical $100-200 billion funding gap between early-stage clean energy R&D and commercial deployment, where traditional investors rationally avoid projects that are too capital-intensive for venture capital yet too risky for infrastructure investors. The report attributes this gap to market failures including knowledge spillovers, environmental externalities, capital market imperfections, and coordination problems, exacerbated by policy uncertainty and rising interest rates. The essay collection proposes comprehensive solutions including demand-side policies (offtake agreements, product standards), innovative financing (completion insurance, blended finance), regional coordination hubs, and federal commercial readiness funding. These interventions aim to align incentives across the innovation ecosystem and enable technologies critical for energy security, affordability, and decarbonization to reach commercial scale. Federal government action is ultimately essential, as private and philanthropic solutions alone cannot scale to the level and speed required by the climate challenge.
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44.
This CFR analysis examines three scenarios for Iran's imminent leadership transition under the aging Supreme Leader Khamenei: managed continuity through clerical succession, military takeover, or regime collapse, with the first two being most likely but all posing significant risks to U.S. interests including proxy escalation and nuclear advancement. The author identifies potential successors and warning indicators of transition timing, while cautioning that U.S. historical missteps in Iran (notably the 1953 coup legacy) and current regime desperation limit Washington's ability to directly influence outcomes. Recommendations include preparing through expanded intelligence, scenario planning, and leveraging existing diplomatic channels to revive nuclear diplomacy rather than attempting direct intervention or support for specific opposition factions. Key mitigation measures include regional force posture reinforcement, coordinated messaging with allies, support for Iranian civil society, and contingency plans for proxy escalation during the transition period. The analysis suggests that with proper preparation, the transition could present opportunities to advance U.S. interests, though all likely outcomes carry inherent risks of continued Iranian regional adventurism.
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45.
CFR fellow Roxanna Vigil argues that the United States must urgently engage with Colombia's new administration to support the 2016 Peace Accords, which face collapse from internal violence and external US pressure. With demobilized combatants facing assassination at roughly 1 per week and armed groups growing from 15,000 to 22,000 members since 2022, the agreement risks unraveling and reigniting conflict. Vigil recommends diplomatic engagement, innovative financing through international financial institutions, and security cooperation focused on accompaniment over direct intervention to prevent accord collapse. Failure to prevent collapse would destabilize the region, increase migration pressures on the US, and undermine American credibility as a reliable long-term partner.
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46.
The U.S. cannot compete with China through traditional mining and processing alone, given Beijing's structural dominance built over decades of strategic investment and weaponized through 2025 export controls on rare-earth elements. Instead, the authors argue the U.S. should leapfrog China's position by scaling disruptive innovation in materials engineering (rare-earth-free magnets), waste-based mineral recovery, e-waste recycling, and bioengineered extraction technologies. Recommendations include establishing a national critical minerals innovation strategy, creating venture funding for frontier technologies, mapping and redirecting mineral waste streams, and coordinating innovation efforts with allies to build competitive, resilient supply chains independent of Chinese control.
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47.
China has achieved first-mover advantages in autonomous, connected, and electric (ACE) vehicles through sustained government support and now dominates global EV exports, threatening U.S. auto industry leadership. The U.S. auto sector supports millions of jobs and over $1 trillion in economic output, making the transition economically and strategically critical. Rather than pursue indefinite protectionism, the U.S. should use tariffs as temporary leverage while providing conditional support to domestic producers, collaborating with allies, and managing security risks through data localization and supply-chain diversification. A purely protective approach will isolate America in outdated ICE vehicles while ceding technological leadership to China, whereas a competitive strategy positions U.S. producers for global success and decarbonization benefits.
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48.
President Trump threatened to seize Kharg Island, Iran's critical oil hub handling roughly 90 percent of the country's crude exports, but walked back the threat after claiming progress in peace negotiations. The threat and reversal come amid a fragile two-month ceasefire between the US-Israel and Iran that has deteriorated due to recent military strikes and disagreements over major issues like Iran's nuclear program and the Strait of Hormuz. Experts warn that occupying Kharg Island could further disrupt global oil markets, provoke Iranian retaliation, and endanger US military personnel, making it a high-risk option despite its strategic value in controlling Iran's economy.
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49.
Iran has developed an effective information campaign using culturally savvy memes, AI-generated videos, and sarcastic social media posts that exploit weaknesses in traditional U.S. counter-messaging approaches. Official Iranian accounts generated massive engagement (900 million views in 50 days), particularly through Lego-style AI videos depicting Iranian military victories and U.S. humiliation, demonstrating that entertainment-focused content is harder to counter than traditional deceptive propaganda since one cannot fact-check a joke. To respond, the U.S. should build real-time threat intelligence from AI labs, disrupt covert networks while accepting open messaging, leverage information about Iranian repression, and renew public service media to rebuild soft power—while avoiding the reputational costs of covert influence operations.
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50.
France's 2026 G7 presidency, designed around economic resilience and reduced dependence on China, faces disruption from geopolitical shocks (Iran's Strait of Hormuz closure) and Trump's unpredictable 'America First' agenda. While Trump's priorities on economic security and critical supply chains partially align with French goals, significant divisions persist on Ukraine, trade, digital sovereignty, and climate policy—driving other G7 members to coordinate more independently. Macron's success may be measured less by advancing his formal agenda than by preventing mounting tensions from fracturing the fragile G7 coalition.
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51.
The 2026 World Cup, hosted primarily in the United States, is unlikely to deliver FIFA's predicted $40 billion revenue windfall due to travel bans targeting fans from Haiti, Iran, Ivory Coast, and Senegal; record-high ticket prices (some exceeding $32,000); and visa-related safety concerns. Early indicators confirm significant shortfalls—80% of hotels in U.S. host cities report bookings below forecast, with 176,000 unsold tickets across the opening phase, indicating attendance will fall well short of the projected 10 million U.S. visitors. The U.S. tourism industry, already declining by 5.5% in foreign visitors last year, is unlikely to experience the anticipated economic recovery, with the American Hotel and Lodging Association describing the tournament as a 'non-event' relative to original expectations.
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52.
The Food for Peace program, transferred from USAID to USDA following the 2025 DOGE dismantling, now prioritizes U.S. agricultural interests over humanitarian needs, bypassing countries facing famine including Sudan, Somalia, and South Sudan in favor of seven selected recipients. New procurement rules require 100-percent U.S. commodities and expensive U.S.-flag shipping, consuming resources needed for operational costs like inland transport and distribution. The underlying "trade over aid" agenda treats hunger assistance as a means to create markets for U.S. farmers through tariff reductions, repeating the failed Haiti model of deepening dependency rather than reducing it. Without expanding recipient countries, revising procurement rules, and returning coordination to the State Department, the program risks undermining both humanitarian outcomes and agricultural support goals.
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53.
The Trump-Xi summit in Beijing addresses the world's most consequential bilateral relationship, with potential to reshape global trade, technology competition, and strategic partnerships. Key areas of focus include technology dominance, particularly in robotics and manufacturing, where allied manufacturing efforts could counter China's current advantages. The outcome carries significant implications for global supply chains, technology standards, and the broader strategic competition between the US and China in the Indo-Pacific region.
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54.
The UN's new Scientific Panel on AI aims to provide governments with credible, independent evidence for AI policymaking, but must navigate a delicate balance between scientific rigor and political legitimacy. Unlike predecessors like the IPCC, the panel produces annual reports while remaining independent from governments and the fragmented UN system, all while defining its own procedures—creating structural challenges including vague mandates and some panel experts' ties to major tech firms. Led by Nobel laureate Maria Ressa and Turing Award winner Yoshua Bengio, the panel combines frontier technological expertise with societal impact analysis across diverse regions and disciplines. Success depends on the panel's first annual report demonstrating transparency, independence, and rigorous methods; if it fails to establish authority, no equivalent institution exists to anchor global AI governance. The decisions made now will determine whether the panel effectively guides global AI policy or becomes another science-policy interface that lost credibility through imbalance.
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55.
Trump's NSPM-11 directs accelerated AI adoption in national security agencies while maintaining safeguards through contracts and in-house testing, treating speed and accountability as joint requirements. The memo reflects an 'assured intelligence model' that manages U.S. dependence on frontier AI by building government leverage through competitive vendor relationships and strict control over deployed systems, directly responding to the Pentagon-Anthropic dispute over autonomous weapons use. A critical unresolved tension concerns who holds authority to set legal boundaries on AI use—the labs, executive branch, courts, or Congress. The CFR experts recommend Congress codify safeguarding mechanisms into defense legislation, though implementation credibility remains questioned given concerns about executive power constraints.
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56.
Trump claims his Iran policy is not driven by electoral considerations, but Operation Epic Fury has significantly damaged his political standing, with his approval rating falling from -13.4 to -19.4 points and key constituencies (white non-college voters, Latinos, young men) withdrawing support. Democrats now lead by 7.1 points on generic ballot polling, largely because the war's economic fallout—spiking gas and inflation—contradicts Trump's core 2024 message of controlling inflation and improving affordability. Even a swift resolution to the Iran conflict may not reverse the economic damage before midterms, as price spikes take weeks or months to normalize. With voting beginning in three months and political momentum favoring Democrats, Republicans face significant headwinds despite recent redistricting efforts.
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57.
Iran's conflict with the United States demonstrated that military defeat need not prevent strategic victory if one can impose cumulative economic and political costs through multi-domain pressure. By choking the Strait of Hormuz, disrupting energy supplies, and running down the clock without seeking conventional victory, Iran showed how to constrain a militarily superior adversary. Chinese strategists are drawing lessons for a potential Taiwan contingency, recognizing that rather than attempting risky amphibious invasion, Beijing could pursue layered coercion—maritime quarantine, cyber disruption, financial pressure—designed to create cascading economic effects and political pressures that overwhelm US decision-making capacity and fragment allied responses. This approach exploits US finite military capacity, multi-theater strain, and vulnerability to prolonged economic disruption, suggesting that future US security challenges may depend less on military outcomes than on managing economic cascades and domestic political consequences.
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58.
The U.S. defense industrial base faces critical vulnerabilities requiring integration of emerging technologies (AI, quantum computing, autonomous systems) while maintaining conventional munitions production—a challenge complicated by China's control of critical minerals and rare-earth supply chains and eroded domestic manufacturing capacity. While bipartisan policy initiatives like the National Defense Industrial Strategy show progress, Washington must prioritize rapid technology integration, increase domestic production capacity through advanced manufacturing investments, secure multiyear funding certainty, and aggressively reduce dependence on Chinese supply chains. The article emphasizes that a resilient defense industrial base is essential for deterrence and rapid wartime mobilization, requiring direct government investment, workforce development, and stronger defense industrial cooperation with allies.
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59.
The Iran War has exposed critical vulnerabilities in U.S. military capabilities, particularly the rapid depletion of precision munitions and inadequate defenses against low-cost Iranian Shahed drones (costing $35,000 versus $3-12 million U.S. defensive systems). Although U.S.-Israeli strikes degraded Iran's military infrastructure, tactical success failed to achieve strategic objectives—the regime survived, uranium stockpiles remained secure, and the Strait of Hormuz was closed, triggering a global energy crisis. The conflict reveals the unsustainability of the current U.S. defense model relying on expensive manned platforms and high-cost interceptor systems, requiring a shift toward mass-produced affordable drones and low-cost defenses. The U.S. should prioritize partnerships with Ukraine's proven low-cost drone production capacity and invest substantially in drone manufacturing, while political leaders must develop coherent pre-war strategies that translate tactical military victories into desired political outcomes.
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60.
The United States is losing soft power, trust with allies, and control over the global security agenda, directly constraining military operations and strategic deterrence. Allies are denying U.S. access to bases, airspace, and intelligence sharing, while new security partnerships form without American involvement. Depleted munitions from recent conflicts and competing budget demands force difficult trade-offs between emerging technologies and traditional military capabilities. U.S. defense policy must pursue asymmetric competition, disciplined innovation, and diplomatic engagement to restore allied relationships and avoid overstretch.
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61.
The U.S.-Israeli strikes on Iran's nuclear infrastructure in 2025-2026 represent the end of diplomatic nonproliferation efforts, replacing negotiated agreements with Israel's 'mowing the grass' strategy of recurring military strikes. After decades where the JCPOA and IAEA inspections failed to gain durable support, Israel shifted to preemption following the October 7 attacks and Iranian protests in 2026. Rather than build large underground facilities, Iran will likely pursue decentralized nuclear programs using small, concealed workshops to evade detection and satellite surveillance. This marks the effective collapse of the global nonproliferation regime, as the deterrence value of nuclear weapons has never been higher and no arms control processes now constrain production. The U.S. remains committed to the Middle East despite decades seeking to pivot to East Asia, with significant implications for regional stability and global commodity flows.
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62.
The SpaceX IPO ($75B) and potential follow-on offerings from Anthropic and OpenAI (~$200B total) are drawing scrutiny about equity supply shocks and weak corporate governance, but both concerns are largely overblown. Market safeguards—S&P 500 profitability requirements (keeping SpaceX out until mid-2027), tiny initial index weights (0.5% in Nasdaq 100), and record-level corporate buybacks offsetting new supply—protect most passive investors and maintain stability. While SpaceX's governance structure concentrates Musk's control problematically, daily stock price signals and investors' growing ability to customize portfolios provide practical counterweights. The broader implication is that U.S. capital markets are functioning reasonably well to absorb the massive capital demands of AI infrastructure and space economy ventures.
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63.
Global defense spending is surging in response to Russia's Ukraine invasion, Middle East conflicts, China's rise, and doubts about US security commitments, with spending increases financed largely through government borrowing rather than taxes or cuts. Japan exemplifies this shift, abandoning its postwar pacifism by reaching 2% of GDP defense spending (up from 1% since the 1970s), though facing constitutional challenges around Article 9 and nuclear weapons. The synchronized rearmament across democracies is pushing up inflation and bond yields—JP Morgan estimates it could increase Treasury rates by 90 basis points—while IMF data show global debt approaching 100% of GDP by 2030, trapping central banks between fighting inflation and financing government deficits. The fiscal collision creates difficult political choices: governments cannot easily fund both military expansion and social programs without unsustainable debt growth, yet geopolitical threats make rearmament politically necessary regardless of economic constraints.
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64.
Will Marshall, CEO of Planet Labs, argues that AI and satellite imagery are converging to create 'planetary intelligence'—a transformative shift as significant as the internet's invention. As launch costs approach economic viability for orbital data centers (currently 3-5x below the $200-300/kg threshold), space-based computing infrastructure will dominate global compute spending within 10 years, potentially expanding the space economy tenfold. This raises critical policy concerns about corporate power concentration, military vulnerabilities of vital orbital infrastructure, geopolitical competition with Chinese firms, and whether AI trained on continuous Earth imagery will better steward planetary ecosystems or enable more sophisticated environmental damage.
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65.
President Trump's Beijing summit with Xi Jinping occurs amid the most intense U.S.-China rivalry in years, characterized by "mutually assured disruption" where both sides wield offsetting geoeconomic weapons—China controls rare-earth minerals essential for U.S. military production, while the U.S. controls advanced AI chip exports. Though China's AI models lag eight months behind U.S. frontier technology, China excels at rapid deployment and offers cheaper solutions, creating rough competitive parity in practical advantage. Taiwan presents the greatest systemic risk to global markets and the AI economy, with Taiwan and Korean semiconductor stocks surging 44–85% year-to-date while remaining vulnerable to Chinese coercion that could threaten TSMC's dominance in cutting-edge chip production. Beyond headline wins on Boeing sales and agricultural goods, the summit signals a negotiation over maintaining a "wary truce" on tariffs and trade, even as fragmented supply chains and uncertainty continue to dampen business investment and global economic growth.
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66.
Prediction markets like Kalshi and Polymarket have exploded into a $24 billion industry, claiming to offer valuable economic and political forecasts that sometimes outperform traditional polls and expert predictions. However, rapid expansion without adequate guardrails has revealed critical vulnerabilities: insider trading on classified military information, market manipulation through data tampering, underage gambling loopholes, and concentration of 67% of profits among algorithmic traders rather than reflecting genuine crowd wisdom. While the Federal Reserve validates their value for macroeconomic forecasting, regulators face an urgent challenge: establishing stronger bipartisan oversight, preventing insider trading and fraud, protecting young people from substituting betting for long-term investing, and resolving jurisdictional conflicts between federal CFTC authority and state gaming regulation.
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67.
The article argues that recent terrorist attacks in southwestern Nigeria—including student abductions and teacher executions—reveal an Islamist insurgency with explicit theological goals rather than isolated criminal acts. Key evidence includes symbolic beheadings, demands for Sharia law implementation, and attacks in non-pastoral areas with no farmer-herder conflict history, undermining the prevailing "farmer-herder clash" explanation. The Tinubu administration's increased defense spending and U.S. military collaboration have yielded tactical successes, including elimination of ISIS's second-in-command, but defeating an eschatological enemy seeking abolition of the secular state will require sustained international cooperation, realistic timeframes, and coordinated action with Sahelian neighbors.
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68.
The 2026 FIFA World Cup in the US represents an unprecedented opportunity for American sports diplomacy, with soccer transcending traditional political divides to strengthen international relationships and soft power. The expanded 48-team tournament has already sold 6 million tickets and is projected to generate $30-50 billion in economic impact, while improved visa processing has dramatically reduced wait times for fan entry (Brazil from 700 to 14 days). Hosting demonstrates American openness and values while inspiring the next generation of athletes through grassroots infrastructure development. Success will position the US favorably for future mega-sporting events (Olympics 2028, Women's World Cup 2031) and potentially elevate soccer to America's second-largest sport within a decade.
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69.
The CEOs of three major humanitarian NGOs—Mercy Corps, CARE, and Save the Children USA—convened at CFR to assess the world's most pressing human rights and humanitarian challenges. The discussion drew on the operational experience of organizations working across global crises to evaluate current response capacities and gaps. The leaders examined what global NGOs are doing to address these challenges amid a shifting geopolitical and funding landscape. The lecture, honoring Arthur C. Helton who was killed in the 2003 UN Baghdad bombing, underscores the enduring risks and imperatives of humanitarian engagement in conflict zones. The event signals ongoing concern within the policy community about sustaining multilateral humanitarian commitments.
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70.
This CFR panel examines how artificial intelligence and autonomous drone systems are fundamentally reshaping modern military conflict, with particular focus on the Iran context. Expert speakers—including former DoD AI leaders and warfare technology specialists—discuss how these technologies are transforming battlefield dynamics and strategic doctrine. The panelists address the critical policy implication: the limits of existing international law and norms in governing AI-enabled autonomous warfare, raising questions about future conflict regulation and deterrence strategies.
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71.Filling the "Missing Middle" to Scale Energy Breakthroughs: Public, Private, and Philanthropic Solutions (CFR)
A critical funding gap—the 'missing middle'—prevents promising energy companies and projects from scaling in the US, slowing technologies needed for energy security, affordability, and sustainability. This gap disadvantages American firms against Chinese and international competitors in clean energy innovation. CFR's Climate Realism Initiative addresses this through 'Financing the Missing Middle,' a policy collection offering strategies to bridge the gap through coordinated public, private, and philanthropic solutions.
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72.
The traditional inverse relationship between stock and bond markets has broken down since 2013, with volatility in both asset classes now moving in tandem even outside acute crises—fundamentally undermining financial risk management. Historically, when equities fell, Treasury bonds rose and provided a buffer for financial institutions; now simultaneous stock-bond declines leave institutions vulnerable to collateral shortfalls that can spiral into systemic crises. Current regulatory frameworks including Basel III and central bank liquidity facilities were designed for pre-2013 correlation patterns and fail to account for this structural change. Policymakers must revalidate bank risk models, restructure emergency liquidity facilities for dual-asset shocks, and pursue credible fiscal consolidation to restore market confidence in sovereign debt. Without these reforms, financial institutions will lack shock absorbers to absorb the next major market stress.
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73.
Thich Quang Duc's self-immolation on June 11, 1963, produced one of the most iconic photographs in history and significantly undermined U.S. support for South Vietnamese President Diem, leading to his overthrow in November 1963. Despite this political shift, the U.S. military commitment to South Vietnam did not reverse; instead, President Johnson escalated involvement from 16,000 advisors in 1963 to 500,000 combat troops by 1967. The episode illustrates how symbolic protest and public opinion can shift political support for specific leaders but fail to reverse deeper strategic military commitments. Historians now rank this decision to commit U.S. combat forces as the second-worst in U.S. foreign policy history, highlighting the dangers of escalating military involvement without addressing underlying political problems.
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74.
The Heritage Foundation argues that Congress must urgently reform federal permitting systems to accelerate domestic energy production, citing that electricity demand will grow 25% by 2030 while current regulations like NEPA, the Endangered Species Act, and the Clean Water Act have become tools for activist litigation rather than environmental protection. The article contends that permitting delays—exemplified by the Mountain Valley Pipeline's 9-year approval timeline—artificially constrain energy supply, driving up household utility costs and inflation across the entire economy. Proposed reforms include establishing firm timelines on environmental reviews, closing litigation loopholes, and streamlining approvals for low-impact projects. The author frames energy security as critical to U.S. national security, economic stability, and geopolitical competitiveness against China and dependency on hostile nations like Russia and Iran.
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75.
The article argues that Trump's strong rhetorical and military support for ongoing Iranian protests represents a strategic opportunity to weaken both the regime and Chinese influence in the Middle East, contrasting sharply with Obama's silence during the 2009 Green Revolution. Current protests are larger and more persistent due to the regime's failures in basic services and the revelation that China—Iran's main patron—refused to intervene during the 12-Day War. The author advocates for targeted U.S. actions, including cyberattacks on the Chinese-designed National Information Network (NIN) that the regime uses for internet control and suppressing dissent. This strategy aims to expose the fragility of both the Iranian regime and the Iran-China partnership while capitalizing on a moment of regime vulnerability.
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76.
Heritage argues that Trump should assert federal constitutional authority to enforce immigration law against state/local obstruction using Title 10 and the Insurrection Act, but then shift to more discrete, technology-driven enforcement rather than visible street operations. Large ICE raids generate violent protests, negative media coverage, and alienate moderate voters, while incidents in LA, Chicago, Portland, and Minneapolis show local officials actively obstructing federal enforcement. Instead, the administration should emphasize workplace raids, facial recognition, social-media monitoring, and 'skip-tracing' technologies to identify and deport illegal immigrants with less public confrontation, demonstrating both constitutional authority and operational sustainability for mass deportation goals.
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77.
The Trump Administration is downsizing the Department of Education to return education authority to states and local communities. Federal regulations impose significant administrative burdens—approximately 48.6 million hours of annual paperwork annually—that distract schools from classroom instruction. The article proposes converting federal programs like Title I and IDEA into state-controlled block grants or micro-education savings accounts (micro-ESAs), enabling greater parental choice and reducing regulatory compliance costs. States should audit federal spending, request Ed-Flex waivers for regulatory flexibility, and adopt civil rights policies aligned with recent Supreme Court decisions. This restructuring fundamentally shifts education governance from federal bureaucrats to parents, teachers, and state policymakers.
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78.
The Heritage Foundation identifies declining marriage and birthrates as an existential threat to America, citing CBO projections of population shrinkage by 2030 without immigration. The foundation proposes policy interventions including removing welfare marriage penalties, expanding tax credits for married families, and providing public recognition for marital stability, arguing that social science demonstrates traditional families outperform alternatives across wealth, education, health, and happiness metrics. The analysis rejects mass immigration and technological solutions as substitutes for family formation and positions strengthening marriage as central to national survival. The piece criticizes both progressive opponents (on women's autonomy grounds) and libertarian conservatives (on principle of non-intervention) as defeatist, framing policy inaction as a choice for managed decline rather than neutrality.
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79.
The report argues that America's declining marriage and fertility rates—with only 69% of adults ever married and a fertility rate of 1.59 births per woman—pose an existential threat to national prosperity and stability. Evidence shows that married-parent households produce better outcomes for children and communities across economic, educational, and social metrics, while government policies have inadvertently penalized marriage through welfare systems and tax structures. The Heritage Foundation proposes three key reforms: a $4,418 Family and Marriage (FAM) tax credit for married parents, a Home Childcare Equalization credit, and Newlywed Early Starters Trust (NEST) accounts, alongside removing barriers to family formation such as housing costs and work inflexibility.
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80.
The latest NAEP results show that while 9-year-olds made modest gains, older students remain significantly below historical performance levels, with reading unchanged since 1971 and math only slightly improved since 1973. Despite tripling per-student spending since 1970 (now exceeding $20,000 annually), decades of centralized reforms have failed to produce improvements, indicating a fundamental accountability problem in the government monopoly system. The article argues that parental choice would create stronger incentives for school improvement than bureaucratic oversight, as families could leave underperforming schools with their funding. These persistent failures suggest that educational freedom and expanded school choice are necessary complements to address systemic underperformance.
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81.
Despite government warnings of intelligence "darkness," CATO argues that Section 702's lapse will have limited practical impact because existing FISC certifications are grandfathered through March 2027, other FISA authorities remain, and most signals intelligence operates under Executive Order 12333 independent of 702. The genuine operational constraint is the inability to issue new directives to service providers, not loss of existing capability. However, the author warns that surveillance capabilities will persist through 12333 without the oversight architecture—FISC review, congressional reporting, compliance procedures—creating operations without adequate accountability. This is particularly concerning given documented tripling of warrantless searches of sensitive targets (journalists, religious groups) in 2025 and the administration's disabling of independent oversight bodies. Congress should condition reauthorization on a warrant requirement for searches of Americans' data, addressing the core civil liberties problem.
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82.
After over a year of historically high tariffs, the US goods trade deficit remains largely unchanged, contradicting the Trump administration's tariff strategy. When adjusted for inflation, April 2026 data shows the deficit at roughly pre-tariff levels (2022–24), despite anomalies like petroleum exports from the Iran war and substantial non-monetary gold exports that temporarily reduce nominal figures. Most economists argue that trade deficits are driven by macroeconomic forces beyond tariffs' reach, and recent data appear to vindicate this view. The analysis suggests tariffs are an ineffective tool for addressing trade imbalances, undermining a core rationale of the administration's trade policy.
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83.
This CATO analysis argues that the Federal Reserve should shrink its bloated balance sheet by reverting to a market-based approach where banks lend reserves to each other, rather than maintaining the current system where the Fed supplies most liquidity. The authors contend that the pre-2008 framework featured a functional interbank lending market that provided superior market discipline and price signals while coinciding with the Great Moderation's stable inflation and unemployment, whereas the post-2008 system created reserve abundance and has been associated with persistent inflation. Both contemporary 'supply-side' and 'demand-side' reform proposals fail to restore a true interbank market; the best solution is systematic reduction in the Fed's securities holdings to restore market-based reserve pricing and align the Fed's role with its function as lender of last resort.
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84.
Government ownership stakes in AI companies—whether through Trump's equity partnerships or Sanders's proposed sovereign wealth fund—would create dangerous conflicts of interest between the government's regulatory role and shareholder incentives, potentially stifling competition and enabling government control over algorithms and user data. The article argues such ownership raises constitutional takings concerns, risks government picking winners at a critical early stage of AI development (comparable to backing MySpace or Yahoo in 1996), and could compromise free expression and privacy protections. Instead, policymakers should adopt a light-touch regulatory framework that keeps government as a neutral regulator, maintains low barriers to entry, addresses underlying labor and infrastructure concerns through targeted policy tools, and allows competition and innovation to drive AI development.
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85.
H.R. 9186 proposes reforming the Controlled Substances Act by updating definitions of "accepted medical use," distinguishing dependence from abuse, and prioritizing scientific evidence in drug scheduling. The bill addresses how current overly restrictive definitions and law enforcement influence have impeded medical research and patient access to potentially therapeutic substances like psychedelics. Key reforms include broadening what qualifies as accepted medical use beyond FDA approval alone and requiring regulators to balance risks against medical benefits rather than focusing primarily on harms. If enacted, the bill could reduce research barriers, improve clinical care for patients, and move drug policy toward a more evidence-based approach, though it does not fully resolve law enforcement's role in medical decisions.
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86.
The testimony argues that DHS agents systematically violate constitutional rights—including due process, free speech, and protection against unreasonable search—with effective impunity due to gutted internal oversight, evidence withholding, ignored court orders, and claims of absolute immunity. Courts have found DHS likely violated the 1st, 4th, 5th, 10th, and 14th amendments, with documented examples including warrantless home invasions, wrongful arrests of citizens and legal immigrants, racial profiling, and violent incidents against peacefully protesting Americans. The witness contends that current law provides no meaningful remedy: citizens cannot obtain universal injunctions against unconstitutional policies, and federal law prohibits suits against federal agents. The testimony calls on Congress to eliminate this "amnesty for agents" by reforming federal law to allow Americans to sue DHS agents for constitutional violations in federal court.
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87.
A study of Illinois parole reform finds that reducing parole supervision for exiting prisoners lowered one-year reincarceration rates by 9–10 percentage points, driven almost entirely by fewer technical revocations rather than any change in criminal behavior. The research shows no evidence that reduced supervision increased crime; in fact, the absence of parole's ongoing threat of technical revocation appeared to offset any potential uptick. Policy simulations suggest that halving parole terms for low-to-medium-risk offenders could shrink average prison populations by roughly 3 percent with no harm to public safety, reinforcing the argument that existing parole systems inflate incarceration through procedural violations without meaningful safety benefits.
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88.
CATO argues that the Blockchain Regulatory Certainty Act (Section 604 of the Digital Asset Market Clarity Act) is sound policy because it correctly distinguishes software developers from money transmitters, preventing those who write blockchain code but never hold user assets from being regulated as financial institutions. The article contends that opponents' law-enforcement concerns are misplaced, since the provision preserves criminal liability for knowingly handling illicit funds and is consistent with the DOJ's own position that writing code without criminal intent is not a crime. CATO further warns that failing to pass the provision would drive developers offshore—noting the U.S. share of open-source blockchain developers has already dropped from 25% to 18%—reducing law enforcement visibility while extending a Bank Secrecy Act surveillance regime that already costs $59 billion annually yet yields minimal investigative leads.
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89.Social Security’s Finances Are Getting Worse, and Americans Don’t Know How Hard the Choices Will Be (CATO)
The Social Security Trust Fund faces accelerating depletion, requiring larger-than-expected adjustments to taxes or benefits. While Americans recognize underfunding, most dramatically underestimate the severity—44% were surprised to learn that nearly 23% benefit cuts would be needed—and strongly resist reform (77% oppose benefit cuts, 77% reject even $1,300 annual tax increases). An independent bipartisan commission has the strongest public backing (71%), but without better understanding of necessary trade-offs, Congress faces formidable political obstacles to meaningful action. Gen Z notably diverges from older cohorts, with majorities supporting personal accounts and benefit reductions for current seniors to protect younger workers from tax increases. The article concludes that the political challenge of reform may ultimately prove harder than solving the fiscal problem itself.
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90.
The Social Security Trustees report projects that the OASI Trust Fund will become insolvent in 2032, one year earlier than previously estimated, with an unfunded obligation now reaching $30 trillion (or $33 trillion excluding trust fund reserves). Cato's analysis argues the official projections underestimate the problem by 6–9 percent due to overly optimistic fertility assumptions compared to Congressional Budget Office and Census Bureau estimates. Closing the funding gap would require an immediate 34 percent increase in payroll taxes—from 12.4 percent to 16.65 percent—imposing roughly $2,900 additional annual burden on median workers, far exceeding public willingness to pay. The deterioration stems from tax policy changes, lower immigration, and declining fertility rates, all reducing future revenues and workforce size. Congress must act urgently to implement gradual reforms before automatic benefit cuts are triggered in 2032, as further delay increases the fiscal burden and makes policy options more severe.
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91.
The article contends that recent US military strikes against drug trafficking vessels (200+ deaths since September 2025) are ineffective because supply-side enforcement cannot eliminate underlying demand. Drawing on economics and drug war history, the author argues that destroying shipments merely incentivizes traffickers to innovate, strengthens violent criminal organizations, and perpetuates cycles of violence and corruption across Latin America. The costs of prohibition—including civil liberties erosion, overdoses, and diplomatic tensions—far outweigh security benefits. The article concludes that the US should legalize drugs rather than continue an ineffective military strategy.
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92.
The article argues that centuries of pessimistic predictions about resource depletion have been repeatedly disproven by human innovation and adaptation. Drawing on economist Julian Simon's philosophy that human ingenuity is the 'ultimate resource,' the authors praise Secretary of Energy Chris Wright for adopting an optimistic approach to energy abundance rather than scarcity-based policies. They cite the shale revolution and recent policy shifts—such as energy superabundance workshops and Operation Gigawatt—as evidence that the US government is embracing innovation-driven energy strategy. The implication is that private sector-led, decentralized innovation rather than government planning drives progress, and meeting global energy demands requires policy frameworks encouraging experimentation and risk-taking.
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93.
The Trump administration's new tariffs on 59 countries and the EU, justified as a response to forced labor violations, appear to be protectionism disguised as human rights advocacy. The tariffs lack logical consistency in their application—countries with similar violations receive identical rates, major violators are excluded, and the total amounts suspiciously match previously struck-down tariffs. The U.S. position is undermined by its own record: it imports $144 billion in forced labor goods annually and refuses to ratify the 1930 ILO Forced Labor Convention. While politically effective because opponents risk appearing to support slavery, these tariffs are unlikely to meaningfully reduce forced labor in global supply chains.
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94.Is There a Federal AI Framework? What the Obernolte-Trahan Bill Means for the AI Policy Debate (CATO)
The Obernolte-Trahan bill establishes a Congressional framework for federal AI policy, addressing the inadequacy of fragmented state regulations and temporary executive orders. The author advocates for a light-touch approach that treats AI as a general-purpose technology, using existing regulations and narrow safeguards for specific concerns like cybersecurity rather than prescriptive rules, drawing parallels to internet-era deregulation that enabled US digital leadership. The framework should prevent state patchwork while improving AI literacy and protecting civil rights and government use of AI. This Congressional approach aims to balance innovation with targeted protections, avoiding overly restrictive regulations that could inhibit beneficial future developments.
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95.
The FBI has revealed approximately 39,650 pages of FISA Section 702 noncompliance records spanning June 2023 to August 2024 through a court filing responding to a Cato Institute FOIA lawsuit. The agency is deliberately slow-rolling their release—producing only 128 pages initially on August 15, 2026—while Section 702 surveillance authority faces imminent expiration and congressional reauthorization votes. This timing appears strategic, preventing lawmakers and the public from accessing potentially damaging evidence of surveillance program violations during the critical reauthorization debate. The disclosure raises questions about government transparency, the constitutional viability of mass electronic surveillance, and whether officials are deliberately withholding evidence of noncompliance to influence legislative action.
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96.
Trump Accounts, while well-intentioned, suffer from poor tax design that makes them less attractive than existing savings vehicles. Family contributions are not tax-deductible and investment gains face ordinary income taxation rather than capital gains rates, leaving savers worse off than using regular brokerage accounts. CATO recommends Congress simplify the structure by eliminating the $1,000 subsidy, making all contributions deductible, allowing tax-deferred growth, and converting accounts to flexible Universal Savings Accounts at age 18—modeled after Canada and the UK—rather than maintaining the current complex, restricted framework.
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97.
CATO proposes three higher education budget reforms—converting subsidized loans to unsubsidized, eliminating Federal Supplemental Education Opportunity Grants, and cutting work-study funding—that would save taxpayers money while improving outcomes by redirecting savings to Pell grants. The analysis demonstrates that these programs have inherent flaws: subsidized loans cost over $1 billion annually with minimal impact on enrollment, while campus-based aid is allocated based on historical political power rather than actual student need. CATO refutes opponents' claims that eliminating subsidies would increase average student debt by $6,000, showing through detailed calculations that the actual average impact would be under $400 per student, making this a fiscally prudent shift toward means-tested aid for the neediest students.
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98.
This article argues that large language models frequently project unwarranted certainty about contested scientific questions, particularly in public health debates. Using 7-hydroxymitragynine (7-OH), an alkaloid in kratom, as a case study, the author demonstrates how AI systems confidently describe it as a highly potent opioid with serious overdose risks, while recent scientific literature reveals ongoing debate about its pharmacology and safety profile—with evidence suggesting more complex, atypical receptor signaling and rare fatal overdoses. LLMs are trained to provide confident syntheses rather than distinguish between settled science and ongoing controversies, risking the amplification of moral panics around emerging substances. The author argues against regulatory approaches to resolve scientific disagreement and instead advocates for transparency about uncertainty, continued open debate, and scrutiny of confident claims from all sources. Policymakers considering substance restrictions should recognize that today's scientific controversy may become tomorrow's accepted therapy.
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99.Restoring the Right to Trial by Jury: How the Right to Trial Act Helps Reclaim the Sixth Amendment (CATO)
The article argues that the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury has been effectively gutted by coercive plea bargaining, with 98.3 percent of federal convictions in 2022 coming from guilty pleas rather than trials. Using the case of Aaron Swartz—who faced a 15,000 percent sentencing increase for refusing a plea deal—as a focal point, the piece illustrates how prosecutors exploit charge stacking, mandatory minimums, and the resulting 'trial penalty' to pressure defendants, including innocent ones, into waiving their constitutional rights. The bipartisan Right to Trial Act (H.R. 9095) would require judges to review plea negotiation history when sentencing after trial and grant them authority to bypass mandatory minimums used punitively, representing a significant step toward rebalancing power between prosecutors and the judiciary in the federal criminal justice system.
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100.
CATO argues that the FCC's public-interest doctrine, which treats broadcasters as public trustees with diminished First Amendment rights, rests on an outdated spectrum-scarcity rationale that has been rendered obsolete by cable, streaming, and the internet. The article traces how successive administrations—from Kennedy and Nixon to Trump—have weaponized FCC licensing power to coerce and punish broadcasters over their editorial choices, citing recent actions against CBS, ABC/Disney, and others. CATO calls for courts to extend full First Amendment protections to broadcasters, for Congress to repeal tools like the equal-time and news-distortion rules, and ultimately for a property-rights approach to spectrum governance that would eliminate the FCC's leverage over editorial content.
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101.
The paper argues that U.S. fixed command and control nodes are increasingly vulnerable to Chinese and other adversaries' long-range strikes, electronic warfare, and unmanned systems, threatening to collapse situational awareness at critical moments. It proposes a three-layered mobile, federated C2 grid: tanker-hosted airborne communications nodes for standoff bridging, low-cost aerial vehicles with modular payloads forming a meshed tactical network, and mobile ground sensors to reduce reliance on fixed infrastructure. The framework is designed to complement theater-level modernization efforts like the E-7 by extending resilient connectivity to the tactical edge. The implication is that the Air Force must move beyond upgrading individual platforms and instead build a distributed architecture that degrades gracefully under attack, preserving decision speed advantage in contested environments.
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102.
The paper argues that the U.S. must develop military human spaceflight capabilities to maintain space superiority against China, whose military-led space habitation and lunar programs are advancing on schedule. It contrasts China's consistent execution with U.S. programs plagued by shifting vision, policy, and funding, warning that this gap—combined with China's pattern of asserting territorial dominance by force—poses a strategic risk. The author proposes a pragmatic pathway centered on the Space Test Course, NASA partnerships, and commercial collaboration, using LEO space stations as proving grounds for Space Force Guardian habitation requirements. The implication is that without a dedicated military human spaceflight program, the U.S. risks ceding strategic control of cislunar space to China.
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103.
This Mitchell Institute study argues the U.S. Air Force needs urgent rebalancing of its combat force mix to prepare for peer conflict, particularly against China, after three decades of underfunding and deferred modernization. Based on a wargame comparing two alternative 2035 force designs, the authors recommend a balanced portfolio of fifth-generation-and-beyond manned aircraft, autonomous uninhabited systems, and advanced guided munitions to maximize survivability and lethality in high-intensity threat environments. The report frames the current moment as a once-in-a-generation opportunity for Congress and the Department of Defense to make strategic force-design choices that close critical capability and capacity gaps. Its implications center on prioritizing modernization funding and accelerating integration of autonomous platforms into Air Force combat operations.
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104.
The Mitchell Institute launched a China Airpower Tracker that maps PLAAF airbases, aircraft, and surface-to-air missile sites using open-source intelligence. The tracker documents China's rapid air force modernization from a defensive homeland force into one capable of power projection beyond the First Island Chain, encompassing advanced fighters, bombers, UAVs, and integrated air defenses across five theater commands. Unlike the U.S. Air Force, the PLAAF also controls all long-range SAMs, radar networks, and airborne infantry, giving it a broader organizational mandate. The tool's interactive mapping of normal operating bases and relocatable SAM positions provides planners with a baseline for assessing Chinese A2/AD coverage and force posture changes during crises.
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105.
This Mitchell Institute policy paper argues that the U.S. Air Force must rebuild its capacity for strategic attack to deny adversaries operational sanctuaries, asserting that long-range penetrating airpower is essential to holding targets at risk anywhere in a conflict. The authors contend that decades of force cuts and deferred modernization have eroded combat capacity to the point where the Air Force cannot simultaneously deter nuclear attacks, defend the homeland, and defeat aggression at acceptable risk levels. They call for scaling up production of new long-range stealth bombers and fighters, framing this as a national strategic choice necessary to maintain credible deterrence and warfighting capability.
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106.
This Mitchell Institute policy paper argues that space superiority is a foundational national security imperative for the United States, as adversaries—particularly China and Russia—are fielding increasingly capable counterspace weapons that threaten U.S. space architecture. The author calls on the Department of Defense to conduct a comprehensive review of space roles and missions, clarify institutional responsibilities, and invest in cross-domain capabilities to improve the survivability of space assets. The paper emphasizes a cultural shift to treat space as a true warfighting domain, including educating warfighters on space dependencies and integrating contested space scenarios into major theater exercises before real conflict erupts. Without these urgent reforms, the authors warn, the U.S. risks defeat in a domain that underpins all military operations as well as critical civil and commercial services.
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107.
Taiwan conducted major live-fire drills on its western coast featuring its newly acquired U.S.-made HIMARS launchers, firing 32 rockets to validate precision strike capabilities and rapid redeployment (relocating within three minutes of launch). The exercises are part of Taipei's broader defensive strategy shift toward long-range missiles, attack drones, and precision munitions designed to counter a potential Chinese amphibious invasion, with plans to eventually field 111 HIMARS launchers. The drills underscore Taiwan's deepening integration of American weapon systems into its anti-invasion posture, with HIMARS providing the capability to strike amphibious forces, beachheads, and potentially mainland staging areas — raising the military cost of any cross-strait operation while also risking escalatory signaling to Beijing.
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108.
U.S. forces disabled three merchant tankers in the Gulf of Oman for allegedly violating the naval blockade of Iran, killing three Indian merchant mariners in the first fatalities from blockade enforcement. At least 50 commercial vessels and 14 seafarers have now been caught in the U.S.-Iran conflict, while the legality of the blockade without a Congressional declaration of war remains in question. Dark transits through the Strait of Hormuz are increasing—roughly half of recent passages occurred with AIS off—making enforcement and verification of U.S. escort claims difficult. The prolonged closure is driving structural shifts in energy trade patterns, with Chinese markets growing pessimistic and industry coining 'NACHO' (Not A Chance Hormuz Opens) to describe the outlook.
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109.
The U.S. Navy established two new commands at HMAS Stirling in Western Australia—Submarine Squadron 3 and Naval Support Activity Stirling—to support Submarine Rotational Force-West (SRF-West), a trilateral AUKUS initiative enabling U.S. and U.K. nuclear submarines to operate from Perth beginning in 2027. This infrastructure will maintain up to five rotational submarines while building Australia's indigenous maintenance workforce and supporting its development of a sovereign nuclear-powered attack submarine fleet under AUKUS Pillar 1. The arrangement enhances U.S. submarine readiness and regional presence in the Indo-Pacific while reducing burden on U.S. shipyards, as demonstrated by recent successful maintenance of HMS Anson using local Australian suppliers and advanced manufacturing techniques. This model establishes sustainable trilateral submarine operations aligned with non-proliferation standards and accelerates Australia's capability to own, operate, and maintain its own SSNs.
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110.
The U.S.-South Korea alliance, anchored in the Korean War (1950-1953) and formalized through the 1953 Mutual Defense Treaty, remains a cornerstone of regional security with over 28,500 U.S. troops permanently stationed in the ROK. Facing escalating threats from China, Russia, and North Korea, both nations are prepared to expand South Korea's operational role and broaden the alliance's strategic mission beyond traditional deterrence. Congress holds key levers to modernize the partnership through strategic flexibility, wartime operational control realignment, burden-sharing arrangements, extended deterrence guarantees, and defense industrial cooperation—signaling recognition that evolving Indo-Pacific threats demand enhanced coordinated military and strategic capabilities.
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111.
Taiwan successfully tested American-made Altius-600 loitering munitions in live-fire drills, demonstrating new asymmetric defense capabilities to counter potential Chinese invasion forces. The approximately 2,000 drones acquired from Anduril Industries feature nine-pound warheads and a 99-mile range, filling critical gaps between long-range anti-ship missiles and short-range artillery. Taiwan is deliberately shifting toward unmanned mass-deployment strategies informed by Ukraine's experience, emphasizing distributed firepower and portability to defeat amphibious threats. The drills integrate with a planned "Littoral Combat Command" designed to defeat maritime threats within 24 nautical miles, part of a broader Indo-Pacific trend where the US, Japan, and Philippines are similarly investing in drone-based deterrence against Chinese military expansion.
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112.
NATO launched BALTOPS 2026, a maritime exercise involving 20 ships and 6,000 personnel from 15 NATO nations, smaller than 2025 due to Middle Eastern commitments. For the first time since 1972, the exercise is commanded from JFC Brunssum, enhancing realistic NATO command structure simulation and interoperability. The exercise focuses on deterring Russian threats in the Baltic through training in amphibious operations, air defense, anti-submarine warfare, mine countermeasures, and advanced unmanned systems. NATO officials emphasize that operational readiness demonstrations serve to prevent crises while building real-world interoperability among allies. The exercise underscores NATO's commitment to strengthening European conventional deterrence with greater ally responsibility for regional defense.
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113.
A fatal shooting aboard future USS John F. Kennedy (CVN-79) killed Boatswain's Mate Seaman Jesse Braswell on June 7, 2026, with another sailor in custody. The involved sailors were part of the carrier's armed in-port security force—a collateral duty with firearm authorization—during construction at Newport News Shipbuilding. The incident, ruled a homicide and under Naval Criminal Investigative Service investigation, raises questions about personnel vetting procedures and operational security protocols for sailors with weapons authority during the pre-commissioning phase.
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114.
The GAO found that DHS's 27 major acquisition programs experienced significant cost growth and management challenges as of FY2025. Of 19 programs with approved baselines, 15 revised their goals, with collective baselined costs increasing $11.4 billion (26%) while most delayed full capability delivery. Critical risks include eight programs experiencing 20%+ staff reductions and dissolution of DHS's department-level acquisition oversight office in October 2025, creating uncertainty over governance structure. Despite this, 18 of 19 programs are meeting their most recent baselines, though the portfolio faces ongoing cost and schedule pressures requiring sustained monitoring.
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115.
CS3 Jermiah Copeland was sentenced to 43 years in federal prison for the unpremeditated murder of CS3 Angelina Resendiz, a 21-year-old sailor aboard USS James E. Williams at Naval Station Norfolk on May 29, 2025. Copeland pleaded guilty to strangling Resendiz in his barracks and concealing her body; GPS data from his phone and witness testimony established the timeline and led to discovery of her remains in a duffel bag. The case highlights persistent vulnerabilities in naval force protection, barracks security, and violence prevention protocols for junior enlisted personnel, raising questions about command oversight and the adequacy of existing safeguards against sexual assault and murder within military facilities.
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116.Upcoming U.S. Depot in the Philippines to Support Fueling of Navy Destroyers, Combat Logistics Force Ships (USNI)
The Pentagon is establishing a Defense Fuel Support Point in Davao Gulf, Philippines, with 41 million gallons of fuel capacity to support U.S. Navy destroyers and logistics ships, expected operational by April 2028. The facility addresses the vulnerability of Cold War-era logistics hubs like Subic Bay to Chinese military threats while supporting regional allies including Japan and Philippine forces. Located near the Sulu Sea and the first and second island chain chokepoint, it reduces U.S. reliance on exposed infrastructure vulnerable to Beijing's military footprint. The DFSP reflects broader U.S. strategy to distribute logistics nodes across the Indo-Pacific to maintain operational resilience in potential Taiwan or South China Sea contingencies, though it faces local political opposition from Davao City leadership.
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117.
The Pentagon has nominated four Navy flag officers for three-star assignments, including new commanders for 3rd Fleet and the Joint Staff, along with leadership transitions in Navy Installations Command and Naval Operations. These nominations fill vacancies created by recent retirements and reassignments, such as the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations position vacant since February and the Joint Staff Director role following Vice Adm. Fred Kacher's retirement. The selections reflect strategic continuity in Navy command structure while implementing Defense Secretary Hegseth's 'less generals, more G.I.s' personnel reduction initiative, which aims to decrease flag officer ranks by 10 percent across the service.
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118.
Taiwan faces an accelerating military threat from China's People's Liberation Army, with U.S. intelligence assessing that China could be capable of invading Taiwan by 2027. Taiwan responded by passing a $24.8 billion, eight-year arms procurement budget in May 2026 and committed to increasing defense spending to 3.3% of GDP, though political divisions resulted in funding 38% below executive proposals. Beyond procurement, Taiwan must address military recruitment and retention challenges, strengthen civil defense preparedness, and protect vulnerable infrastructure—all critical to realizing its defense goals and maintaining cross-Strait stability.
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119.
The article argues that the 2026 US-Iran war has permanently reshaped Persian Gulf geopolitics by breaking the psychological barrier against closing the Strait of Hormuz, which Iran will now integrate as a core deterrence tool replacing the weakened Axis of Resistance. Iran's forward-defense strategy through proxy groups like Hezbollah and Hamas failed to deter US and Israeli strikes on Iranian soil, prompting Tehran to shift its strategic focus to Hormuz closure and Gulf-state targeting as primary leverage. The Houthi capacity to simultaneously disrupt the Bab al-Mandab compounds this threat to global shipping. Iran will prioritize rebuilding missile and drone capabilities over nuclear infrastructure to keep the Strait closure option credible. For policymakers, this means the Gulf's pre-February 2026 security architecture is obsolete: GCC states face a persistent coercion threat, energy supply-chain diversification is now urgent, and any future diplomatic framework must account for Iran's demonstrated willingness to weaponize maritime chokepoints.
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120.
This Chatham House research paper examines the growing crisis of attacks on medical care in armed conflict, reaffirming that protection of the wounded, sick, medical facilities, and personnel is a foundational principle of international humanitarian law (IHL). Despite clear legal frameworks, the paper finds that escalating global instability and protracted conflicts have eroded compliance, with stark evidence that medical protection on the ground has not improved. The authors clarify specific IHL rules governing medical care provision, address challenges arising from recent conflicts, and propose concrete measures for states, organized armed groups, and other actors to strengthen compliance and accountability.
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121.
Youth-led protest movements that toppled governments in Sri Lanka (2022), Bangladesh (2024), and Nepal (2025) have produced new administrations with strong mandates but mounting governance challenges. All three countries face economic strain from IMF bailouts compounded by the Iran war's inflationary pressures and fuel shortages, while inexperienced leaders are struggling to deliver on anti-corruption and reform promises. Relations with India present both opportunities—particularly in energy and humanitarian aid—and risks from border tensions and identity politics under the BJP's expanding regional footprint. The convergence of internal fragility and external shocks means these post-revolutionary governments could squander their democratic renewal windows if structural reforms stall.
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122.Kenya’s G 7 role must address the economic pressures fuelling domestic criticism of President Ruto (Chatham House)
Kenya's participation in the 2026 G7 summit presents an opportunity to address the global economic imbalances that have deepened its domestic vulnerabilities, including a crushing debt burden and widening trade deficits with China. President Ruto's international diplomacy rests on shaky domestic foundations, as anti-government protests driven by inflation, rising fuel prices, and perceptions of costly foreign engagements continue to challenge his legitimacy. The article argues that Kenya is caught between Western financing models that proved risk-averse during acute fiscal stress and Chinese state-backed alternatives that reduce project costs but exacerbate trade imbalances through imported labour and materials. Kenya should use the G7 platform to push for expanded first-loss guarantee mechanisms to derisk investment, ensure EU trade measures do not discourage Chinese investment in African export industries, and leverage its Ebola quarantine commitment to extract US trade concessions.
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123.
Iraq's new Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi faces the enduring challenge of integrating the Popular Mobilization Forces into state control, made more urgent as Iran-aligned militias draw Iraq into the US-Israeli conflict with Tehran. While some faction leaders—including Muqtada al-Sadr and Qais al-Khazali—have signaled willingness to integrate, groups more deeply tied to Iran's 'axis of resistance' such as Kataeb Hezbollah refuse, exposing the limits of any consolidation effort. Past integration attempts, like the Badr Corps after 2003, show that formal incorporation into state institutions does not sever informal loyalties or transfer real coercive power, particularly control over drones and rockets, to Baghdad. The war may offer a political opening as some PMF leaders prioritize the economic gains of stability over resistance, but entrenched patronage networks and US pressure for faster action complicate the path forward.
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124.
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125.
Chatham House highlights that Russia's ongoing invasion is devastating a Ukraine already grappling with entrenched legacy governance structures and vested interests. The think tank notes strong societal and generational pressure for institutional reform, arguing that sustained international support for Ukraine's defense is catalyzing an irreversible transformation of the country's political and policy landscape. Drawing on years of research through its Ukraine Forum, Chatham House underscores that understanding Ukraine's complex internal dynamics is essential for shaping effective Western engagement. The implication is that allied strategy must integrate post-conflict institutional reform planning alongside military and economic assistance.
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126.
Chatham House argues that the October 7, 2023 Hamas attack and Israel's subsequent Gaza offensive exposed the failure of international policy on the Israel–Palestine conflict. The analysis points to Arab normalization deals that sidestepped Palestinian statehood, U.S. disengagement toward other crises, and unchecked Israeli settlement expansion as key factors that deprioritized the peace process. The brief concludes that this neglect is unsustainable and that lasting resolution requires addressing the conflict's root causes—including accountability, governance, and cross-societal bridge-building.
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127.Director of Chatham House UK in the World Programme gives evidence at Parliament Foreign Affairs Committee (Chatham House)
Olivia O'Sullivan, Director of Chatham House's UK in the World Programme, testified before the UK Parliament's Foreign Affairs Committee on the Integrated Security Fund and its role in addressing high-priority security threats. She highlighted the UK's shifting strategic security landscape driven by a massive contraction in global aid spending, forcing difficult trade-offs between immediate defence priorities, conflict prevention, and long-term complex risks. O'Sullivan warned that conflict-affected states risk being neglected under the new international aid environment and urged the government to ensure the centrally situated Integrated Security Fund is preserved through the FCDO restructure to enable long-term strategic investment. The testimony underscores the need for the UK to maintain institutional capacity for anticipating emerging threats even as budgetary pressures mount.
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128.Head of Chatham House Ukraine Forum gives evidence to UK Parliament Defence Committee on Ukraine war (Chatham House)
Chatham House Ukraine Forum head Orysia Lutsevych testified before the UK Parliament Defence Committee that Ukrainian public support for a ceasefire along current front lines is growing, but remains contingent on credible security guarantees including a multinational deterrent force. She highlighted Ukraine's recent battlefield successes driven by defence industry innovation, national unity, and increased European support offsetting US withdrawal, while acknowledging war fatigue from constant bombardment and conscription debates. Lutsevych urged the UK to scale up production of long-range missiles and air defence interceptors, underscoring that any sustainable ceasefire arrangement must credibly prevent future Russian aggression to avoid imperilling both Ukrainian and broader European security.
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129.
The dollar will experience gradual decline rather than sudden collapse in global dominance, following the historical pattern of sterling's century-long transition. While the dollar faces emerging rivals like the euro (which already invoices more trade) and renminbi, deep structural entanglements and universal holdings make rapid displacement unlikely. The decline will be punctuated by periodic crises rather than steady erosion, similar to sterling's 1931, 1949, and 1968 shocks. Policymakers should prepare for managed transition and coordinated global monetary adjustments to avoid destabilizing disruptions.
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130.
The UK's Defence Investment Plan must finally break with endemic dishonesty in defence policy that has systematically misaligned strategic ambitions with actual resources. Decades of promises to achieve 'more with less' through efficiency savings and technological fixes have failed, as evidenced by the UK's inability to mount a rapid maritime response during the 2026 Gulf crisis. The DIP must confront hard tradeoffs between expensive domestic procurement and open-market solutions, and make explicit choices between homeland/Arctic defence or global force projection—a choice obscured by strategic ambiguity for decades. Without such honesty about costs and capabilities, the plan risks repeating past failures and further undermining credibility with NATO allies. The critical test will be whether the DIP finally aligns realistic resources with achievable strategic goals rather than continuing rhetorical ambitions unsupported by budgets.
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131.
The FCAS fighter jet program is effectively collapsing as Germany seeks to withdraw, primarily due to France and Germany's incompatible requirements—France needs carrier and nuclear capabilities while Germany seeks a conventional fighter. This failure reflects broader European defense fragmentation, with four competing next-generation fighter programs underway, which threatens to splinter resources and leave Europe dangerously dependent on an unreliable US F-35 supply through the 2040s. However, this impasse could prove beneficial if it prompts European states to abandon the outdated procurement model driven by industrial prestige and export competition, instead consolidating resources into a single, unified fighter system focused on urgent strategic needs.
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132.Rules against power: Does the world need a new economic alliance to balance the US and China? Independent Thinking podcast (Chatham House)
A new Chatham House report proposes creating an economic alliance—a 'third pole'—to prevent the US and China from undermining the rules-based global economic order. The analysis explores how such a bloc could function, which countries might join, and how major powers would likely react to this challenge. This suggests growing recognition of the need for multilateral economic coordination to address great power competition and preserve global governance structures, though implementation faces significant political obstacles.
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133.
A Russia-Ukraine ceasefire poses significant security risks to Ukraine and Europe due to Moscow's historical pattern of manipulating agreements to strengthen its strategic position. Without careful definition and oversight, a rushed ceasefire could allow Russian forces to regroup and rearm while enabling continued pressure through cyberattacks, sabotage, and election interference. The analysis underscores the need for robust mitigation strategies and long-term security arrangements beyond the ceasefire itself to protect Ukrainian sovereignty and European stability.
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134.
Ethiopia's June 2026 election cannot resolve the country's fundamental conflicts because the electoral process lacks genuine political competition—with many opposition parties aligned with the government, banned, or in exile—while being overshadowed by escalating tensions in Tigray and Amhara regions. The collapse of the 2022 Pretoria Agreement between the federal government and the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) has created significant risk of renewed warfare, with the TPLF reasserting regional authority while the government strengthens ties with the UAE and Israel against the TPLF's aligned partners (Eritrea and Sudan). Regional dynamics have become increasingly complex, with Ethiopia reportedly supporting anti-SAF forces in Sudan's conflict, raising fears that Tigray tensions could trigger wider regional conflagration. The article argues that elections alone cannot address these structural conflicts and calls for urgent, coordinated diplomatic intervention from African Union mediators and major international powers to prevent escalation.
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135.
Armenia's June 2026 election served as a referendum on PM Nikol Pashinyan's historic peace agenda following the 2023 loss of Mountainous Karabakh. His Civil Contract party campaigns for a "Real Armenia" that accepts territorial loss, pursues final peace with Azerbaijan, and shifts toward Western alignment—fundamentally reorienting decades of Russian-dominated policy. A tentative peace agreement negotiated with U.S. mediation in August 2025 awaits constitutional reform and popular endorsement. Deep political polarization over Karabakh's loss, coupled with threats of violence and concerns about democratic backsliding, threatens peace consolidation. Success requires balancing Western engagement with enduring Russian energy dependencies while addressing the grievances of displaced Karabakh Armenians.
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136.Elite capture of Africa’s critical minerals mustn’t be mistaken for resource sovereignty (Chatham House)
The article distinguishes between legitimate resource sovereignty—where African leaders transparently manage mineral wealth for public benefit—and 'elite capture,' where narrow elites control resources for personal enrichment and corrupt external partnerships. Burkina Faso's mining reforms under President Traoré exemplify elite capture: licensing to Russian firms under international sanctions, gold suspected of financing Russia's war, and canceled industrial operations leading to illegal extraction and child labor. By contrast, Morocco's OCP Group demonstrates successful state ownership through transparent governance and competitive global performance. African nations must negotiate contracts and update regulatory frameworks in ways that attract legitimate investment, reduce risk, align with citizens' long-term development, and engage strategically with diverse capital sources rather than ceding control to predatory actors.
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137.
This Chatham House podcast examines whether Britain's potential rejoin of the EU could realistically move onto the political agenda, considering the significantly altered economic and defence environments since Brexit. The discussion explores what terms European leaders might demand for readmitting the UK and whether the strategic case for re-entry has become compelling in light of changed geopolitical circumstances. The conversation suggests that economic and security considerations in the post-Brexit context may reshape calculations around UK-EU relations, with potential implications for continental integration and UK foreign policy alignment.
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138.
A 'super El Niño' predicted for mid-to-late 2026 will amplify UK climate risks, raising temperatures a further 0.2°C on top of the current 1.4°C rise above pre-industrial levels. The Committee on Climate Change warns that without coordinated adaptation, climate damages could reach 1-5% of UK GDP by 2050, with greatest risks from heat, flooding, and water scarcity. Current UK adaptation efforts remain fragmented and legally non-binding, leaving critical infrastructure—power grids, transport, health, food systems—exposed. The report calls for legally enforceable adaptation standards (modelled on the Netherlands and France), £11 billion annual investment in resilience, and sustained local government funding. Inadequate preparation risks cascading failures across interconnected infrastructure as climate variability intensifies.
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139.The UK can’t break off critical mineral links with China. But it can understand its vulnerabilities (Chatham House)
The article argues that the UK cannot and should not pursue full decoupling from China on critical minerals, unlike the US or Asian economies, because the UK lacks the mining scale to subsidize alternatives and its firms benefit substantially from Chinese investment, sales, and shared infrastructure. Key evidence includes the UK's £42 billion trade deficit with China, Chinese stakes in 16 of the top 100 non-Chinese mining firms, and the UK's indirect exposure through semi-manufactured parts from third countries reliant on Chinese processing. The piece recommends a pragmatic approach: implementing clearer guidelines on foreign investment voting rights, shared infrastructure use, and data protection for UK firms, while leveraging the 2025 critical minerals strategy as a foundation to manage genuine vulnerabilities without severing commercially beneficial ties.
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140.Confusion over UK sanctions on Russia undermines a Western response that was already too slow and half-hearted (Chatham House)
The article argues that Western sanctions against Russia have failed to deliver a decisive economic blow due to slow, lowest-common-denominator coordination and an unwillingness to bear costs domestically. The UK's recent decision to delay sanctions on Russian crude-fed diesel and jet fuel—while simultaneously targeting allies' LNG imports—exposed incoherence that undermines European unity. The author contends the West has never treated the Russian threat as existential, leading to half-measures, and warns that the UK's uncoordinated approach post-Brexit further fractures the alliance at a critical moment.
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141.
The Chatham House analysis argues that the China-Russia strategic partnership remains durable, rooted in geographic proximity, shared opposition to Western-led institutions, and complementary multipolarity agendas, but falls short of a full alliance. Key evidence includes Beijing's deliberate foot-dragging on the Power of Siberia 2 pipeline to avoid energy overdependence on Moscow, China's continued preservation of European economic ties, and its refusal to fully back Russia's confrontational posture toward the West. The implication for Western policymakers is that the partnership, while resilient, contains exploitable seams: China's prioritization of economic self-reliance and global market access over ideological solidarity with Russia offers leverage points for differentiated engagement strategies that could prevent the relationship from deepening into a formal alliance.
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142.UK should not invest in new North Sea oil as it is ‘a price taker, not a price maker’ – Dr Fatih Birol, IEA chief (Chatham House)
IEA Executive Director Dr Fatih Birol argued at Chatham House that the UK should not invest in new North Sea oil exploration because, as a price taker rather than a price maker, additional domestic production cannot influence global oil prices or reduce costs for UK consumers. He emphasized that the UK's energy future lies in electrification powered by renewables, nuclear, and natural gas. Birol also warned that the ongoing Strait of Hormuz crisis—which he characterized as larger than the 1973, 1979, and 2022 energy shocks combined—could push the world into a 'red zone' by July-August 2025 as strategic reserves deplete and summer demand rises, with cascading risks to food prices and inflation in emerging economies.
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143.The flow of arms and money feeding the war in Sudan can be cut. What is missing is the will (Chatham House)
The article argues that Sudan's three-year civil war persists primarily because external actors — notably the UAE supporting the RSF and Turkey, Iran, and Egypt backing the SAF — continue to supply arms, drones, and funding through cross-border pipelines, making fighting appear more rational than negotiation. Despite the April 2026 Berlin Conference's humanitarian pledges and calls to halt external support, no enforcement mechanisms were established, and the US-led Quad is structurally dysfunctional since accused enablers like the UAE and Egypt sit within it. The author calls for 'deproxification' — coordinated disruption of arms routes, gold shipments, and logistics corridors — and urges the US to deploy real sanctions leverage against enablers, suggesting Vice President Vance take over the Sudan file to bring sufficient diplomatic weight to bear on Abu Dhabi.
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144.
This Chatham House podcast examines how Gulf oil and gas producers are navigating the global energy transition amid heightened regional instability caused by the US-Israeli war on Iran. The analysis explores whether Gulf states' economic diversification plans can withstand both the structural decline in fossil fuel demand and acute geopolitical disruptions around the Strait of Hormuz. Experts assess the medium- to long-term implications of the conflict for regional energy infrastructure, export capacity, and the pace of transition investments. The discussion suggests that the war could either accelerate diversification by exposing hydrocarbon dependency risks or delay it by redirecting capital toward security and reconstruction. For policymakers, the convergence of energy transition pressures and active conflict in the world's most critical oil-producing region underscores the need for resilient supply-chain strategies and accelerated alternative energy development.
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145.
Egypt has actively engaged in diplomacy and military deployments to help end the US-Israeli–Iran war, driven by a risk-management strategy to safeguard Red Sea navigation, counterbalance Israeli regional dominance, redirect US attention to threats like Sudan and the Nile dispute, and protect its war-strained economy. Cairo initiated backchannel contacts with Iran's Revolutionary Guards, proposed a truce, and coordinated with a new informal quad (Pakistan, Turkey, Saudi Arabia) whose efforts contributed to the eventual Pakistan-mediated ceasefire. While Egypt's mediation enhances its diplomatic relevance, its post-war vision built on pan-Arab collective security faces deep divisions among Arab states over whether Iran or Israel is the primary threat, limiting Cairo's ability to shape the emerging regional order.
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146.Trump’s approach to Taiwan could jeopardize its future. Indo-Pacific allies are taking note (Chatham House)
The article argues that Trump's approach to Taiwan—using a $14 billion arms package as a bargaining chip with Beijing, expressing reluctance to fight a war 9,500 miles away, and echoing China's framing of cross-strait tensions—undermines decades of carefully calibrated US policy. Key evidence includes Trump's willingness to consult with Xi on arms transfers (violating the 1982 Six Assurances), diversion of US military resources away from the Indo-Pacific, and Washington's rhetorical endorsement of Beijing's 'constructive strategic stability' concept. These shifts risk eroding Taiwan's defensive capabilities and deterrence posture, emboldening Xi ahead of his bid for a fourth term, and signaling to Indo-Pacific allies that US security guarantees are increasingly transactional and unreliable.
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147.What is necessary to return Venezuela to stable economic growth and democracy after the US operation? (Chatham House)
Chatham House convenes experts to assess the path forward for Venezuela following the January 2026 US operation, arguing that while Washington has outlined a three-stage process toward stability, concrete plans for credible elections, rule of law, and economic recovery remain inadequate. The discussion draws on two recent Chatham House policy papers that identify specific benchmarks and priorities for democratic elections and legal institutional reform under the interim government. The implications are significant for US and multilateral strategy: sustaining post-intervention gains will require coordinated engagement among the interim Venezuelan government, international organizations, investors, and civil society to avoid a governance vacuum and ensure lasting democratic transition.
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148.How might an African credit rating agency improve the continent's financing conditions? (Chatham House)
The proposed African Credit Rating Agency (AfCRA) aims to improve the continent's financing conditions by challenging the perceived systemic bias of established global rating agencies, which are accused of inflating Africa's default risk premium. While the initiative promises to lower borrowing costs and expand market access for African sovereigns, critics question AfCRA's independence and the empirical basis for the alleged bias. Therefore, while the agency represents a potential mechanism for financial reform, its ultimate success and impact on financing must be viewed in conjunction with broader structural factors, such as improved fiscal transparency and sustainable economic growth.
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149.
A decade after Brexit, UK-EU relations are entering a new phase of cautious engagement, though persistent disputes over trade, regulation, and mobility continue to complicate cooperation. Michel Barnier, former French PM, argues that the relationship's trajectory depends on managing structural tensions while accounting for shifting domestic politics—particularly France's 2027 presidential election. The discussion emphasizes that realistic near-term cooperation outcomes require acknowledging both sides' desire to rebuild ties and the practical limits imposed by regulatory divergence and political constraints in London, Paris, and Brussels.
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150.
Cities and subnational governments are emerging as more effective climate leaders than national governments due to their proximity to communities and control of regulatory frameworks and policy levers. These local and regional authorities can deliver faster, more targeted responses to climate impacts—including flooding, heat, and energy insecurity—while integrating climate action with economic development and public services. However, barriers persist, particularly in under-resourced jurisdictions and emerging economies. Effective climate resilience requires multilevel governance models that balance immediate adaptation needs with long-term energy transition goals amid geopolitical fragmentation and fiscal constraints.
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151.
Sir Michael Moritz argues that understanding contemporary antisemitism and the threat to pluralistic societies requires drawing lessons from his family's history of exile and persecution. He draws parallels between historical trauma and modern political instability, citing current political actions and asserting that the UK is an 'uncomfortable place for Jews today.' The discussion emphasizes that the fragility of security and the struggle of the 'outsider' status must inform policy efforts. Ultimately, the conversation stresses that protecting democratic principles and a pluralistic society necessitates a proactive commitment to combating hate and preserving civil rights.
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152.
The global order is undergoing rapid transformation, characterized by conflicting ambitions from major powers like the US and China, while many regions seek stability. The core challenge involves determining the future relevance of established Western-centric institutions, such as the WTO and the UN, and addressing new threats like AI and climate change. The consensus emerging from the Global South and other regions suggests a move toward a new, inclusive international framework. Policy implications point to the necessity of multilateral diplomacy that empowers diverse regional actors to shape global governance, rather than relying solely on the traditional superpower model.
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153.
The article posits that the fundamental American economic debate—whether to prioritize national self-reliance or global integration—is an enduring force shaping US policy. This historical tension is resurfacing today, driven by strategic competition with China, the revival of industrial policy, and growing domestic skepticism toward globalization. The analysis suggests that these shifts mandate a re-evaluation of US trade policy, presenting complex implications for allies and partners. Ultimately, the US's evolving economic posture could signal a major pivot in American leadership, potentially reshaping the global economic order and established international institutions.
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154.
The article highlights the critical failure of international humanitarian law (IHL) to protect medical personnel and facilities during modern armed conflicts. Despite protective resolutions, hospitals are routinely targeted, and access to medical care for the wounded and sick remains severely compromised, indicating a systemic disregard for international law. To address this crisis, the analysis calls for concrete measures that states, organized armed groups, and international bodies must adopt. Policy efforts must focus on strengthening compliance mechanisms and developing operational guidelines to mitigate the adverse impact of military operations on medical services.
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155.
AI adoption is identified as a critical driver of geopolitical influence and economic competitiveness, with the potential to unlock trillions in productive capacity. However, the realization of this potential is constrained by significant gaps in skills, learning systems, and organizational readiness within existing labor markets. To maintain a competitive edge, the publication stresses that competitive advantage hinges not merely on developing advanced AI models, but on the effective, coordinated deployment of these capabilities across all sectors. Therefore, policymakers, businesses, and academia must collaborate to build responsive labor markets, ensuring the global workforce is equipped with the necessary skills to match talent with economic opportunity and build resilience.
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156.
The upcoming Armenian election is viewed as a critical national referendum on the peace terms negotiated with Azerbaijan, making the outcome highly volatile. The election's significance extends beyond domestic politics, as it is expected to be the most geopolitically charged in Armenia's history. External actors are actively influencing the process, creating risks that threaten the fragile democratic transition initiated in 2018. Consequently, the stability of Armenia's peace process and its political future are at risk, requiring careful monitoring of international involvement.
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157.
Ghana is strategically positioning itself as a key actor in a fragmenting global order by adopting a policy of 'multi-alignment.' Regionally, the country is deepening West African security cooperation and promoting continental integration by hosting the AfCFTA Secretariat. Globally, Ghana advocates for inclusive multilateralism, championing causes like health sovereignty (Accra Reset) and justice, such as leading the UN resolution on the transatlantic slave trade. These efforts aim to promote African agency, strengthen regional stability, and contribute to a more balanced international system amidst great-power rivalry.
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158.US at 250: Internationalism vs. isolationism – America’s enduring foreign policy debate (Chatham House)
The Chatham House article analyzes the historical tension between internationalism and isolationism as the defining characteristic of American foreign policy. It argues that the current skepticism toward the rules-based international order, exemplified by 'America First' policies, must be viewed not necessarily as a historic rupture, but rather as a familiar swing of a long-standing geopolitical pendulum. The piece suggests that understanding this enduring debate is crucial for predicting how the US will adjust its alliances and strategic engagement in the evolving global landscape. Policymakers must therefore anticipate continued shifts in Washington's commitment to multilateralism versus unilateral action.
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159.Dr Fatih Birol, IEA Executive Director, on the Strait of Hormuz crisis and global energy security (Chatham House)
The potential closure of the Strait of Hormuz poses an acute threat to global energy security, with repercussions extending far beyond oil price spikes to include mounting flight cancellations and mandatory fuel rationing. Global economic stability remains highly volatile, swinging daily based on de-escalation prospects between the US, Israel, and Iran. Policymakers must urgently assess the scale and duration of this disruption, as the crisis forces governments to rapidly revise fiscal plans and reassess energy security strategies. Ultimately, the world must determine effective policy responses to mitigate the shock and prevent the geopolitical instability from derailing the global energy transition.
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160.
The Chatham House analysis highlights that Ukraine's path to prosperity requires an ambitious, multi-stakeholder effort to address the staggering $588 billion reconstruction cost. Successful recovery hinges on implementing deep structural reforms and ensuring effective collaboration among the Ukrainian state, Western donors, and the private sector. Crucially, the report emphasizes that integrating with the European Union and establishing long-term security assurances are the primary catalysts for economic growth and industrial reconstruction. Therefore, policy strategies must prioritize strengthening Ukraine's business environment and positioning it competitively within emerging European value chains to sustain momentum toward full EU membership.
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161.
The Chatham House analysis argues that African institutions are central to achieving a durable peace in the Great Lakes region, despite past challenges and fragmented conflict dynamics. While acknowledging the limits of purely African-led mediation, the report stresses that marginalizing regional actors is equally risky. For the peace process to succeed, African institutions must improve coordination by synchronizing high-level diplomatic negotiations with localized, grassroots peacebuilding initiatives. This requires closer strategic collaboration with external mediators, such as the US and Qatar, to maximize regional impact.
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162.
The article examines how middle powers, exemplified by Australia, are navigating the intense pressures of the US-China rivalry, given its critical economic ties to China and strategic alignment with the US. It analyzes the challenges to the established rules-based international order, forcing nations to weigh the costs and limits of strategic hedging. The core discussion revolves around determining if allies can preserve strategic autonomy and economic interests while the terms of traditional US alliances are fundamentally shifting. Ultimately, the piece offers a framework for understanding how nations can maintain balance in a rapidly fragmenting geopolitical landscape.
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163.
Central Asia is identified as the pivotal epicenter of global great power competition, making it a critical testing ground for a new geopolitical settlement. The region's governments are strategically asserting independence from Moscow while maintaining a non-aligned stance relative to the West. This dynamic environment requires external powers, including the EU, US, UK, and Türkiye, to enhance cooperation. Effective multilateral engagement is crucial to supporting regional stability and harnessing Central Asia's vast geoeconomic growth potential.
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164.
Alberta's significant role as Canada's primary energy producer grants it substantial leverage in shaping the nation's foreign and energy policy. The conflict in the Middle East has heightened international interest in North American energy supplies, accelerating the need for Canada to assert economic sovereignty and reposition itself as a reliable global energy partner. The core policy challenge lies in reconciling Alberta's provincial economic priorities with the federal government's foreign policy agenda and alliance recalibrations. The resulting national strategy will therefore be heavily influenced by the tension between these interests, raising questions about achieving consensus across the federation.
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165.Justice for Ukraine: Supporting survivors of war crimes and building international solidarity (Chatham House)
The publication argues that addressing the immense humanitarian toll of war crimes in Ukraine requires adopting a comprehensive transitional justice framework, rather than relying solely on the overloaded judicial system. Key challenges include prioritizing over 200,000 documented atrocities, enforcing international verdicts against non-compliant states, and ensuring reparations are paid. Implementing this holistic approach—combining prosecutions with truth-seeking, reparations, and institutional reform—is crucial not only for victim-centered justice but also for building international solidarity and engaging global states wary of Western-led legal initiatives.
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166.‘Parliaments in dialogue’: Bringing Westminster and Brussels closer together to defend Europe (Chatham House)
Amid growing global security uncertainty, Chatham House is initiating 'Parliaments in dialogue' to facilitate deeper cooperation between Westminster and Brussels. The forum aims to bring together UK and European Parliament members, alongside defense experts, to address how the two legislative bodies can align their strategic ambitions. The core focus is strengthening practical defense collaboration and institutional dialogue to better defend Europe. This initiative signals a policy push toward formalizing and deepening the EU-UK security relationship through parliamentary mechanisms.
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167.
The analysis suggests that the traditional 'special relationship' between the UK and US is facing unprecedented strain due to America's increasingly transactional approach to global alliances. Key reasoning centers on the US adopting shifting priorities and a volatile global outlook, challenging the established rules-based international order. Policymakers must therefore reassess the implications for British foreign, defense, and economic strategies. Ultimately, the UK must prepare for a new, uncertain transatlantic phase, requiring significant adaptation to maintain stability and partnership with Washington.
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168.
The instability resulting from the US-Israeli conflict with Iran is creating global energy market pandemonium, allowing Russia to capitalize on the chaos. This geopolitical strain has bolstered Russia's geostrategic position, enabling it to act as a resilient and indispensable energy supplier. Consequently, Russia is experiencing a significant financial reversal of fortune, effectively mitigating the impact of Western sanctions on its oil exports. This trend strengthens Russia's global influence and its ability to dictate energy price stability, making it a key player in global energy dynamics.
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169.
The publication argues that the control of advanced AI is highly contested, exposing a critical fault line between state authority and private corporate power. This tension is highlighted by recent instances, such as the US designating a domestic AI firm as a national security threat, demonstrating that private companies may wield more leverage than states. The analysis raises urgent questions regarding accountability, specifically who is responsible when military decisions rely on private AI systems. Consequently, policymakers must address whether AI companies should be legally classified as critical national security infrastructure to stabilize global order and democratic governance.
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170.
The UN Humanitarian Chief argues that the global humanitarian system is critically overstretched and underfunded due to proliferating conflicts and significant donor cuts. Key evidence includes the massive displacement and economic shocks caused by regional conflicts (e.g., Lebanon, Gaza), coupled with the alarming trend of international law being undermined and aid workers being increasingly targeted. For policy, the report stresses that the international community must urgently increase funding and demand that the Security Council move beyond generic statements to actively enforce accountability for violations of International Humanitarian Law (IHL).
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171.
President al-Sharaa outlined Syria's comprehensive strategy for national revival, emphasizing a dual focus on massive domestic reconstruction and re-engagement with the international community. The government aims to transition into a stable, inclusive, and accountable state following the fall of the previous regime. Key discussions will cover the economic future, the political transition, and Syria's evolving stance on regional conflicts. This signals that external policy must adapt to a Syrian leadership actively seeking international partnership while managing profound internal and geopolitical pressures.
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172.
The Chatham House Prize recognizes Sudan's grassroots mutual aid groups (ERRs) for their vital role in delivering humanitarian assistance amidst the devastating conflict between the SAF and RSF. These community networks have proven indispensable, providing essential services like food, water, and medical supplies in areas inaccessible or neglected by international organizations. Their ability to operate impartially and maintain infrastructure under threat highlights the critical gap left by failing state institutions and international aid limitations. Policy efforts must therefore shift to prioritizing and empowering local civil society organizations to ensure aid reaches the vast populations in need.
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173.
The analysis concludes that the US-China relationship is a structural, volatile rivalry that requires Western powers to manage competition while ensuring peace. Key areas of competition include military dominance in the Indo-Pacific, technological supremacy (AI, quantum computing), and control over global supply chains. While competition is inevitable, the report stresses that Western nations must simultaneously prioritize cooperation on global challenges, such as climate change and public health. Strategically, the US must strengthen regional alliances to limit Chinese expansion while maintaining diplomatic channels to prevent catastrophic conflict.
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174.Kazakhstan is rewriting its constitution. Is it an exercise in authoritarian modernisation? (Chatham House)
Kazakhstan's sweeping constitutional amendments, framed as modernization, are viewed by critics as a move to consolidate executive power and weaken existing checks and balances. Key evidence includes the introduction of a vice presidency and the restructuring of parliament, which foreground questions of succession ahead of the 2029 elections. The reforms suggest a political trajectory that grants greater latitude to the executive branch, potentially solidifying the power of the current regime. Strategically, these changes have significant implications for regional stability, the future of the ruling elite, and Kazakhstan's complex relationship with neighboring powers like Russia.
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175.
President Stubb argues that the shift from a period of global peace to a multipolar, chaotic world has rendered rigid integration models obsolete. He notes that modern conflicts have turned interdependence—such as energy and trade—into instruments of war, forcing Europe to confront significant geopolitical pressure from both the East and the West. To navigate this disorder, Stubb advocates for 'flexible integration,' urging Europe to adopt a differentiated approach that allows member states to cooperate selectively. This strategy is crucial for maintaining political cohesion and leveraging the EU's growing power to counter external threats.
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176.
The escalating US-Israel-Iran conflict poses a severe threat of destabilization to Iraq, which is already politically and economically fragile. Key evidence includes increased violence from Iran-aligned groups targeting US interests, heightened cross-border activity, and significant economic vulnerability due to energy infrastructure disruption and reduced oil exports. Furthermore, stalled domestic government formation exacerbates Iraq's inability to manage external shocks. Policymakers must urgently develop strategies to mitigate regional spillover risks and support Iraq's political cohesion to prevent conflict from triggering a domestic collapse.
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177.
The Chatham House analysis argues that defending Ukraine's sovereignty over its cultural, linguistic, and religious identity is paramount to achieving any durable peace. Key evidence highlights that since 2014, Ukraine has systematically consolidated its national identity through policies like de-communization and language mandates, directly countering Russian imperial influence. The report warns that Russia's current full-scale attack is specifically designed to dismantle these cultural institutions, making the defense of domestic autonomy a matter of national security. Strategically, safeguarding this cultural heritage is presented not only as a recovery necessity but also as a crucial element for aligning with EU accession standards.
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178.
The escalation of conflict in the Middle East, particularly involving Iran, introduces significant geopolitical and economic risks that could destabilize Western support for Ukraine. Key concerns include the potential for US overextension in the region, which could divert resources and undermine diplomatic unity. Economically, the closure of vital chokepoints like the Strait of Hormuz could cause oil price surges, potentially providing Russia with a financial cushion despite sanctions. Strategically, the West must manage internal divisions and resource allocation to maintain a unified front, while also addressing potential policy failures, such as the EU's ability to meet its LNG phase-out deadlines, which could weaken future leverage against Moscow.
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179.
West Africa faces a critical threat from violent extremism, which is fueled by state fragility, weapons proliferation, and transnational crime rather than solely religious conflict. To counter this, the region must move beyond existing structures by establishing a 'Coalition of the Willing' framework for coordinated hot pursuit and security operations. Policy recommendations emphasize a multisectoral approach that requires diplomatic rapprochement—especially bridging divides between regional blocs—and framing the crisis as a collective regional challenge. Ultimately, strengthening collective security depends on sustained regional cooperation and addressing the root causes of instability across borders.
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180.
Kenya's foreign policy is strategically adapting to a fragmented global order, advocating for African self-reliance and regional integration to maximize its geopolitical influence. The instability highlighted by global crises (e.g., the Middle East) underscores the necessity for African states to accelerate intra-continental trade and development, particularly through the AfCFTA and EAC. Kenya's strategy is to adopt a pragmatic, 'multialliance' approach, maintaining diversified partnerships with global powers (EU, US, China) while championing African-led solutions and promoting borderless continental cooperation. This approach aims to transform Africa's immense potential into economic and diplomatic leverage, positioning the continent as an assertive global player.
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181.
The coordinated US and Israeli strikes aimed at achieving regime change in Iran have triggered a rapid and volatile escalation, drawing the wider Middle East into conflict. The analysis focuses on the depth of commitment from external powers, examining Iran's capacity for both military counter-strikes and domestic unrest. Strategically, the primary concern is the risk of further regional destabilization, which could be amplified by the involvement of other regional actors. Policymakers must therefore assess the potential escalation pathways and identify viable diplomatic routes for de-escalation.
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182.The UK critical minerals strategy: Building national resilience through global political and commercial collaboration (Chatham House)
The UK's Critical Minerals Strategy asserts that securing mineral resources is foundational to achieving clean energy transition, digital economy growth, and national security. Recognizing the vulnerability of concentrated supply chains, the strategy sets ambitious targets to boost domestic production and recycling capacity by 2035, while limiting reliance on any single country to no more than 60%. Policy implementation requires deepening international partnerships (e.g., US, Canada) and leveraging the UK's financial and processing expertise to build resilient, transparent, and diversified global supply chains.
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183.
General Valerii Zaluzhnyi will address the current state of the war in Ukraine, focusing on the evolution of hard power dynamics and the path toward ending the conflict. The discussion will analyze the battlefield realities to assess the viability of peace and outline a common strategic framework for European security. Key reasoning will center on strengthening collective defense, detailing the specific roles that the UK and Ukraine must play. The primary policy implication is the necessity for deepened international cooperation to build robust, shared deterrence capabilities across Europe.
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184.
The Chatham House Africa Programme argues that effective international decision-making requires nuanced, country-specific political analysis rather than generalized views of the continent. Its core value lies in providing independent expertise and research that emphasizes the necessity of transparency, accountability, and the rule of law for successful long-term private investment. Strategically, the program advises that global powers and businesses must recognize Africa's increasing political influence and engage with individual states to support governance reforms and promote global stability.
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185.
The Asia-Pacific region requires sophisticated, interdisciplinary analysis due to its rapid development and complex geopolitical landscape. Chatham House addresses this need by conducting original research and convening expert roundtables across South, Southeast, East Asia, and the Pacific. The program's methodology emphasizes challenging conventional thinking to provide objective insights to decision-makers. Policymakers should utilize this specialized, multi-faceted analysis to navigate regional challenges and influence positive policy outcomes in the area.
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186.
Chatham House's Environment and Society Centre posits that environmental challenges, including climate change and resource depletion, exert systemic impacts on international geopolitics and local communities. The Centre addresses this by conducting multidisciplinary research focused on securing the energy transition and developing sustainable solutions for land and resources. Strategically, the publication advocates for moving beyond traditional policy methods, utilizing initiatives like the Sustainability Accelerator. This approach aims to combine evidence-based policymaking with entrepreneurial experimentation, generating actionable solutions necessary to build global resilience and facilitate radical, sustainable economic shifts.
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187.
The Europe Programme outlines a necessary multi-pillar strategy for Europe to define its future role in a volatile global order. This strategy focuses on achieving strategic autonomy through three core areas: building economic resilience and industrial capacity; developing a comprehensive security architecture that integrates defense, technology, and energy; and forging new global partnerships with key regional powers like India and the Gulf states. The research emphasizes that achieving geopolitical credibility requires an integrated approach that links economic competitiveness with robust security cooperation and diversified global trade agreements.
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188.
The Global Economy and Finance Programme provides independent, actionable analysis on complex global economic challenges, serving as a critical resource for policymakers. Its research focuses on interconnected issues, including the economics of climate change, international debt crises, and the evolution of global monetary systems. By convening experts and conducting original research, the program highlights the necessity of robust international cooperation and effective governance structures, particularly within the G7 and G20. Policymakers should leverage this deep analysis to formulate strategies that address systemic risks, promote sustainable trade, and guide global financial stability.
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189.
The publication argues that the post-1945 global order is severely challenged by rising aggression and competing great powers, leading to a fracturing world order. Key evidence cited includes accusations of double standards among Western powers and the increasing prevalence of transactional statecraft. To improve global security, the center advocates for a dual approach: retaining effective elements of the old order while simultaneously reforming institutions and writing new rules. Policy implications emphasize the need to integrate the voices and interests of smaller middle powers and the Global South into global decision-making processes.
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190.
The Chatham House Middle East and North Africa Programme provides expert analysis focused on overlooked and underestimated issues within the MENA region. Its methodology integrates field research, data collection, and expert discussions to build new frameworks for understanding complex realities. Key areas of focus include geopolitical dynamics, transnational conflict drivers, and the impact of political-economic networks. For policy makers, the program's analysis offers actionable insights into governance, accountability, and evolving state-society relations, directly informing strategic decision-making in the region.
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191.
The Russia and Eurasia Programme provides expert analysis on the complex and volatile region encompassing Russia, Ukraine, and former Soviet states. Its core finding is that the region's stability has been fundamentally disrupted by Russia's war on Ukraine, necessitating a focus on the sovereign independence of all nations involved. Research centers on the seismic geopolitical impacts of the conflict, analyzing Ukraine's resilience and reconstruction efforts alongside Russia's internal and external political trajectories. Policy implications emphasize the need for robust strategies aimed at improving global security and stability across the wider Eurasian landmass.
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192.
The 'UK in the World Programme' is positioned as a highly comprehensive, multidisciplinary initiative designed to provide holistic strategic advice on the UK's global role. Its strength lies in its advisory council, which draws expertise from former high-ranking government officials, leading academics, and specialists across diverse regions (e.g., Middle East, Europe, Asia, and the Indo-Pacific). This diverse composition suggests that the program's analysis will be robust, integrating insights from defense, technology, and geopolitical shifts. Strategically, the program implies that effective UK policy requires a deeply integrated and nuanced approach, moving beyond siloed regional or sectoral strategies.
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193.
This Chatham House program provides comprehensive analysis of the evolving role of the US and North America in global affairs, recognizing a period of significant geopolitical recalibration. The research utilizes expert commentary and deep dives into critical areas, including the US strategy toward China, the renegotiation of global trade policies, and the redefinition of international security ties. The core finding is that these shifts necessitate external powers, such as the UK and Europe, to adjust their strategic planning. The program's implication is providing actionable insights and policy tools to help governments and private sectors navigate these complex, long-term changes in global power dynamics.
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194.
South Korea has emerged as a pivotal and growing defense supplier for Europe's expanding security needs. The report analyzes the key drivers and inherent risks associated with this shift in global defense supply chains. It provides a strategic assessment of future cooperation, emphasizing that Europe must proactively manage the opportunities and challenges to solidify the partnership. This analysis is crucial for policymakers planning future defense procurement and security alliances.
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195.
Bilateral economic relations between Europe and Taiwan are rapidly evolving from purely trade-based cooperation to one deeply intertwined with national security and economic resilience. The core finding is that cooperation is concentrating on three critical sectors: semiconductor technology, renewable energy, and dual-use technologies (such as drones). This strategic focus is driven by Europe's need to diversify supply chains and achieve net-zero goals, while Taiwan benefits from increased demand for its advanced tech. For continued growth, both sides must overcome regulatory and investment hurdles, suggesting that formal mechanisms, such as an EU Bilateral Investment Agreement, are necessary to solidify these strategic partnerships.
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196.
The analysis argues that Russia's war on Ukraine is economically unsustainable due to severe resource constraints and the high cost of modern military production. The economy is characterized by a dual system: overheated military output coexisting with civilian stagnation and labor shortages. To sustain the conflict, the Kremlin must impose increasingly disruptive command-like measures, curtailing civil and market freedoms. These forced mobilizations pose major risks to the regime's internal stability, suggesting that Russia faces a critical strategic choice regarding the scale and goals of the war.
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197.
This paper analyzes the shared strategic challenges and opportunities for Nordic and Baltic states operating within the complex geopolitical landscape of the Indo-Pacific. Drawing on military capability assessments and regional expertise, the analysis focuses on how these states can navigate rising inter-state competition and enhance deterrence capabilities. The core finding suggests that despite geographic distance, these nations share common security interests that require coordinated policy responses. Strategically, the paper implies that these states must deepen their collective security cooperation and diplomatic engagement to maximize their influence and resilience in the Indo-Pacific region.
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198.
Driven by regional instability and a desire for defense-industrial autonomy, Türkiye has strategically developed a sophisticated portfolio of ballistic and cruise missiles. The program employs a twin-track approach, combining limited foreign imports with robust domestic manufacturing, enabling expansion from short-range to long-range systems exceeding 2,000 km. This rapid buildup is supported by domestic engine development and diversification into uncrewed and space-launch platforms. The maturation of Türkiye's guided-weapons sector signals a significant increase in regional military power, enhancing Ankara's strategic autonomy and complicating regional security dynamics.
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199.
The paper identifies that Europe's civil defense infrastructure is highly fragmented, existing as a 'patchwork' of preparedness across member states. This vulnerability is compounded by modern threats that increasingly blur the lines between conventional conflict and peacetime crises. The analysis concludes that closing this gap requires more than just increased funding. Instead, policy must mandate a fundamental, whole-of-society rethinking of resilience, necessitating coordinated preparation involving states, civil society, and the private sector.
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200.
While European allies are making significant investments in military space assets to counter Russian threats, the report finds that current efforts are strategically fragmented and insufficient to achieve true operational independence from the United States. Critical dependencies remain in high-end capabilities such as space-based intelligence, early warning, and space situational awareness (SSA). Achieving full autonomy is technically feasible but requires massive, sustained investment and coordination beyond the 2030 timeline. Policy efforts must therefore shift focus from merely acquiring satellites to building a resilient European space enterprise, prioritizing integrated command-and-control, hardened ground segments, and unified NATO procedures to ensure wartime effectiveness.
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201.
The simulation revealed that while the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (SEANWFZ) Treaty is central to regional stability, ASEAN's collective diplomatic capacity is severely limited when facing a major nuclear-security crisis fueled by great power competition (e.g., China vs. AUKUS). Key evidence showed that member states struggled with 'strategic bandwidth,' highlighting significant gaps in regional crisis literacy and internal inter-agency coordination. Strategically, policy efforts must prioritize reinforcing the SEANWFZ Treaty as the diplomatic baseline and leveraging forums like ADMM-Plus to build robust, coordinated defense mechanisms, rather than relying solely on ASEAN's current diplomatic structure.
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202.
The paper argues that Southeast Asian nations lack systematic crisis planning for a potential US–China conflict over Taiwan, and existing ASEAN mechanisms are insufficient due to the collective-action problem. To address this, the authors propose a 'building blocks' approach that enhances regional crisis resilience across three levels. Strategically, this involves strengthening individual domestic state capacity, leveraging bilateral relationships with the US, China, and Taiwan for preliminary planning, and establishing targeted intra-ASEAN minilateral arrangements. Policymakers should therefore prioritize decentralized, multi-layered planning rather than relying solely on broad regional institutional frameworks.
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203.
Maritime Southeast Asian states (including Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Vietnam) are developing rudimentary Anti-access/Area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities, primarily motivated by concerns over potential major power conflicts, such as a US-China confrontation. However, the paper notes a significant lack of systematic planning, doctrinal coherence, and policy alignment across these nations, meaning no single state is equipped to execute a full A2/AD strategy. While these states view A2/AD as a means to maintain neutrality in critical waterways, their diverse security priorities and historical constraints limit their readiness. This fragmented development suggests that regional partners seeking closer security alignment must anticipate varied and underdeveloped capabilities when planning for future contingencies.
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204.
The analysis concludes that persistent maritime crime in the Malacca Straits is driven by opportunity and geography, not solely by enforcement failure. Evidence shows that criminal activity is highly clustered near existing security infrastructure, and deterrent effects diminish rapidly with distance from patrols. Consequently, the paper advises that maritime security efforts must shift focus from attempting crime elimination to sophisticated risk management. Policy recommendations emphasize reducing blind spots, improving operational flexibility, and enhancing the alignment between local and regional enforcement coordination.