The White House (via OMB) strongly protests Congressional efforts within the FY 2027 NDAA to prohibit the purchase of warships from foreign shipyards. The Administration argues that these restrictions undermine national security by limiting flexibility and hindering its strategy of leveraging allied yards, such as in the 'Finland model,' to drive investment into U.S. shipbuilding capacity. This signals a significant policy shift toward integrating international partners into advanced naval construction, suggesting the Pentagon is prepared to bypass traditional domestic build requirements for future combat vessels.
The End of Nuclear Diplomacy
English Summary
The U.S.-Israeli strikes on Iran's nuclear infrastructure in 2025-2026 represent the end of diplomatic nonproliferation efforts, replacing negotiated agreements with Israel's 'mowing the grass' strategy of recurring military strikes. After decades where the JCPOA and IAEA inspections failed to gain durable support, Israel shifted to preemption following the October 7 attacks and Iranian protests in 2026. Rather than build large underground facilities, Iran will likely pursue decentralized nuclear programs using small, concealed workshops to evade detection and satellite surveillance. This marks the effective collapse of the global nonproliferation regime, as the deterrence value of nuclear weapons has never been higher and no arms control processes now constrain production. The U.S. remains committed to the Middle East despite decades seeking to pivot to East Asia, with significant implications for regional stability and global commodity flows.
中文摘要
2025-2026年美以軍事打擊伊朗核基礎設施，標誌著外交核不擴散努力的終結，用以色列的「割草」戰略（定期軍事打擊）取代了談判達成的協議。在《聯合全面行動計畫》與國際原子能機構檢查數十年未能獲得持久支持後，以色列在2023年十月七日攻擊及2026年伊朗抗議活動後轉向先發制人戰略。伊朗將可能放棄大型地下設施，改採分散式核計畫，利用小型隱蔽工坊規避偵測與衛星監控。此舉標誌著全球核不擴散體制的實質性崩潰，因為核武器的威懾價值前所未有之高，且當前無任何軍備控制流程能制約核武生產。儘管美國數十年來尋求戰略重心向東亞轉移，但仍維持對中東的承諾，此舉對區域穩定與全球商品流動造成重大影響。
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