The Brookings analysis suggests that the APEC summit will likely be characterized by 'pantomime diplomacy,' with leaders prioritizing optics over substantive breakthroughs on major issues like trade or AI. While high-level meetings may establish processes—such as AI incident reporting—China is expected to use the temporary truce to intensify regional pressure on U.S. allies. Policymakers should therefore manage expectations for major deliverables and instead focus on strengthening functional, working-level dialogues and diversifying partnerships to build resilient stability.
How a Russia–Ukraine ceasefire could imperil Ukrainian and European security
English Summary
Chatham House warns that a ceasefire between Russia and Ukraine poses significant risks to European and Ukrainian security. The primary concern is that Russia has a history of manipulating agreements, and a poorly defined pause could allow Russian forces to regroup and rearm. Furthermore, Moscow could continue exerting pressure through non-military means, including cyberattacks, sabotage, and election interference. Therefore, the paper advises that Ukraine and its partners must proactively mitigate these risks to ensure long-term European security and stability.
中文摘要
查塔姆學會警告,俄烏之間的停火行動對歐洲和烏克蘭的安全構成重大風險。主要擔憂在於俄羅斯有操縱協議的歷史記錄,而定義不清的暫停可能會讓俄軍有機會重整部署和重新武裝。此外,莫斯科可能會透過非軍事手段持續施壓,包括網路攻擊、破壞行為和干預選舉。因此,該報告建議烏克蘭及其夥伴必須主動減輕這些風險,以確保長期的歐洲安全與穩定。
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