The White House (via OMB) strongly protests Congressional efforts within the FY 2027 NDAA to prohibit the purchase of warships from foreign shipyards. The Administration argues that these restrictions undermine national security by limiting flexibility and hindering its strategy of leveraging allied yards, such as in the 'Finland model,' to drive investment into U.S. shipbuilding capacity. This signals a significant policy shift toward integrating international partners into advanced naval construction, suggesting the Pentagon is prepared to bypass traditional domestic build requirements for future combat vessels.
Defining Autonomy: Why Software, Not Drones, Will Decide the Next War
English Summary
The article argues that current definitions of lethal autonomous weapon systems are outdated because they focus on physical platforms (drones, munitions) rather than the AI-orchestration software that actually makes targeting decisions. Evidence shows that Ukraine's Delta and Russia's Svod systems demonstrate how battlefield management software fusing sensor data and coordinating hundreds of platforms represents the true locus of autonomous decision-making—a capability the U.S. military currently lacks in an integrated form. The author recommends updating DoD Directive 3000.09 to redefine autonomous weapons to include orchestration software, establishing a vendor-agnostic integrated layer under DAWG, and immediately conducting autonomy experiments to match Russia's operational learning rate. The strategic implication is that the nation building the most effective autonomous orchestration layer first will gain a decisive advantage comparable to early nuclear weapon development.
中文摘要
本文主張，現行對致命自主武器系統（LAWS）的定義已經過時，因為它們過度著重於實體平台（如無人機、彈藥），而非實際執行目標判決的AI協調軟體。證據顯示，烏克蘭的Delta系統和俄羅斯的Svod系統證明了戰場管理軟體如何透過融合感測器數據並協調數百個平台，構成了真正的自主決策核心——這是美國軍方目前缺乏的整合能力。作者建議修訂《國防部指令 3000.09》，將自主武器的定義擴大至涵蓋協調軟體；在國防部武器群（DAWG）下建立一個供應商中立的整合層；並立即進行自主性實驗，以匹配俄羅斯的作戰學習速率。其戰略意涵是，率先建立最有效自主協調層的國家，將獲得一種決定性優勢，其規模可與早期核武器的發展時相媲美。
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