The White House (via OMB) strongly protests Congressional efforts within the FY 2027 NDAA to prohibit the purchase of warships from foreign shipyards. The Administration argues that these restrictions undermine national security by limiting flexibility and hindering its strategy of leveraging allied yards, such as in the 'Finland model,' to drive investment into U.S. shipbuilding capacity. This signals a significant policy shift toward integrating international partners into advanced naval construction, suggesting the Pentagon is prepared to bypass traditional domestic build requirements for future combat vessels.
Taiwanese Forces Deploy American-made Attack Drones Against Maritime Targets
English Summary
Taiwan successfully tested American-made Altius-600 loitering munitions in live-fire drills, demonstrating new asymmetric defense capabilities to counter potential Chinese invasion forces. The approximately 2,000 drones acquired from Anduril Industries feature nine-pound warheads and a 99-mile range, filling critical gaps between long-range anti-ship missiles and short-range artillery. Taiwan is deliberately shifting toward unmanned mass-deployment strategies informed by Ukraine's experience, emphasizing distributed firepower and portability to defeat amphibious threats. The drills integrate with a planned "Littoral Combat Command" designed to defeat maritime threats within 24 nautical miles, part of a broader Indo-Pacific trend where the US, Japan, and Philippines are similarly investing in drone-based deterrence against Chinese military expansion.
中文摘要
台灣成功進行實彈演練，測試了美國製造的 Altius-600 滯空彈藥，展示了用於應對潛在中國入侵部隊的新型非對稱防禦能力。這批從 Anduril Industries 採購的約 2,000 架無人機配備了九磅彈頭和 99 英里射程，填補了長程反艦導彈與短程火砲之間關鍵的火力空隙。台灣正有意識地轉向受烏克蘭經驗啟發的大規模無人機部署戰略，強調分散式火力與便攜性，以擊敗兩棲威脅。此次演練與規劃中的「沿岸戰鬥指揮部」（Littoral Combat Command）相結合，旨在威懾 24 海里內的海洋威脅，這符合更廣泛的印太趨勢，即美國、日本和菲律賓正在投入類似的無人機威懾力量，以應對中國的軍事擴張。
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