The White House (via OMB) strongly protests Congressional efforts within the FY 2027 NDAA to prohibit the purchase of warships from foreign shipyards. The Administration argues that these restrictions undermine national security by limiting flexibility and hindering its strategy of leveraging allied yards, such as in the 'Finland model,' to drive investment into U.S. shipbuilding capacity. This signals a significant policy shift toward integrating international partners into advanced naval construction, suggesting the Pentagon is prepared to bypass traditional domestic build requirements for future combat vessels.
Lebanon between war and statehood: Shrinking the space for Hezbollah
English Summary
The article argues that the 2026 Iran war and post-October 7 context have significantly weakened Hezbollah and created an unprecedented opportunity to neutralize its military threat and strengthen the Lebanese state—but only through sustained U.S.-led efforts combining security capacity-building for the Lebanese Armed Forces, diplomatic coordination between Israel and Lebanon, and economic reconstruction that allows the government to deliver services Hezbollah has traditionally provided. Hezbollah's leadership is decapitated, its Iranian and Syrian sponsors weakened, and even its Shia base is fractured by resentment over the war's devastation, yet the Lebanese government and military remain too weak for direct confrontation without risking state collapse. The author identifies Iran as the critical constraint: Tehran will not negotiate away Hezbollah and will use any sanctions relief to revive its surrogate, requiring Washington to monitor and coordinate the Iran, Israel, and Lebanon tracks simultaneously. Success requires patience, credible state service delivery that prevents re-marginalization of the Shia, and sustained U.S. leadership—a narrow window unlikely to remain open without American attention.
中文摘要
本文論述，2026年的伊朗戰爭和十月七日事件後的局勢，已極大地削弱了真主黨（Hezbollah），為中和其軍事威脅、強化黎巴嫩國家提供了前所未有的機會——但這必須透過持續的美國主導努力才能實現。這些努力包括：為黎巴嫩軍隊（LAF）進行安全能力建構、以色列與黎巴嫩之間的外交協調，以及經濟重建，使政府能夠提供真主黨傳統上提供的公共服務。真主黨的領導層已受挫，其伊朗和敘利亞的贊助方也已減弱，甚至其什葉派基礎群體也因戰爭的破壞而產生怨氣，然而，黎巴嫩政府和軍方目前仍過於虛弱，無法進行直接的對抗，否則將面臨國家崩潰的風險。作者指出，伊朗是關鍵制約：德黑蘭不會為了真主黨進行談判，並且會利用任何制裁解除來復興其代理人。這要求華盛頓必須同時監控和協調伊朗、以色列和黎巴嫩這三個層面的進展。成功需要耐心、可信賴的國家服務提供能力，以防止什葉派群體再次邊緣化，以及持續的美國領導力——這是一個狹窄的窗口期，若缺乏美國的關注，很可能無法維持。
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