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Chokepoints and coercion: Iran’s challenge to maritime openness

Brookings | 2026-06-12 | middle_east

Topics: China, Indo-Pacific, Middle East, Russia, Taiwan, Trade, United States

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English Summary

Iran has introduced politically conditioned access to the Strait of Hormuz by selectively granting passage to vessels from allied nations (Russia, China, Pakistan) while charging tolls and requiring detailed information about ownership and crew nationality, directly challenging the 400-year-old principle of freedom of navigation. This represents a significant precedent for using maritime chokepoints as geopolitical leverage that could spread to other critical waterways like the Strait of Malacca and Taiwan Strait. Such politicization would harm smaller, trade-dependent countries most severely and shift global commerce from economically-determined to geopolitically-determined criteria, requiring major powers to sustain open transit through credible deterrence, transparency mechanisms, and resistance to competing systems of privileged access. The implications extend beyond immediate energy disruptions to fundamentally reshape how states use control of critical infrastructure for coercive purposes in an era of intensifying geopolitical rivalry.

中文摘要

伊朗透過選擇性地向盟國(如俄羅斯、中國、巴基斯坦)船隻提供霍爾木茲海峽的通行權,同時收取過路費並要求提供詳細的船隻所有權和船員國籍資訊,實行了政治條件化的海峽進入權。此舉直接挑戰了數百年來確立的航行自由原則。這代表著一個重大的先例,即將海域咽喉點作為地緣政治籌碼,其影響可能擴散至馬六甲海峽和台灣海峽等其他關鍵水道。此類政治化行為將最嚴重損害小型、依賴貿易的國家,並將全球商業的決定標準從經濟因素轉移至地緣政治因素。這要求主要大國必須透過可信的威懾、透明化機制,以及對競爭性特權通行體系的抵抗,來維持開放的過境權。其意涵不僅限於即時的能源供應中斷,更將從根本上重塑國家在日益激烈的地緣政治競爭時代,利用關鍵基礎設施進行強制性目的的手段。

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