The White House (via OMB) strongly protests Congressional efforts within the FY 2027 NDAA to prohibit the purchase of warships from foreign shipyards. The Administration argues that these restrictions undermine national security by limiting flexibility and hindering its strategy of leveraging allied yards, such as in the 'Finland model,' to drive investment into U.S. shipbuilding capacity. This signals a significant policy shift toward integrating international partners into advanced naval construction, suggesting the Pentagon is prepared to bypass traditional domestic build requirements for future combat vessels.
Recess is crucial for education outcomes: It’s time for U.S. policy to catch up
English Summary
The article argues that recess is essential for cognitive development and emotional regulation, supported by scientific consensus and international examples where high-performing school systems prioritize frequent breaks—Finland provides 75 minutes daily, while Shanghai limits lessons to 35 minutes with regular breaks. U.S. policy has neglected recess since "No Child Left Behind," leaving American children with only 26 minutes daily. A critical equity gap exists: students in high-poverty schools and students of color—those most needing recess's benefits—are most likely denied it. While state mandates improve outcomes (1.8x more likely to provide recommended recess), weak enforcement limits effectiveness, as demonstrated by Georgia's failed 2022-23 law. Effective policy requires state-level mandates with anti-punitive protections, compliance monitoring, and investment in play spaces, particularly in underserved schools.
中文摘要
該文章主張課間休息對認知發展和情緒調節至關重要，此觀點獲得科學共識支持，並由國際案例佐證——高表現學校體系優先安排頻繁休息。芬蘭每日提供75分鐘課間休息，上海將課堂時間限制在35分鐘並定期安排休息。自《不讓任何孩子掉隊法案》以來，美國政策對課間休息投注有限，導致美國兒童每日僅有26分鐘休息時間。文章指出存在著嚴重的公平差距：高貧困地區學校和少數族裔學生——最需要課間休息益處的群體——最有可能被剝奪這一權益。雖然州級授權改善了結果（提供建議休息時間的可能性提高1.8倍），但執法力度不足限制了政策有效性，喬治亞州2022-23年失敗的法律為明證。有效政策需要具有反懲罰保護的州級授權、合規監測以及對遊樂設施的投資，特別關注服務欠足的學校。
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