The White House (via OMB) strongly protests Congressional efforts within the FY 2027 NDAA to prohibit the purchase of warships from foreign shipyards. The Administration argues that these restrictions undermine national security by limiting flexibility and hindering its strategy of leveraging allied yards, such as in the 'Finland model,' to drive investment into U.S. shipbuilding capacity. This signals a significant policy shift toward integrating international partners into advanced naval construction, suggesting the Pentagon is prepared to bypass traditional domestic build requirements for future combat vessels.
The Tactical C 2 Imperative: Building a Resilient, Mobile Command and Control Grid
English Summary
The article argues that advanced adversary capabilities, including long-range strikes and electronic warfare, threaten the viability of fixed Command and Control (C2) nodes, risking a collapse in situational awareness. To counter this, the U.S. military must transition to a resilient, mobile, and federated C2 grid. This comprehensive approach integrates three layers: tanker-hosted airborne nodes for standoff bridging, low-cost aerial vehicles for meshed networking, and mobile ground sensors. Implementing this distributed architecture is critical for maintaining decision advantage and ensuring that modern sensing and communication assets remain operational at the tactical edge.
中文摘要
本文提出，包括遠程打擊和電子戰在內的先進敵方能力，威脅著固定式指揮與控制（C2）節點的可行性，可能導致情勢感知系統崩潰。為應對此挑戰，美國軍方必須轉型至一個具備彈性、移動化和聯邦式結構的 C2 網絡。此一綜合性方法整合了三個層面：用於遠距橋接的油料運輸機搭載空中節點、用於網狀網路的低成本空中載具，以及移動式地面感測器。實施這種分散式架構對於維持決策優勢至關重要，並確保現代感測和通訊資產在戰術前沿仍能保持運作狀態。
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