The Western Pacific remains a highly active theater defined by sustained U.S.-led military exercises and escalating great power competition. Key evidence includes continuous joint operations, such as RIMPAC 2026 in Hawaii and the deployment of CSGs into the South China Sea, juxtaposed with increased naval activity from both China (PLAN task groups) and Russia near Japan's critical straits. These movements underscore a strategic push by non-allied powers to assert presence and challenge regional norms. Policy implications dictate that allied nations must maintain robust multilateral cooperation and interoperability to safeguard freedom of navigation and manage escalating tensions in the Indo-Pacific.
The flow of arms and money feeding the war in Sudan can be cut. What is missing is the will
English Summary
The persistence of the war in Sudan is attributed not to internal conflict alone, but to external actors who are supplying arms, funding, and logistical support, creating a self-sustaining conflict economy. Key regional players, including the UAE, Egypt, and others, are implicated in supplying weapons and facilitating cross-border movements, while international diplomatic efforts have failed due to a lack of enforcement mechanisms. To achieve peace, the international community must undertake a coordinated 'deproxification' effort, forcefully cutting all external lifelines—including arms routes and gold shipments. The analysis concludes that the US must leverage its full diplomatic and economic power, such as sanctions, to pressure enablers and force an end to external patronage.
中文摘要
蘇丹戰爭的持續不僅歸因於內部衝突，更源於外部行為者提供武器、資金和後勤支持，從而形成了一個自我維持的衝突經濟體。包括阿聯酋、埃及等關鍵區域參與者，涉入武器供應和協助跨境流動；而國際外交努力因缺乏執行機制而功敗垂成。為實現和平，國際社會必須進行協調的「去外部化」（deproxification）努力，強力切斷所有外部生命線，包括武器走私路線和黃金運輸。分析結論指出，美國必須充分利用其外交和經濟實力，例如制裁措施，對這些促成者施壓，以終結外部的庇護支持。
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