The White House (via OMB) strongly protests Congressional efforts within the FY 2027 NDAA to prohibit the purchase of warships from foreign shipyards. The Administration argues that these restrictions undermine national security by limiting flexibility and hindering its strategy of leveraging allied yards, such as in the 'Finland model,' to drive investment into U.S. shipbuilding capacity. This signals a significant policy shift toward integrating international partners into advanced naval construction, suggesting the Pentagon is prepared to bypass traditional domestic build requirements for future combat vessels.
A 2026 ‘super El Niño’ could expose gaps in UK preparedness
English Summary
The Chatham House report warns that intensified climate variability, exemplified by a potential 2026 'super El Niño,' will expose critical gaps in the UK's national resilience. Current adaptation efforts are deemed fragmented and lack legally binding standards, leaving essential infrastructure—including health, transport, and power grids—vulnerable to escalating risks like heat, flooding, and drought. To mitigate potential climate damages estimated at 1-5% of UK GDP by 2050, the UK must implement a robust, legally enforceable adaptation strategy. Policy recommendations include mandatory, coordinated investment in resilient physical and social infrastructure, improving existing plans, and securing dedicated funding for local authorities.
中文摘要
查塔姆館（Chatham House）的報告警告，氣候變異性的加劇，例如潛在的2026年「超級厄爾尼諾現象」，將會暴露出英國國家韌性方面的關鍵缺口。現行的適應措施被認為是零散且缺乏具法律約束力的標準，使得包括醫療、交通和電力電網在內的關鍵基礎設施，容易受到熱浪、洪水和乾旱等升級風險的威脅。為減緩預計到2050年造成佔英國國內生產總值（GDP）1-5%的氣候損害，英國必須實施一套穩健且具法律強制力的適應戰略。政策建議包括：強制性地協調投資於具韌性的實體和社會基礎設施、改善現有計畫，並為地方政府確保專項資金。
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