The White House (via OMB) strongly protests Congressional efforts within the FY 2027 NDAA to prohibit the purchase of warships from foreign shipyards. The Administration argues that these restrictions undermine national security by limiting flexibility and hindering its strategy of leveraging allied yards, such as in the 'Finland model,' to drive investment into U.S. shipbuilding capacity. This signals a significant policy shift toward integrating international partners into advanced naval construction, suggesting the Pentagon is prepared to bypass traditional domestic build requirements for future combat vessels.
Advancing U.S.–UK Cooperation to Secure Frontier Artificial Intelligence
English Summary
The RAND–Oxford report argues that the U.S. and UK must establish coordinated bilateral frameworks to secure frontier AI systems against sophisticated nation-state threats. Current AI lab defenses are insufficient against advanced state actors, though both countries possess deep expertise in protecting critical technologies. The report proposes a cluster-based framework organizing AI security into five interconnected domains—access controls, supply chain, monitoring/response, personnel security, and physical security—enabling risk-informed, modular implementation without requiring wholesale industry restructuring. Key recommendations include establishing joint threat intelligence infrastructure, accelerating hardware security R&D, extending government personnel vetting to labs, coordinating supply-chain security, expanding red-teaming, conducting joint crisis exercises, and establishing common security standards.
中文摘要
RAND–Oxford報告指出，美國與英國必須建立協調的雙邊框架，以保護前沿人工智能系統免受複雜的國家級威脅。儘管兩國在保護關鍵技術方面具有深厚的專業知識，但目前人工智能實驗室的防禦措施對先進國家行為體的威脅防護不足。該報告提出了一個群集式框架，將人工智能安全組織為五個相互連接的領域——訪問控制、供應鏈、監測/應對、人員安全和物理安全——實現風險知情的模組化實施，無需行業全面重組。主要建議包括建立聯合威脅情報基礎設施、加速硬件安全研發、將政府人員審查延伸至實驗室、協調供應鏈安全、擴大紅隊測試、進行聯合危機演習，以及建立共同安全標準。
Related Entries
-
1.
-
2.
The Western Pacific remains a highly active theater defined by sustained U.S.-led military exercises and escalating great power competition. Key evidence includes continuous joint operations, such as RIMPAC 2026 in Hawaii and the deployment of CSGs into the South China Sea, juxtaposed with increased naval activity from both China (PLAN task groups) and Russia near Japan's critical straits. These movements underscore a strategic push by non-allied powers to assert presence and challenge regional norms. Policy implications dictate that allied nations must maintain robust multilateral cooperation and interoperability to safeguard freedom of navigation and manage escalating tensions in the Indo-Pacific.
-
3.
The article argues that the post-Cold War era of U.S. unipolarity, established by the perceived invincibility demonstrated during the Gulf War, has ended. This decline is driven by globalization and technological diffusion, which have democratized advanced military capabilities, allowing regional actors to challenge major powers. Consequently, policymakers must prepare for a more volatile international order marked by frequent crises, heightened costs for securing global trade chokepoints, and reduced predictability from American power. The new rules dictate that great powers can no longer effortlessly impose their will through force.
-
4.
The article argues that current market borrowing costs are rising independently of the Federal Reserve's policy stance, challenging the assumption that the Fed controls all rates. Evidence shows significant increases in key rates—such as 2-year Treasuries and mortgages—even while the effective federal funds rate remains steady. This divergence occurs because market rates reflect complex factors like inflation expectations, credit risk, and geopolitical volatility, which are outside the central bank's direct control. Policymakers should therefore recognize that sustainable rate moderation requires credible disinflation and disciplined government budgets, rather than relying solely on Fed intervention.
-
5.
Despite recent trade setbacks, the U.S. retains fundamental structural economic leverage over China, particularly in high-tech sectors and intermediate goods. While Beijing can temporarily weaponize specific resources like rare earths, these chokepoints are vulnerable to diversification efforts by the West. The article argues that the most effective strategy is not unilateral action but coordinated multilateral pressure from U.S. allies across Asia and Europe. Washington must therefore coordinate its economic statecraft with partners to maximize damage to China’s export-dependent model.