ThinkTankWeekly

Taiwan Tests HIMARS Missiles on Island’s West Coast in Major Live-fire Drills

USNI | 2026-06-11 | china_indopacific

Topics: China, Europe, Middle East, Taiwan, United States

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English Summary

Taiwan conducted major live-fire drills on its western coast featuring its newly acquired U.S.-made HIMARS launchers, firing 32 rockets to validate precision strike capabilities and rapid redeployment (relocating within three minutes of launch). The exercises are part of Taipei's broader defensive strategy shift toward long-range missiles, attack drones, and precision munitions designed to counter a potential Chinese amphibious invasion, with plans to eventually field 111 HIMARS launchers. The drills underscore Taiwan's deepening integration of American weapon systems into its anti-invasion posture, with HIMARS providing the capability to strike amphibious forces, beachheads, and potentially mainland staging areas — raising the military cost of any cross-strait operation while also risking escalatory signaling to Beijing.

中文摘要

台灣於西部海岸實施大規模實彈演習,首度動用新購自美國的海馬斯(HIMARS)多管火箭系統,發射32枚火箭以驗證精準打擊能力及快速轉移部署能力(發射後三分鐘內即可完成陣地轉移)。此次演習為台北國防戰略轉型的一環,著重發展長程飛彈、攻擊型無人機及精準彈藥,以因應中國可能發動的兩棲入侵,並計劃最終部署111套海馬斯系統。演習凸顯台灣正加速將美製武器系統融入其反入侵作戰體系,海馬斯具備打擊兩棲部隊、灘頭陣地乃至大陸集結區域之能力,可大幅提高任何跨海峽軍事行動之代價,但同時亦存在對北京釋放升級訊號之風險。

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